
Climate Action Tracker



Without rapid climate action, the world is heading to irrecoverable overshoot

Climate Action Tracker

Warming Projections Global Update

November 2026

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
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Executive Summary

The Climate Action Tracker's 2026 assessment of governments' collective climate action shows that global warming is headed towards **an irrecoverable overshoot of 1.5°C** unless they rapidly reduce emissions to limit both the magnitude and duration of this overshoot. Warming must be brought back below, and ideally well below 1.5°C (around 1.2–1.3°C) by 2100, with temperatures continuing to decline thereafter. This must now be the guiding principle of climate action.

The imminence of breaching 1.5°C cannot be an excuse to open the door to defeatism – the focus has to be on accelerating action to limit the magnitude and duration of overshoot. Every increment of warming above 1.5°C means even more significant consequences across climate, nature and human systems.

The stark choice for governments is to continue to support the fossil fuel industry, which would consign humanity to insurmountable economic damages, rising mortality from heat and climate-driven diseases and disasters that they are unable to adapt to – or pivot to the solutions which are available and cheaper than ever.



Aggregated climate action has now essentially stalled for five consecutive years, with positive and negative actions cancelling each other out:

- **The warming outlook from current policies is leading to 2.7°C in 2100[1] (slightly up from 2.6°C)** as it stood from 2021–2024.
- **Our 2030 and 2035 targets scenario that assumes governments meet all their targets remains unchanged at 2.6°C in 2100.** The round of 2035 NDCs has closed: and it's clear governments have failed to meaningfully improve the outlook for end of century warming.
- Our **"Pledges & targets" scenario**, which includes 2030 and 2035 NDCs as well as long-term targets, now see projected **warming of 2.1°C in 2100, down from 2.2°C last year[2]**. Ambitious near and long-term targets matter, but without credible policies and immediate implementation, they risk becoming empty promises rather than drivers of real-world emission reductions.
- Our **optimistic scenario**, assuming full implementation of all announced and net zero targets, remains at **1.9°C in 2100**.

Even under our most optimistic assessment, if governments were to implement every single national pledge they have made – including the net zero targets – we will still permanently overshoot the 1.5°C limit and get close to 2°C.

Today's inaction takes place against the backdrop of an explosion of climate impacts, including the catastrophic disaster in Nepal in August, more than 50,000 dead in Europe this last northern summer, coral reef bleaching and forests burning. If warming were to reach the 2.7°C projected under current policies, the consequences for people and the planet would be catastrophic and unbearable.

There are signs of progress: clean electricity met all additional global demand in 2025, and India and China are deploying renewables at record pace. Adoption rates of electric light and heavy-duty vehicles are at record levels. Brazil's Amazon deforestation fell by 31% in 2024, and in October 2026, some regions reached the lowest deforestation level since records began. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz exposed once again how fossil fuel dependence leaves countries vulnerable to geopolitical shocks and energy insecurity. The case for renewables and electrification has never been stronger. Global emissions could be on the verge of a peak and a much faster decline than we had previously thought.

But the brutal truth is that the positive developments do not yet add up to bending the curve of emissions fast enough. Rising energy demand and build out of new fossil fuel infrastructure have led to still rising emissions.

Governments collectively are simply not moving fast enough to adopt the policies that would enable us to escape from the emerging overshoot trap. Worse, several **are taking their foot off the accelerator** and slowing their climate action – or in cases such as the USA, Canada and New Zealand – rolling it back at a staggering level.

This lack of decisive action means that long-term warming is expected to cross the 1.5°C limit around 2030.

To hold overshoot to the lowest level still achievable, the pace of action has to accelerate over time: from around 4% emission reductions a year through 2030 (range of 3–5%), to 7% a year in the first half of the 2030s (range of 6–9%), and 9% a year over 2035–2050 (range of 6–15%). Every year of delay steepens the curve.

1 Mostly due to updated historical data and refined policy projections, which have narrowed the size of the range of governments' current policy projections, rather than by major policy developments worldwide.

2 The CAT already factored in the US exit from the Paris Agreement in our 2025 update. We found that removing the US NDC and net zero targets would increase the estimated end of century warming by 0.06–0.07°C, contributing to the 0.1 °C increase reported in our "Pledges and targets" scenario last year. This is in line with what the UNEP Gap Report communicated this year (it uses the CAT's 2025 update data).

The world now needs to take this emergency seriously – acting on every front to follow what we now call "Paris-aligned pathways", which limit the overshoot of 1.5°C, restrict peak warming to around 1.7°C in the 2040s and bring warming back below, and ideally well below 1.5°C (around 1.2–1.3°C) by 2100, with temperatures continuing to decline thereafter. This requires all countries to rapidly reduce emissions, bringing CO2 emissions to net zero by mid-century and greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by the 2070s – at the latest.

The CAT sets out five key levers that could cut emissions at the speed and urgency needed to follow a Paris-aligned pathway, limiting the magnitude and duration of overshoot. These levers would need to be combined with strengthened 2035 targets, and policies that ensure they are implemented on the ground.

- **A transition away from fossil fuels.** Over 70% of global emissions come from fossil fuels. There is no pathway to halve emissions without phasing out fossil fuels. Governments already agreed to do this under the first Global Stocktake at COP28. Progress must be made at COP31.
- **Deep methane cuts.** In Paris-aligned pathways, global methane emissions fall 17–33% below 2020 levels by 2030, with the deepest and fastest cuts (around 50–60%) in the energy sector as coal, oil and gas production winds down, alongside action in agriculture and waste. Instead, methane emissions have risen 3.5% from 2020–2023.
- **Rapid renewables driven economy-wide electrification.** Renewables must keep growing at today's record pace while electrification rates need to accelerate sharply to reach the proposed global goal of 35% of final energy by 2035.
- **Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) must be a complement to emissions cuts, not a substitute.** CDR is essential to address past emissions, lowering CO_2 concentrations from peak levels and enabling warming to be brought down. CDR cannot be a substitute for rapid fossil fuel phase-out. Minimising the amount of required CDR depends on the effective reduction of residual CO_2 emissions and non-CO_2 GHGs. Evidence shows that the faster we phase out fossil fuels, the lower the CDR that will be needed.
- **End deforestation.** Deforestation interacts with global emissions and further pushes the forest ecosystem to the limit. This means that warming of 1.5°C, combined with deforestation, is already a threshold for widespread loss, which could tip the Amazon towards a Savannah-like ecosystem. This reinforces the need to return global warming levels below 1.5 °C and halt deforestation.

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1 Global temperature update

Our global temperature projections show little to no progress for the fifth consecutive year. Despite another round of NDC submissions, projected warming remains broadly unchanged across all scenarios. Governments collectively continue to fail to take decisive action to change the trajectory of end-of-century warming.

Global emissions in 2025 are roughly a quarter above what Paris-compatible pathways that started reductions in 2020 assumed. Overshoot is now unavoidable, but its shape and duration are not yet determined.

Without rapid and ambitious climate action to move the needle and respond to the new reality of the world overshooting 1.5°C, we are moving in the wrong direction. Governments need to immediately course correct.




Figure 1 CAT thermometer with 2100 warming projections for different emissions scenarios.

This year's policy developments and final round of 2035 targets have confirmed the trend of stalled aggregated climate action that we have seen over the past five years.

- Under our **"Policies & action" scenario**, which reflects real-world action based on current policies, warming projections have shifted from 2.64°C to 2.72°C, which moves the headline figure back to 2.7°C as it stood from 2021–2024. This change in the warming estimate is primarily driven by updated historical data and refined policy projections, which have narrowed the size of the range of governments' current policy projections, rather than by major policy developments worldwide.

- Our **"2030 and 2035 targets only" scenario**, which assumes governments all achieve their submitted NDCs to date, remains at 2.6°C, unchanged from last year and unchanged from 2024 when we only considered 2030 targets. The latest round of 2035 NDC submissions is officially closed. With only a few still missing, we can definitively say that this latest round of submissions has failed to meaningfully improve the outlook for end-of-century warming.
- The temperature projections for our **"Pledges & targets" scenario**, which includes 2030 and 2035 NDCs as well as long-term targets, now see warming of 2.1°C, down from 2.2°C last year. This reverses last year's deterioration but does not represent a breakthrough: the projection has returned to its previous level and remains well above 1.5°C. It does highlight the importance of long-term targets and their role in limiting global warming to 1.5°C.
- Our **optimistic scenario**, assuming full implementation of all announced and submitted net zero targets, remains at 1.9°C.

Government climate policies in place are not sufficient for them to achieve their near or long-term targets. At the worst end of the spectrum are countries actively rolling back climate action – USA, Canada and New Zealand. Others who have been historical leaders, as the EU and Germany, are delaying or weakening action. And yet others such as Australia are continuing to authorise massive coal and gas mines that will emit decades after the world should have reached net zero.

The new 2035 targets risk extending this pattern, shifting responsibility onto future governments while neglecting the urgent task of cutting emissions today. Ambitious targets matter, but without governments immediately implementing credible policies they risk becoming empty promises instead of drivers of real-world emission reductions.




Figure 2 Projected emissions and warming based on different CAT scenarios and Paris-aligned pathways.

The past decade demonstrates both what climate policy can achieve and the consequences of inaction. In the five years following the Paris Agreement, national climate commitments and net zero targets helped reduce projected end-of-century warming under current policies by roughly 1°C. But in the second half of the decade, since around 2020, that progress has largely stalled.




Figure 3 Stalled climate action after the initial impact of the Paris Agreement on the estimated global warming increase in 2100. Figure shows the estimates of the Climate Action Tracker from 2009-2026 for 'Pledges & targets', 'Policies & action' and 'Optimistic' scenarios.

This repeated lack of progress has important implications. Due to the lack of sufficient and decisive climate action, human-induced warming reached around 1.37°C in 2025, and long-term warming is expected to cross the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C limit around 2030 (Forster et al., 2026). Had globally coordinated action continued and ramped up since 2020, warming could have been held to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. The window on limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot has closed.

A new generation of climate pathways starts action only in 2025 and because of this cannot limit peak warming to 1.5°C with no or low overshoot, however, they show how net zero greenhouse gas emissions can be achieved by the 2070s and that warming can be brought below or even well below 1.5°C by 2100. We consider these pathways as Paris-aligned, not Paris-compatible, as detailed below:

- ***Paris-compatible pathways*** were historically defined by C1a pathways from the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6).[3] These pathways limit warming to no or limited (<0.1°C) overshoot of 1.5°C , which is equivalent to limiting warming to "well below" 2°C. They also achieve net zero GHGs in the second half of the century (on average around 2070–2075) and bring 2100 temperatures down to below 1.5°C, and in many cases to well below 1.5°C, with a median 2100 warming of ~1.2°C. However, because the world has collectively failed to deliver these cuts, these pathways are now out of date.
- ***Paris-aligned pathways*** are more recently developed post-AR6 pathways which allow an overshoot of 1.5°C and follow historical emissions pathways to more recent years (i.e. 2023 or 2025). These pathways peak warming at around 1.7°C – which corresponds to limiting warming to "below", but not "well below" 2°C. They then reach net zero GHG emissions in the second half of the century (on average around the 2070s) and bring warming back down to below 1.5°C, and ideally well below 1.5°C, before 2100, reaching around 1.2–1.3°C by 2100.

3 The Climate Action Tracker historically used a set of C1a-consistent pathways with additional filters to limit CDR deployment to sustainable levels, see Annex. However, all these pathways were compatible with reaching net zero greenhouse gases in the 2nd half of the century.

In the graphic below, we have included a “Paris-aligned” range pathway to illustrate a pathway that limits the magnitude and duration of overshoot (see Section 3 for more details). The “Paris-aligned” range covers a selection of scenarios that meet the “Paris-aligned” definition outlined above. The “Paris-aligned” line is the 2025 “Highest Possible Ambition” scenario (HPA-2025) developed by Climate Analytics and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) (Climate Analytics and PIK, 2025). This scenario shows the highest possible ambition in a wider set of these new scenarios.




Figure 4 Temperature pathways to 2100 including Paris-compatible and Paris-aligned pathways.

The imminence of breaching 1.5°C cannot be an excuse to open the door to defeatism – the focus has to be on accelerating action to limit the magnitude and duration of overshoot. Every increment of warming above 1.5°C means even more significant consequences across climate, nature and human systems.

The International Court of Justice confirmed in 2025 that 1.5°C is the globally agreed primary temperature goal under the Paris Agreement, and that NDCs must reflect each government's highest possible ambition and, taken together, be capable of limiting warming to 1.5°C (ICJ, 2025). Indeed, the longer emissions remain above levels consistent with a Paris-compatible pathway, the deeper and more prolonged the overshoot becomes.

A temporary overshoot still locks in irreversible losses, which is why warming must be brought back below, and ideally well below 1.5°C (around 1.2–1.3°C) by 2100, with temperatures continuing to decline thereafter. This must now be the guiding principle of climate action.

2 The extent of government failure in climate action and future pledges

The case for taking decisive climate action has never been stronger. Renewable energy deployment, battery storage and EVs are expanding at unprecedented rates, demonstrating that the technologies needed to reduce emissions rapidly are available and increasingly cost-competitive. Yet many governments continue to drag their feet, failing to match this momentum, neither delivering strong enough climate targets nor the policies needed for rapid emissions reductions.

The central challenge remains that of action, which is nowhere near sufficient to limit warming to 1.5°C. The growing gap between governments' targets and the policies in place to deliver them exposes a failure to turn promises into action. Compounding this, we have also noticed a worrying trend of some governments delaying, weakening or rolling back climate policies.




Figure 5 2035 emissions gap between Pledges & targets ('Target gap') and Policies & action ('Implementation gap') and levels consistent with Paris-aligned 'Highest Possible Ambition' (HPA) pathway.

Our latest analysis shows that emissions under governments' current policies and action are projected to reach 53–59 $GtCO_2e$ in 2035. This is a far cry from the levels consistent with the Paris-aligned HPA-2025 pathway, which would see emissions halve from today's levels to around 29 $GtCO_2e$ by 2035. This means that in 2035 the 'implementation gap' is 24–29 $GtCO_2e$.[4]

Compared to the Paris-compatible pathway, the Paris-aligned pathway has a higher level of emissions as a starting point, followed by much steeper reductions in the short and medium term towards 2050, and see the need for negative emissions.

Under the Paris-aligned HPA-2025 pathway, emissions fall around 48% below 2024 levels by 2035 and, by 2050, 95% below 2024 levels, rather than 83% (Climate Analytics and PIK, 2025). The longer we wait, the worse the outcomes in terms of climate and the narrower and steeper the path to net zero needs to be.

The 'target gap' between government targets (including NDCs and long-term targets) and the Paris-aligned pathway is 17–24 $GtCO_2e$. This is slightly smaller than the 'implementation gap' but still wholly insufficient to reach the Paris-aligned pathway.

4 The AR6 1.5°C compatible pathways against which we previously measured this gap are now out of date: because of the lack of action since 2020, the emissions cuts they assumed can no longer be delivered.

The new 2035 targets risk locking in weak ambition for the near-term and may prevent us from avoiding the worst impacts of climate. Ambitious near and long-term targets matter, but without credible policies and immediate implementation, they risk becoming empty promises rather than drivers of real-world emission reductions.

In this section, we take a deep dive into our current policy projections and our assessment of 2030, 2035, and long-term targets, unpacking the trends we have seen. Our analysis reveals where governments are succeeding in delivering on implementation and ambition, and where they fall short. Credible climate leadership requires progress on both fronts: stronger targets and immediate action to achieve them.

2.1 Current policy projections

Our warming projections for the **"Policies and action" scenario** have shifted from 2.64°C to 2.72°C, which moves the headline figure back to **2.7°C**. This seeming stall in progress masks two opposite trends. On the one hand, the clean energy transition is accelerating as the rapid deployment of renewables, falling battery costs and growing electrification reinforce one another. On the other hand, governments continue to expand fossil fuel production, exports and consumption, limiting the impact of these positive developments on emissions and the global warming outlook.

The clean energy transition is delivering measurable change. In 2025, record-breaking solar deployment meant that clean electricity generation met all additional global electricity demand, bringing the growth of fossil-fuelled generation to a halt (Ember, 2026). Some of the clearest examples of this transformation can be seen in **India** and **China**.

Sustained and comprehensive policy pushes by **India** have played a pivotal role in the steady increase in renewable energy deployment in the power sector. Renewable capacity, including large hydro, reached around 256 GW in 2025–26, representing more than 50% of total installed capacity. Solar has expanded particularly rapidly, with around half of current solar capacity installed in the last three years, and around 40 GW of solar and wind added in 2025 alone. This also means that India has met its 2030 target of achieving 50% non-fossil electricity capacity five years ahead of schedule.

However, India's experience also highlights one of the emerging challenges of the energy transition. India's renewable capacity growth has not yet translated proportionately into generation: renewables, including large hydro, account for only around 26% of electricity generation, while coal continues to dominate power generation with a 70% share. Increasing curtailment of renewable electricity, driven by insufficient grid infrastructure and storage capacity, is preventing new renewable additions from translating into faster reductions in fossil fuel use. In some regions, renewable energy is being produced faster than the system can absorb it.

In **China**, renewable energy deployment also continues at an unprecedented pace, recording 430 GW of new wind and solar capacity in 2025, bringing total renewable energy capacity to approximately 2,395 GW, equivalent to more than 60% of installed capacity. China faces the same challenge as India with renewable energy deployment having mainly met rising demand in 2025 and not yet meaningfully displacing fossil fuels, along with increasing curtailment issues.

China's transport electrification is also accelerating rapidly. Electric vehicles (EVs) accounted for more than 50% of new vehicle sales in 2025 and around 12% of the total vehicle stock. More broadly, the share of electricity in final energy consumption increased from 23% in 2015 to 30% in 2025, with transport emerging as one of the most important sectors for fossil fuel displacement and reductions in oil demand.

Accelerating clean energy deployment alone is not enough. To turn record growth in renewables into sustained emission reductions, governments must accelerate investment in grids, storage and system flexibility to allow growing renewable generation to displace fossil fuels rather than to simply meet additional demand. The challenge is increasingly less about deploying clean technologies and more about ensuring they displace fossil fuels fast enough to reduce emissions at the pace required.

The impending reality of a 1.5°C overshoot makes this distinction critical. To halt warming, we need to reach net zero CO_2, to reverse it, to reach and to sustain net negative CO_2 emissions – which, alongside deep cuts to non-CO_2 emissions, leads to net zero GHG emissions.[5] The priority is not simply to reach a peak, but to reach that peak earlier and follow it with rapid, sustained emissions cuts.

This is where progress continues to fall short. Our **"Policies and action" scenarios** continue to start with higher historical emissions than expected, but future emissions offset this by decreasing more steeply after peaking. However, this has not yet translated into a sustained improvement in the end-of-century warming outlook.

At the heart of the lack of improvement in end-of-century warming under current policies is the continued expansion of fossil fuel production, exports and consumption. Governments continue to support new fossil fuel infrastructure even as they pledge to cut emissions, risking decades of further dependence on coal, oil and gas. Fossil fuel price spikes, supply disruptions, and geopolitical crises, such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrate how dangerous fossil fuel dependence has become for both the climate and energy security.

This contradiction is particularly visible in countries that position themselves as climate leaders while continuing to support fossil fuel expansion. As COP31 co-hosts, **Australia** & **Türkiye** have a unique opportunity to take the global transition away from fossil fuels forward and show what a credible transition looks like at home.

Instead, Australia continues to support its fossil fuel industry by approving new and expanded coal mines and gas projects that will lock in emissions for decades. The government still has no phase-out date for fossil fuels in the electricity system. There is no timeline for the retirement of the coal-fired power plant fleet; the government has refused to set a renewable energy target for 2035, and its aspirational net-zero plan still sees a role for fossil gas in 2050 as it continues to export emissions to the world

Similarly, Türkiye continues investing heavily in oil and fossil gas exploration, signing new partnerships, and positioning itself as a new regional hub for fossil fuel exports – overtaking Germany in 2024 as the largest producer of coal-fired electricity in Europe.

5 Reaching net zero GHG emissions requires sustained net-negative CO_2 emissions and deep cuts to non-CO_2 emissions. This results in declining temperatures (Tarshish et al., 2026).

2.1.1 Key countries' impact on current policies in 2035

Our warming projections for the **"Policies and action" scenario** have returned to where they stood in 2021–2024 at **2.7°C**. This change in temperature estimate is primarily driven by updated historical data and refined policy projections, which have narrowed the size of the range of countries' current policy projections, rather than by major policy developments worldwide.

Below we delve into the optimistic and conservative ends of our current policy projections in 2035. The overall trend is that both ends of the range have increased compared to last year. By exploring key countries (China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, US) that have contributed to the change in current policies, we can provide a more nuanced picture of this larger change.




Figure 6 Waterfall graph showing the changes to the 'Policies & action' scenario range (high and low) in 2035 and the countries that contributed to it with at least 100 MtCO2e of the change.

China

Compared to our November 2025 assessment, China's current policy projections (CPP) range has widened. This reflects growing uncertainty over how quickly the country's rapid clean energy expansion will translate into sustained reductions in fossil fuel consumption and emissions. While renewable energy deployment continues at an unprecedented scale, strong growth in electricity demand means that additional clean generation does not automatically result in lower fossil fuel use. China's future emissions trajectory increasingly depends on whether renewables can substantially displace coal, oil and gas at scale, rather than primarily meeting new demand.

- **Our conservative scenario** (CPP high) has been revised upward compared to the November 2025 assessment. This is primarily driven by upward revisions to historical emissions data, with China's 2025 emissions now estimated at 15.6 $GtCO_2e$, around 3% higher than the CAT's previous estimate of 15.1 $GtCO_2e$.[6] At the same time, the IEA's World Energy Outlook scenario, used to inform the upper end of our projections, now anticipates higher future fossil fuel consumption than previously assumed. Together, these changes increased the upper end of the 2035 CPP range from 13.8 $GtCO_2e$ to 14.9 $GtCO_2e$, an increase of approximately 8% compared to our November 2025 assessment.
- **Our optimistic scenario** (CPP low) was revised downward following the release of China's 15th Five-Year Plan and its accompanying energy targets. The plan aims to increase renewable energy consumption to 1.8 billion tonnes of coal equivalent by 2030 and to double non-fossil energy supply between 2025 and 2035. These targets imply substantially faster growth in renewable and other non-fossil energy sources than assumed in our previous assessment. Incorporating these targets into our modelling resulted in lower emissions projections, reducing the lower end of the 2035 CPP range from 12.7 $GtCO_2e$ to 12.0 $GtCO_2e$, or around 5.5% below our November 2025 assessment.

Iran

The CAT's current policy projections for Iran have been revised down, primarily due to a weaker economic outlook, rather than the adoption of stronger climate policies. Iran's emissions are heavily concentrated in the energy and industrial sectors, making them closely linked to economic activity and fossil fuel production. Since our previous assessment in 2023, the economic outlook has deteriorated as a result of the US-Israel war on the country and tighter constraints on fossil fuel exports, leading to lower GDP growth assumptions. Because slower economic growth reduces industrial output, energy demand and fossil fuel consumption, it also leads to lower emissions.

Saudi Arabia

The CAT's current policy projections for Saudi Arabia have been revised upward primarily due to revisions in historical emissions data rather than changes in climate policy.[7] Updated third-party datasets estimate Saudi Arabia's 2024 emissions at 854 $MtCO_2e$, compared to 749 $MtCO_2e$ in our previous assessment, an increase of around 14%. Since Saudi Arabia has not implemented any policies susceptible to bring its emissions down, higher historical emissions translate directly into a higher future emissions trajectory.

6 Please note that all comparisons are made against our projections used in our Global Temperature Report published in November 2025. Further information on the assumptions and methodology underpinning our current policy projections can be found in our CAT country profiles.

7 We do not yet have sufficiently recent emissions data to assess whether, or to what extent, the US-Israel war has affected Saudi Arabia's emissions trajectory. The latest available emissions inventories predate these developments, and any potential impacts on fossil fuel production and domestic energy use are therefore not yet reflected in our latest projections.

USA

The CAT's current policy projections for the US have been revised following a reassessment of the impact of policy changes under the Trump Administration. In our previous assessment, published in November 2025, we applied a relatively wide projection range to reflect uncertainty surrounding the extent to which proposed policy rollbacks would affect future emissions. Since then, additional information on enacted measures, including the passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBB) and repeal of emissions standards in the power and transport sectors, has enabled us to quantify these impacts more robustly.

While the projection range has narrowed as a result, new insights have confirmed the more pessimistic end of our previous assessment meaning that our optimistic scenario has been significantly revised upwards. The lower end of our CPP 2035 has increased from 4,456 $MtCO_2e$ to 5,255 $MtCO_2e$, a change of approximately 18%. Although US emissions are still projected to decline over time, the Trump Administration's recent policy rollbacks have materially slowed the projected pace of emission reductions compared to the trajectory estimated under the Biden Administration. Consequently, projected US 2035 emissions are approximately 12–39% higher than under the Biden Administration's policy trajectory.

2.1.2 Worrying trend of policy rollbacks

United States: Recent policy developments across several developed economies point to a worrying trend of climate policy weakening or rollback. While the **United States** remains the most prominent example, similar dynamics are emerging elsewhere, with governments delaying or reversing previously agreed measures. In some countries, these changes are already reflected in higher emissions projections, while in others the full impact has yet to materialise in our current policy projections.

Canada: The Carney government has dismantled and weakened several flagship climate policies, including the consumer carbon price, the planned oil and gas emissions cap, and EV sales requirements. These changes have already worsened CAT emissions projections and increased the gap between current policies and Canada's climate targets.

EU: While emissions continue to decline, the EU has weakened several elements of its climate framework, including allowing the use of international carbon credits towards climate targets, softening aspects of the 2035 vehicle transition, and weakening parts of methane regulation. These changes reduce the ambition of the EU's future emissions pathway despite continued progress in renewable deployment.

New Zealand: The scale of climate policy rollbacks implemented by New Zealand's conservative government since taking office in 2023 is striking. The government has weakened the country's 2050 methane target despite agriculture being the country's largest source of emissions. It has removed legal requirements for the emissions trading scheme to support meeting international climate commitments, reopened the door to offshore oil and gas exploration, stepped back from planned agricultural emissions pricing, dropped support for EV's, and weakened the country's first-ever emissions standards for cars, among other rollbacks.

Germany: The German government has recently deprioritised and weakened climate policy across most sectors. It has supported new fossil gas capacity, weakened incentives for renewable energy deployment, rolled back measures promoting clean heating, and backed efforts to dilute parts of the EU's climate framework. As a result, the CAT forecasts emissions to be higher in 2030 than previously estimated, meaning Germany is drifting further from its legally binding emission reduction targets for 2030 and 2045.

2.2 Pledges & targets

2.2.1 The count is in: 2035 NDCs have failed to move the needle

As of 6 November 2026, 55 of the countries we assess (including 27 countries within the EU) – and 158 countries worldwide – have submitted their 2035 climate targets (NDCs) to the UNFCCC. These targets collectively cover about 90% of global emissions and around 87% of the global population. Of the countries we track, only three (Egypt, Iran, and Viet Nam) have yet to submit their 2035 NDCs.

With the submission cycle effectively complete, the overall picture is now clear: the latest round of NDCs has failed to meaningfully improve the outlook for end-of-century warming. Our **"2030 and 2035 targets only" scenario**, which assumes that all governments achieve their submitted NDCs, remains at **2.6°C**, unchanged from last year. This finding is particularly striking because our previous global temperature assessment did not yet include 2035 NDCs from several major emitters, including India and Saudi Arabia, which have since submitted targets. Despite these additional NDCs covering a substantial share of global emissions, the aggregate warming outcome remains unchanged.

Emerging trends for 2035 NDCs

A closer look at the latest NDCs reveals several recurring patterns that help explain why this latest NDC cycle has failed to improve the warming outlook.

- Almost none of the countries that we track strengthened their 2030 targets as part of this NDC cycle, despite most remaining inconsistent with a Paris-compatible pathway.[8]
- For around half of the countries the CAT assesses, the gap between their NDC target and a 1.5°C compatible modelled domestic pathway is larger in 2035 than in 2030. In other words, instead of narrowing the ambition gap over time, these countries are drifting further from a Paris-compatible pathway. Progression is not only measured by whether new targets are more stringent or lead to lower emissions than their predecessors, but by whether they narrow the gap to a 1.5°C trajectory.
    - **Saudi Arabia's** new NDC target is set at a higher emissions level than the 2030 target, which it also did not update. Consequently, the gap between a Paris-compatible trajectory and Saudi Arabia's emissions reduction target has significantly increased, from 29% in 2030 to 51% in 2035.
- A number of countries have set targets that land above the emission levels already expected under current policies. In practice, this means they can be met without any additional policies beyond what is already planned or underway. These new targets appear to codify existing trends: they do not drive further transformation guided by stronger climate action over the next decade.
    - **China** has committed to reducing economy-wide net GHG emissions by 7–10% from peak levels by 2035. This translates to a 6–9% reduction below 2025 levels (excl. LULUCF). However, this target is unlikely to drive further reductions beyond current policies, as existing trajectories point to a 5–23% decline in emissions from 2025 to 2035 (excl. LULUCF).
    - **India's** new emissions intensity and non fossil capacity targets as presented in the 2035 NDC will be achievable under current policies, and possibly by or — even before — 2030, without additional mitigation action. As a result, the 2035 NDC will not materially accelerate India's emissions reductions beyond what its existing trajectory already delivers.

8 We have shifted to comparing to Paris-aligned pathways at global level in this report. However, in this section 2.2 where we assess countries' climate pledges and targets at domestic level, we will be comparing to our 1.5°C compatible modelled domestic pathways which are based on Paris-compatible pathways

- Other governments continue to formulate their NDCs as reductions below unrealistically high baseline scenarios (e.g., above emissions under current policies), effectively allowing emissions to continue to grow rather than decline. This enables them to claim progress without actually shifting domestic trends or delivering real emission cuts, undermining the credibility and effectiveness of global climate efforts.
  - **Türkiye's** 2035 NDC, which relies on a highly inflated baseline scenario and can largely be achieved under current policies, allows emissions to continue rising for the next decade.

2.2. 2 A closer look at the target gap




Figure 7 2035 emissions gap between Pledges & targets ('Target gap') and levels consistent with Paris-aligned 'Highest Possible Ambition' (HPA) pathway

The limited impact of the latest NDC cycle becomes most apparent when comparing targets with the emission reductions required to limit warming in line with a Paris-aligned pathway.

Under our **"Pledges and targets" scenario**, the gap between targets (2030 and 2035 NDCs and long-term commitments) and the Paris-aligned pathway is widening. This 'target gap' stands at 5–9 $GtCO_2e$ in 2030 and grows to 18–25 $GtCO_2e$ by 2035. Even if governments fully implemented all these commitments, global emissions in 2035 would still be well above the level of the Paris-aligned pathway. Governments have missed yet another opportunity to put the world on a substantially lower emissions trajectory.

Emissions under current NDCs are projected to reach 52–56 $GtCO_2e$ in 2030 and 47–54 $GtCO_2e$ in 2035—far above the levels of the Paris-aligned HPA-2025 pathway, which requires global emissions to fall to around 47 $GtCO_2e$ by 2030 (about 16% below 2024 levels) and 29 $GtCO_2e$ by 2035 (about 48% below 2024 levels). The AR6 Paris-compatible pathways, against which we previously measured this gap, are now out of date: because of the lack of action since 2020, the emissions cuts they assumed can no longer be delivered.

In 2035, the gap between targets and the Paris-aligned pathway is only around one-fifth smaller than the gap under current policies. Delivering on existing pledges would therefore close only a small part of the shortfall, leaving the vast majority of the emissions gap unaddressed. Every year of delay adds to cumulative emissions and increases the scale and pace of the reductions needed to keep the Paris Agreement's temperature limit in sight.

The warming outlook consequently remains effectively unchanged. Current policies and commitments still fall far short of the action needed to limit warming to 1.5°C. Governments must urgently strengthen their 2030 targets, bring their 2035 commitments into line with the deep emissions cuts required, and put credible policies in place to deliver them.

2.2.3 Long-term targets

Our optimistic scenario, assuming full implementation of all announced and net zero targets, remains at 1.9°C. Mid-century net zero targets can only be taken seriously if backed by interim targets supporting a just and orderly transition.

Only by achieving net zero CO_2 emissions, will we be able to halt warming. To bring warming back to below, and ideally well below, 1.5°C by 2100, net zero GHGs will be needed by the 2070s or before.

Most net zero targets we assess remain vague and fall short of good practice. As of October 2026, only six of the CAT countries assessed (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, EU, Switzerland, UK), together covering just 6% of global emissions—had targets rated "acceptable" in terms of their scope, architecture and transparency.

While some countries, such as India, included their net zero target commitments in their 2035 NDCs, very few have provided any additional details. Though some countries, like Australia, did provide additional information since our last assessment, it continues to see a role for fossil gas in 2050, so its aspirational net-zero plan is completely inconsistent with a Paris-aligned pathway.

We have also removed US climate targets from our **"Optimistic" scenario** following the country's formal withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, which took effect on 27 January 2026.




Figure 8 Share of global GHG emissions by Climate Action Tracker's headline evaluation for announced net zero targets as of November 2026. Emissions data excluding LULUCF taken from PRIMAP emissions database (Gütschow et al., 2026).

3 The world is facing a new overshoot reality

The 1.5°C limit has served as a guiding light to prevent the worst excesses of climate change, providing a lifeline for vulnerable communities and ecosystems across the world.

Had globally coordinated action begun in 2020, as the AR6 pathways assumed, warming could have been held to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. That window has closed: global emissions in 2025 remained close to 2019 levels, roughly a quarter above what those pathways assumed. Overshoot is now unavoidable, but its shape and duration are now down to the actions governments take in the next critical years.

How high warming peaks, how long it stays above 1.5°C and how far it then declines depend on decisions taken now. Warming above 1.5°C can be reversed; many of its impacts cannot. A temporary overshoot still locks in irreversible losses, which is why warming must be brought back below, and ideally well below 1.5°C (around 1.2–1.3°C) by 2100, with temperatures continuing to decline thereafter. This must now be the guiding principle of climate action.

3.1 The consequences of stalled climate action for our health, livelihoods and safety

Reaching warming levels of 1.5°C already means significant global consequences for climate, nature and people. The goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C was set in the Paris Agreement because the risks of exceeding that limit are severe, particularly for those most vulnerable. Additional research since 2015, including the IPCC's 1.5°C special report, has have confirmed and elaborated on those risks (Climate Analytics, 2025).

As we approach 1.5°C of warming today, we are already experiencing significant loss of glaciers and ice sheets, and an increase in the frequency and severity of floods, droughts, land and marine heatwaves, storms and wildfires. These weather and climate events are exacerbating biodiversity loss, stressing food systems and having economic consequences across the globe (Ripple et al., 2026; WMO, 2026).

Every increment of warming above 1.5°C means even more significant consequences across climate, nature and human systems.

One of the biggest risks is that of reaching tipping points – thresholds for irreversible changes in Earth systems. 1.5°C is a safeguard for widespread loss for many of them. Warm water reefs, for example, have likely already reached it. Ocean circulation patterns, forests (especially the Amazon), ecosystems, polar ice sheets and permafrost are all also vulnerable to irreversible systemic change with increasing likelihood as temperatures rise (Lenton et al., 2025).

If warming were to reach the 2.7°C projected under current policies, the consequences for people and the planet only become even more severe. For example, one study finds that a person born in Brussels in 2020 will experience 11 unprecedented heatwave events even if warming is limited to 1.5°C, this would increase to 18 under a 2.5°C warming scenario (Grant et al., 2025, Carbon Brief, 2025).

Another study finds that if temperatures stabilise at 2.7°C, the glacier mass remaining would only be around half that of what could be preserved at 1.5°C (24% vs. 53%, Zekollari et al., 2025). This locks in multi-metre sea level rise, which might make some parts of the globe uninhabitable (Storlazzi et al., 2018).


Adaptation can help to reduce the impacts of climate change on people and nature, but adaptation options become more limited and challenging with higher warming levels, and most challenging for those most vulnerable (AR6 SPM). Mitigation action can make adaptation possible in the first place, substantially reducing its costs and maintaining the effectiveness of adaptation strategies (Theokritoff et al., 2024).

The potential climate change impacts and consequences for people in terms of food security, heat stress, water stress, infrastructure damage, lives lost, vector-borne diseases and more make it clear why acting immediately to slow the current rate of warming and returning below 1.5°C by the end of the century are critical.

3.2 The new reality of Paris-aligned pathways, instead of Paris-compatible

To reflect the current reality that global emissions still have not peaked, and long-term warming is expected to cross the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C limit around 2030, there is a new generation of emissions pathways which assess how to limit overshoot of 1.5°C. We consider them **Paris-aligned**, not **Paris-compatible**.

These new Paris-aligned climate models show higher emissions in 2030, followed by a steeper drop post-2030 to make up for this decade's lack of action, and use CDR to reach net negative CO_2 emissions and bring temperatures down from the peak. These models' post-2030 emissions reductions are dramatic, but they demonstrate that it is still possible to limit global warming to 1.5°C in the longer term. The cost of renewable energy and other zero-carbon technologies has plummeted (IRENA, 2026; Rupert Way et al., 2022) providing countries with a realistic means of achieving the deep decarbonisation needed to align with 1.5°C. Every year of delay shrinks the future emissions budget, meaning the curve gets steeper with each year of inaction (Climate Analytics and PIK, 2025). A just and orderly transition requires early action, and central to this is a transition away from fossil fuels.



Note: Changes in historical inventories and GWP values contributed to some of the differences between 2015 and 2026. The highlighted line in the Paris aligned scenarios range is the "Highest Possible Ambition" (HPA) scenario.

Figure 9 Comparison of Policies & action projections from October 2015 global update to our latest projections and the different shape in pathways of the Paris-compatible and Paris-aligned scenarios.

Earlier in the report we have described how we differentiate between this new generation of Paris-aligned pathways that allows for overshoot of 1.5°C, and those that were *Paris-compatible*. Below we define them again:

- **Paris-compatible pathways** were historically defined by C1a pathways from the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6). These pathways limit warming to no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C (<0.1°C), which is equivalent to limiting warming to "well below" 2°C. They also achieve net zero GHGs in the second half of the century (on average around 2070–75) and bring 2100 temperatures down to below 1.5°C, and in many cases to well below 1.5°C, with a median 2100 warming of ~1.2°C. However, because the world has collectively failed to deliver these cuts, these pathways are now out of date.
- **Paris-aligned pathways** are more recently developed post-AR6 pathways which allow an overshoot of 1.5°C and follow historical emissions pathways to more recent years (i.e. 2023 or 2025). These pathways peak warming at around 1.7°C – which corresponds to limiting warming to "below", but not "well below" 2°C. They then reach net zero GHG emissions in the second half of the century (on average in the 2070s) and bring warming back down to below 1.5°C, and ideally well below 1.5°C, before 2100, reaching around 1.2–1.3°C by 2100.

We construct our "Paris-aligned" range from a range of scenarios that meet the "Paris-aligned" definition outlined above. These are drawn from the Highest Possible Ambition (HPA) scenario and the latest Very Low (VL) scenarios from the CMIP7 ensemble.[9] The "Paris-aligned" line is the 2025 "Highest Possible Ambition" scenario (HPA-2025) developed by Climate Analytics and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) (Climate Analytics and PIK, 2025). This scenario shows the highest possible ambition in a wider set of these new scenarios.

The cost of the past five years of delay is clear from a comparison with the AR6 pathways: peak warming at least 0.1°C higher, an overshoot around a decade longer, and roughly three times the cumulative exposure to warming above 1.5°C (Climate Analytics and PIK, 2025).

This new generation of overshoot pathways offers governments clear, technically feasible routes to cutting their emissions and limiting warming. They also offer a real chance to break the dependence on volatile, crisis-laden fossil fuel markets. While the path may be clear, it relies on ambitious governments willing to walk it.

3.3 The five key levers that would keep the 1.5°C limit in sight

The CAT highlights five core elements of Paris-aligned climate policy and action that, if governments were to implement, would bring warming back below 1.5°C by 2100. To bring down our estimates of end of century warming, governments need to revise their 2035 NDCs to set stronger, Paris-aligned 2035 targets and implement policies that encompass these levers:

1. **A transition away from fossil fuels (TAFF)**

   Fossil fuels account for around 70% of global greenhouse gas emissions (Schumer et al., 2025). Continued extraction and burning of fossil fuels is incompatible with limiting overshoot of 1.5°C. In HPA-2025 Paris-aligned scenario, coal is effectively phased out in the 2040s, gas in the 2050s and oil in the 2060s (Climate Analytics and PIK, 2025). Governments need to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels in a way that spreads the benefits of the energy transition to the communities and workers still reliant on fossil fuel extraction. Governments all agreed to transition away from fossil fuels in the energy system under the first Global Stocktake (GST1) at COP28, and they need to make progress on this at COP31.

9 We do not currently include all VL scenarios in our Paris-aligned scenario set. This is because 3 of them do not reach net zero GHGs by 2100, and 5 of them do not limit warming in 2100 to below 1.5°C with a >66% probability, which is our threshold for classifying a scenario as "below" 1.5°C. The VL scenarios were not explicitly designed to meet these thresholds, and many of those which do not remain very close to the thresholds (e.g. only 0.02°C above the end of century limit for "below" 1.5°C). They would therefore count as very close to Paris-aligned. Nevertheless, in this report, we focus on the subset of Very Low scenarios which meet these thresholds fully, which gives overall 5 scenarios for analysis (HPA and 4 VL scenarios). This does not negate the value of the Very Low scenarios which do not specifically meet these thresholds. In particular, their role in identifying the near-term action required to limit overshoot, such as electrification, remains high.

Hand-in-hand with TAFF comes accelerating the clean energy transition. Under the GST1, governments committed to tripling global renewable capacity from 3.4 TW (2022 level) to 11 TW by 2030 and doubling the annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030, from 2% to 4%. This is broadly in line with Paris-aligned pathways, though some see a faster transition.

Under the HPA-2025 scenario, global renewable capacity reaches 11.9 TW by 2030 meaning that about 1.35 TW would need to be added annually compared to 0.69 TW added in 2025 (IRENA, 2026). Overall, renewables overall are virtually on course to reach the GST1 goal. The HPA-2025 scenario also features a 3.6% compound efficiency improvement rate by 2030 and 3.9% by 2035, compared to 2022 against the current 1.3–1.8% a year achieved since 2019 (Climate Analytics, 2026; IEA (2025), Energy Efficiency).

2. **Deep methane cuts**

   In Paris-aligned pathways, global methane emissions fall 17–33% below 2020 levels by 2030, with the deepest and fastest cuts (around 50–60%) in the energy sector as coal, oil and gas production winds down, alongside action in agriculture and waste. Instead, methane emissions have risen 3.5% from 2020–2023 (Climate Analytics, 2026).

3. **Rapid renewables driven economy-wide electrification**

   The COP31 host has proposed raising electrification from 23% to 35% of final energy by 2035. This goal is broadly aligned with the latest Paris-aligned pathways (Climate Action Tracker, 2026). However, this increased electricity share should only be delivered through clean electricity: electrification must displace fossil fuels rather than reinforce dependence on them. Progress to date has been 0.3 percentage points a year, so the pace has to quadruple to meet this goal. Some of the most ambitious Paris-aligned pathways reach an even more ambitious share of 39% by 2035 and 65% by 2050.

   There is a suite of no-regret policy options that will cut emissions and facilitate economic growth. Key measures include rolling out wind and solar to not only meet new energy demand but also existing demand, and building out the grid infrastructure and electric technologies which can handle higher shares of renewables and reduce overall demand. Electric technologies like EVs and heat pumps are already cheaper to run than their fossil-based counterparts; what is needed is access to capital to reduce the upfront cost of electrification.

4. **Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) must be a complement to emissions cuts, not a substitute**

   In pathways that return warming below 1.5°C, CDR is a necessity, not an option: cumulative removals of around 500 $GtCO_2$ this century, rising to roughly 6–9 $GtCO_2$ a year by 2050, are needed to reach net negative CO_2 emissions and bring temperatures down from the peak (Climate Analytics and PIK, 2025; Climate Analytics, 2026). But CDR cannot substitute for emissions cuts. It cannot lower the peak – only rapid near-term reductions do that – and today's engineered removals stand at about 0.002 $GtCO_2$ a year (Edwards et al., 2026). The task is to drive residual emissions as low as possible across every sector; in practice, removals will need to compensate mainly for the residual emissions that cannot be eliminated, largely in agriculture. CDR, scaled within sustainability and feasibility limits, is a complement to a rapid transition away from fossil fuels, never a reason to delay it.

5. **End deforestation**

   Deforestation interacts with global emissions and further pushes the forest ecosystem to its limit. This means that 1.5°C, combined with deforestation, is already a threshold for widespread loss. Every increment of warming above 1.5°C adds to the climate impacts. Sustained warming at 1.5°C would, for example, also hold the Amazon at the limit of its suggested safe boundary for warming, when deforestation has already passed the 10% suggested as safe (Flores et al., 2024). This reinforces the need to return global warming levels to well below 1.5 °C and halt deforestation.

The recent success by the Lula administration of reducing deforestation rates – with satellite data showing that in the year to July 2026, the deforestation rate fell by 41.8% in the Brazilian Amazon, the lowest level since records began in 1988, shows the power of ambitious policy (BBC, 2026).

3.4 The Climate Action Tracker in the new reality of overshoot

The CAT uses modelled domestic pathways (MDPs) to assess whether countries' targets and policies are on track towards full decarbonisation in line with the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C limit. MDPs are downscaled global least-cost pathways that provide technically and economically feasible emission reduction pathways for each country. Up until now, our 1.5°C MDP was derived from **Paris-compatible pathways** that assumed globally coordinated action from 2020, with global emissions falling around 25% by 2025 and around 43% by 2030 relative to 2019 levels (IPCC, 2022). Because the world has collectively failed to deliver these cuts, these pathways are now out of date.

The CAT is therefore moving to reflect new **Paris-aligned** MDPs, based on pathways[10] that explore how to limit the magnitude and duration of overshoot and get temperatures back below 1.5°C by 2100, including the "Highest Possible Ambition" (HPA) scenario from the REMIND 3.5 model developed by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) in collaboration with Climate Analytics (Climate Analytics and PIK, 2025). As new scenarios become available, we will assess and potentially include them too. While the set of scenarios may be updated in the future, all selected pathways will continue to be evaluated against the temperature criteria described above.

Compared to our previous benchmark, the key changes are:

- **A higher level of emissions as a starting point.**

  Because global emissions in 2025 remained close to 2019 levels, these new Paris-aligned pathways see global emissions fall 17% over 2019–2030 (around 20% below 2025 levels), rather than around 43% by 2030 in the AR6 C1 pathways previously used by the CAT (IPCC, 2022). Countries need to peak emissions as soon as possible and to put in place the policies and infrastructure that enable rapid reductions after 2030. Every year of further delay makes the post-2030 curve steeper.

- **Steeper reductions in the short and medium term.**

  A less stringent 2030 benchmark is not a lower bar. Under the new Paris-aligned MDP, some 2030 targets and policies may appear closer to 1.5°C than in our previous assessments. This reflects a changed benchmark that absorbs past delay, not stronger climate action. The cost of that delay is shifted into the 2030s. After 2030, reductions must accelerate sharply to compensate: emissions fall around 49% below 2025 levels by 2035 and, by 2050, 95% below 2019 levels, rather than 83% (Climate Analytics, 2023; Climate Analytics and PIK, 2025). The longer we wait, the worse the outcomes in terms of climate and the narrower and steeper the path to net zero needs to be.

- **Need for CDR, though not as a substitute for climate action.**

  CDR is essential to address past emissions, lowering CO_2 concentration from peak level and enabling warming to be brought down. It also is key to counterbalance residual emissions in hard-to-abate sectors. However, it is not a substitute for rapid fossil fuel phase-out and deep emissions cuts. Minimising the amount of required CDR depends on the effective reduction of residual CO_2 emissions and non-CO_2 GHGs.

10 As described above, this consists of the Highest Possible Ambition (HPA) scenario and a subset of pathways from the Very Low scenario set in ScenarioMIP-CMIP7.

This change from Paris-compatible to Paris-aligned pathways will continue to have responsibility differentiated by regional effort. Specifically, HPA-2025 and the ScenarioMIP VL scenarios use regionally differentiated carbon prices, with GDP per capita as a proxy for development status, converging to a global average by 2070. Advanced economies therefore cut emissions ahead of emerging and developing economies, partially addressing feasibility concerns with global least-cost pathways (Gidden et al., 2023; Muttitt et al., 2023).

However, this regional differentiation does not represent a "fair share" of effort for each country, and additional support and climate finance remain necessary and important (Bauer et al., 2020). In this context, countries with higher historical and current responsibility, and greater capability, are expected to do more in terms of contributing to reduce emissions within and outside their own borders. Advanced economies should achieve at least their Paris-aligned MDP domestically and with their own resources, while providing significant support for emissions reductions elsewhere. Some emerging and developing economies will need additional international support to meet their Paris-aligned MDP.

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CAT The Consortium

The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) is an independent scientific analysis produced by three research organisations tracking climate action since 2009. We track progress towards the globally agreed aim of holding warming well below 2°C, and pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C.

climateactiontracker.org

Climate Analytics is a non-profit institute leading research on climate science and policy in relation to the 1.5°C limit in the Paris Agreement. It has offices in Germany, the United States, Togo, Australia, Nepal and Trinidad and Tobago.

climateanalytics.org

NewClimate Institute is a non-profit institute established in 2014. NewClimate Institute supports research and implementation of action against climate change around the globe, covering the topics international climate negotiations, tracking climate action, climate and development, climate finance and carbon market mechanisms. NewClimate Institute aims at connecting up-to-date research with the real world decision making processes.

newclimate.org

Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR) is an energy and environment focused think-tank that aims to accelerate the energy transition by supporting sustainable mobility, green economy, and well designed climate change policy. IESR has experience mainly in Indonesia, but is expanding its focus to work in other regions and countries.

iesr.or.id

Annexes

A1 Country snapshots

ARGENTINA's climate policy keeps going backwards under President Javier Milei. There have been no meaningful policy developments in 2026, while key climate policy frameworks and implementation bodies are dismantled.

Meanwhile, the administration continues to prioritise fossil fuel expansion. Oil and gas production and exports are growing at record levels, driven by the development of the Vaca Muerta shale fields and plans to expand LNG infrastructure. With no clear strategy to advance the energy transition in the last few years, Argentina has also fallen short of its 2025 renewables target.

Overall, we see very little movement at the national level, outside of a clear push for Argentina to advance the development of carbon markets under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

Despite its role as COP31 Negotiations President and the warnings from the first Climate Risk Assessment about the severe environmental, social, and economic consequences of the escalating climate crisis, **AUSTRALIA** continues to support and expand the fossil fuel industry both domestically and with its considerable coal and fossil gas exports.

The government released its 2035 target in September 2025 - which it does not expect to meet under current policies - alongside its Net Zero Plan. The government has no 2035 renewable energy target; the slow rollout of renewables means it is unlikely to meet its 82% on-grid 2030 renewable target; industrial facilities are able to buy their way out of emissions reductions through offsets, and measures in other sectors of the economy remain limited. Alongside approvals of new and expanded coal mines and gas projects, these all weaken Australia's credibility and leadership at COP31.

BRAZIL shows a mixed picture with new progressive climate policies alongside continued fossil fuel expansion.

During 2025-2026, Brazil adopted new, economy-wide policies aimed at sustainable development, job creation and environmental restoration, while its "Plano Clima", together with its mitigation and adaptation strategies, established an overarching framework for climate policy implementation. Declining deforestation rates in the Amazon and the Cerrado have been driven by the government's reinstatement of monitoring and conservation efforts.

Still, Brazil's climate action remains inconsistent with the 1.5°C warming limit. Continued expansion of oil and gas production, including new drilling in the Amazon and rules relaxing environmental licensing requirements, directly contradicts both Brazil's climate leadership ambitions and the Paris Agreement goals. Brazil's 2035 NDC relies heavily on a huge planned land-use sink rather than decarbonising all sectors of the economy; it is not 1.5°C aligned, and the gap between its target and a 1.5°C modelled domestic pathway has widened compared to 2030.

Under Prime Minister Mark Carney's leadership, **CANADA**'s federal government has continued to roll back and weaken climate policies, including repealing the zero-emissions vehicle sales mandate, adopting a weaker industrial carbon price trajectory, and cancelling the planned cap on oil and gas emissions.

A federal-Alberta agreement has further undermined key measures through provincial policy carve-outs and concessions, including industrial carbon pricing, the Clean Electricity Regulations, and oil and gas methane rules. While the government has made some progress by finalising new waste methane regulations and reinstating some consumer rebates for electric vehicles and home energy retrofits, these policy gains are far outweighed by the widespread policy rollbacks

Meanwhile, the government is advancing new fossil fuel projects, including designating a proposed West Coast oil pipeline as a project of "national interest," to be fast-tracked under new federal legislation. Carney has not recommitted to Canada's 2030 or 2035 targets and has conceded that, under his plan, emissions will be higher in the coming years than previously projected

CHINA continues to drive the global clean energy transition through record deployment of renewable energy and rapid electrification across the power, transport and industrial sectors. Renewable generation is increasingly displacing coal-fired power, while electric vehicles, which now account for more than half of new vehicle sales, are beginning to reduce oil demand.

These developments are contributing to an emerging decline in emissions after decades of growth. In 2026, the government released a series of plans under its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), setting new ambitious targets to boost further renewable energy expansion and electrification. However, whether this trend can be sustained will depend on continued renewable expansion, stronger grid integration and faster displacement of fossil fuels across the economy.

COLOMBIA's climate ambition faces an uncertain future following the election of far-right President Abelardo de la Espriella, who has pledged to expand oil and gas exploration, mining and fracking. His recent election victory marks a potential turning point for a country that has positioned itself as a climate leader, including through its commitment to halt new oil and fossil gas exploration licenses and its international push to phase out fossil fuels.

The incoming administration's support for fossil fuel expansion puts recent climate and conservation gains at risk, raising concerns over the future direction of Colombia's energy transition. Meanwhile, the implementation gap remains more critical than ever: despite ambitious commitments and progress in areas such as renewable energy and deforestation reduction, structural barriers, fiscal dependence on fossil fuel revenues, and limited international financial support continue to hinder delivery.

ETHIOPIA's climate action unfolds against a backdrop of efforts to enhance economic growth and improve energy access. Almost all of Ethiopia's electricity generation comes from renewable sources, but access to electricity remains a major challenge. In its submitted 2035 NDC, Ethiopia updated its NDC targets for 2030 and set new ones for 2035. The targets are set against updated BAU emissions levels, with emissions projections revised substantially downwards due to assumptions in the LULUCF sector.

Most of the planned emissions reductions in Ethiopia's new NDC rely on expanding its carbon sink through reforestation projects. At the same time, Ethiopia stands out as one of the few countries analysed by the CAT that has 1.5°C compatible unconditional 2030 and 2035 targets compared to its fair share. While the conditional targets are not 1.5°C aligned compared to modelled domestic pathways, the gap for this compatibility is narrowing from 2030 to 2035.

The **EUROPEAN UNION** adopted a legally binding target to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 90% by 2040. At the same time, however, political debates over the EU's post-2030 climate framework increasingly focus on flexibility measures that could weaken implementation, including greater reliance on international carbon credits and proposed changes to carbon pricing, energy efficiency and renewable energy policies.

While initiatives such as the Electrification Action Plan and efforts to modernise electricity grids could support faster decarbonisation, growing pressure to relax climate regulations, vehicle standards and carbon pricing mechanisms risks slowing progress. The EU continues to position itself as a climate leader, but questions remain over whether it will match its long-term targets with the policies, investment and international climate finance needed to deliver them.

GERMANY is weakening rather than accelerating climate action, jeopardising its legally binding emissions reductions target for 2030 and climate neutrality target for 2045. Despite a strong climate policy framework and an increasingly high share of renewable energy in electricity generation, recent government decisions threaten to slow the energy transition and increase projected emissions.

The government is expanding support for fossil gas, reducing certainty on renewable energy subsidies, and weakening measures for transport and building decarbonisation. A particularly concerning shift is the government's push to use international carbon credits to meet its emissions reduction targets, enabling Germany to shift responsibility for emissions reductions abroad rather than delivering the necessary cuts domestically.

INDIA continues to rapidly expand renewable energy capacity, surpassing its 2030 target of 50% non-fossil installed power capacity five years ahead of schedule. However, continued reliance on coal and fossil gas, alongside rising energy demand, keeps emissions on an upward trajectory. Its 2035 NDC represents only a marginal improvement on paper and requires no additional mitigation beyond current policies, widening the gap to a 1.5°C-compatible pathway.

Coal still accounts for around 70% of electricity generation, while grid integration and storage constraints hinder renewable deployment. Although progress is being made in electric mobility, green hydrogen and the operational carbon market, implementation remains insufficient to drive substantial emissions reductions. Greater investment in renewable energy, grids and storage, together with a clear fossil fuel phase-out strategy and stronger international support, will be essential.

INDONESIA is sending increasingly mixed signals on climate action. On the one hand, the government has announced highly ambitious plans to deploy 100 GW of solar and battery storage over the next three years, a programme that could fundamentally reshape the country's power sector if delivered. On the other hand, official electricity planning continues to prioritise coal and fossil gas expansion in the near term, while the cancellation of the country's most advanced early coal retirement pilot in 2025 raised fresh concerns about implementation.

Beyond the power sector, Indonesia's industrial downstreaming strategy is expected to drive significant growth in captive coal generation, while rising deforestation and growing pressure on land use threaten progress towards the FOLU Net Sink 2030 target.

With over 90% of its electricity generated from renewable sources, **KENYA** is a bold leader on climate action in East Africa. Expanding this progress beyond the power sector remains challenging, with 73% of total emissions in 2022 coming from the agriculture, land use change, and forestry sector (AFOLU).

With traditional fuels such as firewood, charcoal, and kerosene used by nearly 70% of households for cooking, and an economy heavily reliant on agriculture, demand for wood and land for cultivation is significant, driving severe deforestation and outpacing efforts at reforestation. While Kenya submitted a 2035 NDC in April 2025, its emissions reduction target lacks ambition, does not include targets for the AFOLU sector, and did not commit to a fossil fuel phase-out.

MEXICO has taken an important step forward by submitting a 2035 NDC that aligns its emissions pathway with its 2050 net zero target and introduces new sector-specific mitigation measures. However, a significant implementation gap remains: under current policies, emissions are still projected to be 16-20% above 2023 levels by 2035.

The forthcoming Special Climate Change Programme (PECC) will be a critical test to see if the government can translate these targets into concrete actions. At the same time, ongoing tensions between Mexico's climate ambitions and energy policy persist. Fossil fuel exploration, production and use are expected to increase based on plans from the state-owned oil and gas company (PEMEX) and targets for electricity production are still framed under the category of clean energy sources, which include certain fossil-gas technologies.

MOROCCO took an important step forward in its 2035 NDC by committing to phase out coal by 2040, conditional on international support. This is a significant milestone for a country where coal still generates the majority of electricity. Morocco also continues to make steady progress in deploying renewable energy and remains on track to meet its unconditional 2030 target. However, the ambition of its 2035 target falls short, allowing higher absolute emissions than in 2030. At the same time, plans to expand fossil gas infrastructure risk slowing the transition away from fossil fuels and undermining longer-term climate goals.

NEW ZEALAND has spent the past three years systematically rolling back key elements of its climate policy framework. Among other rollbacks, the government has weakened the country's 2050 methane target, removed the requirement for emissions trading settings to support international climate commitments, abandoned plans for agricultural emissions pricing, and reopened the door to offshore oil and gas exploration. These changes are reflected in its 2035 NDC, which is not aligned with a 1.5°C pathway and may allow emissions to rise after 2030.

NIGERIA continues to place fossil gas at the centre of its energy and development strategy. Through its Decade of Gas initiative, launched in 2021, the government is expanding gas production and infrastructure to improve energy access and meet growing demand. While Nigeria's 2035 NDC reaffirms its commitment to universal electricity access by 2030 and net zero emissions by 2060, its continued reliance on fossil gas as a "transition fuel" risks locking in future emissions and delaying the shift to a cleaner energy system. The challenge will be balancing energy access and economic development objectives with the deep emissions reductions required over the coming decades.

In its new NDC, **NORWAY** committed to reducing emissions by 70–75% below 1990 levels by 2035. While its 2030 and 2035 targets are 1.5°C aligned compared to modelled domestic pathways, stronger domestic policies will be needed to achieve them. Norway continues to lead globally in electric vehicle adoption, with zero-emission and plug-in hybrid vehicles accounting for 94% of new sales in 2024, keeping it on track to phase out fossil fuel cars by 2025. As the power sector is already almost fully decarbonised, cutting transport emissions remains a key focus, though progress in agriculture and land use lags behind. More importantly, Norway continues to profit off the production and export of fossil fuels while publicly proclaiming its commitment to ambitious climate action, a sharp contradiction at the heart of the world's "greenest" petrostate.

PERU's progress in advancing climate policy remains slow, reflecting a broader context of political instability and limited policy implementation. Following the ousting of President Pedro Castillo in 2022, President Dina Boluarte's government has been in turmoil, plagued by scandal and conflict with the legislature, increasing political instability and contributing to slower policy development overall while failing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Despite these challenging circumstances, there has been some movement in the climate policy space. Peru's recently published National Climate Change Strategy for 2050 sets targets for 2030 and 2050, further clarifies Peru's net zero target of 2050, and serves as the main policy instrument to drive and coordinate Peru's long-term response to climate change. However, the government continues to invest in fossil fuels, approving new oil extraction projects and planning to increase oil and gas production – moves that are not aligned with 1.5°C or compatible with Peru's climate targets.

Progress on climate action in the **PHILIPPINES** remains limited, with new commitments undermined by continued fossil fuel dependence. Its 2035 NDC raises the unconditional component to 7%, but changes to the baseline and the inclusion of a large projected land-sector sink cast doubt on the claimed increase in ambition. The headline 75% reduction offers little clarity on whether the country will deliver substantially deeper cuts outside the land sector.

Meanwhile, the US-Israel war with Iran and the subsequent energy crisis have exposed the country's dependence on imported fossil fuels, prompting a national energy emergency as supply disruptions drove up costs. The government temporarily increased coal-fired generation and permitted limited use of dirtier transport fuels. Although higher electricity prices have accelerated rooftop solar uptake, the crisis response risks reinforcing fossil fuel dependence. The test ahead is whether energy security concerns accelerate a lasting shift towards renewables and electrification.

The only noteworthy piece of climate legislation that **RUSSIA** has passed in the last year is its 2035 NDC, which aims to cut emissions by 33-35% below 1990 levels, including LULUCF. Due to its huge LULUCF sink, which has been enlarged through recalculations that are not aligned with UNFCCC guidelines, Russia will easily meet that target with no additional policies.

Energy policy remains focused on finding new markets to export its fossil fuels. Russian projections for future fossil fuel demand are bullish, with significant effort directed towards increasing sales to Asia. Such ambitious projections, however, fail to deal with reality as it is. Its coal industry is in turmoil, with a large number of companies on the verge of bankruptcy. Its gas infrastructure is not built to transport the volumes to Asia that it once exported to the EU. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries have led to declines in production, causing Russia to temporarily ban oil exports as it manages a domestic fuel crisis.

SAUDI ARABIA's emissions continue to rise and are projected to increase through at least 2035, with no signs of bending down in sight. Despite repeated commitments to expand renewable energy, progress has been limited, with renewables accounting for only a small share of electricity generation.

The country's 2035 NDC does little to change this trajectory: ambition remains far from 1.5°C compatible, and the gap between Saudi Arabia's targets and a 1.5°C pathway is wider in 2035 than in 2030. As the world's largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia continues to rely heavily on fossil fuel revenues, while avoiding measures that would address the underlying driver of its emissions growth.

SOUTH AFRICA has taken important steps to strengthen its climate governance, including bringing the Climate Change Act into force and finalising a new Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) that envisages a major expansion of solar, wind and battery storage. However, the country continues to risk its transition through plans for new fossil gas capacity and delays to coal plant retirement.

While South Africa now has economy-wide climate policy instruments in place, including carbon budgets and a carbon tax, key implementation details remain unfinished and existing incentives are still too weak to drive substantial emissions reductions. At the same time, the new IRP makes coal phase-out dependent on the build-out of gas infrastructure, raising concerns about long-term fossil fuel lock-in.

SOUTH KOREA's first Renewable Energy Basic Plan aims to nearly triple renewables capacity by 2030, but rising and uncertain electricity demand from AI data centres and semiconductor manufacturing could deepen the country's reliance on fossil fuels. Driven by government-backed industrial megaprojects, projected peak demand in 2040 was revised upwards by as much as 26.8 GW in just four months. Rather than accelerating renewables, the government is now looking to expand LNG power as a back-up to variable renewables and to fast-track new nuclear projects, risking fossil gas lock-in and diverting investment away from renewables.

Following its 2035 NDC submission in December 2025, targeting a 53-61% reduction below 2018 levels, South Korea has since enshrined its new longer-term target ranges for 2040 and 2045 into law, in response to the 2024 Constitutional Court ruling. However, as with its 2030 NDC, these new targets leave room to rely on international carbon credits, carbon removal and CCUS instead of deep emissions reductions at home. To get on track, South Korea must meet growing demand with renewables expansion and commit to delivering its targets domestically.

SWITZERLAND continues to rely heavily on international carbon credits under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to meet its 2030 emissions reduction target. While the government has continued to develop its bilateral cooperation, the volume of mitigation outcomes transferred to date remains very small relative to the reductions needed.

Questions therefore remain over whether and how Switzerland can secure sufficient high-integrity international mitigation outcomes and deliver the necessary domestic reductions to meet its 2030 target. A key test will be the next revision of the CO_2 Act for 2031–2040, which the government is preparing and which is expected to undergo public consultation in 2027.

As the host of COP31, **TÜRKIYE** faces a crisis of contradiction: while calling for accelerated climate action, its own targets are weak and lack the ambition necessary to drive much-needed emissions reductions. Türkiye's 2035 NDC would be well overachieved with currently implemented policies and see emissions still increase over the next decade, clearly incompatible with the 1.5°C limit and its Paris Agreement obligations.

Türkiye has made good progress on expanding wind and solar energy, nearly doubling their share of total generation in the last five years. At the same time, the government's efforts to increase fossil fuel production and become a hub for oil and fossil gas, as well as to cement its status as the largest producer of coal-fired electricity in Europe, undermine Türkiye's credibility and risk locking the country into a fossil fuel-intensive future

The **UNITED ARAB EMIRATES** continues to expand its fossil fuel industry while pursuing climate policies that fall short of what's needed to meet its climate goals. In May 2026, the UAE left OPEC, freeing itself from production quotas and signaling its intention to further increase oil output with immediate effects: production reached near-record levels in June.

Meanwhile, the government continues investing in fossil gas extraction and LNG export infrastructure, including a USD 6.2 billion investment in the Umm Shaif gas field and the development of the Ruwais LNG export terminal. Although the country continues to implement its clean energy targets and expand renewable capacity, it has yet to commit to phasing out fossil fuels, instead relying heavily on carbon capture and storage (CCS) to reconcile continued hydrocarbon expansion with its climate ambitions.

The **UNITED KINGDOM** has taken a fairly comprehensive approach to cutting its emissions. Strong renewable energy targets, streamlining of the permitting process for transmission infrastructure, a wide range of electrification measures, and peatland restoration have been notable bright spots that ought to be commended. Challenges remain, however.

Wind and solar deployment is not at the level needed to achieve the government's Clean Power 2030 Action Plan, hampered in particular by insufficient transmission infrastructure. High electricity prices complicate the economic benefits of electric technologies, while active support for the expansion of aviation risks blowing the UK's carbon budget. Lastly, if the government moves ahead with further oil and gas drilling in the North Sea, it will be signing off on a 350 MtCO2e climate bomb – with almost no economic benefit for the British public.

In the **UNITED STATES**, the Trump Administration is escalating its unprecedented rollback of climate change mitigation targets, policies and funding, obstructing clean energy and technology deployment while accelerating fossil fuel production and consumption. The withdrawal from the Paris Agreement effectively nullifies US emissions reduction targets for 2030, 2035, and 2050. The 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBB) stalls renewable energy development, particularly beyond 2030, and undermines electric vehicle uptake.

Meanwhile, US oil and gas production reached an all-time high in 2025 and is projected to increase further in 2026. The administration rescinded the 2009 Endangerment Finding, removing the legal foundation for federal regulation of emissions and enabling the repeal of vehicle emissions standards. It also eliminated the Biden Administration's emissions standards for fossil fuel-fired power plants, as rising electricity demand from AI data centres threatens to drive substantial expansion in fossil fuel generation. In combination, the Trump Administration's agenda will significantly slow emissions reductions and push the US even further off track from a 1.5°C-aligned trajectory.

VIET NAM continues to strengthen support for renewable energy development, alongside a recent push for nuclear power. The transport sector has also seen rapid growth in electric vehicle uptake. However, progress toward decarbonising its economy remains uneven, particularly in the power and industrial sectors. While renewables are increasingly prioritised, many recent policy initiatives still lack detailed implementation frameworks, and continued investment in coal and LNG risks locking in future emissions. Many recent policy initiatives still require detailed implementation frameworks before they can deliver substantial emissions reductions, while continued investment in coal and LNG risks slowing the transition.

The government's focus on energy security and meeting rapidly growing electricity demand has reinforced the role of fossil fuels, particularly following the Closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This has created a growing tension at the heart of Viet Nam's energy strategy: renewables are increasingly recognised as the long-term solution, yet coal and LNG continue to play a prominent role in plans to support economic growth and energy security. Viet Nam remains one of the last Climate Action Tracker countries yet to submit a 2035 NDC, leaving uncertainty over its post-2030 emissions trajectory.

A2 Comparison to UNEP

This annex compares the global temperature projections reported by the UNEP's Emissions Gap Report (EGR) to the Climate Action Tracker's annual temperature update.

The EGR estimates global warming over the 21st century under four mitigation scenarios: current policies, unconditional NDCs, conditional NDCs, and conditional NDCs plus all net-zero pledges. For each scenario, temperature outcomes are presented assuming a 10%, 66%, and 90% probability of staying below the respective warming thresholds.

At the 66% probability level, the EGR and CAT warming estimates align (see table below). The EGR projects warming of 2.8°C (range: 1.6 – 4.5°C) under current policies. Under unconditional NDCs, projected warming decreases to 2.7°C (1.5 – 4.1°C), and further to 2.6°C (1.5 – 3.9°C) when considering conditional NDCs. Including all NDCs and net-zero pledges reduces projected warming to 2.1°C (1.4 – 2.9°C).

With the same probability level, the CAT's projections are 3.0°C (2.2 – 3.4°C) under current policies, 2.8°C (2.1 – 3.2°C) for the NDC scenario, 2.3°C (1.7 – 2.6°C) for the pledges and targets scenario, and 2.1°C (1.5 – 2.4°C) for the optimistic scenario. CAT defines the range of its temperature outcomes assuming a 16%, 66%, and 84% probability.

Overall, warming projections from the CAT and the EGR are very close for the NDC and optimistic scenarios. For current policies, the CAT projects higher warming than the EGR. The differences in the headline figures circulated in media and public communication come mainly from three sources:

- **Probability threshold**: The EGR reports its central estimate at a 66% probability, while the CAT uses a 50% threshold.
- **Climate model**: The EGR uses the FaIR climate emulator, while the CAT uses MAGICC7.
- **Data vintage**: The CAT includes the most recent set of historical data available to reflect the latest trends (especially for China and India).

Further details on the methodological differences are detailed below.

The table below summarises the warming assessments of different scenarios under the EGR and CAT (end-of-century warming) with a 66% chance.

Table 1 Summary of CAT warming estimates compared to UNEP's Emissions Gap Report estimates

Temperatures	50% chance	66% chance		Comments
	CAT	CAT	EGR	
Current Policies	2.7°C	3.0°C	2.8°C	
NDCs	2.6°C	2.8°C	2.7°C (unconditional) 2.6°C (conditional)	CAT uses unconditional NDCs
Pledges plus binding net zero targets	2.1°C	2.3°C		
Optimistic (all net zero targets)	1.9°C	2.1°C	2.1°C	

Overview of differences in methodology

Despite having similar temperature outcomes and general approaches to temperature projections, there are several methodological and conceptual differences (non-exhaustive list) between the CAT and EGR:

- **Likelihood**: The UNEP EGR's main scenario assumes a 66% chance of limiting warming below a threshold, whereas the CAT's analysis is based on a 50% chance.
- **Country level input data**: The CAT updates its country calculations as well as its assessment of international aviation and shipping on a rolling basis throughout the year to reflect the latest available data. This includes historical emissions, current policy projections, and targets and pledges.
  - Importantly, for the case of large emitting countries such as China and India, the calculations going into the warming projections reflect the latest version of the PRIMAP historical emissions time series, covering the period from 1990 to 2025 (PRIMAP-hist 2026[1]).
  - Both assessments now exclude US targets from all their scenarios, following the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and US policy rollbacks. The CAT already reflected these changes last year in its 'policies and action', '2030 and 2035 targets' and 'pledges and targets' scenarios. We reported that removing US targets raised projected warming by 0.06–0.07°C, which contributed to the 0.1°C increase in the 'pledges and targets' scenario. This year, the CAT has also removed all US targets from its optimistic scenario. The EGR made these changes only in its 2026 report, which increased their NDC warming estimates and drove their optimistic scenario estimate up by 0.2°C, compared to the 2025 report.
- **Pathway extension methodologies**: The UNEP EGR report is extending current policies and NDCs throughout the century and now starting in 2035 based on their implied carbon price. Over time, carbon prices are adjusted to follow the same growth trajectory as global GDP. Following the method published by Rogelj et al. 2023,[2] the emissions implied by these carbon price trajectories are estimated based on the relationships found in five IAM modelling frameworks. The CAT applies the equal-quantile extension framework[3] drawing on a comparable set of IAM models to extend emissions trajectories.
- **Climate model**: The UNEP's EGR uses the FaIR[4] climate emulator, while the CAT uses MAGICC7[5] - both are calibrated to the IPCC AR6. When calculating CAT's global warming projections using FaIR, only the deadline number for current policies shifts from 3.0°C to 2.9°C, bringing it closer to the EGR report's numbers. For all other scenarios, the projections change slightly, but not enough to affect the headline numbers included in Table 1.
- **Methodological update, CAT**: For this year's assessment, the CAT implemented minor updates to its methodology and updated several input datasets and the database of pathways used to extend emissions. These changes are described in detail in Annex 3 on methodological updates and their impacts.
- **Methodological update, EGR**: Roughly two-thirds of the reduction in temperature projections compared to the previous year (about 0.3°C lower) stem from updated policy projections and newly submitted NDCs. The remaining reduction reflects methodological updates.

1 Gütschow, J., Busch, D. and Pflüger, M. (2026) 'The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series (1750-2025)'. Available at: https://zenodo.org/records/22876287

2 Rogelj, J., Fransen, T., den Elzen, M., Lamboll, R.D., Schumer, C., Kuramochi, T. et al. (2023). Credibility gap in net-zero climate targets leaves world at high risk. Science 380(6649), 1014-1016. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adg6248

3 Lamboll, R. D., Nicholls, Z. R. J., Kikstra, J. S., Meinshausen, M., and Rogelj, J.: Silicone v1.0.0: an open-source Python package for inferring missing emissions data for climate change research, Geosci. Model Dev., 13, 5259–5275, https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-13-5259-2020, 2020a

4 Leach, N. J., Jenkins, S., Nicholls, Z., Smith, C. J., Lynch, J., Cain, M., Walsh, T., Wu, B., Tsutsui, J., and Allen, M. R. (2021): FaIRv2.0.0: a generalized impulse response model for climate uncertainty and future scenario exploration, Geosci. Model Dev., 14, 3007–3036, https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-14-3007-2021

5 Meinshausen, M., S. C. B. Raper and T. M. L. Wigley (2011). "Emulating coupled atmosphere-ocean and carbon cycle models with a simpler model, MAGICC6: Part I – Model Description and Calibration." Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 11: 1417-1456. doi:10.5194/acp-11-1417-2011

A3 Methodology updates and impacts

This annex provides an overview of the methodological changes in the assessment of global emission pathways and temperature projections that have been introduced since the CAT's global temperature update in November 2025.

Updates to CAT's global warming projections methods

1. The database of regional emission pathways from the IPCC AR6 scenario database, which is used to extend countries' emissions beyond the last year of their assessment, was regenerated using the same methodological approach as last year. The pathways are harmonised to the updated historical emissions for 2015 (from the latest country assessment and PRIMAP-hist).
2. Emissions of countries not assessed by the CAT are now based on NDC Quantification data from Climate Resource (November 2026) in the target scenarios, replacing a PIK dataset from 2021. Historical emissions for these countries now come from PRIMAP-hist 2025 instead of PRIMAP-hist 2024.
3. Since the US is no longer assigned any targets, following its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, when the emissions of the other OECD countries are extended, their total is scaled up to the size of the full OECD region in 2024. That way, the missing US targets does not distort their pathways.
4. The CAT updated the country assessments as well as its assessment of international aviation and shipping to reflect the latest available data. This includes historical emissions, current policy projections, and targets and pledges. Bangladesh and Senegal were assessed for the first time as CAT countries. For a full overview, please see Annex 4 on scenario definitions.

The following table provides an overview of the impacts of the methodology, data and policy updates on the temperature assessment in 2100 compared to last year's assessment (median warming, in °C). Note that values are approximate: each change was estimated in the order in which it was introduced, but applying changes in a different order may not lead to the same values.

Table 2 Overview of the of the impacts of the methodology, data and policy updates on the temperature assessment in 2100 compared to last year's assessment (median warming, in °C).

	Policies and action	2030 & 2035 targets only	Pledges and targets	Optimistic scenario
Updated pathway extension database	+0.046	+0.054	+0.023	+0.013
Updated historical emissions (country assessments, PRIMAP-hist 2025, 2015 as starting point of the pathway extension)	+0.040	+0.050	+0.020	+0.010
Climate Resource data for the targets of countries not assessed by the CAT	0	-0.064	-0.044	-0.048
Impact of US in OECD region No US targets	0	+0.023	+0.010	+0.007
Updated international aviation and shipping projections	+0.025	0	+0.001	+0.001
Updated country assessments for countries assessed by CAT (policies and targets)	-0.023	-0.061	-0.141	-0.055
Bug fixes and other code changes	-0.004	+0.007	-0.003	+0.051
Total change compared to last year	+0.085	+0.010	-0.135	-0.021

Temperature assessment of the Paris-compatible scenarios


The CAT has historically used a subset of the AR6 scenarios which limit warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot to characterise the emissions reductions needed to be fully compatible with the Paris Agreement (Climate Analytics, 2023). These pathways were selected to guide the global energy transition to net zero in a sustainable way, with reduced reliance on CDR. They are all consistent with reaching net zero GHGs in the second half of the century, and are therefore consistent with the C1a classification of scenarios used in IPCC AR6 WGIII (Riahi et al, 2022). We have not conducted a specific temperature assessment for this subset of AR6 pathways, but as they are consistent with the C1a classification, we use data from the C1a pathways in the AR6 WGIII report to classify these scenarios. In this report, the C1a pathways were assessed to have a 2100 temperature of 1.2°C in the median, with a 90th percentile range of 1.1–1.4°C.

Change in 'Policies and action' emissions projections for 2050 over the years

For the second year in a row, projected global emissions in 2050 are no longer lower than the year before. The change in trend in 2025 of projected global emissions can largely be attributed to the CAT shifting from global warming potential (GWP) from the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) to IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).

Projected 2050 emissions under 'Policies and action', by assessment year

For the second year in a row, projected global emissions for 2050 are no longer lower than in the previous year's assessment. The change in trend in 2025 is partly related to the CAT switching its global warming potential (GWP) values from the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) to its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).



Note: The emissions pathway for 2020 was scaled up to match the start of the emissions pathway for 2026 line to remove the impact of changes to historical emissions and the use of different global warming potentials *(AR4 for 2019-2024, AR5 for 2025-2026).*

Figure 10 Projected global emissions under 'Policies and action' across CAT assessments, for the timeframe 2010–2050

A4 Scenario definition

This annex provides an overview of how we define each of the CAT's scenarios while also giving details on what assumptions were made for each scenario, and for each country in this update.

CAT scenarios at a glance

Each CAT scenario adds one more layer of commitment to the one before it. All except the current policy line use only the high end, to stay conservative.

Table 3 Overview of the different scenarions used by Climate Action Tracker with their definitions.

Temperatures	Comments
Policies and actions	Takes the 'Current policy pathways' scenarios from the country tools, shown as a high (Max) and a low (Min) line. They run to 2035, and to 2050 for China.
Targets 2030 only	Takes the 'Commitment Max' scenario from the country tools, up to 2030.
Targets 2030 & 2035	Targets 2030 only, plus the 'Commitment Max' scenario from the country tools, for 2031–2035 where the tool has a 2035 NDC target. For countries where the tool does not include data until 2035, Climate Resource data fills this period.
Pledges & targets	Targets 2030 & 2035, plus 'Commitment Max' scenario from the country tools, beyond 2035 to the row's last year. If there is no 2035 target, it extends from 2030 instead.
Optimistic	Pledges & targets, plus any further commitments, as set out below: ▸ If the country tool has an 'Other commitment' row filled, add its Max to the row's last year. ▸ If there is no 'Other commitment' row but the country has a net-zero target in the Net Zero Tracker (IEA column), follow Pledges & targets to the last pledge year. Then draw a straight line to zero in 2080. If the country only has the baseline, the line starts in 2030. ▸ If there is neither, leave 'Pledges & targets' unchanged.

Input to CAT's temperature estimates, per country

Table 4 Overivew of inputs for each country under the Climate Action Tracker's various temperature projections for 2100.

Country	Last updated	2030 & 2035 targets only (no hot air)*	Pledges & Targets			Optimistic targets		Policies & action
			2030 NDC target*	2035 NDC target*	Net Zero targets	NZT included?	Method	Policies until
Argentina	June 2026	Updated NDC (2021)	Updated NDC (2021)	No 2035 target (2030 target extended)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Australia	September 2026	2030: Updated NDC (2022); 2035: NDC (2025)	Updated NDC (2022)	NDC (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Bangladesh	October 2026	Current policies	Current policies	Current policies	–	No target	–	2035
Brazil	April 2026	2030: Updated NDC (2023); 2035: NDC (2024)	Updated NDC (2023)	NDC (2024)	Yes	Yes	Conserva-tive global estimate	2035
Canada	September 2026	2030: Updated NDC - domestic target (2021); 2035: NDC (2025)	Updated NDC - domestic target (2021)	NDC (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Chile	September 2025	NDC (2025)	NDC (2025)	NDC (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
China	October 2026	2030: NDC 2.0 (2022); 2035: NDC 3.0 (2025)	NDC 2.0 (2022)	NDC 3.0 (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2050

Country	Last updated	2030 & 2035 targets only (no hot air)*	Pledges & Targets			Optimistic targets		Policies & action
			2030 NDC target*	2035 NDC target*	Net Zero targets	NZT included?	Method	Policies until
Colombia	October 2025	2030: Updated NDC (2020); 2035: NDC 3.0 (2025)	Updated NDC (2020)	NDC 3.0 (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Costa Rica	March 2023	Updated NDC (2020)	Updated NDC (2020)	No 2035 target (2030 target extended)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2030
Egypt	September 2025	Current policies	Current policies	No 2035 target (2030 target extended)	–	No target	–	2035
Ethiopia	October 2026	Current policies	Current policies	Current policies	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
EU27	August 2026	2030: Updated NDC (2023); 2035: NDC (2025)	Updated NDC (2023)	NDC (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Germany		Covered in EU27						
India	October 2026	Current policies	Current policies	Current policies	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Indonesia	September 2026	Current policies	Current policies	Current policies	No	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Iran	September 2026	Current policies	Current policies	No 2035 target (2030 target extended)	–	No target	–	2035
Japan	April 2026	2030: Updated NDC (2021); 2035: NDC 3.0 (2025)	Updated NDC (2021)	NDC 3.0 (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Kenya	March 2026	Current policies	Current policies	Current policies	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Mexico	September 2026	2030: Current policies; 2035: NDC	Current policies	NDC	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Morocco	November 2025	2030: Updated NDC (2021); 2035: NDC 3.0 (2025)	Updated NDC (2021)	NDC 3.0 (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
New Zealand	October 2026	2030: Updated NDC (2021); 2035: NDC (2025)	Updated NDC (2021)	NDC (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Nigeria	September 2026	NDC 3.0 (2025)	NDC 3.0 (2025)	NDC 3.0 (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Norway	September 2025	2030: Updated NDC (2022); 2035: NDC (2025)	Updated NDC (2022)	NDC (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Pakistan	October 2026	Current policies	Current policies	Current policies	–	No target	–	2035
Peru	December 2025	2030: Updated NDC (2020); 2035: NDC 3.0 (2025) - conditional target	Updated NDC (2020)	NDC 3.0 (2025) - conditional target	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Philippines	September 2026	Current policies	Current policies	Current policies	–	No target	–	2035
Russian Federation	September 2026	Current policies	Current policies	Current policies	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Saudi Arabia	September 2026	2030: Updated NDC (2021); 2035: NDC (2025), interpolated to its 2040 target	Updated NDC (2021)	NDC (2025): interpolated between the 2030 target (2021) and the 2040 target (2025)	No	Yes	CAT estimate	2035

Country	Last updated	2030 & 2035 targets only (no hot air)*	Pledges & Targets			Optimistic targets		Policies & action
			2030 NDC target*	2035 NDC target*	Net Zero targets	NZT included?	Method	Policies until
Senegal	February 2026	Current policies	Current policies	No 2035 target (2030 target extended)	–	No target	–	2035
South Africa	November 2025	2030: Updated NDC (2021); 2035: NDC (2025)	Updated NDC (2021)	NDC (2025)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
South Korea	September 2026	2030: Update NDC -domestic target (2021); 2035: NDC (2025) - domestic target	Update NDC -domestic target (2021)	NDC (2025) - domestic target	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Switzerland	September 2026	2030: Current policies; 2035: NDC (2025) - domestic target	Current policies	NDC (2025) - domestic target	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Thailand	September 2024	Updated NDC (2020)	Updated NDC (2020)	No 2035 target (2030 target extended)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
Türkiye	September 2026	Current policies	Current policies	Current policies	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
UAE	September 2024	Net zero pathway (Long-term Strategy, 2023)	Net zero pathway (Long-term Strategy, 2023)	Net zero pathway (Long-term Strategy, 2023)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
UK	September 2026	2030: Updated NDC (2022); 2035: NDC	Updated NDC (2022)	NDC	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
USA	September 2026	No target (current policies)	No target (current policies)	No target (current policies)	–	No target	–	2035
Viet Nam	September 2026	Current policies	Current policies	No 2035 target (2030 target extended)	Yes	Yes	CAT estimate	2035
International Aviation **	September 2026	CAT estimate of 2030 emissions under carbon neutral target & 2050 target						
International Shipping**	October 2025	2030, 2040 and 2050 targets						

* For weak targets, we take a country's estimated 2030 or 2035 level under current policies, if that level is lower than the target.

** International bunkers targets are included in all pathways as they have been formally adopted by their respective governing bodies.

A5 Country ratings summary

Figure 11 Summary of Climate Action Tracker's Overall rating and rating components.

