The continuing rapid growth in renewable energy in India, combined with sustained reductions in coal imports and a slow down in coal development—with coal-fired “ultra-mega power projects” cancelled—is a strong indication that the low carbon transformation of India’s energy supply sector is gathering momentum. With China continuing to reduce its coal and carbon dioxide emissions, the ongoing growth of renewable energy and slowdown of coal in India is the most important development underway globally today.
However, India’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement (PA) does not yet reflect these developments. Under current policies, with the targeted 175 GW of renewable power capacity to be reached by 2022, India is already set to overachieve its 2030 NDC emissions intensity target. The likely continued expansion of renewables after 2022, for which no targets have yet been set, would result in India also overshooting the 2030 non-fossil capacity target set in its NDC.
In addition, the Draft Electricity Plan projects that, despite the increasing electricity demand, no new coal capacity, apart from the capacity already under construction, would be needed after 2022. If the Draft Electricity Plan is implemented, India will achieve its NDC’s 2030 40% non-fossil capacity target before 2022, and will reach 57% by 2027.
India’s Paris Agreement NDC commitment is therefore weaker than the actions resulting from current policies and is ripe for improvement. Neither the NDC nor current policies are ambitious enough to limit warming to below 2°C, let alone the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit, unless other countries make much deeper reductions and comparably greater effort.
We therefore still rate India’s effort “medium.” Upgrading the Indian NDC to match planned policies would move its NDC significantly towards the CAT’s “sufficient” rating and would place it in a leadership position globally.
On 2 October 2016, India ratified the Paris Agreement. India ‘s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets to lower the emissions intensity of GDP by 33%–35% by 2030 below 2005 levels, to increase the share of non-fossil based power generation capacity to 40% of installed electric power capacity by 2030 (equivalent to 26–30% of generation in 2030), and to create an additional (cumulative) carbon sink of 2.5–3 GtCO2e through additional forest and tree cover by 2030.
Existing policies and measures are described in detail in India’s NDC. However, the description of the targets is very brief. India could increase the transparency of its NDC by describing the greenhouse gas and sectoral coverage and metric for the intensity target (e.g. constant or nominal GDP) as well as the way it envisages it will achieve the non-fossil power capacity target.
Given that the coverage is not specified, we have assumed that the 2030 intensity target excludes the agriculture sector, consistent with India’s Copenhagen pledge to reduce the emissions intensity of GDP by 20%–25% by 2020 below 2005 levels.
Under the assumption of a 7.2% annual GDP growth, we rate the absolute emissions levels resulting from both the 2020 and 2030 intensity targets “medium.” The non-fossil generation target would result in lower absolute emissions than the intensity target alone, effectively leading to a larger reduction in intensity than in the NDC target itself (see below). As the non-fossil generation target is conditional on the provision of resources, the CAT rating is based on the intensity target.
For 2020, India had earlier put forward a pledge to reduce the emissions intensity of GDP by 20% to 25% by 2020 below 2005 levels. This target is also rated as “medium.”
The “medium” rating indicates that India’s climate plans are at the least ambitious end of what would be a fair contribution. This means they are not consistent with limiting warming to below 2°C, let alone with the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit, unless other countries make much deeper reductions and comparably greater effort.
Our analysis shows that India can achieve its NDC target with currently implemented policies, i.e. it would not have to put any other policies in place. With currently implemented policies, we project the share of non-fossil power generation capacity will reach 38–48% in 2030, corresponding to a 25–31% share of electricity generation, and India’s emissions intensity in 2030 will be 42–45% below 2005 levels. Thus, under current policies, India is likely to achieve its 40% non-fossil target, and is set to exceed its emissions intensity target by a wide margin. Absolute emissions from the NDC’s non-fossil power generation target are projected to be 747–758 MtCO2e lower than the emissions from the NDC’s emission intensity target; however, the non-fossil fuel generation target would still be rated “medium.”
Although India’s 2022 renewable energy target represents a rapid increase in renewable energy generation, this is not enough to keep up with growth in electricity demand. Between 2014 and 2030 under current policies, we estimate the average annual growth rate for solar and wind power generation is around 3%—about half the growth rate of overall electricity production. During the same period, under our current policy pathway, we project capacity additions of 154–267 GW for solar and wind power, and 186–217 GW for coal power. 50 GW of coal-fired power capacity is currently under construction in India, with another 178 GW in the permitting pipeline (The Energy Mix, 2016). Were all these plants to be built, this would result in considerable overcapacity. Ultimately, this would lead to a greater lock-in of carbon-intensive power infrastructure in India than appears necessary.
There is substantial uncertainty on the future of coal power capacity in India - as illustrated by the Energy Ministry’s proposal to cancel the construction of four coal-fired Ultra Mega Power Plants (UMPPs) in June 2016. Leading coal power producers such as Adani appear to have suspended investments and further development in this area and instead have scaled up investments in solar and renewable energy in both India and Australia. Also, the Draft Electricity Plan confirms that no new coal capacity is needed after 2022, apart from the 50 GW that is already under construction and is likely to be ready by 2022. The Draft Electricity Plan further assumes that no gas fired capacity will be deployed after 2022 as the availability of natural gas is uncertain in India. Based on the Draft Electricity Plan, we calculate that India will significantly reduce its emissions and, by 2030, its emissions intensity will be 51–53% below 2005 levels, exceeding its NDC target.
India ratified the Paris agreement exactly one year after the submission of its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), on 2 October 2016. Since India did not submit an NDC prior to ratification, the INDC became its first NDC. It includes the following main elements (Government of India, 2015a):
The coverage and metrics of the emissions intensity target are not specified in the NDC. In our analysis, we have assumed that the target excludes the agricultural sector, consistent with India’s 2020 pledge. Under the assumption of a 7.2% annual GDP growth rate (IEA, 2016), the emissions level resulting from this target would be 5.9–6 GtCO2e (excluding LULUCF) by 2030. These emissions are 6.1–6.2 times greater than 1990 emissions levels.
Depending on the way India plans to achieve its 40% non-fossil capacity target (e.g. by additional capacity of renewable energy sources, nuclear power or a combination), we estimate that reaching this target would result in an emissions level of 5.2–5.3 GtCO2e (a factor of ~5.4 above 1990 levels) by 2030.
If fossil fuel- based power plants are replaced by nuclear, an additional 51 MtCO2e can be reduced compared to the scenario in which they are replaced only by solar capacity. This is due to the higher load factor (electricity generation per GW installed) of nuclear energy compared to solar energy. The emission reductions implied by the NDC non-fossil capacity target are in line with emissions levels expected from the current policy pathway. Under current policies, India is also already meeting the emissions level required by its intensity target. In addition to these mitigation targets, India’s NDC also strongly emphasises adaptation measures.
Although not stated in the NDC, we assume that the target to create an additional carbon sink of 2.5–3 GtCO2e through additional forest and tree cover by 2030 is cumulative, representing an average annual carbon sink of 167–200 MtCO2e over the period 2016–2020. Over half of this target could be achieved by the Green India Mission, which is expected to enhance annual carbon sequestration by about 100 MtCO2e (Government of India, 2015a).
India has pledged to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 20–25% in 2020 below 2005 levels. This target does not cover emissions from the agricultural sector. India proposed the target during the Copenhagen negotiations and submitted it to the Copenhagen Accord on 30 January 2010. The quantification of this pledge covers a range of emissions between 3.6–3.8 GtCO2e in 2020 (excluding LULUCF). These emissions are 3.7–3.9 times greater than 1990 emissions levels.
In 2007, at the G8+5 Summit in Germany, then Indian Prime Minister Singh pledged that India’s per capita emissions would never exceed those of the developed world. Given India’s low per capita emissions, meeting this pledge does not require any emissions reductions compared to current policy projections up to 2030, and this pledge is not shown in the figure. However, we take this pledge into account in the global pathway to 2100, when calculating the associated rise in global temperature. During the period 2016–2030, India’s population is projected to increase by 13% (or 177 million people), reaching 1.49 billion people (World Energy Outlook 2016 projections for India) by 2030. Over the same period, we project per capita emissions to reach around 3.4–3.6 tCO2e per capita (excluding LULUCF) by 2030; despite this strong growth, per capita emissions in 2030 are projected to be about 30% below the world average in 2013 (World Bank, 2017).
We rate India’s 2030 INDC and 2020 pledge “medium”.
The pledges are in line with effort sharing approaches that focus on equal cumulative per capita emissions. Approaches that focus on historical responsibility and capability would require more stringent emissions reductions. Current policy projections for 2030 are in line with fair shares based on converging per capita emissions for all countries to the same level (equality), and staged approaches.
The “medium” rating indicates that India’s climate commitments are at the least ambitious end of what would be a fair contribution. This means they are not consistent with limiting warming to below 2°C, let alone with the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit, unless other countries make much deeper reductions and comparably greater effort.
Unlike other developing countries such as China, India has not yet announced a peaking year for GHG emissions. Based on our effort-sharing analysis, India’s emissions indeed would not need to peak before 2050 to contribute a fair share of global emission reductions. However, to be rated “sufficient,” India’s emissions growth would have to slow down compared to current policy projections.
Our analysis shows that India can achieve its NDC target with currently implemented policies, i.e. it would not have to put any other policies in place. Under current policy projections, greenhouse gas emissions (excluding LULUCF) are projected to reach a level of 3.5 GtCO2e in 2020 and 5.1–5.4 GtCO2e in 2030. This is a 65% increase in emissions from 2010 levels by 2020 and a more than doubling of 2010 levels by 2030. While this growth is in line with both the 2020 and 2030 intensity pledge, the achievement of India’s targets depends on actual economic growth levels. We assume a 7.5% and 7.0% GDP (real) annual growth between 2014–2020 and 2021–2030, respectively. This translates into an average annual growth rate of 7.2% from 2014–2030. These GDP growth projections are used for both the targets and current policy projections (IEA, 2016). The Indian Government aims for higher GDP growth of around 8% per year in its 12th Five Year Plan (Government of India, 2013) and NDC (Government of India, 2015a), but has not yet been able to achieve its aspirations. In a speech to members of the U.S. Congress, Prime Minister Modi said that its annual growth goal must “be achieved with a light carbon footprint, with greater emphasis on renewables” (IEEFA, 2016).
India’s total emissions have been growing steadily since 1990. The overall growth slowed down around 2000 as land use changed from being a small source of emissions in the first inventory year—14 MtCO2e in 1994—to a large sink, with removals of 223 MtCO2e in 2000, 175 MtCO2e in 2007 and 253 MtCO2e in 2010.
Population is one of the main drivers of India’s projected GHG emissions. By 2028, India is projected to overtake China as the largest country in terms of population. By 2030, India’s population is projected to grow to ~1.5 billion but the per capita emissions would still be far below the world average in 2013 (World Bank, 2017).
India launched its National Action Plan on Climate Change (NACC) in 2008, which outlines eight national missions in the area of sustainable development (Government of India, 2008). India’s 12th Five Year Plan for the period 2012–2017 (Government of India, 2013) proposed a re-organisation of the NACC. The Five Year Plans provide the basic direction for government activities, addressing all sectors and policy areas. Our analysis includes the 11th and 12th Five Year Plans.
The power sector accounted for 38% of India’s total emissions (excluding LULUCF) in 2014. Given that the fuel mix is dominated by coal-fired generation (75% in 2014; IEA, 2016), the emissions intensity of electricity supply in India is relatively high (812 gCO2/kWh in 2014). On the other hand, per capita electricity demand in India is very low at around 957 kWh/capita in 2013, or about one third of the global average in that year (IEA, 2014). In 2014, 19% of the population—244 million people—still had no access to electricity (IEA, 2016).
In June 2014, the Government of India announced its commitment to achieving a reliable electricity supply for all by 2019 (Forum of Regulators, 2014). Population growth, increased access to electricity and economic development are expected to result in a rapid growth of electricity demand in India. Over the next decade, India is likely to have the fastest-growing electricity market of any of the world’s biggest economies (IEEFA, 2015). In our projections, we assume a growth of electricity demand of 5.2% a year (IEA, 2016).
On the federal level, India has implemented two major renewable energy-related policies. The 'Strategic Plan for New and Renewable Energy' provides a broader framework (outlining the mission, objectives, goals, implementation, and evaluation plan for India's renewable energy sector) and the 'National Solar Mission', launched in 2010, contains capacity targets for solar energy. Since the election of Prime Minister Modi in May 2014, the Indian Government has put climate change policy higher on the political agenda.
The original targets of the ‘National Solar Mission” were 10 GW of solar power capacity by 2017 and 20 GW by 2022 (MNRE, 2010). Cumulative installed solar power capacity in India reached 4 GW in July 2015 (MNRE, 2015c). In November 2014, the government announced plans to increase its solar capacity to 100 GW installed capacity by 2022. This scaling-up of the national solar mission was officially adopted in August 2015 (MNRE, 2015b). By the end of 2014 the Government of India had approved plans for 25 Solar Parks and Ultra Mega Solar Power Projects, with a combined capacity of over 20 GW, to be developed in the coming five years (MNRE, 2014a).
In the first half of 2015, targets for other renewable energy sources were also increased. India currently targets a cumulative installed capacity of 175 GW by 2022. This target consists of 100 GW solar, 60 GW wind, 10 GW biomass and 5 GW small-scale hydro (MNRE, 2015a). Wind power is supported via a Generation Based Incentive, while state-level feed-in tariffs apply for all renewables. These are regulated by the Electricity Act (2003) and the National Tariff Policy (2006).
Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) are in place that promote renewable energy and facilitate Renewable Purchase Obligations (RPO), which legally mandate a percentage of electricity to be produced from renewable energy sources. In April 2015, the RPO was revised upwards, from 3% by 2022 to 8% by 2019.
The Ministry of Power announced in April 2015 that every new coal-fired power plant would have to be accompanied by a renewable power plant of at least 10% of the generating capacity (IEEFA, 2015; Kenning, 2015). Given the supporting mechanisms and policies in place, it is expected to be feasible that India will meet its ambitious renewable energy targets.
With current policies, we project the share of non-fossil power generation capacity to reach 43% by 2022, the target year for 175 GW renewable energy. This share will either decrease to 38% or increase to 48% by 2030, depending on whether or not the renewable energy deployment trend is continued post-2022, i.e. the higher end of emission projections assume no additional deployment of wind and solar capacity after 2022 whereas the lower end assumes that the deployment trend continues after 2022. The 38–48% share of non-fossil capacity corresponds to 25–31% non-fossil power generation. If India were to achieve its ambitious targets for 2022, then the 40% target of non-fossil power capacity generation by 2030 would be within reach. If renewables continue to grow after the 2022 target is met, then India is likely to overachieve its non-fossil capacity target.
Although committed to diversifying power supply and supporting renewable energy, the Indian government also supports the domestic coal industry. This is reflected in its aim of doubling India’s domestic coal production to 1.5 billion tonnes by 2020, and to end the need for import of thermal coal (IEEFA, 2015). Under current policies, we project India’s coal-fired power capacity to double in the period 2014–2030.However, the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) in a recent study assessed that no new coal based capacity may be needed before 2026 (The Energy and Resources Institute, 2017). India’s 12th Five-Year Plan set a target of 60% for new coal plants using supercritical technology, but most plants still have less efficient subcritical technology (IEA, 2015a).
In December 2016, the Central Electric Authority (CEA) published the Draft Electricity Plan, which provides electricity demand forecasts for the period 2017–2027, and calculates installed capacities from conventional and renewable energy sources needed to meet that demand (Government of India, 2016a). To finalise the Draft Plan, it is undergoing a consultation process in which the CEA is seeking feedback from stakeholders.
The Draft Plan incorporates the impact of demand-side management as well as numerous energy efficiency and conservation measures that substantially reduce electricity demand. Considering additional capacity from nuclear, hydro, gas and renewables, the study reveals that no new coal-fired generation capacity is required during the years 2017–2022. However, additional coal-based capacity of 44 GW is needed in the period 2022–2027 to meet increasing electricity demand. This capacity can be supplied by the 50 GW of coal-fired plants already under construction, and likely to be commissioned by 2022. The Plan essentially means that the 178 GW of coal fired generation capacity in the permitting pipeline is likely to be suspended until at least 2027 (The Energy Mix, 2016).
The Draft Electricity plan also assumes that no additional gas-fired power plants will be deployed after 2022 as the availability of gas is very uncertain in India. Our estimates for the Draft Electricity Plan result in power sector emissions level of 1.24 and 1.26 GtCO2e in 2022 and 2027, respectively. These estimates are higher compared to figures calculated by the Draft Electricity Plan which are 0.98 and 1.16 GtCO2e for 2022 and 2027, respectively (Government of India, 2016a). The discrepancy is due to the use of different emission factors (i.e. gCO2/kWh): the Draft Plan uses an average CO2 emission factor while the CAT uses higher emission factors based on WEO 2016.
Uncertainty around the future construction of coal power capacity is illustrated by the June 2016 proposed cancellation of four coal-fired Ultra Mega Power Plants (UMPPs) by the Energy Ministry (IEEFA, 2016). Leading coal power producers such as Adani appear to have suspended investments and movement forward in this area and have instead scaled up investments in solar and renewable energy in both India and Australia(Mittal, 2016, Parkinson, 2016).
An assessment from The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) indicates that the currently installed capacity and the capacity under construction would be sufficient to meet India’s electricity demand by 2026, which means that no new coal based capacity will be deployed before 2026 (The Energy and Resources Institute, 2017). The report also estimates that after 2024 all new capacity can be renewable if they become cost competitive and the grid is able to accommodate increased amounts of variable sources of generation (The Energy and Resources Institute, 2017). These estimates are in line with the projections from the Draft Electricity Plan and reinforce the possibility of less coal dependent future electricity generation.
These developments and the apparent softening of commitments to build the currently planned coal capacity are not yet reflected in the energy and emissions scenarios for India. In our current policy projections, we assume coal-fired power plant capacity will increase by 185–217 GW from the current level of 176 GW, reaching 361-393 GW by 2030. Should the developments outlined above, combined with the rapid growth of renewables, continue for much longer, they would be a strong indication that India is beginning a long-term transition towards a diversified, low carbon power supply.
In 2010 the Indian Government introduced a coal tax of 50 rupees (0.8 USD) per metric tonne of coal produced and imported to acknowledge the externalities related to coal use and to encourage a shift away from coal-fired power. Since then, this tax—now called the Clean Environment Cess—was doubled three times, reaching 400 rupees per tonne in the 2016–2017 budget. The revenues from the coal tax feed into the National Clean Environment Fund, which provides finance to renewable energy projects. Part of the revenue has been earmarked for the implementation of ‘Ultra Mega Solar Power’ projects (IEEFA, 2015; Mahapatra, 2016).
Apart from rapid electricity demand growth, another challenge India faces is its high power grid losses. India has the highest aggregate technical and commercial (AT&C) grid-loss rate in the world (IEEFA, 2015), estimated at 26%. In May 2015 the “National Smart Grid Mission” was approved to bring efficiency in power supply and facilitate the reduction in grid losses and outages (Government of India, 2015b).
India finalised its first light vehicle fuel-efficiency standards in 2014; these were scheduled to take effect in April 2016, but their implementation was postponed by a year (TransportPolicy.net, 2017). The standards are scheduled to come into force in April 2017, setting efficiency targets for new vehicles that weigh under 3,500 kg with no more than 9 seats (The International Council on Clean Transportation, 2014). The efficiency targets start at the equivalent of 130 gCO2/km in 2016-17 and fall to 113 gCO2/km in 2021-22 (The International Council on Clean Transportation, 2014). The standards are based on the average weight of the fleet that manufacturers will sell in a year and the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MORTH) is responsible for implementing the standards under the regulations of Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE). Currently there are no CO2 emission standards for light commercial vehicles.
In 2013, the Indian Government set up the National Electric Mission Mobility Plan (NEMMP) 2020 (Government of India, 2015c). As part of the Mission, the Department of Heavy Industry launched the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of (Hybrid &) Electric Vehicles (FAME India) scheme. The scheme aims to support the development of the hybrid/electric vehicle market and targets a deployment of 6–7 million vehicles per year by 2020 (Government of India, 2015c). India’s vision for electrification of vehicles was also reflected in a recent statement by Indian Power Minister Piyush Goyal who said: “by 2030, not a single petrol or diesel car should be sold in the country.” (The Times of India, 2017).
Under the 'National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency,' India implemented its 'Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT)' Mechanism, which resembles an emissions trading scheme (ETS). The first phase of the PAT scheme ran from 2012 to 2015. Currently the scheme is in its second phase (2016–2019). PAT differs from traditional cap-and-trade systems as it sets intensity-based energy targets. The scheme covers 478 of the country’s industrial and power generation facilities in eight sectors that, in total, cover 60% of India’s 2007 GHG emissions.
The target is to achieve on average energy savings of 6.7 Million toe of the participating facilities in 2015 (below the 2007–2010 baseline level) (Government of India, 2016b). These targets are calculated for each installation separately; more efficient plants have lower SEC targets compared to more inefficient plants. Installations that exceed their target can sell Energy Saving Certificates to installations that did not meet their target (EDF, CDC Climate Research & IETA. 2015). In the second phase, PAT scheme has incorporated more units from the existing sectors as well as including additional sectors like railways, electricity distribution and refineries as stated in its NDC (Government of India, 2015a). The second phase covers 621 facilities from 11 different sectors, and the target is to achieve on average energy savings of 8.9 Million toe from the participating facilities in 2019 (below the 2014–15 baseline level) (Government of India, 2016b).
Historical emissions are taken from UNFCCC (2016) for 1994, 2000 and 2010. From the Second National Communication, 2007 data point was retrieved (Government of India, 2012). Between these data points trend interpolation was performed. Before 1994, trend extrapolation was performed to complete the series from 1990-2010.
Current policy projections are based on the World Energy Outlook 2016 Current Policy Scenario (IEA, 2016) for CO2 emissions from fuel combustion combined with the US EPA non-CO2 emissions projections until 2030 (US EPA 2012) and extrapolation of other CO2 emissions based on WBCSD/IEA (2013). The increased renewable energy target for 2022, which are not included in the World Energy Outlook 2016 Current Policy Scenario, was additionally quantified and included in our current policy projection. A scenario range was developed with higher end indicating no ambitious deployment of renewables after the target year (2022) whereas the lower end considers a continuation of the renewables deployment trend after 2022. The increased renewable energy deployment is expected to result in emissions savings of 74 MtCO2e beyond the World Energy Outlook Current Policy Scenario in 2020 and 12–181 MtCO2e in 2030.
Planned policy projections are also based on the World Energy Outlook 2016 Current Policy Scenario (IEA, 2016) with power sector emissions adjusted as per the Draft Electricity Plan. The projected installed capacities for 2022 and 2027 from the Draft Electricity Plan are used to estimate the average annual installed capacity additions between 2014 and 2027.
The average annual capacity additions from different sources of generation are estimated under the assumption that no new coal and gas power plants are installed after 2022. With average annual installed capacities, total installed capacity for 2030 is projected. Installed capacities serve as a basis to calculate the electricity generation and the corresponding emissions from the power sector using the generation factors (i.e. gCO2/kWh) from the WEO 2016.
With CAT calculations, the power sector emissions for the years 2022 and 2027 are higher compared to the estimates from the Draft Electricity Plan. The discrepancy is due to the use of different emission factors: the Draft Plan uses an average CO2 emission factor while the CAT uses higher emission factors based on WEO 2016. The difference in power sector emissions from the Draft Plan and the Current Policy Scenario is used to derive emission trajectory for the planned policy pathway.
For consistency with the current policy projections, the intensity targets for 2020 and 2030 are quantified based on GDP assumptions from the World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2016). GDP is assumed to grow by on average 7.5% in the period 2014–2020, and 7% in the period 2020–2030. This is roughly in line with the historical GDP development until 2014 and projections to 2019 from the IMF (2015). The 2020 pledge excluded agriculture. We assumed this is also the case for the 2030 target, even though it is not mentioned in the NDC. If agriculture were to be included, the resulting emissions level would be 8% higher (5.9–6.1 GtCO2e).
The 40% non-fossil power generation capacity target is overachieved if the ambitious deployment of renewables continues after 2022. For the lower end of current policy pathway, 48% non-fossil power generation capacity can be achieved. If no additional deployment of renewables is assumed after 2022 then 38% non-fossil capacity is achieved. Here, we analysed two ways of achieving the additional capacity needed beyond currently implemented policies and show the range of these two options, 1) based on solar power, and 2) based on nuclear power. These two options represent the extremes in terms of emissions reductions. With the second option, an additional 51 MtCO2e can be reduced compared to the scenario in which only solar power is deployed. This is due to the fourfold higher load factor of nuclear energy compared to solar energy.
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