EU

In its INDC the EU committed to emissions reduction by “at least 40%” by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2015). Since then the EU has adopted renewable energy and energy efficiency goals. This legislation – in addition to a number of other policies – would lead to emissions reductions of 48% (European Commission 2018c). However, this has not yet been reflected in a ratcheted-up NDC.

After the Dutch government called on the EU to strengthen this target to 55% (Government of the Netherlands 2018), the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for including such emissions level in EU’s NDC with the majority of 369 to 116 votes (European Parliament 2019c). According to some estimates, the implementation of the existing coal phase-out plans, combined with closing coal power in the remaining EU member states by 2030 would result in emissions reduction by 58% (Sandbag 2019b). A study by Climact and NewClimate Institute shows that emissions reduction of up to 62% is possible if best practice policies found in some EU member states are applied across the EU (Climact & New Climate Institute 2018).

The uncertainty of LULUCF accounting

In June 2018, a new EU Regulation on the inclusion of emissions and removals from the LULUCF sector in the EU 2030 climate and energy framework entered into force. It allows EU member states to use LULUCF removals for up to 280 MtCO₂—between 2021 and 2030—to meet the emissions reduction target in the non-ETS sectors (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2018f, 2018g). Since the removals were not included in 1990 emissions levels, this represents a potential weakening of the 2030 target by 28 MtCO₂ or 0.8%.

Under the Copenhagen Accord, the EU committed to reducing emissions by 20% below 1990 levels. Should other developed countries commit to comparable efforts, and developing countries contribute according to their capabilities, the EU offered to increase its 2020 emissions reduction target to 30%.

In May 2012, the EU submitted a provisional QELRO¹ (Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Objective) level equivalent to 20% reduction from base year over the second commitment period. This target is to be fulfilled jointly by the EU and its member states.²

In 2015 the EU and Iceland signed an agreement to jointly fulfil the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol (European Commission 2015a).

In 2008 the EU member states agreed on the 2020 Energy and Climate Package that included a number of measures that would make the achievement of the 20% emissions reduction target possible. These measures included the Effort Sharing Directive specifying national emissions targets for the EU member states, amendment of the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme, and the Renewable Energy Directive aiming to increase the share of renewables to 20% by 2020. The EU reached the emissions reduction target for 2020 six years early. It is also on track to achieving the renewable energy target as well with 17.5% of energy in the EU coming from renewables in 2017 (Eurostat 2019e).

1 | The QELRO, expressed as a percentage in relation to a base year, denotes the average level of emissions that an Annex B Party could emit on an annual basis during a given commitment period.

2 | This QELRO is inscribed in the amendments agreed in Doha in December 2012. The EU has yet to ratify these amendments.

In February 2011, based on the former 2°C warming limit agreed in Copenhagen, EU leaders endorsed the objective of reducing Europe's GHG emissions by 80–95% below 1990 levels by 2050 conditional on necessary reductions to be collectively achieved by developed countries in line with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (European Council 2011). However, the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goal is significantly more ambitious than the former 2°C Copenhagen target, and requires more rapid—and deeper—emissions reductions.

In November 2018, the European Commission presented a draft of the EU Long-term Strategy “A Clean Planet for all”. The proposal includes eight emissions reduction scenarios, two of which assume achieving emissions neutrality by the middle of the century (European Commission 2018a). In his statement presenting the strategy, EU Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, Arias Cañete, made it clear that only the scenarios resulting in emissions neutrality were compatible with the Paris Agreement and achieving this goal was “in Europe’s interest” (European Commission 2018d).

The Commission’s strategy follows numerous calls for adopting an emissions neutral goal. In July 2018 mayors of tenmajor European cities, including Paris, London, Stockholm and Copenhagen, urged the Commission to set a net-zero emissions goal for 2050 (C40 Cities 2018). Further, some member states called for the adoption of such a goal before the Commission’s strategy was published: in the Meseberg Declaration, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the French President Emmanuel Macron agreed to “develop an EU strategy 2050 for the long-term transformation towards carbon neutrality, which is not only a necessity, but also an economic opportunity” (The Federal Chancellor 2018). In their June 2018 common statement, representatives of 14 EU member states representing 76% of the EU population demanded that the long-term strategy included “at least one pathway towards net zero GHG emissions in the EU by 2050 followed by negative emissions thereafter” (The Ministry for an Ecological and Solidary Transition 2018).

Some member states have also already adopted - or are considering adopting—such a goal at a national level:

• In June 2018, all Danish political parties agreed to set a target of becoming carbon neutral by 2050 (The Ministry of Energy Utilities and Climate 2018). In October 2018 the Danish government adopted a proposal of a plan titled “Together for a greener future” with the goal of reducing net emissions to zero by the middle of the century and listing 38 initiatives to achieve this goal (Danish Ministry of Energy 2018; Regeringen 2018).
• Sweden’s January 2018 Climate Act introduced the goal of net-zero emissions by 2045 (Government Offices of Sweden 2018).
• In December 2018 the lower house of the Dutch Parliament adopted draft Climate legislation introducing the target of reducing GHG emissions by 95% by 2050 (Clingendael Spectator 2019). However, the Dutch Parliament’s upper house has not yet voted this into law.
• In May 2019, the UK’s Committee on Climate Change, an advisory body to the British government, recommended adoption of the goal of net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050 instead of the 80% emissions reduction goal adopted in 2008 - importantly including international aviation and shipping and excluding international offsets (UK Committee on Climate Change 2019). On 12 June, Theresa May’s government tabled draft legislation in Parliament to strengthen the country’s 2050 target to net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases (UK Government 2019b, 2019a).
• In 2016 Germany adopted an objective of “nearly greenhouse gas neutrality by mid-century” with its Climate Action Plan 2050, (Federal MInistry for the Environmet Nature Conservationand Nuclear Safety 2018). However, this plan has yet to become law.
• In April 2019, the French government proposed an Energy and Climate law with a net zero 2050 target for adoption.
• In June 2019, the new Finnish government adopted a plan that envisages carbon neutrality by 2035 relying only on domestic measures leading to emissions reduction and increase in carbon sinks. It states that “the production of electricity and heat in Finland must be almost emission-free by the end of the 2030s” and emissions from transport halved by 2030 in comparison to 2005 (Finnish Government 2019)

Adopting the target of climate neutrality at the European level – accompanied with a ratcheting up of the 2030 emissions reduction goal would enhance the EU’s position as a leader in climate action. In March 2019 the European Parliament called for the adoption of such a target and asked the Commission to examine the harmonisation of carbon and energy pricing in the EU to achieve it (European Parliament 2019c).