
Climate Action Tracker



Climate Action Tracker

International Climate Initiatives

Large potential, limited impact – and what it would take to make them work

November 2026

CLIMATE ANALYTICS

NEW CLIMATE INSTITUTE

Summary

The Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA - or "Action Agenda") has become a prominent element of the UNFCCC process – designed to complement the official negotiations with a multitude of voluntary initiatives and activities not requiring consensus by all Parties.

These voluntary initiatives are launched by COP Presidencies, the High-Level Champions, or groups of governments; typically aiming to increase ambition beyond the formally negotiated consensus. They differ from COP and CMA decisions, which are agreed by consensus and are subject to the transparency and accountability mechanisms of the Paris Agreement.

At COP30, the Brazilian Presidency consolidated the growing number of climate initiatives into the Action Agenda, while Türkiye's COP31 Presidency has added several new ones, including the goal of 35% electricity in global final energy by 2035. It has also framed Antalya as an implementation-focused "COP of the Future" where the task is to translate existing commitments into measurable results.

Independent analyses of climate initiatives have shown they can be effective in signalling political commitments, building momentum behind sectoral climate action, and facilitating knowledge sharing, cooperation and dialogue across countries and sectors. Most importantly, they have the potential to make a substantial contribution towards closing the emissions gap to a 1.5°C trajectory.

At the same time, this theoretical potential is surrounded by reasonable doubt. The effectiveness of cooperative climate initiatives has stagnated since 2018; fewer than a third require their members to set targets, and fewer than a fifth publish a budget. Across Asia, that pledge content has, at best, been loosely integrated into national policies, and signatories are not doing any better than non-signatories.

Unlike NDCs, whose implementation is reported in Biennial Transparency Reports, reviewed by experts and assessed through the Global Stocktake, no process inside the UNFCCC comprehensively reviews delivery of Action Agenda commitments. The result is that responsibility and accountability are becoming diffused, without a clear understanding of what emission reductions the initiatives are achieving.

Politically, there is a risk that Presidencies can claim outcomes on the strength of signatures with no process to robustly test their success. Meanwhile, governments join without needing to adopt a consistent national target or corresponding policies, which could deflect attention away from real action.

This report investigates both the potential and the impact of the Action Agenda to date and makes specific recommendations as to how transparency and accountability can be strengthened and measurement of progress towards the Paris Agreement's 1.5° limit can be addressed.

It provides quantitative and qualitative analyses of five selected international climate initiatives (Powering Past Coal Alliance, Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge, Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration, Global Methane Pledge, and Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use) and provides recommendations for their improvement.

Five selected **International climate initiatives**



PPCA
Powering Past Coal Alliance

3R2E
Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge

ZEV-D
Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration

GMP
Global Methane Pledge

GDFLU
Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use

One of these initiatives, namely the Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge (3R2E), is a special case. Eleven days after its launch, all parties adopted its headline targets - to triple renewables and double energy efficiency - as part of the outcome of the first Global Stocktake - through an official CMA decision. These targets are, therefore, not a voluntary initiative but rather a commitment of all Parties. Only the pledge's accompanying commitments, on coal, NDC integration and annual review, remain voluntary, and are not tracked.

Together, all five initiatives we analyse would, in theory, have significant potential to narrow the gap towards Paris-compatible pathways. Our estimates show that if their current members achieve their goals, emissions would be ~7.4 $GtCO_2e$ lower in 2030 compared to current policies, about 10% better than at their launch due to increased membership. Universal participation could more than double this potential to ~16 $GtCO_2e$. For 2035, emissions could be ~8.9 $GtCO_2e$ lower under the current level of membership and ~20 $GtCO_2e$ lower under universal membership.

A large proportion of this potential is attributable to the goal of tripling renewables and doubling energy efficiency. As the headline targets of the 3R2E pledge were adopted as part of the Global Stocktake (GST), the case of universal membership applies. This potential alone amounts to ~9.9 $GtCO_2e$ in 2030, and ~14 $GtCO_2e$ in 2035. In other words, between 60- 70% of the total potential under universal membership stems from the GST outcome. The remainder is attributable to the four voluntary initiatives – though considerable overlap exists.

Potential global emissions reductions from climate initiatives	PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance	ZEV-D Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration	GMP Global Methane Pledge	GDFLU Declaration on Forests and Land Use	Total of all non-binding initiatives	3R2E* Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	Overlap PPCA and ZED-V overlap with 3R2E	Grand total** mitigation potential of five initiatives
2030	Global emissions reductions in GtCO2e if all initiative targets are met							
Current initiative members	0.66	0.08	1.5	2.6	4.8	3.2	0.63	7.4
Members at initiative launch	0.03	0.06	1.1	2.5	3.7	3.1	0.08	6.7
Universal coverage	**2.9**	**0.66**	**2.8**	**3.2**	**9.5**	**9.9**	**3.1**	**16.3**
2035	Global emissions reductions in GtCO2e if all initiative targets are met							
Current initiative members	0.37	0.21	1.8	2.3	4.7	4.7	0.5	8.9
Members at initiative launch	0.01	0.15	1.4	2.3	3.8	4.6	0.2	8.2
Universal coverage	**3.1**	**1.6**	**2.9**	**2.8**	**10.3**	**14.2**	**4.2**	**20.3**

* The goals of the 3R2E initiative were adopted in paragraph 28(a) of COP28 and are binding for all Parties. The values shown here for members show the share of the potential from the named signatories of the original pledge.

** not accounting for possible overlaps between GMP and 3R2E / ZEV-D. For more details on the overlap estimates, see the Methodology section.

NB: We have performed a central assessment based on a range of assumptions. All of these assumptions carry uncertainties, but we have not quantified the uncertainty range here. Numbers in the table may not add up due to rounding.

The figures are measured against current policies rather than NDCs, so they may already include reductions governments are already committed to.

The process adopted by the COP30 Brazilian Presidency - to consolidate and understand the landscape of agenda items - was an important step in terms of getting more transparency and accountability. This report shows there's more required, and what the COP31 Turkish Presidency could consider.

Overall, our analysis finds the impacts of all of the analysed initiatives to be significantly below their potential.

- **Membership has generally grown over time**, but coverage remains uneven and more limited. Cases where new participation coincided with - or led to - a change in national policies include Morocco's coal phase-out and Chile's policies on zero emission vehicles. For many initiatives, major emitters are absent, for example China, India and Russia did not sign the Global Methane Pledge.
- **High coverage is not automatically a predictor of success**, it could also stem from weak or vague participation rules. Signatories of the Glasgow Forest Declaration, for example, account for the vast majority of forest cover loss, which has remained stable since the initiative was launched and did not decline as pledged.
- **Progress is off track across all analysed initiatives:**
  - The coal phase-out in OECD countries is the closest to achieving its target.
  - On the 3R2E (GST) targets, renewables capacity is close to being on track against the tripling target, while the doubling of efficiency is significantly off track.
  - EV uptake is off track and must accelerate substantially.
  - Methane emissions and deforestation trends are particularly concerning, as both are moving in the opposite direction of their stated targets.
- **There is limited evidence that signatories to these initiatives are leading the way in terms of climate action:** in the case of the PPCA, they tend to be ahead, but in the others, frontrunner countries are not part of the initiatives, for example China in the case of EV adoption. For other initiatives, there is no notable difference between signatories and non-signatories, and in the case of methane, signatory s country emissions have even risen faster than non-signatory countries'.
- **Members are generally more likely than non-members to have adopted domestic targets** related to the goals of the analysed initiatives, although the degree of alignment with the initiatives' level of ambition varies.
  - In many cases, domestic targets were already in place when countries joined the initiatives. However, we also find examples where the initiatives have led to the proliferation of corresponding targets among signatories.
  - Across the five initiatives, only a minority of G20 signatories have a domestic target consistent with what they signed, and for the binding GST renewables target only the EU has a consistent domestic target, with Australia consistent in share terms but short on capacity.
  - Initiatives are rarely referenced in NDCs or Biennial Transparency Reports, with the Global Methane Pledge being mentioned most frequently.
- **Initiatives have advanced collective efforts in some cases**, or have helped mainstream and formalise climate targets.
  - All analysed initiatives created political momentum on their topics.
  - The PPCA normalised and mainstreamed the idea of phase-out targets for coal.
  - Some governments' methane reduction targets explicitly mirror the ambition level of the Global Methane Pledge and aim at a 30% reduction below 2020 levels by 2030.
- **Targets are mostly clear, time-bound and aligned with 1.5°C** – but not always. The Global Methane Pledge's methane reduction target, for example, falls short of being 1.5°C consistent. Halting deforestation and the energy efficiency goal, lack robust baselines, indicators or accounting methods.
- **Some initiatives have country-specific targets**, which allows progress tracking against these targets and holding countries accountable, whereas collective targets risk a dilution of responsibility.
- **Governance and accountability mechanisms remain weak**, with limited monitoring and reporting, compliance requirements, consequences for underperformance, and transparency on funding and institutional structures.

Initiatives falling short of their potential can be attributed to initiative-specific design flaws, as well as more structural reasons.

Our recommendations are directed at closing this accountability gap and directed at Parties through the CMA, COP Presidencies, the initiatives themselves, the UNFCCC secretariat, and the High-Level Champions.

With particular attention to Türkiye's newly announced electrification target, they are:

1. Initiatives should be designed around their intended purpose and the actors whose behaviour they seek to influence. Initiators should clearly define whether an initiative is intended primarily to raise political attention, support implementation of existing commitments, or drive additional mitigation ambition. Design features such as targets, participation requirements, reporting arrangements, and assessment frameworks should follow from this objective.

   All initiatives should at minimum support implementation of the Paris Agreement and the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake. Where initiatives aim to drive emission reductions, they should adopt measurable, Paris-aligned targets, transparent monitoring systems, and clear mechanisms for assessing progress and impact.

2. Initiative design should reflect implementation realities. This includes addressing policy, financial, infrastructure, and institutional barriers; creating incentives and benefits for participation; allowing flexibility for national circumstances; facilitating access to support; and avoiding unintended consequences. Initiatives should be developed with a clear understanding of how their objectives contribute to broader transitions and long-term decarbonisation.

3. Proponents of initiatives, including the Presidencies, should actively and selectively expand participation, focusing on major emitters and other countries whose involvement can materially affect outcomes. Diplomatic efforts should emphasise the practical benefits of participation, including access to knowledge sharing, finance, technology, influence over emerging standards, and reputational advantages, while ensuring that expansion does not dilute ambition or engagement.

4. Key stakeholders engaged in the setting of initiatives, particularly governments and Presidencies, should strengthen transparency and accountability. Several strategies are available, differing in the degree of consensus they require. For example, initiatives themselves should set quantified, time-bound, country-specific targets with clear baselines, backed by robust monitoring and reporting of individual signatories' progress.

   Initiative secretariats could formalise and expand their reporting to the UNFCCC, which remains voluntary and rudimentary on target achievement. Third-party evaluations could become more systematic and examine whether signatories deliver action beyond their NDC and GST commitments. A formal and arguably more effective alternative is the use of the Paris Agreement's transparency framework: a CMA decision at COP31 could invite Parties to reference relevant initiative targets in their NDCs and report on progress in their Biennial Transparency Reports, for inclusion in the Secretariat's synthesis reports and be subject to the relevant review processes.

   Beyond the country level, the outcomes of the Action Agenda could be integrated into the second Global Stocktake, with the High-Level Champions or the Secretariat submitting to its technical dialogue an assessment of delivery against targets, drawing on available reporting by country by the initiatives themselves. This would create the periodic review initiatives currently lack and allow their collective contribution and additionality to be assessed.

5. COP Presidencies should manage the Action Agenda as a coherent portfolio rather than a collection of separate initiatives. New initiatives should only be launched where they fill genuine gaps, complement existing efforts, and demonstrate clear additionality. Greater coordination, alignment, and consolidation would reduce fragmentation and increase the Action Agenda's overall effectiveness and contribution to global climate goals.

Table of Contents

Summary i

1 Introduction 1

2 Purpose and evolution of international climate initiatives in the context of the Action Agenda 2

2.1 Overview and role within the Action Agenda 2

2.2 Expected role and benefits 5

2.3 Limitations and critiques 5

3 Evaluation of selected climate initiatives within the Action Agenda 7

3.1 Mitigation potential 9

3.2 Effective operational design 12

4 Discussion and recommendations 15

4.1 Discussion 15

4.2 Recommendations 17

5 International climate initiative analysis 21

5.1 Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) 22

5.2 Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge (3R2E) 26

5.3 Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration (ZEV-D) 30

5.4 Global Methane Pledge (GMP) 34

5.5 Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use (GDFLU) 38

6 Glossary 42

7 Full list of member countries per initiative 43

8 Methodology 46

8.1 Quality of targets 46

8.2 Membership and coverage 46

8.3 Mitigation potential 46

8.4 Global progress 48

8.5 G20 policy alignment 49

1 Introduction

The COP31 Presidency has explicitly framed the November 2026 meeting as the "COP of Implementation", and has stated that the task is to translate existing commitments into measurable results rather than to announce new ones.

Meanwhile, as reported in our latest Global Warming Projections report, the latest round of 2035 NDCs has failed to meaningfully improve the outlook for end-of-century warming. For at least half of the countries assessed, the emissions gap between their NDC target and a 1.5°C compatible pathway is larger in 2035 than in 2030. At the same time, the growing gap between governments' pledges and the policies they have put in place to deliver them, exposes a failure to turn promises into action (Climate Action Tracker, 2026).

Existing targets and commitments need to be delivered, and future action needs to go beyond them at a time when the lack of action to date has resulted in the likely exceedance of 1.5°C by 2030 thus requiring efforts to limit both the magnitude and duration of overshoot of 1.5°C.

It has become customary for the COPs, beyond negotiated outcomes, such as the first Global Stocktake energy package, to become a platform for the launch of initiatives like declarations or alliances with a promise of accelerated ambition in specific areas or contexts and with specific groups of actors, which have become closely associated with the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA or "Action Agenda").

These initiatives are not negotiated within the COP process but rather announced or mediated by the COP presidency. One key difference is that formal COP decisions reflect a level of political accountability of governments: The formal commitments made as, or pursuant to, negotiated COP outcomes, such as NDCs or the GST energy package, are subject to assessment through mechanisms such as the UNFCCC synthesis report and other measures by which observations can be made of the collective progress made or not towards these political commitments. In contrast, there is currently no organised process for assessing whether such initiatives deliver emissions reductions or mitigation ambition beyond what countries have already committed to in their NDCs and the first Global Stocktake. With limited transparency arrangements and no accountability mechanism in place, it remains difficult to evaluate their contribution in quantitative terms.

The Action Agenda provides a space within the wider UN climate regime to mobilise and showcase voluntary action by governments, and non-Party stakeholders, such as cities, regions, businesses, investors and civil society. These initiatives and the Action Agenda are important in this ecosystem because they raise the profile of key transition challenges, connect actors working on common objectives, facilitating the exchange of technical knowledge, and help mobilise implementation across sectors.

A key feature of the COP process has been the steady accumulation of such initiatives over time, as successive presidencies and other leading stakeholders seek to define deliverables beyond formal negotiated outcomes. The result is an increasingly crowded and partially fragmented landscape of hundreds of initiatives whose impact, additionality and accountability are difficult to assess.

Against this backdrop, the COP30 Presidency launched a categorisation and consolidation of initiatives within the Global Climate Action Agenda, seeking to strengthen the coordination, implementation and impact of non-negotiated initiatives and to align them more closely with the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake. Overall, the COP30 Presidency grouped more than 300 initiatives and created 30 activation groups (COP Presidency 2025). It also found that just over 25% of active initiatives had reported on progress in 2025. In 2026, this number rose to roughly half (NAZCA portal 2026).

The central question is whether the Action Agenda is generating measurable real-world impact, following the guidelines of the Paris Agreement and the First Global Stocktake, with participating actors accountable for delivering on their promises, or whether it has become primarily a vehicle for announcements, pledges and high-profile launches with limited follow-through.

For many initiatives, the transparency and accountability arrangements are not yet sufficient to robustly answer this question. There is no formal requirement under the Paris Agreement's transparency framework for governments to report specifically on the voluntary pledges and declarations they have joined under the Action Agenda. Further, assessing the impact of the initiatives under the Action Agenda is inherently difficult, as desired effects, e.g. the uptake of EVs for initiatives on carbon-free transport, cannot be directly attributed to one initiative or action, but is a result of multiple forces.

In this report, we examine whether international climate initiatives are translating political announcements into credible implementation and additional climate action.

Building on our previous assessments of initiatives, we take a closer look at the following five initiatives: the Powering Past Coal Alliance, the Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge, the Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration, the Global Methane Pledge, and the Glasgow Declaration on Forests and Land-use. For each, we:

- Update the mitigation potential to assess their potential contribution to emission reductions, and their relationship to existing national policies;
- Evaluate design features, including those that promote accountability, and the extent to which they lead to effective implementation.

Our report concludes with recommendations for an effective design of initiatives and measures to enhance progress and accountability within the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement.

2 Purpose and evolution of international climate initiatives in the context of the Action Agenda

2.1 Overview and role within the Action Agenda

The complexities with reaching consensus on specific issues within the UNFCCC process have fuelled interest in cooperative climate initiatives, international cooperative initiatives, "climate clubs", and related concepts (Falkner et al. 2022). These initiatives have become a major component of the wider climate governance landscape by aiming to advance voluntary climate action and bringing together coalitions of national governments and non-state actors to pursue concrete goals.

These initiatives are driven by the idea that a smaller group of actors, typically a "coalition of the willing," can pursue more ambitious climate action and, hence, have at times been deliberately promoted as a "more positive form of diplomacy" (Depledge et al. 2022). Their role is to mobilise resources, foster partnerships, and advance solutions that go beyond the ambition achieved through individual countries' commitments or formal negotiations (Manimaran et al. 2025).

There are also important interactions between different channels of intergovernmental climate action. The goals of tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvement by 2030 originated as benchmarks in IEA and IRENA 1.5°C scenarios. The G7 adopted related solar and offshore wind capacity targets in April 2023, and the G20 Leaders' Declaration in September 2023 endorsed tripling renewables globally (but not the efficiency goal). At COP28, the Presidency launched the voluntary Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge on 2 December 2023, and eleven days later both goals were adopted by all Parties in paragraph 28(a) of the first Global Stocktake decision (1/CMA.5), the core of the "UAE Consensus".

BOX 1. The Global Climate Action Agenda

In 2025, the COP30 Presidency introduced an organisation of the Global Climate Action Agenda, which comprises 30 objectives organised across six thematic areas. The Action Agenda builds on existing climate initiatives: rather than adding another layer to an already crowded landscape, it seeks to align and strengthen ongoing efforts across initiatives.

Under this framework, the Global Stocktake serves as the guiding reference point, while cooperation across initiatives is organised through "Activation Groups", which are tasked with developing "Plans to Accelerate Solutions" for each objective.

Most Activation Groups are led by a prominent initiative that assumes responsibility for monitoring progress through an annual implementation cycle and preparing to scale existing solutions by 2028 (Climatechampions.net).

A recent assessment of the ambition of the Action Agenda indicates that most initiatives are aligned with a 2 °C pathway by 2030 but with insufficient ambition after 2030 even for that level of warming. Only a few initiatives include goals with the potential to move the world closer to 1.5°C (Roelfsema et al. 2026).

International climate initiatives can take the form of alliances, declarations, pledges, agreements, coalitions, or partnerships (Kuramochi et al. 2024). They frequently involve not only national governments but also non-state actors, including companies, financial institutions, international organisations, civil society groups, and subnational governments.

A defining feature of climate initiatives is their voluntary nature. Further, most focus on targets, policies, or measures within a particular sector, with the aim of triggering specific economic or technological tipping points (Depledge et al. 2022) – as the UNFCCC does not prescribe specific policies or measures at the national or sub-national level (Forner and Waskow 2023).

The number of climate initiatives has grown steadily over time (Figure 1). Activity notably picked up during and in the run-up to the Paris Agreement in 2015, as well as in 2019, 2021 and 2023, coinciding with periods of heightened international climate engagement. Mitigation-focused initiatives make up the largest share, but the share of adaptation-focused initiatives has increased over time.




Figure 1 New initiatives by year and policy focus. Data source: CoAct database (2026). The CoAct database tracks data on cooperative climate initiatives, focusing on those with at least one non-state and/or sub-national actor. It goes beyond the registered Cooperative Climate Initiatives on the NAZCA portal by the UNFCCC. The figure is based on the full dataset, and therefore differs from the version currently published.

Most initiatives pursue goals that are related to at least one objective of the Action Agenda (Figure 2). Some of the most supported goals include (28) Innovation and climate entrepreneurship, (18) Education, capacity building and jobs, followed by objectives related to the energy transition and conserving forests.




Figure 2 Number of initiatives per Action Agenda objective. Source: CoAct database (2026).

2.2 Expected role and benefits

There is no clear general agreement on the analysis of the impact and effectiveness of the Action Agenda.

Several studies have indicated that the goals of the different initiatives, if aggregated and fully implemented, can put the world closer to a path aligned with the Paris Agreement temperature limit (CAT 2023; Roelfsema et al. 2026; ETC 2023; NewClimate Institute et al. 2017; 2018; 2019; 2021; 2022). The work of Roelfsma et al. (2026) indicates that while the aggregated "ambitions of COP initiatives are generally aligned with a below 2 °C pathway by 2030, implementation is critical, and ambition must be translated into concrete actions".

Since initiatives pursue a wide range of objectives and functions, many of which involve broader and less easily quantifiable outcomes, their effectiveness should therefore also be assessed against their stated goals, rather than only by whether they deliver the emission reductions that global climate negotiations and domestic policies have so far struggled to achieve.

One important function of climate initiatives is signalling. Participation can communicate both national priorities and the broader direction of global climate action; sending signals to markets and private-sector stakeholders about the future direction of policy and investment (Oberthür et al. 2021). Joining an initiative may reflect and reinforce domestic policy goals, help prevent political backsliding (Tosun and Rinscheid 2021), enhance a country's reputation, and position it as a climate frontrunner.

Many initiatives also attract additional members over time. This is often facilitated by the momentum generated during COPs and by the "moral pressure on others to raise their game" (Falkner et al. 2022). Early members frequently, though not always, already align with an initiative's objectives, whereas new members often need to increase domestic ambition to join. Expanding membership is generally seen as positive because it broadens coverage and increases the potential impact of an initiative. At the same time, larger coalitions may become less agile and can sometimes lose the flexibility, efficiency, and ambition that smaller groups are more likely to be able to maintain (Forner and Diaz 2023).

Climate initiatives also play important practical roles in capacity building, dialogue, and knowledge sharing. Initiatives can facilitate access to knowledge, technical expertise, and, in some cases, financial support – thereby strengthening cooperation between countries in the Global North and Global South (Oberthür et al. 2021).

They can provide a "safe space" for diplomatic engagement (Mourier 2020) and help counter fragmentation by bringing together actors that might otherwise not collaborate due to differences in geography, actor type, or level of governance (Chan et al., forthcoming; Oberthür et al. 2021).

Finally, initiatives can shape agendas, build momentum around specific objectives, and contribute to the mainstreaming and formalisation of climate targets that may eventually gain wider international acceptance (Falkner et al. 2022; Koppenburg 2025). They can also offer an alternative avenue for progress when multilateral negotiations stall. In this context, targets serve an important benchmarking function.

They provide a reference point that civil society actors can use to hold governments accountable for their commitments. This is particularly valuable for sector-specific targets, which often require more concrete and measurable action than the economy-wide emission reduction commitments embedded in the Paris Agreement (Oberthür et al. 2021).

2.3 Limitations and critiques

One common concern with climate initiatives is the risk of elevating "cheap talk and symbolic gestures" over substantial action (Falkner et al. 2022). Research suggests that climate initiatives often attract countries already well-positioned to meet their objectives with relatively little additional effort (Jewell et al. 2019), while failing to attract other relevant members over time.

Many also struggle to maintain momentum beyond the COP or high-level event at which they were launched (Kuramochi et al. 2024; Manimaran et al. 2025). This is particularly true of one-off pledges and initiatives without dedicated secretariats, which may become inactive before achieving their stated goals.

In the worst case, an initiative can attract attention and resources, creating the appearance of action without producing substantial change. It may even be counterproductive if it diverts attention or resources from more effective action elsewhere. Evidence on performance reinforces these concerns. According to a report on Global Climate Action, the share of high-performing initiatives has declined in recent years, while more than half are not generating significant outputs (NewClimate Institute et al. 2022). Similarly, Manimaran et al. (2025) found that only 5% of initiatives had fully achieved their stated objectives.

Participation is also uneven. Countries from the Global South, particularly Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), remain underrepresented in many initiatives (Forner & Diaz 2024). At the same time, major emitters such as China, South Africa, or the Russian Federation are often absent from signatory lists, limiting the potential reach and impact of these efforts.

The climate initiatives on the table today also leave important gaps in coverage. Relatively few focus on reducing N_2O and fluorinated gas (F-gas) emissions, while others overlap considerably in scope and objectives, raising questions about whether participation in multiple initiatives generates meaningful additional benefits (CAT 2023).

Another frequently cited concern is the quality and clarity of commitments. Many initiatives lack concrete and measurable targets, while others rely on ambiguous definitions or methodologies (CAT 2023; NewClimate Institute 2026). Accountability mechanisms are also generally weak: few formal processes exist to hold signatories responsible for meeting their commitments, while both the benefits of participation and the consequences of non-participation or non-compliance are often limited (Mourier 2020).

Climate Analytics (2025) examined four COP pledges (the Coal to Clean Power Statement, the Energy Transition Council, the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge, and the Global Methane Pledge) and the two JETPs across eight fossil-fuel-dependent Asian countries. Its central finding is that the pledges' voluntary status allows governments to make commitments without delivering: coal capacity rose in all five signatories of the Coal to Clean Power Statement, signatories added more coal capacity on average than non-signatories, and the only Methane Pledge non-signatory saw slower methane growth than two signatories. Pledge content was at best loosely integrated into NDCs and national policies. Furthermore, most pledges lack specific, time-bound national targets, and even those with global targets leave national responsibility undefined. Finally, the report highlights that, in Asia, pledge content has been at best loosely integrated into NDCs and signatories have not outperformed non-signatories.

The report also finds that the pledges were not designed in a way to prevent the shift from coal to gas now underway in several of these countries. The energy pledges either ignore fossil gas or treat it as secondary, and the JETPs are framed around coal retirement alone; this "tunnel vision on coal" has left gas as the default replacement, with the Viet Nam JETP in particular incentivising the government to plan for greater LNG dependence. A pledge architecture that constrains one fossil fuel while remaining silent on another therefore channels investment toward the unconstrained fuel, and the report notes that industry-led methane initiatives are being used to legitimise further gas development. The recommendation that follows is that pledge commitments be written into NDCs and reported through the BTR/ETF cycle, and that future initiatives address fossil fuels as a whole rather than coal in isolation.

While climate initiatives can reduce fragmentation by bringing actors together around shared objectives, their proliferation can also further fragment the governance landscape. In some cases, this raises concerns that parallel initiatives could weaken the coherence and effectiveness of the broader UNFCCC regime (Mourier 2020).

Ultimately, the value of these initiatives should be judged by whether they help deliver the goals of the Paris Agreement: strengthening ambition, accelerating implementation, and closing the gap to a 1.5°C-consistent pathway. That test has to be applied with the initiatives' institutional position in mind.

Commitments made under the Paris Agreement sit inside an accountability architecture that Parties spent a decade negotiating: NDCs are communicated to the secretariat, synthesised annually and assessed collectively through the Global Stocktake, and progress against them is reported every two years in Biennial Transparency Reports under the Enhanced Transparency Framework, subject to technical expert review and multilateral consideration. Whatever its limits, that system makes it possible to say, for any Party, what was promised, what has been done, and what the gap is.

Action Agenda initiatives have no equivalent. They are launched by presidencies and champions outside COP and CMA decisions; governments join by signature, with no obligation to translate the pledge into a national target, to report against it, or to submit to review. Self-reporting to the Global Climate Action Portal is voluntary and uneven, the annual yearbook focuses on activity rather than assessing delivery, and the High-Level Champions have no mandate to measure progress or to identify governments that have not delivered.

In 2026, only half of all registered active initiatives reported on their progress, which was an increase from just over 25% the previous year (NAZCA portal 2026). Similarly, of the active initiatives, only 58% have set targets, the majority of which are quantitative; the remainder have not set any targets. Independent analysis found that output effectiveness across cooperative initiatives has stagnated since 2018 and fewer than a third require their members to set targets (Chan et al. 2025);

The emergence of a two-tier system with negotiated outcomes and voluntary initiatives can be beneficial to global climate outcomes because it creates complementary channels of action. Problems may arise if voluntary pledges begin to substitute for, rather than supplement, formal commitments, or if they attract greater political visibility than the actions that are formally tracked and reviewed. The effectiveness of such arrangements ultimately depends on the credibility of participating countries' commitments and the extent to which initiatives drive tangible action beyond symbolic endorsement.

3 Evaluation of selected climate initiatives within the Action Agenda

This section summarises the mitigation potential and the design of selected initiatives within the Action Agenda to enquire about effectiveness. As noted in the previous section, there is a large number of initiatives within and outside the Action Agenda and, therefore, a thorough and comprehensive analysis of all initiatives is not practical. We base our analysis on a similar set of initiatives as included in our previous reports, as together they represent a significant potential for emissions reductions and cover the main areas and sectors for climate action. We cover the following initiatives:

- Powering Past Coal Alliance
- Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge
- Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration
- Global Methane Pledge
- Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use

The Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge is a special case, because its headline targets were adopted in paragraph 28(a) of the first Global Stocktake decision eleven days after launch and so now binds all Parties through the Paris Agreement's NDC and transparency cycle, whereas its commitments on coal, NDC integration, enablers and annual review stayed in the voluntary text and are not subject to any transparency or accountability framework (see Box 2).

BOX 2. The Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge and the first Global Stocktake

The pledge's two headline goals were adopted in paragraph 28(a) of decision 1/CMA.5 eleven days after its launch. What carried across, however, was less than the pledge itself, which was placed in a wider and differently framed package of commitments.

How the targets were adopted

Paragraph 28 "calls on Parties to contribute to the following global efforts, in a nationally determined manner, taking into account the Paris Agreement and their different national circumstances, pathways and approaches." The targets therefore apply to all Parties to the Paris Agreement, but as collective global efforts rather than obligations on any individual Party. Paragraph 28(a) also carries only the headline language. The pledge's specification, at least 11,000 GW of installed renewable capacity (implying a 2022 baseline) and a rise in the global efficiency improvement rate "from around 2% to over 4% every year until 2030," appears nowhere in the decision.

What remains only in the pledge

Besides the commitments on reflecting the targets in NDCs discussed in the main text, several elements have no counterpart in any negotiated text:

- *Ending new coal investment.* The pledge links renewables deployment to the phase-down of unabated coal power, "in particular ending the continued investment in unabated new coal-fired power plants." Paragraph 28(b) retains only "accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power."
- *Energy systems free of unabated fossil fuels.* The pledge's preamble sets this objective "well ahead of and by mid-century at the latest." The GST decision instead calls for "transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems … so as to achieve net zero by 2050" and for net-zero energy systems "utilizing zero- and low-carbon fuels well before or by around mid-century," and paragraph 29 recognises a role for "transitional fuels."
- *Efficiency as the "first fuel."* The pledge commits signatories to place energy efficiency "at the core of policymaking, planning, and major investment decisions." The GST decision has no equivalent.
- *Enablers.* The pledge lists permitting acceleration, grid expansion and system integration, market design, electrification and demand management, lower cost of capital and finance for developing economies, technology transfer, cross-border interconnection and a just-transition workforce commitment. None appear in paragraph 28; grids and storage were later taken up separately in the COP29 Presidency's Global Energy Storage and Grids Pledge.
- *Annual review.* Signatories committed to agree a way to review progress annually until 2030, for example through ministerial meetings and annual reports. IRENA and the IEA publish annual tracking reports, but no ministerial review with signatory-level reporting has been established, and the GST decision provides no review of paragraph 28 before the second Global Stocktake in 2028.

What the GST decision contains that the pledge does not

Paragraph 28 embeds the renewables and efficiency targets in a wider energy package, including transitioning away from fossil fuels (28(d)), reducing non-CO_2 emissions including methane (28(f)), reducing road transport emissions (28(g)) and phasing out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies (28(h)).

Accountability

Neither text gives Parties a national reporting line for the targets themselves; the difference lies in how accountability operates, not whether national reporting exists. Paragraph 28 sits within the Paris Agreement's cycle: Article 14.3 requires the stocktake outcome to inform Parties' NDCs, progress against NDCs is reported in Biennial Transparency Reports under Article 13 and subject to technical expert review, and the second Global Stocktake will assess collective progress against paragraph 28. That accountability is collective and mediated through each Party's own NDC, but it exists. The pledge has no equivalent channel, and the second stocktake will assess paragraph 28, not the pledge.

For the emissions impact (3.1), we estimate how the mitigation potential of each initiative has changed as membership has expanded since its launch. We also refine our methodology to improve the robustness of these estimates, including through a more systematic treatment of overlaps between initiatives.

The analysis of initiatives' operational design (3.2) examines key design features identified in the literature – such as quantitative targets, dedicated secretariats, implementation processes, and transparency and accountability mechanisms – to assess the extent to which initiatives are equipped to support effective implementation and credible delivery. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 provide a summary of the results. Detailed analysis for each of the above-mentioned initiatives is found in Section 5.

3.1 Mitigation potential

In our previous analysis, we concluded that the full potential of initiatives, as evaluated by the Energy Transitions Commission, is highly unlikely to be delivered and that only around a quarter would be additional to targets already in place. Among other reasons, this is because

- governments would need to make these efforts to deliver their NDCs anyway;
- initiatives overlap with each other and with earlier COP26 pledges;
- major emitters have not signed up;
- pledges contain loopholes and unclear commitments; and
- implementation and accountability mechanisms remain weak.

Our new analysis of this report indicates that the aggregate potential of these initiatives in 2030 corresponds to a reduction of ~7.4 GtCO2e below current policy emissions levels, under the current level of membership, if all members achieved the initiatives' stated goals. This estimate is broadly in line with our previous analysis and represents an increase of 10% compared to the potential based on membership at the initiatives' inception.

This increase since the launch of the initiatives reflects efforts undertaken so far to expand membership (see factsheets for individual data). If membership in these initiatives were universal, which it is in the case of the renewable and energy efficiency objectives now covered by the COP GST decision, the potential reduction would more than double, reaching a total of ~16 GtCO2e (see Table 1 and Figure 3).

For the Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge, the targets were adopted in paragraph 28(a) of the GST decision so the full ~9.9 $GtCO_2e$ "universal" potential is already a commitment of all Parties. The ~3.2 $GtCO_2e$ attributable to the pledge signatories is the estimated share of the GST commitments for these governments.

For 2035, the expected reductions would total ~8.9 GtCO2e under the current level of membership and ~20 GtCO2e under universal membership.

Membership alone will not deliver this potential as will be discussed in the next subsection. We also note the current US administration's destructive attitude towards climate action in general, which will likely hamper delivery of the initiatives they have signed up to. While a detailed assessment of how US policies may affect the mitigation potential of these initiatives is beyond the scope of this report, the implications could be significant, given that the US accounts for approximately 10% of the total projected emission reductions, and a quarter for the current membership group.

Table 1 Mitigation potential of initiatives. Emissions reductions below emissions expected under current policies if all members achieved each initiative's goals.

Potential global emissions reductions from climate initiatives	PPCA	ZEV-D	GMP	GDFLU	Total	3R2E*	Overlap	Grand total**
	Powering Past Coal Alliance	Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration	Global Methane Pledge	Declaration on Forests and Land Use	of all non-binding initiatives	Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	PPCA and ZED-V overlap with 3R2E	mitigation potential of five initiatives
2030	Global emissions reductions in GtCO2e if all initiative targets are met							
Current initiative members	0.66	0.08	1.5	2.6	4.8	3.2	0.63	7.4
Members at initiative launch	0.03	0.06	1.1	2.5	3.7	3.1	0.08	6.7
Universal coverage	**2.9**	**0.66**	**2.8**	**3.2**	**9.5**	**9.9**	**3.1**	**16.3**
2035	Global emissions reductions in GtCO2e if all initiative targets are met							
Current initiative members	0.37	0.21	1.8	2.3	4.7	4.7	0.5	8.9
Members at initiative launch	0.01	0.15	1.4	2.3	3.8	4.6	0.2	8.2
Universal coverage	**3.1**	**1.6**	**2.9**	**2.8**	**10.3**	**14.2**	**4.2**	**20.3**

* The goals of the 3R2E initiative were adopted in paragraph 28(a) of COP28 and are binding for all Parties. The values shown here for members show the share of the potential from the named signatories of the original pledge.

** not accounting for possible overlaps between GMP and 3R2E / ZEV-D. For more details on the overlap estimates, see the Methodology section.

NB: We have performed a central assessment based on a range of assumptions. All of these assumptions carry uncertainties, but we have not quantified the uncertainty range here. Numbers in the table may not add up due to rounding.

There is significant overlap between the renewables and efficiency commitment under the GST and other initiatives, most notably the phasing out of coal under the Powering Past Coal Alliance and the Zero Emissions Vehicles Declaration. This overlap is accounted for in the total reductions shown in Table 1 and Figure 3.

Of the ~16 $GtCO_2e$ universal-membership potential in 2030 (Table 1), ~9.9 $GtCO_2e$, roughly 60%, is the tripling-and-doubling potential already committed by all Parties under paragraph 28(a) of the GST decision, and in 2035 the share rises to ~14 of ~20 $GtCO_2e$, about 70%.; for the current-membership totals the paragraph 28(a) share is ~3.2 of ~7.4 $GtCO_2e$ in 2030 and ~4.7 of ~8.9 $GtCO_2e$ in 2035, around half.

Smaller overlaps were not quantified and may slightly inflate the total reduction values. This affects the reductions to be delivered by the methane pledge and the renewables and efficiency pledge since higher generation from renewables and higher energy efficiency would reduce methane emissions from upstream gas and oil production.

Overlaps between initiatives are common and can be an asset, rather than a sign of duplicate efforts.


A good example is the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge (3R2E): since its overarching goal was adopted by all Parties in paragraph 28(a) of the GST decision, the pledge no longer sets the goal so much as marks which governments have put their names to it, while more focussed initiatives, such as the PPCA or ZEV-D, target the concrete actions required to deliver it.

The recently-announced electrification pledge by the COP 31 Presidency of Türkiye – to raise electricity's share of final energy consumption to 35 percent by 2035 is another example: this initiative's goal, if achieved, would fully overlap with the GST1 renewable and energy efficiency targets which applies to all parties bound by COP decisions. However, it could be indispensable for achieving the GST1 efficiency target by focussing governments' attention on one very concrete set of policy measures to reach the energy efficiency target, which would otherwise be missed.

Potential global emissions reductions from climate initiatives

Global emissions levels in $GtCO_2e$ if all initiatives achieve all targets

2030




PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance	3R2E Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	ZEV-D Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration	GMP Global Methane Pledge	GDFLU Declaration on Forests and Land Use	Overlap of impact from initiatives		
0.66	3.2	0.08	1.5	2.6	0.6	$GtCO_2e$	Current initiative members
2.2	6.7	0.58	1.4	0.52	2.4		Non-members
2.9	**9.9**	**0.7**	**2.8**	**3.1**	**3.1**		**Total potential**

0 $GtCO_2e$

Potential global emissions reductions from climate initiatives

Global emissions levels in $GtCO_2e$ if all initiatives achieve all targets

2035



PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance	3R2E Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	ZEV-D Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration	GMP Global Methane Pledge	GDFLU Declaration on Forests and Land Use	Overlap of impact from initiatives		
0.37	4.7	0.21	1.7	2.3	0.53	$GtCO_2e$	Current initiative members
2.7	9.4	1.4	1.1	0.45	3.7		Non-members
3.1	**14.2**	**1.6**	**2.9**	**2.8**	**4.2**		**Total potential**

0 $GtCO_2e$

Figure 3 Mitigation potential of initiatives in comparison to emissions under current policies and the emissions level which would have been required under 1.5°C aligned pathways with a 2020 starting point.

The combined reduction potential of ~16 $GtCO_2e$ in 2030 and ~20 $GtCO_2e$ in 2035 would bridge a large part of the gap between the emissions expected under current policies and the level aligned with the Paris Agreement (Figure 3).

These totals, however, combine two different kinds of commitment.

The renewables and efficiency potential, ~9.9 $GtCO_2e$ in 2030 and ~14 $GtCO_2e$ in 2035 under universal participation, is already a commitment of all Parties under paragraph 28(a) of the GST decision, and so sits inside the Paris Agreement's NDC and transparency cycle regardless of who has signed the pledge; the 3R2E signatories account for ~3.2 and ~4.7 $GtCO_2e$ of it.

What remains attributable to the voluntary initiatives alone, the coal, vehicles, methane and forest pledges net of their overlaps with 3R2E, is ~4.8 $GtCO_2e$ in 2030 and ~4.7 $GtCO_2e$ in 2035 at current membership, rising to ~10 $GtCO_2e$ in both years under universal participation.

Roughly 60% of the headline 2030 figure and 70% of the 2035 figure is therefore an implementation gap against a commitment Parties have already made, and only the remaining ~7 $GtCO_2e$ in 2030 is potential that broader membership of the Action Agenda initiatives could add; even that part is partly echoed in the GST decision, which calls for the phase-down of unabated coal (28(b)), the reduction of methane (28(f)) and the halting and reversal of deforestation by 2030 (para 33), without quantified targets (Figure 3).

For this potential to be realised, all member countries would need to achieve the initiatives' stated goals, and for the four voluntary initiatives membership would need to become universal. For the renewables and efficiency target, universal participation already exists in the form of paragraph 28(a) of the GST decision, so what is missing there is not signatures but delivery.

The record on delivery is split: renewable capacity is close to on track, with current policies projected to reach ~9.5 TW by 2030 against the ~11 TW tripling target (IEA 2025), whereas the efficiency goal is being missed by a wide margin, with annual improvements in 2023 and 2024 below even the 2% baseline rate rather than the 4% required.

The other initiatives are all making efforts to expand membership, but while universal membership is potentially possible, each remains far from it, and the experience of 3R2E, where near-universal coverage coincides with one target within reach and the other well off track, illustrates that closing the membership gap does not by itself close the implementation gap.

The remaining gap should be bridged by the strengthening of national efforts and complemented by initiatives covering other parts of the emissions space, such as other non-CO2 gases and other sectors such as the food system.

3.2 Effective operational design

Besides estimating the potential impact of initiatives on global greenhouse gas emissions, we also examined their design and achievements – or lack thereof – to date. Specifically, we assessed how well initiatives are set up and governed, as robust design is a key precondition for effectiveness. At the same time, we evaluated what initiatives have accomplished since their launch, taking into account their diverse objectives, many of which extend beyond direct emission reductions. We assessed each initiative against a common set of indicators with a summary of the results presented below and detailed findings in Section 5. It should be noted that the conclusions drawn are indicative of the five initiatives analysed in detail, but are not necessarily representative of all initiatives.

Targets

While most analysed initiatives have clear, specific and time-bound targets, some lack robust baselines or accounting methodologies. Examples of this include the Glasgow Forest Declaration, which has both been interpreted as aiming to end gross and net deforestation, or the pledge to double energy efficiency, which lacks a clear measurement indicator. The targets of the analysed initiatives tend to be aligned, or almost aligned, with 1.5°C pathways. In some cases, they are directly derived from 1.5°C scenarios, such as the energy targets. While three of the five initiatives pursue collective

targets (3R2E, GMP and the Glasgow Forest Declaration), which risks a dilution responsibility, some at least aim to develop country-specific plans (GMP) or are expected to equally apply to the country level (Glasgow Forest Declaration).

Membership and coverage

Membership tends to increase over time, although participation varies considerably between initiatives – ranging from 44 signatories today to the ZEV Declaration to 159 signatories to the GMP. Initiatives with collective targets and without country specific targets tend to attract more signatories. While broad membership can signal widespread support and raise visibility of the targets, it is harder to attribute progress or the lack thereof to individual countries.

Coverage of the share of global emissions is often much lower than the membership figures suggest, largely because major emitters such as China, India and Russia are often absent. For example, the GMP is supported by 82% of countries, yet signatories only cover 61% of global methane emissions. PPCA members account for only 11% of total coal generation, and signatories of the ZEV Declaration for 20% of the light-duty vehicle market. Signatories of the Glasgow Forest Declaration account for the majority of world's forests, but they also account for the majority of tree cover loss (94%) – without showing any sign of progress. In contrast, targets adopted as part of the GST enjoy the coverage of all Parties to the Paris Agreement.

China and India, the first and fourth largest renewables markets, declined to sign the renewables and energy efficiency pledge because of its clauses on phasing down unabated coal and ending investment in new coal plants. However, both countries adopted the tripling and doubling targets eleven days later with the adoption of the GST decision. Therefore, the headline targets of the GST should enjoy universal coverage, at least for all countries that are party to the Paris Agreement. What China, India and other non-signatories of the pledge have not accepted are the pledge's additional commitments: on coal, on reflecting the targets in NDCs, and on annual review as none of these were carried into the GST decision.

Some initiatives have been successful in attracting new countries over time that have a high relevance to mitigation, such as South Korea joining the PPCA, and countries whose participation has represented a significant increase in domestic ambition, such as Chile joining the ZEV Declaration or Morocco joining the PPCA. In some cases, this can be directly attributed to cooperation with the initiatives' secretariats, in other cases, joining may be a secondary consideration after domestic priorities.

While high coverage indicates high potential for signatories to make an impact, this does not automatically translate into a higher chance of success.

Progress

Progress among the analysed initiatives is off track across the board:

- In the case of phasing out coal, OECD countries are close to being on track towards their 2030 phase-out target.
- Ramping up the adoption of ZEVs and renewable energy is lagging behind the required trajectory, but both targets can still be achieved with accelerated adoption.
- However, for the Global Methane Pledge and the Glasgow Forest Declaration, not only is progress insufficient, it is also moving in the opposite direction to the stated goals. Methane emissions are increasing rather than decreasing, and deforestation levels are the same today as when the initiative was launched.

Signatories appear to outperform non-signatories in some areas, particularly in phasing out coal. Elsewhere, however, the differences are limited. In terms of renewable energy deployment and ZEV adoption, the non-signatory group performs at least equally well or even better, largely due to China's rapid progress.

Alignment of national policies with initiatives goals for G20

Across initiatives, members are more likely than non-members to have adopted domestic targets, although their alignment with initiative goals varies considerably. In the case of the PPCA, some members have fully aligned coal phase-out targets, such as Canada, France and the UK, while others have later timelines that fall short of the alliance benchmark, including Germany, Italy and South Korea. By contrast, non-members generally lack coal phase-out targets altogether.

The 3R2E targets now bind all Parties through paragraph 28(a) of the GST decision. Most G20 countries have domestic renewable energy targets. Assessing whether these are consistent with the collective goal is challenging: the tripling is a global figure, and a 1.5°C-consistent distribution requires some countries to expand well beyond threefold and others, with high existing shares or slow demand growth, by less. Neither the pledge nor the GST decision apportions the target, which is one of its design weaknesses.

Judged against national 1.5°C benchmarks rather than a uniform multiplier, only few G20 targets are consistent with the goal. The EU's targets are; Australia's 82% renewable electricity target also is in share terms but, on the government's own projections, delivers around a 2.6-fold increase in wind and solar capacity, short of the national 1.5°C benchmark of roughly a fourfold increase (CAT 2025). Neither China nor India, which did not sign the pledge, has a target framed in these terms, although both are on course to exceed a tripling on current deployment. Almost no country has adopted a domestic target for the efficiency goal.

There are two important caveats. Firstly, the alignment of national and initiative targets often predates membership of the initiative, which suggests that initiatives have so far played only a small, albeit non-negligible, role in driving higher domestic ambition. Secondly, even when some countries' targets are aligned, actual progress is often lagging behind what would be needed to meet the targets.

In the case of the Global Methane Pledge, to which most G20 countries are signatories, the absence of domestic methane targets is more common than their presence. However, a small number of countries have adopted targets that are consistent with the minimum ambition level of the pledge (Canada, Mexico and South Korea). Finally, among countries experiencing significant deforestation, some lack domestic targets altogether (Argentina and Australia), while the alignment of other countries' zero deforestation targets remains uncertain due to ambiguity in their scope or interpretation (Brazil and Indonesia).

One final caveat concerns the United States, which is a member of four of the five analysed initiatives. Although it has not formally withdrawn from any initiative, its unprecedented rollback of climate policies suggest that it is highly unlikely to make meaningful efforts to advance initiatives' objectives under the current administration. At the same time, there is little indication that it will actively obstruct these initiatives; continued membership may simply reflect an absence of a deliberate decision to withdraw. Similar, albeit less pronounced, concerns apply to some other countries where achieving the initiatives' targets appears unlikely due to limited political commitment.

Governance and accountability

Most initiatives publish an annual progress report through their secretariats or partner organisations. These may focus on the initiative's activities (Glasgow Forest Declaration), selected national or regional case studies (ZEV-D), or sectoral barriers and opportunities (PPCA). For the 3R2E targets, progress is tracked quantitatively against the goal, and that tracking is done by IRENA and the IEA under their own mandates rather than by the initiative, which has no secretariat.

Within the initiatives, neither the secretariats nor the UNFCCC scrutinise signatories more closely than non-signatories, and there are no consequences if collective or country-specific progress is off track.

Where obligations exist on paper they are not enforced: the PPCA requires a no-new-coal commitment and a phase-out date on joining, the GMP commits signatories to maintain public information on their policies, and the 3R2E pledge commits them to agree an annual review process, but compliance is unmonitored and uneven.

Otherwise, membership is open to all countries irrespective of whether compatible domestic policies are in place or in the making. The benefits for signatories are modest: visibility, networking, knowledge sharing and access to decision-making processes, with financial support available in a few cases, such as through the CCAC for methane mitigation.

Transparency regarding secretariats' governance structures, funding sources and funding volumes is also limited; across the wider population of cooperative initiatives, fewer than a fifth publish a budget and fewer than half a governance structure (Chan et al. 2025).

Furthering collective efforts

The analysed initiatives contribute to collective climate action in various ways. Through their active engagement at COPs and in the Action Agenda, they coordinate action, maintain political momentum and support collaborative platforms. All initiatives participate in, or even host, Activation Groups and have contributed to plans to accelerate solutions.

The analysed initiatives have helped mainstream and formalise climate targets – both on a national level and globally. Most notably, the 3R2E pledge paved the way for its tripling renewables and doubling efficiency targets to be adopted eleven days later in the GST1 decision, although its other commitments were not carried across. Initiatives have also been reflected in the adoption of corresponding domestic targets: the PPCA normalised and mainstreamed the idea of phase-out targets for coal, while some governments' methane reduction targets explicitly mirror the ambition level of the Global Methane Pledge and aim at a 30% reduction below 2020 levels by 2030.

There is considerable cooperation across initiatives, as evidenced by joint events and reports, aligned targets, and pooled resources. In some cases, established initiatives have offered their institutional capacity to newer initiatives; the PPCA became the host of the Coal Transition Commission and the No New Coal Compact. In other cases, established initiatives have launched new initiatives to cover identified gaps; the FCLP launched the REDD+ Coalition to mobilise finance.

At the same time, initiatives also fall short of their potential to reduce fragmentation and further collective efforts. Media attention typically peaks at launch and then declines gradually. This matters not in itself but because, with no reporting or review built into the initiatives, publicity is one of the few accountability pressures most of them generate.

Targets do, however, often remain useful benchmarks for the public and civil society organisations to call on countries to do more on individual or collective targets. However, initiatives play only a small role in countries' reporting to the UNFCCC and are mentioned infrequently in NDCs, and rarely in Biennial Transparency Reports, with the only exception being the GMP.

4 Discussion and recommendations

4.1 Discussion

Chapter 2 shows the Action Agenda has grown into several hundred initiatives launched by successive presidencies. But there is mixed evidence regarding their impact, and divided opinions on their value and role in international climate action.

On the one hand, initiatives can effectively signal political commitments and help build momentum for ambitious climate action. They also facilitate knowledge sharing, capacity building, technical cooperation and dialogue across countries and sectors.

But on the other hand, initiatives have fallen short, particularly in terms of meeting their own targets, due to limited accountability. The effectiveness of initiatives in achieving their goals has stagnated in

recent years. Fewer than a third of them require members to set targets, and fewer than half submit progress reports.

Chapter 3 tests five of the most prominent initiatives against the Paris Agreement's goals and finds their contribution to climate action, beyond what governments are already doing, is moderate. Progress to date is off track for all five or even reversing for two; signatories do not perform better than non-signatories except on phasing out , and even reduce methane emissions more slowly. Most G20 signatories have no domestic targets matching what they signed; and the initiatives are largely absent from NDCs and Biennial Transparency Reports.

Individual initiatives have been effective in attracting new and relevant members over time, increasing coverage, mainstreaming certain climate targets and actions, triggering the implementation of domestic policies (to a small extent), remaining relevant in the public discourse, and facilitating cooperation across geographies, types of actors, and related initiatives.

Roughly 60% of the universal-membership potential estimated in Chapter 3 is already a COP commitment of all Parties as part of the first Global Stocktake.

Taking the initiatives in the previous section as indicative of the broader Action Agenda reveals a landscape with significant potential to support both greater ambition and stronger implementation. But it is also clear that for this potential to be realised in governments' policies and targets, and to contribute materially to closing the emissions gap to 1.5°C pathways, accountability needs to be improved.

The potential of Action Agenda items to achieve their potential is weakened by their design and governance arrangements, which largely do not create sufficient incentives for participation, delivery and accountability. Commitments under the Paris Agreement, including the GST decision, sit inside an accountability including the communication of NDCs, the preparation and review of BTRs and the Global Stocktake.

In contrast, governments join initiatives by signature, often with no obligation to adopt a national target, report against it, nor submit to review, and no established body is mandated to assess delivery. The result is a two-tier system where the commitments subject to the Paris Agreement framework risk carrying less political visibility at COPs than the commitments that are not, and where presidencies can claim political outcomes on the strength of signatures that no process robustly tests. There is also a real risk that parties to these initiatives will use their signatures to deflect from real action.

Ultimately, there is no one-size-fits all approach to designing effective initiatives, as initiatives create impact through different routes. Two paths can be distinguished:

From global goal to national action: an initiative can aim to establish a globally-agreed goal, then work towards its national implementation. This happens in a stepwise manner: first, the initiative creates momentum by striking a balance between an ambitious global goal, whether vague or not, a low entry bar for individual countries and large participation.

In the best case, the goal is agreed at COP level, as in the case of targets adopted by the global stocktake; second, the initiative tightens its rules by, for example, introducing country-specific targets or a method to determine them as well as reporting and evaluation requirements. It can also exclude members that do not perform.

The first step can be particularly impactful in terms of political visibility, because it signals that the whole world is behind a goal, even if responsibilities are diffuse. Implementation and delivery, however, are not yet guaranteed.

It is in the tightening of rules where things often go wrong. Initiatives have only limited incentives to do so, as it may require excluding members and being honest about limited impact. Self-evaluation is difficult. Governments can hide behind others, or even participate in order to slow progress. An initiative may thus give the impression of action and crowd out other measures while, in essence, there is none.

Of the analysed initiatives, reducing methane emissions and halting deforestation are stuck at this second step. Countries disagree on the country-specific contributions and assessment metrics. Here it is critical to bring country-specific commitments into the UNFCCC process.

From frontrunner coalitions to global norms: alternatively, an initiative can be designed as a frontrunner "club" of governments who individually commit to an ambitious action, without aiming for global participation. Examples are the PPCA or ZEV-D initiatives.

The merit of such initiatives is that they normalise a policy behaviour (coal phase-out, an end to sales of CO2-emitting cars), raising the likelihood that such policies are implemented in other countries. In this way, they can change the global norm without a universally agreed target. They can also put other governments under pressure by highlighting their lack of commitment to equivalent action. There are signs of this in the case of the PPCA.

This route requires strict entry criteria, constant evaluation and reporting. However, the risk of countries hiding in such an initiative, and of the initiative merely giving the appearance of action, is much lower than on the route through a global goal.

4.2 Recommendations

The following recommendations are directed at COP Presidencies, governments, the UNFCCC secretariat, and initiative leaders and secretariats, and focus on strengthening both the effectiveness of the Action Agenda and its links to the UNFCCC process. They are particularly relevant for COP31, given the Turkish Presidency's stated interest in the Action Agenda and its recently-announced electrification initiative.

Across the Action Agenda, initiatives are more likely to generate impact when their objectives, participation incentives and accountability arrangements are designed around the actors whose behaviour is expected to change.

Architects of initiatives and COP presidencies should be clear about an initiative's underlying objective from the outset, and design it accordingly, keeping in mind the need to urgently increase climate action, in line with the Paris Agreement, and implement the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake.

The intended purpose of an initiative should shape core design features, including whether quantified targets are needed, what participation requires, and how progress and impact are assessed. All initiatives must be designed with a view to, at minimum, alignment with the commitments governments have already made under the Paris Agreement, and implementation of the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake.

Some initiatives aim mainly to raise an issue's political profile. In this mobilisation phase, it is important to get a large number of participants behind the topic, so it may be desirable to initially have a low bar for participation. This drums up support to at a later stage move the topic to a higher level and potentially to a formal COP consensus decision.

But if the Presidency wants an initiative to raise ambition and drive implementation as COP outcomes, each should set a clear target against a stated baseline, establish reporting systems, designate an entity responsible for compiling the reports, and require signatories to adopt a domestic target or supporting policies. The UN High-Level Expert Group's integrity standards for non-state net zero commitments set the right benchmark, and governments should not fall below it.

Initiatives designed to support implementation of already-existing global commitments should be developed with a clear understanding of how they link and contribute to delivery. For example, the proposed 35% electrification by 2035 pledge may function as a means of delivering broader objectives such as doubling energy efficiency. Its value will depend on whether it is launched with a well-defined indicator and baseline for electricity's share of final energy, country-level targets

(or a published method for deriving them), or electrification plans or roadmaps, a reporting system, and, ideally, a fossil fuel-displacement metric so that additional electrification is not met by gas or coal-fired generation.

Initiatives intended to raise global ambition in a particular area should set sufficiently ambitious, Paris-aligned, and measurable objectives and assess their additionality relative to existing international pledges and initiatives and to the commitments all Parties have already made when they signed up to the GST decisions, through country-specific targets as in the PPCA or ZEV-D.

Finally, design should also reflect country-level implementation realities. This means:

- accounting for key policy, financing, infrastructure and institutional barriers, including aiming to work together with solution providers and limiting the influence of actors with a potential to undermine collective action,
- connecting targets to domestic interests beyond emission reductions and creating corresponding incentives; at the very least emphasising clear benefits of participation,
- allowing flexibility for national circumstances,
- considering how the initiative can facilitate the support needed for delivery,
- anticipating the foreseeable consequences of partial design, such as coal phase-out commitments that are silent on gas and thus unable to prevent a greater reliance on fossil gas, and
- pairing objectives that promote the adoption of positive practices and technologies (phase-in) with explicit phase-out commitments and metrics, rather than treating them as alternatives – although this could potentially also be covered effectively elsewhere.

Proponents of initiatives, including Parties and Presidencies, should actively and selectively broaden participation in initiatives, prioritising major emitters and other governments that can make a material contribution and are likely to engage constructively.

Initiatives with limited membership or coverage are unlikely to achieve impact at scale. It is often the case that governments participating at the outset who are likely to achieve the initiative's target anyway. The real work starts after the initiative has been launched – by adding new impactful members. Diplomatic efforts should therefore focus on those whose participation can make a difference to national policies and/or the global picture.

They should identify what would make participation valuable to priority governments and emphasise tangible benefits of joining, including a voice in shaping priorities and emerging standards, access to peer learning and proven approaches, opportunities for technology diffusion and climate finance, stronger relationships and trust with participating governments and reputational benefits from demonstrating leadership or reputational damage from not joining. These "club goods" can strengthen incentives both to join and to remain actively engaged.

At the same time, the recruitment should remain selective enough to preserve ambition, coordination and meaningful participation. While high coverage indicates high potential for signatories to make an impact, this does not automatically translate into a higher chance of success (see GMP).

Key stakeholders engaged in initiatives, in particular governments and the Presidencies, should strengthen transparency and accountability, including through the Paris Agreement mechanisms.

Our findings indicate that accountability mechanisms for Action Agenda initiatives are relatively weak. Global commitments often create limited incentives for action because responsibility for delivery is diffuse, individual contributions are difficult to assess, and there is a risk that participating in an initiative is a deflection from real action.

There are several strategies to improve accountability, which differ in the degree of consensus they require, ranging from measures initiatives can take on their own to those requiring agreement among Parties. Arguably, the strongest would be to route initiatives through the architecture that already exists under the Paris Agreement.

Initiatives themselves, and in particular their architects, should establish clear country-specific or at least country group-specific targets: quantified, time-bound commitments with a clear baseline and assessment metric, where signatories' individual contributions are either determined upfront or derived through a common methodology. These should be backed by robust monitoring, reporting and evaluation arrangements that make individual members' contributions and progress (or lack thereof) visible.

Initiative secretariats could also formalise and expand their reporting to the UNFCCC. Reporting is currently voluntary and has recently broadened from documenting activities to covering progress towards targets, but reporting on target achievement remains rudimentary and is often absent altogether. To report effectively, secretariats would need to collect data themselves or request signatories to provide it. Their reporting should also cover the extent to which targets have been formalised in COP decisions or implemented as national policies, and activities that increased cooperation and reduced the fragmentation of efforts.

External independent evaluation by third parties can complement and strengthen accountability within the UNFCCC system by assessing initiatives' delivery against stated targets and signatories' individual contributions to global progress.

External evaluation may be more critical than self-evaluation. Such monitoring already takes place through central tracking efforts (e.g. the CoAct database) and initiative-specific assessments (e.g. in the academic literature, or by organisations such as the Forest Declaration Assessment on deforestation). It could be made more comprehensive and systematic, and enhanced by examining whether signatories are delivering additional action beyond their existing NDC and GST commitments.

The Paris Agreement's transparency and accountability mechanism could also cover these initiatives. To this end, the CMA could invite or request Parties to reference in their NDCs the relevant targets of initiatives they are signatories to, and to report on progress in their BTRs, including the policies and measures through which they intend to deliver them.

Given the COP31 Presidency's stated commitment to move from delivery to action, it could consider a CMA decision at COP31 to this effect. The Secretariat could then include this reporting in its NDC and BTR synthesis reports, which the Enhanced Transparency Framework's (ETF's) modalities already permit. This would make such reporting routine, give initiative pledges greater visibility and allow their contribution to be assessed more accurately.

Aside from the country-level route, the Global Stocktake, as the international mechanism for assessing collective progress, is also highly relevant. Improving the accountability of individual Action Agenda items is important for their effectiveness, but may not be enough on its own: even NDCs, which are subject to established reporting arrangements, are not aligned with the Paris Agreement. Parties and COP Presidencies should therefore ensure that the outcomes and learnings of the Action Agenda are integrated into the second Global Stocktake, whose information collection begins in the coming cycle and for which non-Party inputs are already provided for under decision 19/CMA.1.

A COP31 decision could request the High-Level Champions or the Secretariat to submit to the technical dialogue an assessment of delivery against stated targets, including signatory lists and related action taken at home, whether national targets or supporting policies, drawing on reporting by initiative secretariats on delivery against their targets, ideally by country. This would create the periodic review that initiatives currently lack, and an opportunity to assess their collective contribution, progress and additionality relative to NDCs and to the outcome of the first Global Stocktake.

COP Presidencies should manage the Action Agenda actively as a coherent portfolio of initiatives, reducing fragmentation, overlap and unnecessary duplication.

COP Presidencies should consider whether new initiatives are necessary and, if so, how each fits within the broader landscape, including whether it fills a genuine gap, complements or duplicates existing efforts, mobilises the actors needed for delivery, and has a credible pathway to changing their behaviour and achieving its stated objective.

Where objectives, memberships or activities overlap, COP Presidencies should not create more initiatives, instead promote greater coordination, alignment or consolidation. Proposed initiatives should likewise be assessed against the existing landscape before being added to the Action Agenda, including their additionality to current pledges and potential contribution to existing global objectives.

This more active stewardship should be reflected, for example, in the new governance arrangements the Presidency currently proposes through the Global Implementation Accelerator and the Climate Implementation Bridge. This would help shift the Action Agenda from an accumulation of individual initiatives towards a more coherent and mutually reinforcing portfolio.

5 International climate initiative analysis



PPCA
Powering Past Coal Alliance
Phase out unabated coal power generation by 2030 in the OECD and by 2040 globally.



3R2E
Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge
Triple renewable energy generation capacity to at least 11,000 GW by 2030 and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements.



ZEV-D
Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration
Achieve 100% ZEV sales globally by 2040, and by 2035 in leading markets.



GMP
Global Methane Pledge
Reduce global methane emissions by at least 30% from 2020 levels by 2030.



GDFLU
Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use
Halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030.

For each of these five selected initiatives of this analysis we examine:

- The commitment
- The quality of the targets
- Membership and coverage
- Potential emissions impact, both current members and if all nations joined
- Progress towards the targets
- How the initiative furthers collective efforts and climate action
- Policy alignment of G20 nations
- Governance and accountability

Launched in 2017 at COP23 Fiji

Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA)

Commitment: Government members of the Power Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) commit to phasing out existing unabated coal power generation by 2030 in the OECD and by 2040 in the rest of the world, and to a moratorium on any new coal power stations without operational carbon capture and storage (CCS).

Quality of targets

Is the initiative's target specific and measurable?


Is the initiative's target aligned with 1.5°C?

Does the initiative have country specific targets?

Membership

65 national governments are signatories [1]


33% of 196 nations



Since its launch, government membership has more than doubled. Notable additions include the Republic of Korea, which joined in 2025 and operates the world's sixth-largest coal fleet, and the United States, which joined in 2023 and has the third-largest coal fleet, although its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, its repeal of emission limits on power plants, and support for keeping coal plants running negates its commitment to the initiative. Morocco joined in 2023, when coal still accounted for 60% of its electricity mix. However, China and India, together holding a dominant share of global operating capacity, remain outside the alliance.

Coverage of current members

11% of total coal electricity generation in 2025



Two positive trends can be observed. Firstly, the initiative's coverage increased from 2.3% in 2017 to 11% today. This was driven by new members joining the PPCA. At the same time, the share of total coal generation held by today's members has effectively reduced over time, from 23% in 2017 to 11% today. This was driven by an absolute increase in coal-based power generation within several non-signatory countries, as well as a gradual reduction of coal firing among the signatories. Despite these trends, signatories' coverage remains low compared to that of other initiatives.

Potential emissions impact

Global mitigation reduction potentials

Global emissions levels in $GtCO_2e$ if all initiative targets are achieved, based on different levels of global initiative membership

2030

Policies & action
58 $GtCO_2e$

2.9 $GtCO_2e$ — **Total PPCA potential**
If all countries join and all coal phase-out targets are met

PPCA members
0.66 $GtCO_2e$
Non-members
2.2 $GtCO_2e$

After achieving all global PPCA targets
55 $GtCO_2e$

13.4 $GtCO_2e$ — **Total mitigation potential of the other four analysed climate initiatives** [2]
If all countries join and all targets are met for 3R2E, ZEV-D, GMP & GDFLU initiatives

14.0 $GtCO_2e$ — **Remaining implementation gap if every single nation achieves every initiative target**

1.5°C compatible
27 $GtCO_2e$

Under current policies, we estimate that coal power production would fall by about 70% in OECD countries and 30% in the rest of the world by 2035 compared to 2022.

Under the Powering Past Coal Alliance's targets, coal power production would stop completely in OECD countries and halve in non-OECD countries, assuming they aim for a 2040 phase-out date.

We estimate that the reductions in 2030 could be ~0.7 $GtCO_2e$ compared to emissions under current policies from the initiative's current signatories and ~2.9 $GtCO_2e$ with much broader participation. [3]

This potential has increased significantly from ~0.03 $GtCO_2e$ of the original membership group.

For the members group, the potential in 2035 is smaller than in 2030 because the efforts to phase out coal already planned by countries under current policies are expected to significantly reduce coal power emissions by 2035. [4]

Mitigation potentials for achieving Powering Past Coal Alliance targets

Year	Launch members PPCA members in 2017	Current members PPCA members in 2026	Universal coverage If all countries achieved targets
2030	0.03 $GtCO_2e$	0.66 $GtCO_2e$	2.9 $GtCO_2e$
2035	0.01 $GtCO_2e$	0.37 $GtCO_2e$	3.1 $GtCO_2e$


0 $GtCO_2e$

Progress towards the targets

OECD countries

Coal share in electricity generation

Percentage of coal-based electricity in total power generation




Within the OECD, progress is slightly off track towards meeting the 2030 phase-out target, and momentum has slowed down in recent years. PPCA members are outperforming non-members: on average, coal accounts for 10% in their electricity mix today, compared with 36% among non-signatories.

Non-OECD countries

Coal share in electricity generation

Percentage of coal-based electricity in total power generation




Among non-OECD countries, progress is clearly off-track. Although the share of coal in the power mix has decreased slightly since 2017, the pace of change remains far too slow to align with the PPCA's goal of phasing out unabated coal power globally by 2040.

Furthering collective efforts and climate action

Collaboration, cooperation and alignment of efforts

Engagement in the Global Climate Action Agenda	**High:** The PPCA is the host initiative of the plan to 'Accelerate Coal Transitions' under GCAA Objective 4, which outlines three main pillars for action and 13 practical solutions.
Active outreach	**High:** Regular attendance, participation and engagement at COPs, Clean Energy Ministerial meetings, London Climate Action Week, and other high-level events.
Collaboration with non-state actors	**Yes:** PPCA members include 65 national and 52 subnational governments, and 66 business, finance and utility members. The PPCA also has 23 partner organisations.
Alignment with related initiatives	**High:** The PPCA hosts the secretariat of the Coal Transition Commission, contributed to the development of the Roadmap to Transition Away from Fossil Fuels (TAFF), is part of the 'Decarbonisation Twinning Initiative', and jointly coordinates the 'No New Coal Compact' initiative with UN Energy.
Mainstreaming targets	**High:** The PPCA has contributed to the normalisation and mainstreaming of phase-out targets for coal, which can now be found in the NDCs and domestic policies of several countries, primarily among PPCA signatories, but also beyond this group. In many cases, these targets align with those proposed by the PPCA.
Formalising targets	**Medium:** GST paragraph 28(b): "Accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power."
Maintaining public interest	**Medium:** The PPCA has maintained a sustained presence in public discourse over time. Reporting peaked around its launch and during COP26 and COP28, when international climate initiatives received heightened attention. Averaging around 2,200 media mentions per year, the initiative continues to attract moderately high levels of public and media interest.



Policy alignment of G20 nations

PPCA members

Aligned targets

- **Canada** 2030 target — 9.4% to 4.1%
- **France** 2030 target — 2.3% to 0.3%
- **UK** Coal-free — 6.7% to 0.1%

Targets are not aligned

- **Germany** 2038 target — 37.4% to 20.6%
- **Italy** 2038 target — 11.2% to 1.4%
- **Mexico** Under consideration — 9.4% to 3.1%
- **South Korea** 2040 target — 45.2% to 31.1%

Domestic target for phase-out of coal in electricity generation

No targets

- **USA** No target — 29.8% to 16.3%

Share of coal in electricity generation: 2017 and 2025

Non members

Not a PPCA signatory

- **Argentina** No target — 1.4% to 1.8%
- **Australia** No target — 61.5% to 42.7%
- **Brazil** No target — 3.9% to 2.3%
- **China** No target — 67.1% to 54.4%
- **EU** No target — 21.9% to 9.2%
- **India** No target — 76.3% to 70.8%
- **Indonesia** No target — 55.7% to 61.5%
- **Japan** No target — 33.8% to 32.1%
- **Russia** No target — 16% to 18.4%
- **Saudi Arabia** No target — 0% to 0%
- **South Africa** No target — 89.6% to 81.4%
- **Türkiye** No target — 32.8% to 34.3%

Governance & accountability

Leadership

Secretariat	Secretariat hosted by E3G
Co-chairs	Canada and the United Kingdom
Steering committee	Five government representatives and Bloomberg Philanthropies
Budget	Supported by the governments of Canada, the UK, Germany, Sweden, and Bloomberg Philanthropies. No public information is available on the size or allocation of the budget.

Monitoring & reporting

By the secretariat and third parties	The Coal Transition Commission (CTC) publishes at least one report per year, usually focusing on a specific topic such as flexibility or market regulation. There is no dedicated tracking of progress for PPCA members. While other organisations, including Global Energy Monitor, the IEA and Bloomberg, collect the necessary data to track progress, integration across trackers and efforts to track countries specifically against the PPCA's targets could be improved.
By countries	Member countries are not required to report their progress or implemented policies and actions to the secretariat. Our research revealed that only six countries have referenced the PPCA in their NDCs (the UK, Canada, the Marshall Islands, Morocco, Colombia and Singapore), while an additional four countries have referenced the PPCA in their Transparency Reports or Long-Term Strategies. This suggests that the initiative does not play a significant role in countries' reporting to the UNFCCC.

Accountability & incentives

Compliance	The PPCA allows countries to join with commitments that are not consistent with targets for their respective country group. For example, Germany has the domestic target to phase out coal by 2040, while, as an OECD country, it should phase out coal by 2030. There are no consequences for countries that are not on track towards meeting their target.
Incentives	By joining, members gain access to the network's expertise and presence at the table. The PPCA does not provide any direct financial support itself, but helps members access finance and financial solutions. It explicitly aims to connect coal-dependent countries with supporters who can help develop plans and implement the transition.

Notes

1 Below is the full list of the 65 members (current to October 2026) with the year they joined:

Albania (2021)
Angola (2017)
Austria (2017)
Azerbaijan (2021)
Bahrain (2025)
Belgium (2017)
Canada (2017)
Chile (2021)
Colombia (2023)
Costa Rica (2017)
Croatia (2021)
Cyprus (2023)
Czechia (2023)
Denmark (2017)
Dominican Republic
El Salvador (2017)
Estonia (2021)
Ethiopia (2017)
Fiji (2017)
Finland (2017)
France (2017)
Germany (2019)
Greece (2019)
Guatemala (2025)
Honduras (2025)
Hungary (2021)
Iceland (2023)
Ireland (2018)
Israel (2018)
Italy (2017)
Kosovo (2023)
Latvia (2017)
Liechtenstein (2017)
Lithuania (2018)
Luxembourg (2017)
Malta (2023)
Marshall Islands (2017)
Mauritius (2021)
Mexico (2017)
Montenegro (2021)
Morocco (2023)
Netherlands (2017)
New Zealand (2017)
Niue (2017)
North Macedonia (2021)
Norway (2023)
Panama (2023)
Peru (2020)
Portugal (2017)
Senegal (2018)
Singapore (2021)
Slovakia (2019)
Slovenia (2021)
South Korea (2025)
Spain (2021)
Sweden (2017)
Switzerland (2017)
Tuvalu (2017)
UAE (2023)
Uganda (2024)
Ukraine (2021)
United Kingdom (2017)
United States (2023)
Uruguay (2021)
Vanuatu (2017)

2 The five initiatives analysed are:

PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance
3R2E Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge
ZEV-D Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration
GMP Global Methane Pledge
GDFLU Declaration on Forests and Land Use

3 Note that ~10% of this potential reduction is from the US alone.

4 Overlaps: Over 80% of this potential is driven by the rollout of renewable power sources, and thus overlaps fully with the efforts of the Renewables Pledge (see next section). There are two reasons why our renewables rollout does not achieve the full coal pledge potential:

- South Korea and Japan, both classed as OECD for this initiative, have failed to drive coal out of their power sector fast enough. Our calculations for the renewables pledge therefore see some residual coal power in these countries in 2030.
- Our calculations for renewables also do not assume that Indonesia and India fully phase out coal by 2040, but allow for this to happen by 2045 instead. Therefore, if Indonesia and India were to sign up, the initiative would need to drive an earlier phase-out.

Launched in 2023 at COP28 UAE

Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge (3R2E)

Commitment: Signatories commit to work together to triple the world's installed renewable energy generation capacity to at least 11,000 GW by 2030. Signatories also commit to collectively double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements from around 2% to over 4% every year until 2030.

Quality of targets


Is the initiative's target specific and measurable? [1]

Is the initiative's target aligned with 1.5°C?

Does the initiative have country specific targets?

Membership

132 national governments are signatories [2]




67% of 196 nations

A high number of signatories pledged their support at the launch of the Pledge, and this figure has increased slightly since then. As the Pledge's targets have become part of the UAE consensus, support can also be conceptualised as encompassing all parties to the UNFCCC, making it nearly universal. In this study, we focus on the Pledge's explicit signatories.

Coverage of current members

45% of total energy consumption in 2024



Although membership numbers are high, signatories only account for 45% of total energy consumption. This is because several of the largest energy consumers are missing from the list, including China, India, Indonesia, Russia and Saudi Arabia. There has not been a notable change in coverage, due to the shorter duration of the initiative and the fact that new members are smaller economies.

Potential emissions impact

Global mitigation reduction potentials

Global emissions levels in $GtCO_2e$ if all initiative targets are achieved, based on different levels of global initiative membership

2030

Policies & action
58 $GtCO_2e$

3R2E members
3.2 $GtCO_2e$

Non-members
6.7 $GtCO_2e$

9.9 $GtCO_2e$
Total 3R2E potential
If all countries join and all renewable and efficiency targets are met

6.4 $GtCO_2e$
Total mitigation potential of the other four analysed climate initiatives [3]
If all countries join and all targets are met for PPCA, ZEV-D, GMP & GDFLU initiatives

After achieving all 3R2E targets
48 $GtCO_2e$

14.0 $GtCO_2e$
Remaining implementation gap if every single nation achieves every initiative target

1.5°C compatible
27 $GtCO_2e$

3R: Under current policies, global renewables capacity is expected to grow from 3.7 TW in 2022 to 9.8 TW by 2030, a x2.6 fold increase. Under 3R2E it should at least triple. Since 1.5°C-compatible pathways see even stronger growth, we have assumed capacity slightly more than tripling to ~12 TW by 2030.

2E: Global improvements in energy efficiency have varied between 1–2% per year with little improvement. Under current policies this could rise to 2–3% per year. The initiative aims for 4% a year. [4]

If the goals of the pledge are achieved, we estimate that the reductions in 2030 will be ~3.2 $GtCO_2e$ compared to emissions under current policies from current members and ~9.9 $GtCO_2e$ with universal membership. [5]

For the membership group, just over half of the reductions will come from renewable power deployment and the rest from efficiency improvements. For the rest of the world, efficiency holds more potential: for universal membership, around 60% of the emissions reductions would be driven by efficiency savings. [6]

Mitigation potentials for achieving Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge targets

Year	Launch members 3R2E members in 2023	Current members 3R2E members in 2026	Universal coverage If all countries achieved targets
2030	3.1 $GtCO_2e$	3.2 $GtCO_2e$	9.9 $GtCO_2e$
2035	4.6 $GtCO_2e$	4.7 $GtCO_2e$	14.2 $GtCO_2e$


0 $GtCO_2e$

Progress towards the targets

Tripling Renewables

Installed capacity of renewables

Total renewable electricity generation capacity in gigawatts




Progress towards reaching the 11,000 GW target is slightly behind schedule. Although renewable energy uptake has increased and accelerated in recent years, it needs to increase further to meet the target. Notably driven by high adoption rates in China, non-signatories have overtaken the signatories in terms of total deployment.

Doubling Energy Efficiency

Rate of efficiency improvement

Annual change in energy intensity



Progress towards doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvements is significantly off track. In 2023 and 2024, the annual improvement in energy intensity failed to reach even the baseline level of 2%. To get back on track, countries must now double down on electrification in energy end-use sectors.

Furthering collective efforts and climate action

Collaboration, cooperation and alignment of efforts

Engagement in the Global Climate Action Agenda
High: There are 8 Plans to Accelerate Solutions for Objective 1 (Tripling renewables and doubling energy efficiency). Host initiatives include the World Green Building Council, Green Grids Initiative, Global Clean Power Alliance, and Utilities for Net Zero Alliance.

Active outreach
Medium: Given the lack of a secretariat, the 3R2E pledge itself does not host or participate in events. Other organisations, including the IEA and IRENA, have presented at COP, the Bonn sessions, and other high-level events.


Collaboration with non-state actors
No: The 3R2E is a government-only pledge. There are several initiatives that include non-state actors that have pledged to support the 3R2E goal.

Alignment with related initiatives
High: There is close collaboration between the institutions that have put forward and that track progress towards the two overarching targets, as evidenced by joint reports, joint events, and synchronised outreach and messaging. Several event series have been set up to bring relevant actors, including the annual Global Renewables Summit, which is hosted by the Global Renewables Alliance in partnership with the European Commission, the COP30 Presidency, IRENA, and the governments of Bahamas and Kenya.

Mainstreaming targets
Medium: The targets started out as analytical benchmarks. In April 2023, the G7 pledged to increase offshore wind and solar PV in support of the 11,000 GW target put forward in the IEA and IRENA 1.5°C scenarios. In July 2023, the G20 discussed and tentatively supported these targets but without pledging a collective target for the G20. At COP28, the voluntary 3R2E pledge was formally launched, and became a formal COP outcome during the same event. So far, countries' renewables targets do not appear to match the level of ambition or language of the pledge.

Formalising targets
High: GST paragraph 28(a): "Tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030."

Maintaining public interest
High: The energy targets have attracted a high level of interest from the media, with an average of 10,000 articles published each year, although reporting has declined since 2025.



Policy alignment of G20 nations

3R2E members

Aligned targets

- **Australia** 82 %
  34.8% to 38.6%
- **EU** 72 %
  45.2% to 47.7%

Targets are not aligned

- **Argentina** 57 %
  34.8% to 34.6%
- **Brazil** 84 %
  89% to 86.6%
- **Canada** 72 %
  65.4% to 63.9%
- **Japan** 38 %
  22.1% to 23.6%
- **Mexico** 35 %
  20.3% to 23.1%
- **South Korea** 20 %
  9.6% to 10.4%

No targets

- **USA** No target
  22.7% to 25.6%

Share of renewables in electricity generation: 2023 and 2024

Domestic 2030 target for renewables share in electricity generation

The initiative only has a global, collective target.
We developed downscaled benchmarks to compare against current domestic targets for most G20 countries, with the exception of France, Germany, Italy (all covered by the EU target) and the UK.

Non members

Not a 3R2E signatory

- **China** -
  30.6% to 37%
- **India** 42 %
  19.3% to 24.1%
- **Indonesia** -
  18.6% to 18.1%
- **Russia** -
  17.7% to 17.4%
- **Saudi Arabia** 50 %
  1.1% to 2.2%
- **South Africa** 33 %
  12.4% to 13.6%
- **Türkiye** 47 %
  42% to 43.3%

Governance & accountability

Leadership

Secretariat

The 3R2E pledge does not have a permanent, independent secretariat with a governance structure and a formal decision-making procedure. The pledge and its key targets are, however, supported by various major institutions.

Budget

There is no information on the availability, sources and size of the budget publicly available. Monitoring is funded through regular work at IRENA, IEA and partner institutions.

Monitoring & reporting

By the secretariat and third parties

COP28 president tasked IRENA to set up an annual report series to monitor progress towards the UAE consensus. Both IRENA and the IEA comprehensively track progress towards meeting the overarching renewables target, while also showing data on other relevant or supporting indicators, such as investments in renewable power generation capacity or grids. IRENA and IEA also track progress towards the energy efficiency target.

By countries

Signatories are not required to report on their contributions towards the collective target under the pledge. There is also no mechanism that would require countries to report on their progress as signatories to the UAE consensus.

Accountability & incentives

Compliance

There are no ex-ante compliance requirements for countries upon joining the 3R2E pledge. There are also no consequences for countries if collective progress is not on track – neither under the pledge nor under the UAE consensus.

Incentives

Signatories benefit from political visibility and participation in a prominent initiative that receives high levels of attention and that sends a strong market signal. There is no dedicated technical or financial support available under the pledge, but various such programs exist.

Notes

1. The tripling of renewables target can be considered specific and measurable, however, the doubling of energy efficiency target lacks a commonly agreed measurement indicator.

2. Below is the full list of the 132 members (current to October 2026):

Albania	Burkina Faso	Eswatini	Kenya	Montenegro	Poland	Togo
Andorra	Burundi	Ethiopia	Kiribati	Morocco	Portugal	Tunisia
Angola	Cabo Verde	Fiji	Kosovo	Mozambique	Romania	UAE
Antigua and Barbuda	Canada	Finland	Kyrgyzstan	Namibia	Rwanda	Ukraine
Argentina	Chad	France	Latvia	Nauru	San Marino	United Kingdom
Armenia	Chile	Gambia	Lebanon	Netherlands	Senegal	United States
Australia	Colombia	Georgia	Lesotho	New Zealand	Serbia	Uruguay
Austria	Comoros	Germany	Liechtenstein	Nicaragua	Seychelles	Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan	Costa Rica	Ghana	Lithuania	Nigeria	Sierra Leone	Vanuatu
Bahamas	Côte d'Ivoire	Greece	Luxembourg	Niue	Singapore	Yemen
Bangladesh	Croatia	Grenada	Malawi	North Macedonia	Slovakia	Zambia
Barbados	Cuba	Guatemala	Malaysia	Norway	Slovenia	Zimbabwe
Belgium	Cyprus	Guinea	Maldives	Oman	Somalia	
Belize	Czechia	Hungary	Mali	Pakistan	South Korea	
Benin	Denmark	Iceland	Malta	Palau	Spain	
Bhutan	Djibouti	Ireland	Mauritius	Panama	Sweden	
Bosnia and	Dominican Republic	Italy	Mexico	Papua New Guinea	Switzerland	
Brazil	El Salvador	Jamaica	Micronesia	Paraguay	Syrian Arab Republic	
Brunei Darussalam	Equatorial Guinea	Japan	Moldova	Peru	Tajikistan	
Bulgaria	Estonia	Jordan	Monaco	Philippines	Thailand	

3. The five initiatives analysed are:

PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance	**3R2E** Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	**ZEV-D** Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration	**GMP** Global Methane Pledge	**GDFLU** Declaration on Forests and Land Use

4. Energy efficiency here is defined as the amount of primary energy expended per unit of GDP

5. Note that ~15% of this potential reduction is from the US alone.

6. Overlaps: Around two thirds of the global potential for renewables is driven by a fast phase-out of coal in the power sector in line with the targets under the Powering Past Coal Alliance, and thus overlaps fully with the emissions impact from that pledge. Additional reductions come from even faster coal phase-out as well as displacement of gas-fired power generation. For the current members, the coal phase-out has less prominence accounting for only one fifth of the reduction potential.

Launched in 2021 at COP26 Glasgow

Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration (ZEV-D)

Commitment: Government signatories commit to rapidly accelerating the transition to zero-emission vehicles. Signatories will work towards all sales of new cars and vans being zero emission globally by 2040, and by no later than 2035 in leading markets. The ZEV Declaration is implemented by the Accelerating to Zero Coalition (A2Z).


Quality of targets

- ✗ – ✓ Is the initiative's target specific and measurable?
- ✗ – ✓ Is the initiative's target aligned with 1.5°C?
- ✗ – ✓ Does the initiative have country specific targets?

Membership

44 national governments are signatories [1]


22% of 196 nations



Since its launch, government membership has increased slightly. France and Spain joined in 2022, while Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nigeria became signatories in 2024. Several signatories had very low levels of EV deployment at the time of joining, including Chile with a ZEV share of below 1%. Conversely, China, where EVs account for nearly half of all car sales, is not a signatory. Several signatories to the Declaration, including India, Kenya, Mexico and Turkey, are committed to accelerating the adoption of ZEVs, but they have not pledged to reach 100% ZEV sales by a certain year.

Coverage of current members

20% share of 2025 global light-duty vehicle sales



A2Z members account for a slightly higher share of the global LDV market today than they did at the time of launch, which can be attributed to the new member countries. Compared to other initiatives, coverage remains relatively low at 20%.

Potential emissions impact

Global mitigation reduction potentials

Global emissions levels in $GtCO_2e$ if all initiative targets are achieved, based on different levels of global initiative membership

2035

1.6 $GtCO_2e$ — **Total ZEV-D potential**
If all countries join and all ZEV sales targets are met

Policies & action
55 $GtCO_2e$

ZEV-D members 0.21 $GtCO_2e$
Non-members 1.4 $GtCO_2e$

After achieving all global ZEV-D targets
53 $GtCO_2e$

18.7 $GtCO_2e$ — **Total mitigation potential of the other four analysed climate initiatives** [2]
If all countries join and all targets are met for PPCA, 3R2E, GMP & GDFLU initiatives

13.7 $GtCO_2e$ — **Remaining implementation gap if every single nation achieves every initiative target**

1.5°C compatible
21 $GtCO_2e$

Globally, electric vehicles (EVs) are making up 5% of total light duty vehicle stock in 2025, up from just over 1% when the initiative was launched in 2021. Under current policies this is expected to grow to ~30% by 2035.

We have assessed a much faster increase: reaching twice this level, 55–65%, by 2035 on the way to 95–100% by 2050. This is in line with the initiative's goals for car markets to move to 100% EVs by 2035 in leading markets and 2040 in the rest of the world.

Under this scenario, emissions from the initiative's current signatories in 2035 could be ~0.21 $GtCO_2e$ lower than under current policies. This is a slight increase from ~0.15 $GtCO_2e$ for the original membership group. With universal participation, emissions in 2035 could be ~1.6 $GtCO_2e$ lower than under current policies.

The large increase in potential from 2030 to 2035 reflects the fact that this is a very dynamic part of the energy transition with the potential to scale fast. [3]

Mitigation potentials for achieving Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration targets

Year	Launch members ZEV-D members in 2021	Current members ZEV-D members in 2026	Universal coverage If all countries achieved targets
2030	0.06 $GtCO_2e$	0.08 $GtCO_2e$	0.7 $GtCO_2e$
2035	0.15 $GtCO_2e$	0.21 $GtCO_2e$	1.6 $GtCO_2e$


0 $GtCO_2e$

Progress towards the targets

Advanced economies

Zero-emissions vehicle share of LDV sales

Percentage of BEVs and FCEVs in total light duty vehicles sales [3]




ZEV adoption is growing steadily in advanced economies. While year-on-year growth is promising, current adoption levels are far from the required ramp-up path when assuming linear growth to the target. ZEVs accounted for 11% of the market in 2025. Signatories are clearly outperforming non-signatories.

Developing economies and emerging markets

Zero-emissions vehicle share of LDV sales

Percentage of BEVs and FCEVs in total light duty vehicles sales




In developing economies and emerging markets, ZEV adoption is even lower, currently accounting for just 6% of the market. In this group of countries, non-signatories are demonstrating higher levels of adoption than signatories to the ZEV Declaration. China, a non-signatory, is leading the pack with an EV market share of around 50% (not shown as it would distort the picture for this country group).

Furthering collective efforts and climate action

Collaboration, cooperation and alignment of efforts

Engagement in the Global Climate Action Agenda	**Medium:** The A2Z Coalition was not part of any Activation Group as of COP30. The Road Transport Breakthrough, to which the A2Z Coalition is an implementing partner, is the host initiative of the Plan to Accelerate Road Transport Decarbonisation under Objective 2 of the GCAA.
Active outreach	**High:** Regular attendance, participation and engagement at COPs, New York Climate Action Week, transport conferences, and others.
Collaboration with non-state actors	**Yes:** ZEV-D signatories include 44 national governments; 80 cities, states, and regional governments; 14 automotive manufacturers; 48 fleet owners and operators, or shared mobility platforms; 14 investors; 2 financial institutions; and 37 other signatories.
Alignment with related initiatives	**High:** The A2Z Coalition has worked with other initiatives to produce consolidated update reports on the transport transition. Its targets are also largely in line with those of other initiatives, such as the EV100 initiative and the Global Memorandum of Understanding for ZEV trucks and buses.
Mainstreaming targets	**Medium:** The A2Z Coalition may have contributed to the mainstreaming and diffusion of 100% ZEV targets globally. More than 16 national and subnational governments have committed to 100% phase in sales of ZEV cars and vans. However, not all signatories have translated their commitment under the A2Z Coalition into national law.
Formalising targets	**Medium:** GST paragraph 28(g): "Accelerating the reduction of emissions from transport on a range of pathways, including through development of infrastructure and rapid deployment of zero- and low-emission vehicles."
Maintaining public interest	**Low:** Compared to other initiatives, the ZEV Declaration received relatively little media attention, with an average of around 140 articles published each year. Reporting peaked in 2022, one year after the Declaration's launch and in the year that the A2Z Coalition was launched, before falling to low levels in 2025 and 2026.



Policy alignment of G20 nations

ZEV-D members

Aligned targets

Canada 2035 target
5.5% to 11.7%

France EU target (2035)
11.1% to 27.5%

UK 2035 target
13.6% to 31.1%

Share of ZEVs in LDV sales: 2021 and 2025

No targets

India No target
0.8% to 5.0%

Mexico No target
0.4% to 2.9%

Türkiye No target
0.5% to 17.6%

India, Mexico, and Türkiye have not committed to the quantitative targets upon signing the ZEV-D.

Non members

Not a ZEV-D signatory

Argentina No target

Australia* No target
2.3% to 11.3%

Brazil No target
0.2% to 4.1%

China No target
14.2% to 41.5%

EU 2035 target
10.8% to 24.7%

Germany EU target (2035)
16.5% to 26.6%

Indonesia No target
0.1% to 14.3%

Italy EU target (2035)
5.5% to 8.6%

Japan No target
0.7% to 2.5%

Russia No target
0.1% to 0.8%

Saudi Arabia No target

South Africa No target
0.1% to 0.3%

South Korea No target
17.3% to 21.4%

USA* No target
3.5% to 8.2%

Domestic target for 100% ZEV sales share

* Non-signatories with aligned targets on the sub-state level

Governance & accountability

Leadership

Secretariat	The ZEV Declaration is implemented by the Accelerating to Zero (A2Z) Coalition, the secretariat of which is hosted by the ICCT.
Steering committee	Comprised of five organisations: Ceres, Climate Group, Drive Electric Campaign, ICCT, and the UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero
Budget	Supported by the Drive Electric Campaign and the government of the UK. No public information is available on the size or allocation of the budget.

Monitoring & reporting

By the secretariat and third parties	The A2Z Coalition publishes key performance indicators on its website, primarily in aggregated form or focusing on progress in specific markets. It also presents annual and quarterly data on the share of EVs in signatories' LDV market, and showcases newly adopted policies. However, it does not explicitly measure signatories' current progress against a target-compatible trajectory. The A2Z Coalition has collaborated with other organisations to prepare a COP29 progress update on all EV-related initiatives.
By countries	Signatories are not required to report their progress, implemented policies or actions to the secretary. While several countries state their EV adoption or transport-sector related targets in their NDCs, only the UK mentioned the ZEV Declaration of the A2Z Coalition in theirs – indicating that the initiative plays a negligible role in countries' reporting to the UNFCCC.

Accountability & incentives

Compliance	The A2Z Coalition allows countries to join that have (not yet) put national policies in place that are aligned with the targets of the ZEV Declaration. Furthermore, the public information on the initiative does not specify which signatories fall into the 'leading markets' group, which makes it difficult to assess alignment. There are no consequences for countries that are not on track to meet their targets.
Incentives	The A2Z Coalition supports its signatories by coordinating activities, providing implementation support and facilitating knowledge sharing and networking. While it does not provide direct financial support, countries can submit requests for short-term technical assistance to the ICCT under the ZEV Rapid Response Facility.

Notes

1 Below is the full list of the 44 members (current to October 2026) with the year they joined:

Armenia (2021)	Costa Rica (2024)	Ghana (2021)	Lithuania (2021)	Norway (2021)	Ukraine (2021)
Austria (2021)	Croatia (2021)	Greece (2021)	Luxembourg (2021)	Paraguay (2021)	United Kingdom (2021)
Azerbaijan (2021)	Cyprus (2021)	Iceland (2021)	Malta (2021)	Poland (2021)	Uruguay (2021)
Belgium (2021)	Denmark (2021)	India (2021)	Mexico (2021)	Rwanda (2021)	Vatican City (2021)
Cabo Verde (2021)	Dominican Republic (2021)	Ireland (2021)	Morocco (2021)	Slovenia (2021)	
Canada (2021)	El Salvador (2021)	Israel (2021)	Netherlands (2021)	Spain (2022)	
Chile (2021)	Finland (2021)	Kenya (2021)	New Zealand (2021)	Sweden (2021)	
Colombia (2024)	France (2022)	Liechtenstein (2021)	Nigeria (2024)	Türkiye (2021)	

2 The five initiatives analysed are:

PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance	**3R2E** Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	**ZEV-D** Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration	**GMP** Global Methane Pledge	**GDFLU** Declaration on Forests and Land Use

3 ZEVs (Zero-emissions vehicles) includes BEVs (Battery electric vehicles) and FCEV (Fuel cell electric vehicle) but excludes PHEVs (Plugin hybrid electric vehicles)

ZEV	Zero-emissions vehicle	FCEV	Fuel cell electric vehicle	LDV	Light-duty vehicle
BEV	Battery electric vehicle	PHEV	Plugin hybrid electric vehicle	A2Z	Accelerating to zero (coalition)

4 Overlaps**:** As electrification and efficiency are driven by the pledge on Renewables and Energy Efficiency (3R2E), the emissions impact of this initiative is estimated to overlap fully with that pledge. However, given the slow progress on the Efficiency part of 3R2E and the lack of detail on how the required efficiency improvements should be achieved, this initiative, if implemented fully, represents an important driver in achieving 3R2E.

Launched in 2021 at COP26 Glasgow

Global Methane Pledge (GMP)

Commitment: Participants joining the Global Methane Pledge (GMP) agree to take voluntary actions to contribute to a collective effort to reduce global methane emissions by at least 30% from 2020 levels by 2030.

Quality of targets


Is the initiative's target specific and measurable?

Is the initiative's target aligned with 1.5°C?

Does the initiative have country specific targets?

Membership

159 national governments are signatories [1]




81% of 196 nations

Since its launch, the number of governments participating in the Global Methane Pledge has significantly increased. With 159 national governments and the European Union having signed up, the Global Methane Pledge has more participants than most other climate initiatives. Notable new members include Australia, Kazakhstan and Egypt, all of which joined in 2022 and all of which have methane accounting for at least 15% of their total greenhouse gas emissions. Some of the largest emitters, including China, India, and Russia, are not participating.

Coverage of current members

61% share of total global methane emissions in 2024



Participants' share of global methane emissions has increased. This can be attributed to two trends. Firstly, there has been an increase in overall membership, which can be interpreted as a positive step towards near-universal consensus. Secondly, there has been a lack of progress in signatory countries, which as a whole have witnessed an increase in methane emissions rather than a decrease since the launch of the GMP, at a slightly higher rate than non-signatory countries.

Potential emissions impact

Global mitigation reduction potentials

Global emissions levels in $GtCO_2e$ if all initiative targets are achieved, based on different levels of global initiative membership

2030

Policies & action
58 $GtCO_2e$

2.8 $GtCO_2e$
Total GMP potential
If all countries join and all CH_4 reduction targets are met

GMP members
1.45 $GtCO_2e$
Non-members
1.35 $GtCO_2e$

After achieving all global GMP targets
55 $GtCO_2e$

13.5 $GtCO_2e$
Total mitigation potential of the other four analysed climate initiatives [2]
If all countries join and all targets are met for PPCA, 3R2E, ZED-D & GDFLU initiatives

Global methane emissions have increased steadily, reaching over 8 $GtCO_2e$ in 2020 and continuing to rise since then. Under current policies, these emissions are expected to stabilise soon and return to 2020 levels by 2030. Under the Global Methane Pledge, global emissions should be reduced much more quickly, falling to 30% below the 2020 level by 2030.

14.0 $GtCO_2e$
Remaining implementation gap if every single nation achieves every initiative target

If members collectively worked towards this goal, we estimate that the reductions in 2030 will be ~1.5 $GtCO_2e$ compared to emissions under current policies from the initiative's current signatories and ~3 $GtCO_2e$ if all countries joined. [3]

1.5°C compatible
27 $GtCO_2e$

This potential has increased slightly from ~1.1 $GtCO_2e$ of the original membership group.

In practice, a small overlap is expected between the emissions impact from the GMP and the savings from the Renewables and Vehicle initiatives discussed in this report. This is because here we quantify savings from all methane emissions, including the energy sector, and a share of these savings will also be driven by a reduction in methane leakage from upstream oil and gas production, which in turn is impacted by the reduction in fossil fuel consumption driven by the other two efforts. We have not quantified this overlap here.

Mitigation potentials for achieving Global Methane Pledge targets


Year	Launch members GMP members in 2021	Current members GMP members in 2026	Universal coverage If all countries achieved targets
2030	1.11 $GtCO_2e$	1.45 $GtCO_2e$	2.8 $GtCO_2e$
2035	1.36 $GtCO_2e$	1.75 $GtCO_2e$	2.86 $GtCO_2e$

0 $GtCO_2e$

Progress towards the targets

Global methane emissions

Total CH_4 emissions in gigatonnes carbon dioxide equivalent



Globally, methane emissions are increasing. There has been no slowdown in the growth of emissions since the GMP was launched. Participants of the GMP have even increased their emissions at a slightly higher rate than non-signatory countries. In order to meet the 2030 reduction target, decisive action is required. Analyses show that implementing all technologically feasible mitigation options could enable meeting the target.

Furthering collective efforts and climate action

Collaboration, cooperation and alignment of efforts

Engagement in the Global Climate Action Agenda
High: The GMP is part of several activation groups, including those for objectives 4 (transitioning away from fossil fuels), 15 (solid waste management) and 25 (reduction of non-CO_2 gases). The CCAC hosts one Plan to Accelerate Solutions for objective 25.

Active outreach
High: Regular attendance, participation and engagement at COPs, Transatlantic Dialogue meetings, London Climate Action Week, and other high-level events.


Collaboration with non-state actors
No: The GMP is open to participation of national governments only. There are several related initiatives that are open or restricted to participation from non-state actors, including the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership, the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, or the Oil and Gas Decarbonisation Charter.

Alignment with related initiatives
High: The GMP formally cooperates with the Global Methane Initiative (GMI), the Global Methane Hub (GMH), the IEA, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the World Bank. Its targets are consistent with those of the Oil and Gas Decarbonisation Charter, which pledges to zero routine flaring by 2030 and net zero operations by 2050.

Mainstreaming targets
Medium: The GMP, via the CACC, supports countries in developing national methane roadmaps and action plans, some of which contain explicit reduction targets for 2030, while others focus on identifying mitigation potentials or policies. The GMP is therefore likely to have supported the formulation of reduction targets

Formalising targets
Medium: GST paragraph 28(f): "Accelerating the substantial reduction on non-carbon dioxide emissions globally, in particular methane emissions by 2030."

Maintaining public interest
Medium: There has been a high level of general media interest in the GMP, with an average of almost 10,000 articles published per year. However, reporting peaked in 2022 and remained high until 2024, before dropping off – although still remaining at higher levels than other initiatives.



Policy alignment of G20 nations

GMP members

Aligned* targets

Canada >35% reduction
+2.1% average change

Mexico 30% reduction
+0.9% average change

South Korea 30% reduction
-0% average change

Targets are not aligned

Japan 11% reduction
-0.4% average change

Domestic 2030 target for methane reductions

Average annual change in methane emissions 2020-2024. Positive numbers represent an increase in emissions, negative a reduction.

No targets

Argentina No target
+0.3% average change

Australia No target
+2.3% average change

Brazil No target
+1.8% average change

EU No target
-1.1% average change

France No target
-1.4% average change

Germany No target
-1.5% average change

Indonesia No target
+6.7% average change

Italy No target
-2.1% average change

Saudi Arabia No target
+1.5% average change

UK No target
-1.5% average change

USA No target
+0.5% average change

Non members

Not a GMP signatory

China No target
+0.3% average change

India No target
+2.2% average change

Russia No target
+0.3% average change

South Africa No target
-0.3% average change

Türkiye No target
-0.2% average change

* *For a target to be considered aligned it would need to aim to achieve methane emissions reductions that are at the same level or greater than the overall GMP target of 30% below 2020 levels. It should be noted that some countries will need to go beyond this reduction.*

Governance & accountability

Leadership

Secretariat	Secretariat hosted by the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CACC).
Co-coveners	Canada and the European Union.
GMP Champions	Canada, Chile, EU, Germany, Japan, Micronesia, Nigeria, and the UK.
Budget	USD 100 million to date from over 21 government and philanthropic contributors.

Monitoring & reporting

By the secretariat and third parties	The CCAC and UNEP publish an annual Global Methane Status Report, which assesses the status of progress towards the 2030 targets. It includes a current policies scenario, which projects rising emissions until and beyond 2030. It also analyses methane mitigation policies and measures in countries' NDCs and national action plans. The IEA hosts a Global Methane Tracker, which also features information on recent policy developments.
By countries	GMP countries are encouraged, but not required, to develop, update and submit their Methane Action Plans or Roadmaps to the secretariat. These plans usually set out current and planned policies for reducing methane emissions by 2030 and beyond. To date, over 25 countries have referenced the GMP in their NDCs, 20 of which have done so in NDCs 3.0. This includes Saudi Arabia, the EU, Australia, Nigeria, Canada and the UK. This makes the GMP a more prominent initiative within countries' reporting to the UNFCCC.

Accountability & incentives

Compliance	The are no ex-ante compliance requirements for countries upon joining the GMP, which is also due to the collective nature of the target. Country-specific contributions towards this target are expected to vary significantly depending, among other things, on the respective sector-specific contributions to methane emissions. At COP30, the GMP Ministerial Roundtable reviewed the progress made to date. However, there are no formal mechanisms to hold countries accountable if collective progress falls behind schedule.
Incentives	Participants of the GMP have access to a range of supporting materials and knowledge, including case studies, sector-specific guidelines and tools, sector-specific expert assistance, policy and regulatory support, and country projections. The CCAC has also set up two programmes to support ODA-eligible countries in developing policies, regulations and roadmaps: the Fossil Fuel Regulatory Programme and the Methane Roadmap Action Programme.

Notes

1 Below is the full list of the 159 members (current to October 2026):

Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, UAE, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Cook Islands

2 The five initiatives analysed are:

PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance

3R2E Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge

ZEV-D Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration

GMP Global Methane Pledge

GDFLU Declaration on Forests and Land Use

3 Note that ~10% of this potential reduction is from the US alone.

Launched in 2021 at COP26 Glasgow

Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use (GDFLU)

Commitment: Signatories of the Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use pledge to conserve forests and other terrestrial ecosystems and accelerate their restoration. Signatories commit to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030. In 2022, the Forest and Climate Leaders' Partnership (FCLP) was launched to deliver the Declaration.

Quality of targets


Is the initiative's target specific and measurable?

Is the initiative's target aligned with 1.5°C?

Does the initiative have country specific targets?

Membership

143 national governments are signatories [1]




73% of 196 nations

Since 2021, the Glasgow Declaration on Forests has attracted a growing number of signatories. With 143 national governments and the European Union among its signatories, it has managed to rally more participating countries than most other climate initiatives. Several countries with large forests or high deforestation rates, including Brazil, China, Russia, Colombia and Tanzania, already signed the Declaration in 2021.

Coverage of current members

94% share of global tree cover loss in 2025



Signatories are responsible for the vast majority of global tree cover loss. At the time of launch, this figure stood at 88%, and has since risen to 94%. This suggests that, if they all took ambitious action, the Declaration's signatories have the potential to significantly reduce global tree cover loss.

Potential emissions impact

Global mitigation reduction potentials

Global emissions levels in $GtCO_2e$ if all initiative targets are achieved, based on different levels of global initiative membership

2030

Policies & action
58 $GtCO_2e$

3.2 $GtCO_2e$ **Total GDFLU potential**
If all countries join and all coal phase-out targets are met

GDFLU members
2.6 $GtCO_2e$
Non-members
0.52 $GtCO_2e$

After achieving all global GDFLU targets
54 $GtCO_2e$

13.1 $GtCO_2e$ **Total mitigation potential of the other four analysed climate initiatives**
If all countries join and all targets are met for PPCA, 3R2E, ZED-D & GMP initiatives [2]

14.0 $GtCO_2e$ **Remaining implementation gap if every single nation achieves every initiative target**

1.5°C compatible
27 $GtCO_2e$

To quantify the impact of this initiative, we focus on emissions from deforestation. Additional savings could come from halting land degradation or increasing tree cover, but we have not quantified these.

Deforestation are highly variable. On average they have fallen slowly, from ~5 $GtCO_2e$ in the early 2000s to ~4 $GtCO_2e$ in the five years to 2020. Under current policies, forests would still continue to emit ~3 $GtCO_2e$ per year by 2030. This initiative wants to completely halt deforestation by that year.

We estimate that the current signatories alone would be responsible for ~2.6 $GtCO_2e$ of deforestation emissions by 2030 and would therefore save that amount if they achieved the initiative's aim of stopping deforestation completely.

This potential has only increased slightly from ~2.5 $GtCO_2e$ of the original membership group.

The potential in 2035 is smaller than in 2030 because the efforts to end deforestation already planned by countries under current policies are expected to already significantly reduce deforestation emissions by 2035 under current policies.

Mitigation potentials for achieving Declaration of Forests and Land Use Pledge targets


Year	Launch members GDFLU members in 2021	Current members GDFLU members in 2026	Universal coverage If all countries achieved targets
2030	2.5 $GtCO_2e$	2.6 $GtCO_2e$	3.1 $GtCO_2e$
2035	2.2 $GtCO_2e$	2.3 $GtCO_2e$	2.8 $GtCO_2e$

0 $GtCO_2e$

Progress towards the targets

Global deforestation

Total land cover loss in million hectares



Collective progress towards the zero deforestation target is dramatically off track. Global deforestation rates in 2024 were similar to those when the initiative was launched and have even increased slightly in between. If emissions follow a linear trajectory between 2021 and the target year, they should be one third lower than they are now.

Furthering collective efforts and climate action

Collaboration, cooperation and alignment of efforts

Engagement in the Global Climate Action Agenda
High: The FCLP is focal point contact of the activation group 5 (Investments to halt and reverse deforestation) and participates in Activation Group 23 (Harmonization of Carbon Markets and carbon accounting standards). It is one of the implementing initiatives for several Plans to Accelerate Solutions, including 'Integrating Deforestation into Financial Decision-Making', 'Land tenure for Afro-descendant communities', 'REDD+ and combatting deforestation', and 'Synergistic implementation across the Rio Conventions'.

Active outreach
High: Regular attendance, participation and engagement at COPs, New York Climate Week, London Climate Action Week, and other high-level events.


Collaboration with non-state actors
No: The Glasgow Declaration on Forests is open to participation of national governments only.

Alignment with related initiatives
High: The FCLP collaborates with several other cooperative, forest-related initiatives, including the Bonn Challenge, the Central African Forests Initiative, the Great Green Wall for Sahara and the Sahel Initiative, the New York Declaration on Forests, and the Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity Producers and Traders. It developed the Forest Finance Roadmap in collaboration with the government of Brazil and support by UNEP, and launched the J-REDD+ Coalition to address the financing gap.

Mainstreaming targets
Medium: In 2014, the NY Declaration on Forests first put forward the goal of halting natural forest loss by 2030, which the Glasgow Declaration then reaffirmed and expanded in 2021. Its targets likely also shaped the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework in 2022, and the Declaration of the 19th session of the UN Forum on Forests in 2024. [3]

Formalising targets
Medium: GST paragraph 33: "[…] enhanced efforts towards halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030."

Maintaining public interest
Medium: Interest from the media peaked in the year of launch and has declined significantly since then. While it averaged 1,300 articles per year throughout the entire period, this figure fell to below 500 in 2025.



Policy alignment of G20 nations

GDFLU members

Aligned targets

Canada
2030 target
-8.3% average change
Domestic target for achieving zero deforestation

Targets are not aligned

Brazil
2030 target
+0.4% average change

Indonesia
2030 target
+2% average change

Both Brazil and Indonesia have a zero deforestation by 2030 target. However, both targets are surrounded by uncertainty regarding the scope or the accounting methodology

No targets

Argentina
No target
0% average change

Australia
No target
-9.6% average change

Average annual change in deforestation between 2020-2024. Positive numbers represent an increase in deforestation, negative a reduction.

Low / no deforestation

China, EU, France, Germany, Italy
Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye
UK, USA

Non members

Not a GDFLU signatory

India
Saudi Arabia
South Africa

Governance & accountability

Leadership

Secretariat	FCLP Secretariat hosted by the United Nations Office for Project Services
Co-coveners	Guyana and the United Kingdom
Steering committee	Comprised of ministers of member countries
Budget	The FCLP is supported through contributions of its member countries and partners, which in 2025 included financial support from Canada, South Korea, Norway, the United Kingdom. In-kind support was provided by Germany, the Environmental Defence Fund and the Climate and Land Use Alliance.

Monitoring & reporting

By the secretariat and third parties	The FCLP publishes an annual report, which focuses on the activities of the FCLP and its members over the past year. The Forest Declaration Assessment, a civil society-led effort, tracks progress towards halting and reversing deforestation by 2030. It publishes an annual report and shows global and country-specific deforestation numbers in a dashboard, but does not specifically highlight progress (or lack thereof) among signatories.
By countries	Signatories are not required to report on their progress to the secretary, or on implemented policies and actions. Only 5 countries (the UK, Viet Nam, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Andorra) have referenced the Glasgow Forest Declaration in a previous NDC submission. Several more countries have included a reference in other submissions, such as Biennial Update Reports, Biennial Reports and National Adaptation Plans, but the initiative appears to play a minor role in countries' reporting to the UNFCCC overall.

Accountability & incentives

Compliance	There are no stringent ex-ante compliance requirements for joining the Glasgow Forest Declaration or the FCLP. Interested countries must describe how they plan to work towards achieving the zero deforestation target, and indicate which action areas or efforts the country will support or lead under the FCLP. FCLP members convened at the Ministerial level at COP30 in Brazil to reflect on how the initiative supported relevant outcomes at COP30. There are no consequences for signatory countries if collective, or country-specific, progress is not on track.
Incentives	Members of the FCLP have improved access to political leaders, increased visibility at COPs and international forums, receive technical and policy support, and have a platform for collaboration and knowledge sharing.

Notes

1 Below is the full list of the 143 members (current to October 2026):

Albania	Burkina Faso	DR Congo	Haiti	Luxembourg	Niger	San Marino	Thailand
Andorra	Cambodia	Ecuador	Honduras	Madagascar	Nigeria	Sao Tome and	Togo
Angola	Cameroon	El Salvador	Hungary	Malawi	North Macedonia	Senegal	Tonga
Argentina	Canada	Equatorial Guinea	Iceland	Malaysia	Norway	Serbia	Türkiye
Armenia	Central African	Estonia	Indonesia	Mali	Pakistan	Seychelles	Turkmenistan
Australia	Chad	Eswatini	Ireland	Malta	Panama	Sierra Leone	UAE
Austria	Chile	Fiji	Israel	Mauritius	Papua New Guinea	Singapore	Uganda
Azerbaijan	China	Finland	Italy	Mexico	Paraguay	Slovakia	Ukraine
Bangladesh	Colombia	France	Jamaica	Moldova	Peru	Slovenia	United Kingdom
Belarus	Congo	Gabon	Japan	Monaco	Philippines	Somalia	United States
Belgium	Costa Rica	Georgia	Kazakhstan	Mongolia	Poland	South Korea	Uruguay
Belize	Côte d'Ivoire	Germany	Kenya	Montenegro	Portugal	Spain	Uzbekistan
Bhutan	Croatia	Ghana	Kyrgyzstan	Morocco	Romania	Sri Lanka	Vanuatu
Bosnia and	Cuba	Greece	Latvia	Mozambique	Russia	Suriname	Vatican City
Botswana	Cyprus	Grenada	Lebanon	Nepal	Rwanda	Sweden	Viet Nam
Brazil	Czechia	Guatemala	Liberia	Netherlands	Saint Lucia	Switzerland	Zambia
Brunei Darussalam	Denmark	Guinea-Bissau	Liechtenstein	New Zealand	Saint Vincent and the	Syrian Arab Republic	Zimbabwe
Bulgaria	Dominican Republic	Guyana	Lithuania	Nicaragua	Samoa	Tanzania	
Burkina Faso	DR Congo	Haiti	Luxembourg	Niger	San Marino	Thailand	

2 The five initiatives analysed are:

PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance	**3R2E** Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	**ZEV-D** Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration	**GMP** Global Methane Pledge	**GDFLU** Declaration on Forests and Land Use

3 A few countries have also put forward zero deforestation targets for 2030 – albeit with differences in countries' interpretations of the target.

6 Glossary

3R2E	Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge
A2Z	Accelerating to Zero (Coalition)
BEV	Battery electric vehicle
CCAC	Climate and Clean Air Coalition
COP	Conference of the Parties (annual climate change conference)
EV	Electric vehicle
FCLP	Forest & Climate Leaders' Partnership
FCEV	Fuel cell eletric vehicle
GCAA	Global Climate Action Agenda
GDFLU	Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use
GMP	Global Methane Pledge
IAM	Integrated Assessment Model
LDV	Ligh-duty vehicle (=car)
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions (climate targets)
PHEV	Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle
PPCA	Powering Past Coal Alliance
ZEV	Zero emission vehicle
ZEV-D	Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration

7 Full list of member countries per initiative

Current membership of five selected international climate initiatives

(as of October 2026)

	PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance	3R2E Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	ZEV-D Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration	GMP Global Methane Pledge	GDFLU Declaration on Forests and Land Use	Total number of the five initiatives country is a signatory
Afghanistan						0
Albania	■	■		■	■	4
Algeria						0
Andorra		■		■	■	3
Angola	■	■		■	■	4
Antigua and Barbuda		■		■		2
Argentina		■		■	■	3
Armenia		■	■	■	■	4
Australia		■		■	■	3
Austria	■	■	■	■	■	5
Azerbaijan	■	■	■	■	■	5
Bahamas		■				1
Bahrain	■			■		2
Bangladesh		■		■	■	3
Barbados		■		■		2
Belarus					■	1
Belgium	■	■	■	■	■	5
Belize		■		■	■	3
Benin		■		■		2
Bhutan		■			■	2
Bolivia						0
Bosnia and Herzegovina		■		■	■	3
Botswana					■	1
Brazil		■		■	■	3
Brunei Darussalam		■			■	2
Bulgaria		■		■	■	3
Burkina Faso		■		■	■	3
Burundi		■				1
Cabo Verde		■	■	■		3
Cambodia				■	■	2
Cameroon				■	■	2
Canada	■	■	■	■	■	5
Central African Republic				■	■	2
Chad		■		■	■	3
Chile	■	■	■	■	■	5
China					■	1
Colombia	■	■	■		■	5
Comoros		■		■		2
Congo				■	■	2
Costa Rica	■	■	■	■	■	5
Côte d'Ivoire		■		■	■	3
Croatia	■	■	■	■	■	5
Cuba		■		■	■	3
Cyprus	■	■	■	■	■	5
Czechia	■	■		■	■	4
Denmark	■	■	■	■	■	5
Djibouti		■		■		2
Dominica				■		1
Dominican Republic	■	■	■	■	■	5
DR Congo				■	■	2
Ecuador				■	■	2
Egypt				■		1
El Salvador	■	■	■	■	■	5
Equatorial Guinea		■		■	■	3
Eritrea						0
Estonia	■	■		■	■	4
Eswatini		■		■	■	3
Ethiopia	■	■		■		3
Fiji	■	■		■	■	4
Finland	■	■	■	■	■	5
France	■	■	■	■	■	5
Gabon				■	■	2
Gambia		■		■		2
Georgia		■		■	■	3
Germany	■	■		■	■	4
Ghana		■	■	■	■	4
Greece	■	■	■	■	■	5
Grenada		■		■	■	3
Guatemala	■	■		■	■	4
Guinea		■		■		2
Guinea-Bissau					■	1
Guyana				■	■	2

Current membership of five selected international climate initiatives

(as of October 2026)

	PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance	3R2E Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	ZEV-D Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration	GMP Global Methane Pledge	GDFLU Declaration on Forests and Land Use	Total number of the five initiatives country is a signatory
Haiti				■	■	2
Honduras	■			■	■	3
Hungary	■	■			■	3
Iceland	■	■	■	■	■	5
India			■			1
Indonesia				■	■	2
Iran						0
Iraq				■		1
Ireland	■	■	■	■	■	5
Israel	■		■	■	■	4
Italy	■	■		■	■	4
Jamaica		■		■	■	3
Japan		■		■	■	3
Jordan		■		■		2
Kazakhstan				■	■	2
Kenya		■	■	■	■	4
Kiribati		■				1
Kosovo	■	■		■		3
Kuwait				■		1
Kyrgyzstan		■		■	■	3
Laos						0
Latvia	■	■			■	3
Lebanon		■		■	■	3
Lesotho		■		■		2
Liberia				■	■	2
Libya				■		1
Liechtenstein	■	■	■	■	■	5
Lithuania	■	■	■		■	4
Luxembourg	■	■	■	■	■	5
Madagascar				■	■	2
Malawi		■		■	■	3
Malaysia		■		■	■	3
Maldives		■				1
Mali		■		■	■	3
Malta	■	■	■	■	■	5
Marshall Islands	■			■		2
Mauritania				■		1
Mauritius	■	■			■	3
Mexico	■	■	■	■	■	5
Micronesia		■		■		2
Moldova		■		■	■	3
Monaco		■		■	■	3
Mongolia				■	■	2
Montenegro	■	■		■	■	4
Morocco	■	■	■	■	■	5
Mozambique		■		■	■	3
Myanmar						0
Namibia		■		■		2
Nauru		■		■		2
Nepal				■	■	2
Netherlands	■	■	■	■	■	5
New Zealand	■	■	■	■	■	5
Nicaragua		■			■	2
Niger				■	■	2
Nigeria		■	■	■	■	4
Niue	■	■		■		3
North Korea						0
North Macedonia	■	■		■	■	4
Norway	■	■	■	■	■	5
Oman		■		■		2
Pakistan		■		■	■	3
Palau		■		■		2
Panama	■	■		■	■	4
Papua New Guinea		■		■	■	3
Paraguay		■	■		■	3
Peru	■	■		■	■	4
Philippines		■		■	■	3
Poland		■	■		■	3
Portugal	■	■		■	■	4
Qatar				■		1
Republic of Korea	■	■		■	■	4
Romania		■		■	■	3
Russia					■	1
Rwanda		■	■	■	■	4

Current membership of five selected international climate initiatives

(as of October 2026)

	PPCA Powering Past Coal Alliance	3R2E Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge	ZEV-D Zero Emission Vehicles Declaration	GMP Global Methane Pledge	GDFLU Declaration on Forests and Land Use	Total number of the five initiatives country is a signatory
Saint Kitts and Nevis				■		1
Saint Lucia				■	■	2
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines					■	1
Samoa				■	■	2
San Marino		■		■	■	3
Sao Tome and Principe				■	■	2
Saudi Arabia				■		1
Senegal	■	■		■	■	4
Serbia		■		■	■	3
Seychelles		■		■	■	3
Sierra Leone		■		■	■	3
Singapore	■	■		■	■	4
Slovakia	■	■		■	■	4
Slovenia	■	■	■	■	■	5
Solomon Islands				■		1
Somalia		■		■	■	3
South Africa						0
South Sudan						0
Spain	■	■	■	■	■	5
Sri Lanka				■	■	2
Sudan				■		1
Suriname				■	■	2
Sweden	■	■	■	■	■	5
Switzerland	■	■		■	■	4
Syrian Arab Republic		■			■	2
Tajikistan		■		■		2
Tanzania					■	1
Thailand		■			■	2
Timor-Leste				■		1
Togo		■		■	■	3
Tonga				■	■	2
Trinidad and Tobago				■		1
Tunisia		■		■		2
Türkiye			■		■	2
Turkmenistan				■	■	2
Tuvalu	■			■		2
UAE	■	■		■	■	4
Uganda	■				■	2
Ukraine	■	■	■	■	■	5
United Kingdom	■	■	■	■	■	5
United States	■	■		■	■	4
Uruguay	■	■	■	■	■	5
Uzbekistan		■		■	■	3
Vanuatu	■	■		■	■	4
Vatican City			■		■	2
Venezuela						0
Viet Nam				■	■	2
Yemen		■		■		2
Zambia		■		■	■	3
Zimbabwe		■			■	2

8 Methodology

We derived the evaluation framework from previous empirical research on international climate initiatives, as well as from commonly cited expectations and critiques regarding their effectiveness and governance, as identified in Section 2.

8.1 Quality of targets

For each initiative, we assessed the quality of its targets using the SMART framework, evaluating whether targets were specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound. To assess alignment with the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C temperature limit, we compared initiative targets with benchmarks from widely used 1.5°C transition pathways and sector-specific assessments, including the International Energy Agency's Net Zero Emissions Scenario and relevant benchmarks developed by the Climate Action Tracker and other expert organisations. We also examined whether initiatives adopted collective, initiative-wide targets or established country-specific commitments for participating members.

8.2 Membership and coverage

Membership data were compiled from official initiative sources, including websites and publicly available membership lists. Countries were classified as members or signatories based on the initiative's own definitions, regardless of potential differences in the credibility or political commitment of individual participants. While some memberships may reflect varying levels of commitment, we applied a consistent classification approach across all initiatives. Given the diversity of terminology used by initiatives, the terms member and signatory are used interchangeably throughout the analysis. In the case of the Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use, we focus on signatories to the Declaration rather than members of the implementing alliance.

Where available, we collected annual membership information to assess changes in participation over time. For initiatives that do not provide historical membership records, information on founding or early membership was supplemented with contemporary reporting from the period of launch.

To assess coverage, we selected a sector-specific indicator that reflects the potential influence of participating countries on the relevant global system, such as greenhouse gas emissions, energy production, market share, or other sectoral metrics. This approach provides an indication of the extent to which initiative members can influence global outcomes in the targeted area.

8.3 Mitigation potential

We assessed expected impact on emissions in 2030 and 2035 under three possible membership scenarios:

- The impact if only those countries who originally signed up to the initiative achieved its goals
- The impact if all current signatories to the iniative fully achieved the initiative's goals
- The impact if all countries in the world were to sign up and achieve the initiative's goals

The assessment approach differed by initiative.

PPCA / 3R2E

We based our assessment on our analysis of the impact of 3R2E in our report from November 2025 "Three key near-term actions could bend the warming curve; bringing projected warming below 2˚C" where, amongst others, we analysed the emissions reductions expected under tripling of renewables and doubling of efficiency for the G20[1].

We then scaled this impact separately for the emissions reductions from tripling renewables and the reductions from doubling efficiency, using

- each country's current power sector emissions in 2022 (Ember, 2026) for the reductions from tripling renewables and
- each country's primary energy demand (IEA, 2024) in 2022 for the reductions from doubling efficiency.

Emissions reductions were scaled separately from G20 members of the initiative to all member countries globally and from G20 non-members of the initiative to all non-member countries globally. For a full list of all member countries per initiative, see Section 7.

The impact of the coal initiative consisted of three elements:

- the impact of reduced coal power emissions driven by the tripling renewables initiative (and fully overlapping with that initiative's impact) and thus following the approach above,
- the additional phase-out of residual coal power emissions in OECD[2] countries in 2030 and 2035 where the tripling of renewables had failed to achieve a complete phase-out, and
- an additional phase-down of residual coal power emissions in non-OECD countries (but excluding China) in 2030 and 2035 assuming full phase-out in these countries would be achieved by 2040.

Emissions reductions were scaled from G20 members of the initiative to all member countries globally and from G20 non-members of the initiative to all non-member countries globally. For a full list of all member countries per initiative, see Section 7.

Given the large share that the US has in coal power emissions globally, and the possible impact of the initiative we quantified this initiative's impact with and without the US as a signatory given that despite their membership on paper, national policy is currently diametrically opposed to the initiative's goals.

Overlaps

There is strong overlap between the emissions reductions from these two initiatives. Around 80% of the coal reductions are driven by renewables rollout, while two thirds of the renewables reductions are achieved by efforts to phase out coal power. These overlaps are accounted for the the estimate of the total combined emission reduction potential across initiatives.

ZEV-D

We anchored our analysis in historical data on total light-duty vehicle (LDV) stocks and electric vehicle (EV) stocks from the IEA (IEA, 2026), complemented by data from Eurostat (Eurostat, 2026) on EU countries not present in the IEA data, resulting in a list of 34 countries to study[3].

To estimate EV stocks under current policies in 2030 and 2035, we used the STEPS projections at regional level from the IEA (IEA, 2026).

To estimate EV stocks under impact of the initiative, we used CAT transport sector benchmarks aligned with 1.5°C scenarios from our October 2024 report Decarbonising road transport: light-duty vehicles which align well with the initiative's goals of phasing out sales of internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles by 2035 in advanced economies and 2040 in the rest of the world.

1 G20 jurisdictions analysed in the 2025 paper: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Türkiye, United Kingdom, USA, EU. For the present analysis, the EU was split into its 27 constituent states by the same indicator used to scale to global level.

2 OECD here includes South Korea

3 Brazil, Indonesia, China, India, Japan, Korea, USA, EU

The difference in the number of EVs between current policy baseline and a scenario under the impact of the initiative was the converted to emissions reductions, using regionally average annual emissions factors per vehicles, derived from the IEA's assessment of energy savings impact per vehicle per region (IEA, 2026).

Emissions reductions were scaled from studied members of the initiative to all member countries globally and from studied non-members of the initiative to all non-member countries globally. For a full list of all member countries per initiative, see Section 7.

Overlaps

The impact of doubling efficiency, estimated in our November 2025 paper "Three key near-term actions could bend the warming curve; bringing projected warming below 2˚C" already achieves an electrification rate that is at least as high as the electricity share in transport expected from the achievement of this initiative's aims. We have therefore assumed full overlap of its emission reduction potential with the 3R2E initiative.

GMP

We based our assessment on our analysis of the impact of the GMP in our report from November 2025 "Three key near-term actions could bend the warming curve; bringing projected warming below 2˚C" where, amongst others, we analysed the emissions reductions in the G201 expected under a 30% reduction of global methane emissions below 2020 levels.

We updated the analysis from 2025 to account for historical emissions development, by using updated down-scaled country-level IAM pathways aligned with 1.5°C scenarios, harmonised to historical 2023 emissions.

Emissions reductions were scaled from G20 members of the initiative to all member countries globally and from G20 non-members of the initiative to all non-member countries globally. For a full list of all member countries per initiative, see Section 7.

Overlaps

Although there is expected to be some reduction in methane emissions due to the reduced demand for fossil fuels driven by tripling of renewables in the power sector, this overlap has not been calculated here and may lead to a slightly overestimate of the total combined emissions reductions between these two initiatives.

GDFLU

For this initiative we were able to do a bottom-up analysis for all countries and then sum the emissions impact for members and non-members separately directly.

We only assessed emissions impact from halting deforestation.

Historical data on 5-year average deforestation emissions from Grassi (Grassi, 2026) for the period 2016–2020 were combined with regional projections of deforestation development under current policies from Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) (Gidden, 2023).

This resulted in an estimate of emissions from deforestation under current policies for the years 2030 and 2035. Since these emissions should be reduced to zero under the initiative's aims, the emission reduction potential was simply equal to the expected emissions level under current policies.

8.4 Global progress

We assess progress towards each initiative's objectives for both the global aggregate and separately for signatory and non-signatory countries. To provide a simple indication of whether current developments are consistent with the initiative's stated goals, we draw a linear pathway between the initiative's launch year (or official baseline year, where applicable) and its target year. This approach offers a transparent benchmark against which observed progress can be evaluated. However, it should be interpreted with caution, as it does not account for the non-linear deployment dynamics often observed in technological transitions.

We used the following data:

- **PPCA:**
  - Indicator: Share of coal in total electricity generation (%).
  - Source: Ember (2026). Yearly Electricity Data.
- **3R2E:**
  - Indicator: Installed renewable capacity (GW).
  - 3R2E: Share of coal in total electricity generation (%). Ember (2026). Source: Ember (2026). Yearly Electricity Data.
  - Indicator: Annual improvement of energy intensity (%).
  - Source: US EIA (2026). International Energy Statistics.
- **ZEV-D:**
  - Indicator: Share of zero-emission vehicles (BEVs and FCEVs) in LDV market.
  - Source: IEA (2026). Global EV Outlook 2026.
- **GMP:**
  - Indicator: Global CH4 emissions (MtCO2e).
  - Source: European Commission, Joint Research Centre (2025). EDGAR Community GHG Database.
- **GDFLU:**
  - Indicator: Annual global deforestation (Mha).
  - Source: Forest Declaration Assessment Partners (2025). Forest Declaration Assessment 2025.

8.5 G20 policy alignment

To assess policy alignment among G20 countries, we compiled country-specific targets relevant to each initiative and evaluated whether they were fully aligned with the initiative's objectives, partially or not aligned, or absent altogether. Combined with information on initiative membership, this classification was used to group countries according to their level of alignment and participation.

Targets for phasing out coal were taken from Bloomberg (Global Coal Countdown), renewables targets from Ember (2030 Global Renewable Target Tracker), ZEV targets from the ZEV Transition Council (Phase Out Map), and deforestation and methane reduction targets from the Climate Action Tracker, the Climate Policy Database, and complemented by additional research. It should be noted that some of the renewable energy targets are derived and not official, for example in the case of India, which has a renewable capacity target. Australia's renewables target only covers on-grid generation. China has a wind and solar generation target of 30% by 2030, and India has a JETP target of 44% renewable on-grid power generation – both of which are not shown in the figure.

In addition to target alignment, we assess countries' observed progress since the launch of each initiative. Country-level progress is measured using the same indicators and data sources employed in the global progress analysis. For the Global Methane Pledge, progress is assessed based on methane emissions, expressed as a percentage of 2020 levels. For the Glasgow Forest Declaration, progress is measured using deforestation rates, likewise expressed as a percentage of 2020 levels. This enables a comparison between countries' stated commitments and their observed performance since the initiative was established.

To be considered as having low to no deforestation, annual emissions from deforestation (MtCO2 in the period 2000-2020) must be below 10% of domestic emissions (excl. LULUCF, in most recent historical year).

Authors

Climate Analytics
Claudio Forner
Sofia Gonzales-Zuñiga
Neil Grant
Bill Hare

NewClimate Institute
Janna Hoppe
Kienor (Ziru) Ye
Niklas Höhne

Editing
Cindy Baxter

Design
Designers For Climate Studios

With support from:
Yvonne Deng

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the wider CAT team for their work on country and sectoral assessments.

This report and analysis of the impact of international climate initiatives were made possible with the generous support of the Climate Emergency Collaboration Group (CECG).

The Consortium

The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) is an independent scientific analysis produced by three research organisations tracking climate action since 2009. We track progress towards the globally agreed aim of holding warming well below 2°C, and pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C.

climateactiontracker.org

Climate Analytics is a non-profit institute leading research on climate science and policy in relation to the 1.5°C limit in the Paris Agreement. It has offices in Germany, the United States, Togo, Australia, Nepal and Trinidad and Tobago.

climateanalytics.org

NewClimate Institute is an independent non-profit organisation that develops solutions to tackle climate change and drives their implementation worldwide. Through research, policy advice and knowledge sharing, we aim to raise the ambition for climate action and support sustainable development.

newclimate.org

Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR) is an energy and environment focused think-tank that aims to accelerate the energy transition by supporting sustainable mobility, green economy, and well designed climate change policy. IESR has experience mainly in Indonesia, but is expanding its focus to work in other regions and countries.

iesr.or.id