

Climate Action Tracker

1.5°C-compatible climate action and targets:

Brazil

June 2025



BRAZIL

COP30 host Brazil is home to nearly 60% of the Amazon rainforest and the sixth largest global emitter, accounting for [2.5% of global emissions in 2023](#). A significant share of its emissions come from the land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) sector, particularly deforestation, which makes Brazil's emissions profile unique among major economies.

Brazil's current 2035 NDC

In November 2024, Brazil submitted a 2035 NDC target which the CAT finds is not 1.5°C compatible.

- ▶ **2035 target:** Reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 59–67% below 2005 levels by 2035 (including LULUCF), covering all sectors and gases.
- ▶ **2030 target:** This submission did not increase the ambition of its 2030 mitigation target and kept a cap on GHG emissions at 1,200 MtCO₂e (including LULUCF) in 2030.

At the sectoral level, the NDC lacks quantitative specificity and clear targets. In particular, it does not include any details on the expected contributions of LULUCF to the 2035 target. The NDC also includes the intent to use the Paris Agreement's Article 6, to sell international carbon credits, with transfers being authorised to sell the reductions from 59% up to the level of 67% below 2005 levels by 2035.

The risks and limitations of Brazil's 2035 NDC

Heavy reliance on LULUCF for meeting climate targets carries significant risks for Brazil. The LULUCF sector is highly volatile, with emissions and removals fluctuating sharply in response to changes in deforestation rates, enforcement, and climate impacts. According to our research, projections for LULUCF vary widely (from roughly -120 to -610 MtCO₂e)¹ depending on methods and assumptions taken, demonstrating the sector's unpredictability.

This volatility introduces major uncertainty into Brazil's overall emissions pathway. **High dependence on LULUCF to meet NDC targets could mask insufficient progress in other key sectors, particularly energy.** If LULUCF removals fall short of expectations, Brazil's ability to achieve real, lasting decarbonisation could be undermined.

At the same time, Brazil's intent to use Article 6 poses a major risk for its long-term mitigation ambition as it may be selling emission reductions that are relatively inexpensive or would have occurred anyway. **This includes so-called "low-hanging fruit" – easy and cheap reductions that, once sold, may leave seller countries with fewer options to increase their own climate action in the future.**


According to our [guidelines for a good NDC](#), any contribution of the LULUCF sector, engineered and novel types of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) or international carbon markets under Article 6, should be stated separately.

Brazil should lead by example

As COP30 president, we call for Brazil to resubmit its NDC with strengthened 2030 and 2035 targets in line with a 1.5°C-compatible pathway, transparently communicate a separate target for the LULUCF sector and indicate the level of international support and finance needed to achieve this level of decarbonisation.

¹ Range for LULUCF projections informed by [Soterroni, A. C., et al \(2024\)](#) and [Centro Clima \(2022\)](#).

1.5°C-compatible NDC targets for 2030 and 2035



BRAZIL	2030	2035
INCLUDING land use & forests	Emissions reductions below 2005 levels	
1.5°C modelled domestic pathway	74%	84%
EXCLUDING land use & forests		
1.5°C modelled domestic pathway	12%	24%

The CAT evaluates NDC targets **excluding LULUCF emissions** in order to keep the focus on emissions from fossil fuels and industry, and because of the often-massive uncertainty in estimations of LULUCF emissions and removals. Given the limited nature of the underlying data published by the Brazilian government on LULUCF emissions, we had to build our own range of what the 2035 NDC meant for emissions of all other sectors:

- ▶ The target of 59% below 2005, which we interpret as the national action component of the NDC, leads to a range of 2% below and 70% above 2005 levels, excluding LULUCF (or 968–1,681 MtCO₂e/year).
- ▶ The target of 67% below 2005, which we interpret as the internationally supported component of the NDC, amounts to a range of 23% below to 49% above 2005 levels, excluding LULUCF (763–1,476 MtCO₂e).

In both cases, the resulting level of 2035 emissions of the target (excl. LULUCF) is neither aligned with our 1.5°C compatible fair shares nor our 1.5°C compatible modelled domestic pathways. However, Brazil would be at the threshold of 1.5C alignment if it avoids selling reductions achieved domestically and limits the contribution of LULUCF to its target.²

To be in line with our 1.5°C modelled domestic pathway, Brazil's 2035 emissions (excl. LULUCF) should not be higher than 747 MtCO₂e, which is 24% below 2005 levels. Similarly, Brazil would need to aim for a reduction of 85% below 2005 levels or emissions levels of 419 MtCO₂e (incl. LULUCF) to be in line with our 1.5°C modelled domestic pathway.

In terms of what is needed for a 1.5°C fair share target, Brazil's would need to cut emissions even further to at least 720 MtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF) 27% below 2005 levels by 2035.

² Calculations based on our own assumptions for LULUCF projections which expect the sector to be a sink in the future, ranging from roughly -120 to -610 MtCO₂e

Brazil's current policies are out of step with its targets. Current policy pathways would lead to emissions of about 1,100 – 1,200 MtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF) or 15-25% above 2005 levels in 2035—far above what would be required for a 1.5°C-consistent trajectory.

Entry points to increasing climate action

To close the emissions gap between current policies and the 1.5°C pathway and raise the ambition of its climate commitments, Brazil could do the following:

Strengthen its 2030 and 2035 targets with a separate target for LULUCF: To prove its climate leadership, Brazil should resubmit its NDC with strengthened 2030 and 2035 targets which clearly outline the different sectors' contributions to the mitigation target, in particular that of the LULUCF sector. To further support this, Brazil should follow through with its intention to publish sectoral, detailed plans that include concrete targets and pathways. In line with its status as a developing country, Brazil should also indicate the level of international support and finance needed to achieve its strengthened NDC.

Submit a long-term strategy to the UNFCCC: Brazil should develop a detailed plan with transition pathways for all sectors to achieve its climate neutrality goal by 2050. Again, providing clarity on the intended role of the LULUCF sector in meeting its long-term targets.

End fossil fuel expansion, phasing out of fossil fuels, and accelerate renewables: The government must halt new oil and gas exploration and shift investment to wind, solar, and other renewables. Brazil's focus on fossil gas to address temporary hydropower shortages is at odds with its renewable energy potential and risks locking in high emissions. Brazil should develop a comprehensive energy transition policy with a timeline for phasing out fossil fuels and a detailed plan for achieving the transition in a just and equitable way.

Sustain and deepen efforts to halt deforestation: Continued and enhanced reductions in Amazon deforestation are critical. Brazil should maintain and strengthen enforcement, restore forest governance institutions, and expand protected areas to ensure that deforestation rates continue to fall—a crucial step for both emissions reductions and biodiversity.

Implement robust mitigation measures in agriculture and land-use: Brazil should adopt stronger mitigation measures in agriculture, forestry, and land-use sectors, including supporting low-carbon agriculture, restoring degraded lands, and improving incentives for sustainable land management. These actions are essential for closing the ambition gap and achieving deep emissions reductions.

For further details on Brazil's climate targets and actions, please see our [Brazil assessment](#).



Authors



Climate Analytics

Sarah Heck
Sofia Gonzales-Zuñiga
Claudio Forner
Bill Hare



NewClimate Institute

Ana Missirliu
Niklas Höhne

Editing

Cindy Baxter

Design

Designers For Climate Studios

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CAT

The Consortium



The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) is an independent scientific analysis produced by two research organisations tracking climate action since 2009. We track progress towards the globally agreed aim of holding warming well below 2°C, and pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C.

climateactiontracker.org



Climate Analytics is a non-profit institute leading research on climate science and policy in relation to the 1.5°C limit in the Paris Agreement. It has offices in Germany, the United States, Togo, Australia, Nepal and Trinidad and Tobago.

climateanalytics.org



NewClimate Institute is an independent non-profit organisation that develops solutions to tackle climate change and drives their implementation worldwide. Through research, policy advice and knowledge sharing, we aim to raise the ambition for climate action and support sustainable development.

newclimate.org



Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR) is an energy and environment focused think-tank that aims to accelerate the energy transition by supporting sustainable mobility, green economy, and well designed climate change policy. IESR has experience mainly in Indonesia, but is expanding its focus to work in other regions and countries.

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