Russian Federation

Critically Insufficient4°C+ World

NDCs with this rating fall well outside of a country’s “fair share” range and are not at all consistent with holding warming to below 2°C let alone with the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit. If all government NDCs were in this range, warming would exceed 4°C.

Highly insufficient< 4°C World

NDCs with this rating fall outside of a country’s “fair share” range and are not at all consistent with holding warming to below 2°C let alone with the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit. If all government NDCs were in this range, warming would reach between 3°C and 4°C.

Insufficient< 3°C World

NDCs with this rating are in the least stringent part of a country’s “fair share” range and not consistent with holding warming below 2°C let alone with the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit. If all government NDCs were in this range, warming would reach over 2°C and up to 3°C.

2°C Compatible< 2°C World

NDCs with this rating are consistent with the 2009 Copenhagen 2°C goal and therefore fall within a country’s “fair share” range, but are not fully consistent with the Paris Agreement long term temperature goal. If all government NDCs were in this range, warming could be held below, but not well below, 2°C and still be too high to be consistent with the Paris Agreement 1.5°C limit.

1.5°C Paris Agreement Compatible< 1.5°C World

This rating indicates that a government’s NDCs in the most stringent part of its “fair share” range: it is consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C limit.

Role model<< 1.5°C World

This rating indicates that a government’s NDC is more ambitious than what is considered a “fair” contribution: it is more than consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C limit.

Historical emissions

Historical emissions levels are taken from the inventory data submitted to the UNFCCC until the last available year, here 2018 (Russian Federation, 2020d).

NDC and other targets

Targets for all years are calculated using national inventory submissions (Russian Federation, 2020c). For 2030 we assume that LULUCF emissions are included in the pledge. For 2020, we calculate two estimated targets for emissions: including and excluding the LULUCF emissions sector.

To quantify the pledges including LULUCF sector accounting, we use sectoral emission projections from the Fourth Biennial Report to the UNFCCC (Russian Federation, 2019b). We also calculate the national accounting quantities for afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation using the current LULUCF Kyoto rules. For forest management we use 1990 as reference level.

Current policy projections

The upper limit of current trend projections for 2030 is based on the “with measures” scenario of Russia’s Fourth Biennial Report (Russian Federation, 2019b).

The lower limit of current trend projections in 2030 is based on the World Energy Outlook 2019 Current Policy scenario projections for CO₂ from fuel combustion until 2030 (IEA, 2019), the US EPA non-CO₂ (US EPA, 2019) emission projections until 2030 and extrapolation of the historical trend for other CO2 emissions. We also quantify the flaring limit and renewable electricity generation targets. The World Energy Outlook 2019, however, no longer provides the list of policies considered in the projections, so that it is not clear which current policies are considered.

For the Renewable Energy target we assume a 2.5% targets for 2020, which is referenced in multiple energy national documents such as Resolution No. 512-r on the State Program of Energy Efficiency and the Development of the Energy Sector (IFC Advisory Services, 2013), and is in line with capacity-based targets of adding 3,600 MW of wind power, 1,520 MW of solar power, and 751 of small scale hydro power over the period 2014–2020 outlined in Resolution No. 861 and referred to in Decree No. 449 on the Mechanism for the Promotion of Renewable Energy on the Wholesale Electricity and Capacity Market (Russian Federation, 2013b, 2013a). We also assume a 2024 renewable energy target of 4.5% as referenced in Governmental resolution No. 512-r of 3 April 2013, Approving the State Programme for Energy Efficiency and the Development of the Energy Sector (IRENA, 2017).

For the flaring gas limit we quantify the implementation of the 95% limit included in the 2009 Decree on Measures to Stimulate the Reduction of Air Pollution from Associated Gas Flaring Products. To reflect the high uncertainty around future emissions from flaring in Russia and the large margin of underachievement of the limit observed in recent years we assume a conservative scenario of effectiveness of this policy, with projected flaring emissions stagnating at 2012 levels. Mitigation from limiting flaring is calculated using historical flaring data from NOAA (2011), historical oil production data from (IEA, 2014), and projections for oil production of the BP energy outlook (BP, 2014).

COVID-19 impact

We applied a novel method to estimate the COVID-19 related dip in greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 and the deployment through to 2030.The uncertainty surrounding the severity and length of the pandemic creates a new level of uncertainty for current and future greenhouse gas emissions. We distil the emission intensity (GHG emissions/GDP) from the pre-pandemic current policy scenario and apply to it most recent GDP projections that take into account the effect of the pandemic. To capture a wide range, we have used more than one GDP projection.

For the Post COVID-19 current policies max scenario we have used the 2020 GDP growth rate from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) Regional Economic Prospects: May 2020 (EBRD, 2020) and the 2021 growth rate from the World Bank Global Economic Prospects: June 2020 (World Bank, 2020). For the Post COVID-19 current policies min scenario we have used the 2020 and 2021 GDP growth rates in the IMF World Economic Outlook Growth Projections: June 2020 (IMF, 2020). We then use the GDP growth projections until 2030 that were used as a basis for the original pre-pandemic current policy scenario.

Global Warming Potentials

The CAT uses Global Warming Potential (GWP) values from the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) for all its figures and time series. Assessments completed prior to December 2018 (COP24) used GWP values from the Second Assessment Report (SAR).