China

On 3 November 2025, China submitted its 2035 NDC, committing to reduce economy-wide net greenhouse gas emissions by 7–10% from their peak—a conservative target unlikely to drive emissions reductions beyond those already expected under existing policies. However, the target should be understood as a floor, not a ceiling, for China’s climate ambition—as the government emphasised, China is “striving to do better.”

The CAT projects that 2025 could mark the peak of China’s CO₂ emissions if the clean energy transition's current momentum continues. Strong growth in clean energy contributed to a 1% year-on-year decline in CO₂ emissions in the first half of 2025, with renewables accounting for nearly 40% of China’s total power generation.

China has already exceeded its 2030 NDC targets for installing 1,200 GW of wind and solar capacity and achieving a forest stock volume of about 18.5bn m³. It is also on track to raise the share of non-fossil fuels in energy consumption to 25% by 2030.

China’s 2035 NDC targets further enhance these three goals. However, China risks falling short of its CO₂ emissions intensity reduction targets under both the 14th Five-Year Plan (2025) and the previous NDC (2030), partly due to the impacts of COVID-19 and slower economic growth. Closing the remaining gap in carbon intensity reductions and meeting the 2030 NDC target will require substantially greater climate ambition in the 15th Five-Year Plan.

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan will be formalised in early 2026, while the newly released Recommendations identify a “main target” for 2025–2030 of making “major new progress in building a beautiful China,” including establishing a “green production and lifestyle” and achieving the 2030 carbon peaking goal on schedule.

The CAT’s overall rating for China’s policies and targets remains “Highly insufficient.”

The CAT estimates that China’s GHG emissions have stabilised in 2025; emissions totalled 15.1-15.2 GtCO₂e in 2025, excluding emissions from emissions from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF), compared with an estimated 15.2 GtCO₂e in 2024. Progress towards peaking emissions is primarily driven by the rapid deployment of renewables in the power sector, which has outpaced growth in electricity demand.

Based on emission trends observed in the first three quarters of 2025 and China’s new NDC submission, the CAT has narrowed the projected emissions range, reflecting greater certainty compared with our previous assessment published in June 2025. We now expect absolute emissions in 2030 to reach between 14.6 and 15.3 GtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF).

• In the conservative scenario, China’s emissions are projected to plateau at current high levels until around 2030, followed by a modest annual decline averaging 2% through 2035, reaching 10% below peak emissions in 2035.
• In the optimistic scenario—featuring accelerated renewable deployment and a faster coal phase-down—emissions are projected to peak as early as 2025, followed by a steeper annual decline averaging 2.6%. This rate of decline would yield an additional reduction of 4% by 2030 and 6% by 2035 relative to the conservative pathway. The result would be a reduction of 16% below peak emissions in 2035.

Compared with our previous assessment, the emissions estimates have been revised downward, largely due to lower historical emissions updated in PRIMAP v2.6.1, on which the CAT’s calculations are based.

China will fail to meet its 2025 emissions intensity reduction target under the 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP). By the end of 2024, CO₂ intensity has only been reduced by 12% from 2020, making the 2025 target of 18% increasingly difficult to achieve. We project that emissions intensity will decrease by only 16–17% by 2025, even assuming GDP grows at the 5% rate targeted during the "Two Sessions," the annual plenary sessions of China’s two major political bodie.

Achieving the 2030 NDC target of a 65% reduction in carbon intensity from 2005 levels will also be challenging, as the target requires limiting emissions to 14.4 GtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF) in 2030; an emissions level that is below even our optimistic scenario. This underscores the need for accelerated decarbonisation through more ambitious policies under the 15th FYP (2026-2030), which is due for release in the first quarter of 2026.

China’s new 2035 NDC marks a shift from intensity-based targets to, for the first time, an absolute emissions reductions target. The new target commits to reducing economy-wide net GHG emissions by 7–10% from peak levels by 2035 and "strive to do better." However, this target is unlikely to drive further reductions beyond current policies, as existing trajectories point to a 10–16% decline in emissions from 2025 to 2035 (excl. LULUCF).

Although the 7-10% target is insufficient, it should be interpreted as a floor rather than a ceiling for China’s climate ambition ​(Trasi, 2025)​. As emphasised in the NDC, China is “striving to do better.” It is typical for Chinese climate policymakers to understate targets to ensure delivery, prioritising the credibility of target implementation over setting highly ambitious objectives ​(You, 2025)​.

China has already surpassed two of its 2030 NDC targets ahead of schedule. By 2024, the combined installed capacity of wind and solar power reached 1,400 GW, exceeding the 2030 goal of 1,200 GW. Forest stock volume, targeted to increase by about 6bn m³ from 2005 levels to around 18.5bn m³, already surpassed 20bn m³.

China is also on track to meet its 2030 non-fossil energy share target of 25% without significant additional effort. The 2035 NDC builds upon this momentum, enhancing these three targets: by 2035, China aims to raise the share of non-fossil fuels to above 30%, expand the installed capacity of wind and solar power to 3,600 GW, and increase total forest stock volume to over 24bn m³.

To align emissions with its 2060 carbon neutrality goal, China needs to:

• Control and reduce fossil fuel dependence by integrating clear targets for coal consumption reduction in the 15th FYP. Achieving the 2030 NDC carbon intensity reduction target will inevitably require a substantial decline in coal use. However, new coal-fired power plants continue to be approved. Concrete policy measures to cap new coal power capacity and total coal consumption will be essential to prevent carbon lock-in and avoid more stranded assets.
• Accelerate decarbonisation of high-emitting industry sectors. The newly released draft for comment on implementing renewable energy consumption targets mark a positive step toward industrial decarbonisation. If made binding and stringent, the targets could drive greater renewable energy use in energy-intensive industries. The expansion of China’s national Emissions Trading Scheme
• (ETS) to cover major industrial sectors by 2027 is a welcomed first step. Whether or not the system will meaningfully reduce emissions cannot be determined at this point. The system’s success depends on the allowance allocation and the emissions cap, which are yet to be determined.
• Enhance mitigation of non-CO₂ gases, especially methane. The inclusion of all GHGs in China’s 2035 NDC represents progress compared with the earlier carbon peaking goal. Beyond their inclusion in the overall target, dedicated measures to reduce non-CO₂ emissions would strengthen the NDC and help ensure actual reductions in methane and other potent gases.

While China’s reliance on fossil fuels and high emissions are likely to persist in the near term, its energy transition continues to gain momentum, supported by rapid renewable deployment, structural reforms in the power sector, and expanded mitigation efforts across end-use sectors:

• Global supply chain leadership: China is the powerhouse of the global energy transition’s supply chain, manufacturing over 80% of solar panels, 60% of wind turbines, and 75% of electric vehicles (EVs) and their batteries worldwide.
• Record energy transition investment: China remained a global leader in energy transition investment in 2024, accounting for 39% of the global total and two-thirds of the global increase. Investment and sales in clean energy technologies contributed over 10% of China’s GDP for the first time in 2024, totalling USD 1.9tn. The so-called “new three” sectors—EVs, batteries, and solar power—alone generated USD 1.1tn in added value.
• Rapid renewable energy expansion: China’s total renewable energy capacity (including hydropower) reached 2,159 GW, with wind and solar totalling 1,673 GW by June 2025. In the first half of 2025, renewables supplied almost 40% of total electricity generation. Combined wind and solar generation increased by 247bn kWh year-on-year, surpassing the total growth in national electricity consumption.
• EV leadership: China is leading the global EV market, producing 70% of all EVs sold worldwide. Domestically, over 12 million new energy vehicles (NEVs)—including battery EVs and plug-in hybrids—were produced and sold, capturing a 40.9% market share. NEVs now make up 8.9% of all vehicles on the road in China, the majority being battery EVs. The new 2035 NDC target of making NEVs the mainstream in new vehicle sales reflects the government’s confidence in sustaining the sector’s growth momentum.

While China emits over one-third of global CO₂, it is also the world’s factory, producing more than one-third of global manufactured goods ​(IEA, 2024a; Norton, 2024)​. Our calculations follow a production-based approach, which does not reflect the role of international trade in driving China’s emissions. Research indicates that China remains the world’s largest generator of embodied trade carbon emissions. The gap between emissions embodied in China’s exports and those in its imports widened from 0.7 GtCO₂ in 1990 to 1.8 GtCO₂ in 2019 ​(CGTN, 2024)​. According to the Global Carbon Budget, China’s 2021 consumption-based CO₂ emissions are about 10% (or 1.2 GtCO₂) lower than the territorial emissions ​(Friedlingstein et al., 2025)​.

The CAT rates each country’s targets and policies against (1) its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation considering a range of equity principles including responsibility, capability and equality, and (2) what is technically and economically feasible using modelled domestic pathways which in absence of a better method are based on global least-cost climate change mitigation.

Comparing a country’s fair share ranges and modelled domestic pathways provides insights into which governments should provide climate finance and which should receive it. Developed countries with large responsibility for historical emissions and high per-capita emissions, must not only implement ambitious climate action domestically but must also support climate action in developing countries with lower historical responsibility, capability, and lower per-capita emissions.

The CAT rates China’s climate targets and policies as “Highly insufficient.” This rating indicates that China’s climate policies and commitments are not consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit.

Although progress in the power sector’s clean transition may help China achieve a downward emissions trend, the country should adopt more concrete and ambitious policies during the 15th Five-Year Plan period to accelerate its shift away from fossil fuels, in order to contribute sufficiently to the 1.5°C goal.

China's suite of sectoral 14th Five-Year Plans set out a range of mitigation measures to prepare the country for a post-coal transition but is unable to counter growing energy demand and reduce fossil fuel dependence.

The country is expected to well overachieve its energy-related NDC targets, yet it risks falling short of its carbon intensity target. The projected average absolute emissions in 2030 under current policies remain unchanged from the previous assessment, as does the corresponding rating of “Insufficient.”

Record-high renewable deployment has been sufficient to meet growing electricity demand, curb coal power generation, and reduce China’s total CO₂ emissions by 1% year-on-year in the first half of 2025.

Meanwhile, coal plant construction continues to expand, driven by regional stimulus and framed as support for grid flexibility. In 2024, China remained dominant in global coal trends, with new proposals, commissioning, and construction exceeding the rest of the world combined. Newly started construction reached 94 GW—the highest level since 2015—driven by a permitting boom in 2022–2023. To avoid further carbon lock-in, China should halt new coal plant approvals, repurpose existing plants for grid flexibility, and accelerate retirements to prevent overcapacity.

Persistent overcapacity and weak demand—largely due to the ongoing real estate downturn—continue to challenge China’s cement and steel industries, as reflected in falling cement production and rising exports of steel and cement. Key supply-side measures include enhancing energy efficiency, scaling up electrification, and phasing out outdated production capacity.

• Progress in strengthening China’s national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) includes its expansion beyond the power sector to cover cement, steel, and electrolytic aluminium. China plans to include chemicals, petrochemicals, civil aviation, and papermaking in the ETS by 2027. The system is expected to shift from an intensity-based approach to absolute emissions caps by 2030, with the goal of covering all high-emitting industries by 2035 under NDC 3.0.

The full policies and action analysis can be found here.

Under China’s NDC targets, the country’s emission levels would reach 14.6 GtCO₂e/year in 2030. This projection, based on the median value of conservative and optimistic estimates from the two most binding energy-related NDC targets (peaking and carbon intensity targets), represents a 32% increase from 2010 levels. 

The CAT keeps its rating of China’s 2030 NDC target against modelled domestic pathways as “Highly Insufficient,” indicating that its 2030 domestic targets need substantial improvements to be consistent with the 1.5°C temperature limit.

China’s emission levels under its NDC commitments are higher than what would be deemed 1.5°C compatible compared to our “fair share” approach. The CAT maintains its rating of China’s NDC targets against its fair share as “Insufficient.” This rating takes into account the fact that China has effectively submitted an unconditional NDC target but has not indicated a level of emissions that would be achieved with international support (a conditional NDC target).

China’s President Xi Jinping first announced China’s commitment to reach “carbon neutrality before 2060” in a declaration at the UN General Assembly in September 2020. China has since officially submitted a long-term strategy (LTS) to the UNFCCC in October 2021. As the LTS submission does not meet the majority of the CAT’s criteria for a best-practice approach in LTS formulation, we find China’s net zero target to be “Poor.”