South Korea

South Korea’s energy and climate policy continue to shift as different administrations come into power. Following the election of President Lee Jae-myung in June 2025, South Korea committed to a 2040 coal phase-out at COP30, representing a concrete step towards power sector decarbonisation. However, the timeline remains too slow to align with 1.5°C-compatible pathways, and the potential reliance on LNG could undermine the effectiveness of the phase-out and create long-term fossil fuel lock-in.

South Korea submitted its 2035 NDC in December 2025. The CAT assesses the target as not 1.5°C-aligned against modelled domestic pathways, based on the upper end of the target range. While the NDC indicates its intention to use market mechanisms under Article 6, it does not provide sufficient information on its planned use, leaving the level of domestic mitigation implied by the target unclear. The CAT cautions against buying international carbon credits to delay or avoid investing in domestic mitigation. Any reliance on international credits would set South Korea further off track from 1.5°C-compatibility.

Under current policies, South Korea remains off course to meet its 2030 NDC and the deeper reductions needed for 1.5°C alignment. Emission reduction efforts are limited in particular by the industrial sector, South Korea’s largest energy consumer. The upcoming Phase 4 of the Emissions Trading Scheme (K‑ETS) tightens the emissions cap and increases purchased allowances to better align with the 2030 NDC, though many high-emitting industries still receive free allocations and the overall impact remains uncertain. The CAT rates South Korea’s overall climate action as “Insufficient” (see below for a detailed explanation on the rating improvement).

South Korea’s GHG emissions show a downward trend since 2018. However, the overall trajectory of emissions under current policies remains largely unchanged from previous assessments, despite revisions to historical data and updated government projections. According to our estimates, emissions are expected to reach 11–19% below 2018 levels by 2030 (excl. LULUCF), falling short of South Korea’s domestic NDC target committing to a 32% reduction below 2018 levels.

Prior to his impeachment, former president Yoon reversed his predecessor’s nuclear phase-out policies and prioritised nuclear power over renewables. While the new government intends to expand renewable energy, the overall pace and scale of deployment remains to be seen. Its 2035 NDC sets a 30% renewable electricity target in 2035, which represents a step back from the 30% target originally outlined in its updated 2030 NDC from 2021.

South Korea has one of the lowest shares of renewable power generation among OECD and G20 countries, and deployment remains insufficient to meet its climate ambitions. The 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand, formulated under the Yoon administration, maintains the lower planned share of renewables at 22% of total electricity generation in 2030 set in the 10th Plan. South Korea has significant renewable energy potential, but expansion is bogged down by complex permitting processes, grid limitations and an outdated market system.

Nuclear power supplied almost a third of South Korea’s electricity in 2024 and there are plans to develop up to two new large-scale nuclear reactors (1.4 GW each) by 2038 and a new small modular reactor (SMR) by 2036. The 11th Basic Plan projects nuclear as the dominant source of the electricity mix between 2030 and 2038. Nuclear power development has been given access to low-interest financing, since it is categorised as a “green” project under the revised 2022 K-Taxonomy. Although nuclear power generates electricity without emitting CO₂, the CAT does not consider it a viable solution to the climate crisis due to associated high risks such as nuclear accidents, high cost compared to renewables, long construction times, vulnerability to heat waves, and security issues.

The CAT's overall "Insufficient" rating for South Korea’s climate action is an improvement compared to our previous assessment. This change in rating largely reflects updates to our methodology that incorporate the latest scientific information from the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), rather than increased climate action and ambition in the country (see overall rating section below for more details). In fact, South Korea’s upper bound of emissions under current policies are projected to be higher compared to the previous assessment, meaning the gap between current policies and the levels needed for a 1.5°C-consistent pathway has widened.

To bend its emissions curve further and align itself with a 1.5°C trajectory, South Korea could:

• Prioritise domestic emissions reductions and strengthen transparency on the use of international carbon credits. South Korea should focus on reducing emissions within its borders rather than relying on international carbon credits, particularly given their limited transparency and uncertain mitigation outcomes. Any overseas emissions reduction target must be accompanied by clear information and robust safeguards to address potential greenwashing and accounting uncertainties.
• Strengthen the ambition and implementation of its 2030 target. While South Korea has now submitted its 2035 NDC to the UNFCCC, the ambition of the 2030 target remains unchanged and current policies remain insufficient to achieve it. Further legislative and policy action on climate remains a priority, and the recent establishment of the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment could support more coordinated decision-making and help drive progress.
• Accelerate the early retirement of coal power plants through public and private finance. Following South Korea’s coal phase out commitment, the government should set a clear and earlier coal phase-out year, well before 2040, to align with a 1.5°C-compatible pathway. Investments should prioritise the early retirement of coal capacity and support renewable energy deployment, rather than converting plants to LNG or hydrogen/ammonia co-firing.
• Expand renewable energy development and limit reliance on fossil gas. South Korea should at least revert back to its 30% renewable electricity generation target for 2030 as proposed in its 2021 NDC. This should be supported by concrete policies to accelerate deployment, streamline permitting, and strengthen grid integration, alongside measures to avoid the long-term lock-in of fossil gas capacity while phasing out coal.
• Stop funding fossil fuel projects overseas as promised during the Leaders' Summit on Climate in 2021. South Korea is a major donor for such projects, primarily for fossil gas and oil, and ending this funding could significantly support the global transition away from fossil fuels and align with the first Global Stocktake outcomes. In line with this, South Korea should move towards ending domestic fossil fuel exploration and production.

There have been a few recent positive developments in South Korea, including:

• Revision of the Carbon Neutrality Act: In August 2024, the Constitutional Court ruled parts of South Korea’s Carbon Neutrality Act unconstitutional and mandated the government to provide a more credible legal framework to reach its carbon neutrality target by March 2026. It remains to be seen whether the revisions will fully meet the Court’s requirements for a credible emissions pathway beyond 2030 and alignment with the 2050 target. The government has since submitted its 2035 NDC target to the UNFCCC, noting that it is in the process of formulating the Second National Basic Plan for Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth, which is expected to inform the revision and implementation of the Carbon Neutrality Act.
• Making a commitment to phase out unabated coal. At COP30, South Korea joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance and announced its intention to phase out coal, marking an important step towards decarbonising the power sector. The government has already confirmed it will retire 40 of its 61 coal power plants by 2040.
• Tightening and reforming the Emissions Trading Scheme. In November 2025, the government finalised the allocation plan for Phase 4 (2026–2030) of the K-ETS, tightening the emissions cap and increasing the share of allowances that companies must purchase. This represents a deliberate action to align the ETS with South Korea’s 2030 climate target, although many high-emitting industries will continue to receive a substantial number of free allowances, and it remains to be seen how effectively the changes will reduce actual emissions.

The CAT rates each country’s targets and policies against (1) its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation considering a range of equity principles including responsibility, capability and equality, and (2) what is technically and economically feasible using modelled domestic pathways which in absence of a better method are based on global least-cost climate change mitigation.

Comparing a country’s fair share ranges and modelled domestic pathways provides insights into which governments should provide climate finance and which should receive it. Developed countries with large responsibility for historical emissions and high per-capita emissions, must not only implement ambitious climate action domestically but must also support climate action in developing countries with lower historical responsibility, capability, and lower per-capita emissions.

South Korea’s overall rating, NDC target ratings and policies and action rating have all changed, mainly due to a methodological enhancement to reflect latest scientific information. Our modelled domestic pathways (MDPs_^[1]) now incorporate the latest global least-cost pathways from the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), and our fair share (FS) ranges have been updated based on the latest literature, which aligns our equity approaches with international environmental law (Rajamani et al., 2021) and therefore excludes studies based on cost-effectiveness.

Therefore, the changes in ratings do not represent a meaningful improvement in climate action on the ground, compared to our previous assessment. In fact, the upper end of South Korea’s projected total emissions under current policies in 2030 have slightly increased due to a considerable upwards revision in historical data and new projections.

• The policies and action rating has changed from "Highly insufficient" to "Insufficient"
• The (domestic) NDC rating compared to modelled domestic pathways has changed from "Insufficient" to "Almost sufficient"
• The (full) NDC rating compared to fair share pathways has changed from "Highly insufficient" to "Insufficient"
• The overall rating has changed from "Highly insufficient" to "Insufficient"

However, as highlighted above, we note that these changes in rating are primarily a result of methodological enhancement rather than increased climate action and ambition in South Korea.

^[1] The changes to our modelled domestic pathways are particularly significant for South Korea. These result from updating our global least-cost pathways from the IPCC's Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (SR1.5) to the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6). SR1.5 consisted of only five regions (R5ASIA/LAM/REF/OECD/MAF, with South Korea grouped under R5ASIA).
The AR6 expanded the regional resolution to provide 10 regions, and ASIA was split into CHINA, INDIA and REST_OF_ASIA (with South Korea grouped under REST_OF_ASIA). While grouped in R5ASIA, South Korea's emissions allowance was influenced by strong trends of rapidly falling emissions (specially from China). When the added regional resolution separates China and India from the rest of Asia, South Korea is grouped with developing countries where emissions could still slightly grow, therefore resulting in a higher emissions allowance than before.

The CAT rates South Korea’s 2030 climate targets and policies as “Insufficient”, a rating indicating that South Korea’s climate policies and commitments need substantial improvements to be consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit.

The “Insufficient” rating is one category higher than the previous assessment largely due to an update of our modelled domestic pathways to the latest science (i.e., the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report scenario dataset) and a literature update to its fair share (FS) ranges, which aligns our equity approaches with international environmental law. Thus, it does not necessarily reflect improved climate policies and targets compared to our previous assessment.

The CAT rates South Korea’s current policies as “Insufficient”. The rating indicates that South Korea’s climate policies and action in 2030 need substantial improvements to be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. If all countries were to follow South Korea’s approach, warming would reach over 2°C and up to 3°C.

South Korea’s emissions under current policies will reach between 638–701 MtCO₂e/year in 2030, or 11–19% (excl. LULUCF) below 2018 levels, falling well short of reaching its domestic (i.e. excluding international credits) 2030 NDC target of 32% below 2018 levels. The upper end of South Korea’s projected emissions under current policies has increased following a considerable upwards revision in historical data and updated projections from the government. In particular, the industrial sector, South Korea’s largest energy consumer, could hinder emissions reduction efforts. This underscores the need for the South Korean government to ramp up implementation to close the gap between its current policies and NDC target and align with a 1.5°C-compatible trajectory.

Compared to the 10th Plan, the 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand, finalised in February 2025 under the Yoon administration, projects a greater reliance on fossil gas, a slight reduction in coal, and maintains nuclear power as the dominant source of the electricity generation. At the same time, it keeps the targeted share of renewable energy at 22% in 2030, falling short of the 30% target previously set out in its 2030 NDC.

Prior to his impeachment, former president Yoon Suk-Yeol pursued a nuclear-focused strategy, approving two large-scale nuclear construction projects in 2024 which were previously denied by the Moon administration following its denuclearisation policy. While the draft 11th Plan had proposed three new large reactors, the final plan scaled this back to two, reflecting a slight increase in planned renewable energy capacity. Yoon also approved an offshore drilling project led by the Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC), targeting potential reserves of up to 14 billion barrels of oil and gas. Although KNOC has stepped back from further drilling after early results showed limited commercial potential, it is still seeking external investors to help advance future exploration efforts. As one of the world’s largest importers of oil and gas, South Korea should prioritise renewable energy development to avoid technology lock-in and risks of stranded assets rather than expand fossil fuel production.

South Korea’s energy policy has continued to shift across administrations, although these developments are not yet reflected in our current policy projections. Since he was elected in June 2025, President Lee Jae-Myung and his Democratic Party have made decisions which appear to signal a positive change toward more climate action: announcing a coal phase-out date and joining the powering Past Coal Alliance, along with agreeing on a new 2035 headline target, adapting Phase 4 of the Emissions Trading Scheme to better meet its 2030 NDC target, and making more positive statements about renewables.

While South Korea’s coal phase-out announcement at COP 30 represents a considerable step towards decarbonising the power sector, the planned pace is insufficient for near-term climate goals, and the role of LNG as a transition fuel raises questions about the overall impact.

The full policies and action analysis can be found here.

We rate the domestic component of South Korea’s NDC target for 2030 as “Almost Sufficient” when compared to modelled domestic pathways.

The “Almost Sufficient” rating indicates that South Korea’s domestic commitment is not yet consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit but could be with moderate improvements. If all countries were to follow South Korea’s approach, warming could be held below—but not well below—2°C.

We rate South Korea’s full NDC target (including the domestic and the international element) as “Insufficient” when compared with its fair-share contribution to climate action. The rating indicates that South Korea’s NDC target in 2030 needs substantial improvements to be consistent with its fair share of the global mitigation effort to limit warming to 1.5°C.

South Korea’s target is at the least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort and is not consistent with the 1.5°C limit, unless other countries make much deeper reductions and comparably greater effort. If all countries were to follow South Korea’s approach, warming would reach over 2°C and up to 3°C.

Given that South Korea’s fair share contribution requires reductions that go beyond the minimum level of emissions reductions for global least-cost mitigation (modelled domestic pathway), South Korea needs to improve both the domestic component of its NDC target and provide additional support for emissions reductions achieved overseas.

We evaluate the net zero target as: Average.

After former President Moon Jae-in announced South Korea’s goal of becoming carbon neutral by 2050, the government also included this commitment in its updated NDC and its Long-Term Strategy (Republic of Korea, 2020, 2021c). The carbon neutrality target is further enshrined in law through the Carbon Neutrality Act, passed in August 2021 (Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment, 2021) and enforced in March 2022 (Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment, 2022).

In October 2021, South Korea published two carbon neutrality scenarios that result in net zero emissions in 2050 (Republic of Korea, 2021b). Both scenarios aim for a coal phase-out before 2050 but remain unclear about the exact phase-out year. One of the scenarios maintains a share of fossil gas, while the other one phases out fossil gas by 2050 as well. South Korea is still not explicit in its coverage of GHGs, and the target review process lacks detail.

South Korea’s Carbon Neutrality Act was deemed unconstitutional in the Constitutional Court ruling of August 2024 for the lack of legally binding emission reduction targets for the period 2031–2049, which places an excessive burden on future generations. The government is required to enact revised legislation by March 2026 but has faced criticism for its slow pace in advancing climate legislation. In August 2023, out of 291 proposed climate-change-related bills, only 33 had been passed (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2023). Legislative momentum has increased recently following the establishment of the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment, which consolidates climate and energy policymaking under a single ministry. It is expected to support more coordinated decision-making and could help drive further legislative and policy action on climate (Kang, 2025).

For the full analysis click here.