Russian Federation

Since the last CAT update in 2022, Russia has shown a severe lack of ambition in proposing and implementing new emissions reduction policies. Its few relevant policies are unambitious or, in the case of its updated Climate Doctrine, have seen Russia’s climate ambition regress. Russia’s climate target is even less ambitious and will be easily achieved under current policies.

Russia's existing policies indicate no real commitment to curb emissions, leading at best to stabilising, but more likely to continuously rising emissions. The CAT rates Russia’s current policies as “Highly insufficient” when compared to its fair share, but “Critically insufficient” when compared to modelled domestic pathways. Based on CAT methodology, we take the better of the two ratings. The “Highly insufficient” rating indicates that Russia’s policies and action in 2030 reflect minimal to no action and are not at all consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. If all countries were to follow Russia’s approach, warming could reach over 3°C and up to 4°C.

Further information on how the CAT rates countries (against modelled domestic pathways and fair share) can be found here.

Under current policies, Russia’s economy-wide emissions are expected to continue rising to 2030 or barely stabilising, when instead they should be rapidly declining. According to our latest estimates, currently implemented policies would lead to emissions between 2,067 and 2,145 MtCO₂e in 2030 (excluding LULUCF). This represents a 32–34% decrease in emissions below 1990 levels, a level that goes well beyond the unambitious 2030 NDC target, which amounts to a 14–22% decrease below 1990 levels (excluding LULUCF). Given that current policies will already lead to emissions lower than the 2030 NDC target, the NDC therefore fails to drive further ambition.

Russia’s fossil fuel industry is central to the functioning of the state, with a quarter of the country’s GDP and half of its exports related to fossil fuels (Javeline et al., 2023). Fossil fuel industry oligarchs exert significant influence on the government and represent a major obstacle to decarbonisation (Javeline et al., 2023), with Russian elites viewing the green transition as a threat to the country’s economic model. Given the centrality of fossil fuel revenues to the government’s budget, Russian concerns around the effect of the transition on its economy are legitimate. However, commitments to expanding oil, gas and even coal extraction risk significant stranded assets.

The government’s expectation of increased future demand for hydrocarbons is contradicted by Russia’s own Central Bank (Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 2024), which highlights the risks posed to the Russian economy by betting on increased fossil fuel demand against prevailing market trends.

A recent commitment by the EU to fully cease importing Russian oil and gas by the end of 2027 marks the beginning of the end for a major trading relationship for Russian fossil fuels (European Commission, 2025). The IEA’s STEPS scenario, its most conservative forecast, sees Russian fossil gas exports fail to recover from its pre-war heights, with exports still 20% below pre-war levels by 2035. In its lower emissions forecasts, this would be 30–50% below pre-war levels (IEA, 2024b, p. 146). Betting on such a high increase in demand for Russian hydrocarbons reflects the fossil fuel industry’s influence on energy policy compared to independent projections.

Prior to the war in Ukraine, Russian exports were highly exposed to the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Since the war and its resulting tensions with Europe, the importance of the European market to Russia’s economy has dropped significantly, further reducing the political and economic impetus to decarbonise. The subsequent crackdown on internal dissent since the war began has seen many Russian environmental organisations labelled as "undesirable," leading to their closure (Album, 2024). This has served to stifle critique of government policy from civil society at the same time as fossil fuel interests remain deeply embedded within senior levels of government (Jolly, 2022).

Russia published its Energy Strategy to 2050, which serves as its guiding energy document (Russian Federation, 2025b). Given the extent to which the war in Ukraine upended Russia’s previous energy strategy – especially regarding exports – this new strategy signals current Russian thinking. Although the strategy was updated to factor in post-war market dynamics, it doubles down on fossil fuels to an extreme extent. Its target scenario aims for a 1.1% share for wind and solar in primary energy consumption by 2050: ten times less than the share of coal alone. When all fossil fuels are taken into account, they will meet 85% of Russian primary energy consumption in 2050. Nuclear is the only low-carbon energy source which sees a substantial increase in energy consumption over the next quarter-century, demonstrating the value Russia places on its nuclear industry.

Alongside the overarching energy strategy, Russia also released two plans for the power sector in 2024, one covering the years 2025–2030 and the other covering 2031–2042. In conjunction with the energy strategy, these serve as guiding documents which set out Russian priorities for the power sector out to 2041. Ultimately, they involve a similarly fossil fuel-intensive trajectory in line with the energy system as a whole.

Recent legislative developments

In 2023, Russia released its Climate Doctrine (Russian Federation, 2023c), an update to the first version released in 2009 (Russian Federation, 2009). The update removed references to the role of fossil fuels in driving climate change. Instead, the document promotes “technology neutrality,” a term used to promote fossil and nuclear energy over renewables, in line with state policy (Russian Federation, 2020a; World Nuclear Association, 2024). The Climate Doctrine is a high-level document and provides no concrete mitigation measures nor pathways, other than to reiterate Russia’s previously stated goal of achieving net zero by 2060, an aspiration which relies on an unrealistically large increase in the forestry sink.

This goal has since been achieved through a recalculation of Russia’s forestry sink in 2024 (RBC, 2024). Russia uses its own methodology rather than the internationally recognised methodology used by other Parties to the UNFCCC. Historical data for the LULUCF sector was recalculated to absorb at least double the amount of emissions than previously reported (Russian Federation, 2023a, 2024a, 2025a). This allows Russia to meet its 2050 target of absorbing 1,200 MtCO₂e through the forestry sector without having to implement any substantial measures to expand and protect its forests.

Russia now includes emissions from contested Ukrainian regions in its emissions inventory – regions that Ukraine also counts. This has led to bitter disputes at the UN and double counting of the same emissions across both inventories (Mouratidi, 2023; Volcovici, 2024). The CAT includes all emissions from Russia’s inventory in our analysis.

In the transport sector, pre-war plans to expand electric vehicle (EV) production to around 220,000 units by 2030 have been slashed by three-quarters, with updated targets now aiming to produce 54,250 EVs domestically (Partsvania, 2023; Russian Federation, 2025e). However, Moscow leads the way in Russia for EV adoption, and leads the way in Europe for the rollout of electric buses (Kozlova, 2024; Timerkhanov, 2024).

In 2022, Russia established a national monitoring system for climate active substances (President of Russia, 2024; Russian Federation, 2022c). While not a mitigation measure in and of itself, the data could be used to inform more ambitious climate policy, although there have been funding issues (Interfax, 2024a).

There are questions around whether the monitoring system is being used to accurately assess emissions, or if it is rather a tool to advance government interests. Russia plans to use the maximum possible absorption capacity of forests and other ecosystems to achieve its 2035 target (President of Russia, 2025). The larger Russia’s reported sink, the easier it is for it to achieve its 2035 target without significantly reducing emissions in other sectors. Full transparency is required if the data is to be considered valid.

The security-climate nexus & Russia’s international position on climate

Aside from the Climate Doctrine, Russia has passed very few emission reduction policies in recent years. Its war on Ukraine has dominated the political landscape, and alongside its security, economic and geopolitical implications, can also be considered Moscow’s most significant development from a climate perspective. The war has been a catastrophe both in terms of the loss of human life as well as for the environment, with intensive bombing and military fuel consumption generating significant carbon emissions (Bun et al., 2024).

In 2023, Russia released its Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Russian Federation, 2023b). The section of the document on Russia’s role in international climate negotiations focusses on stopping what Russia terms interference with its natural resources. In other words, it asserts Russia’s position to justify exploiting fossil fuels into the future. This reflects active policy in the international arena, with Russia – alongside Saudi Arabia – leading a small group of petrostates in blocking global efforts to transition away from fossil fuels (Sengupta, 2024).

Russia’s Arctic policy has also factored heavily into Russian climate policy in recent years. Melting Arctic ice will open new trade routes and allow access to hydrocarbon resources that were previously inaccessible. This rush to expand oil and gas extraction demonstrates the extent to which Russia is committed to relying on fossil fuels far into the future (Russian Federation, 2020b, 2023b; Xinhua News Agency, 2023), and efforts are already underway to open new oil fields along the Arctic continental shelf (Raimondi, 2024).

In spite of Russia’s vast renewables potential (Melnikov, 2023), fossil fuels dominate the electricity mix. Fossil gas accounted for 45% of power generation in 2024, with coal contributing another 18%. Although renewables represented less than 1% of generation, hydro and nuclear together made up 36% (Ember, 2025).

Russia intends to maintain power sector emissions at 2019 levels (Russian Federation, 2021c). Russia sees fossil gas as a solution to climate change, and promotes emission reductions through energy efficiency and reducing emissions from existing fossil fuel sources rather than with a significant ratcheting up of clean energy (Soldatkin, 2024). Despite this, the energy intensity of the Russian economy has remained almost exactly the same over the last decade (Ember, 2025). State support is primarily directed towards propping up fossil fuels and supporting nuclear power both domestically and abroad to help develop Russia’s soft power internationally (Rodeheffer, 2025; Stankevich, 2025).

In 2024, Russia approved two strategies for the power sector: one for 2025–2030 and one for 2031–2042. According to Russia’s plans, fossil fuels will account for 57.4% of generation (44.5% gas and 11.2% coal) by 2042. This is just 5.3% lower than in 2023. Meanwhile, wind and solar will make up 3.3%, hydropower 14.8%, and nuclear will contribute 24% (up from 18% in 2024) (Russian Federation, 2024d).

Coal

In 2024, coal accounted for 18% of Russia’s power generation – up from 15% a decade earlier (Ember, 2025). Russia has not adopted COP26’s coal exit and has no plans to phase out coal from its power system. To the contrary, Russia plans to increase coal generation by 19% above 2023 levels by 2035 (Russian Federation, 2024d). This is in stark contradiction to any pathway that is serious about aligning with the Paris Agreement.

Russia is the third largest coal exporter in the world (IEA, 2024a). Since the war in Ukraine, Russia has shifted supply towards Asian markets. Although domestic generation increased in 2024 from the previous year, exports dipped. As a result, President Putin ordered the Ministry of Energy to develop measures to protect the coal industry against falling production. Specifically, export duties were temporarily abolished and the government pushed ahead with transport agreements to export coal more efficiently (Interfax, 2024b).

Despite being such a large player in the global coal trade, the industry is responsible for just 1% of Russia’s GDP (Trading Economics, 2025). Decarbonisation represents an opportunity for Russia to take real leadership on the international stage. However, rather than positioning itself as a leader, Russia instead sees coal as a market to be exploited well into the future (Stankevich, 2025). While coal is not a critical industry to the country as a whole, it is for the Kuzbass region where much of Russia’s coal mining takes place (Korppoo et al., 2023).

A just transition for this region would involve proactive state policy that could, for instance, be modelled on the European Union’s Green Transition Fund for Poland, which invests in coal regions to support economic diversification and shield workers from transition impacts (European Commission, 2022).

Given the disparity between Russian coal trade projections and the IEA’s (IEA, 2024b; Stankevich, 2025), Russia is taking a gamble on the future of its coal regions – and consequently political stability – by not investing in a just transition in the near term to prepare for the economic threats that it will face as demand for Russian coal drops.

Fossil gas

Fossil gas supplied 45% of Russia’s electricity generation in 2024 (Ember, 2025). The total volume of gas supplied to the domestic market will likely increase over the next decade, with gas an important piece of Russian energy policy (IEA, 2024b; Russian Federation, 2024c). The IEA expects gas generation to increase by 12% by 2035 compared to 2023 levels (IEA, 2024b).

The Ministry of Energy plans to build out 5.3 GW of new gas-fired thermal power plants between 2025–2030, and another 14.3 GW between 2031–2042 as older plants are retired (Russian Federation, 2024d, 2024c). The Russian government claims that fossil gas is not a cause of climate change, but a solution to it (Soldatkin, 2024), highlighting the influence of the gas industry on the Russian government.

Huge revenues come from state-owned companies like Gazprom and Rosneft, and Russia uses its gas supply (and fossil fuels more generally) as a geopolitical tool internationally (Javeline et al., 2023). Justifying fossil gas as a transition fuel not only adds legitimacy to continued use of gas domestically, but also for expanding into new markets in developing countries (Russian Federation, 2025d). This runs counter to Paris Agreement compatible pathways, and is the logic of fossil fuel interests rather than a scientifically-founded emissions pathway (Fyson et al., 2022).

Russia plans to expand the gasification of the country, i.e. building out fossil gas infrastructure to more remote regions (Russian Federation, 2020a). Constructing new pipelines further locks Russia into a fossil fuel-intensive future, rather than meeting the socio-economic needs of remote regions with decentralised renewable energy sources (Agyekum et al., 2021).

Renewables

Electricity generation from renewables comes almost entirely from hydropower in Russia, a legacy of major Soviet infrastructure projects. Wind and solar play only a minor role (Mitrova, 2022). Hydropower made up 17% of generation in 2024. Russia expects this share to fall to 15% by 2035 and stabilise thereafter, though absolute capacity will remain roughly the same as in 2024 (Ember, 2025; Russian Federation, 2024d).

Russia holds 9% of the world’s hydropower reserves, especially in the Far East where potential for new hydro capacity is especially prevalent (Javeline et al., 2023). However, government policy tends to favour nuclear over hydro in terms of developing low-carbon sources.

Wind and solar make a negligible contribution, amounting to 0.6% of generation in 2024 (Ember, 2025). Russia originally aimed to increase the share of renewables to 4.5% by 2024, but implementation has fallen behind even this low target (International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 2017). Russia is unlikely to ratchet up renewables any time soon, with the Ministry of Energy now planning to increase wind and solar generation to just 3.3% by 2042 (Russian Federation, 2024d).

Russia has abundant renewables resources, and there is public support for developing renewables not only for domestic consumption but also for exports (Agyekum et al., 2021). However, Russian policy inhibits the growth of renewables. Specifically, local content requirements - which demand that over half of the equipment and components used in a renewable energy project must be produced in Russia - squeeze out investment (Crowley-Vigneau et al., 2023; Scheifele et al., 2022). While it is understandable that a country used to being energy-independent would want to protect domestic industry, without government investment and policy support these local content requirements serve to stifle renewable energy rather than promote domestic industry (Crowley-Vigneau et al., 2023).

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, international investors have pulled out of Russian renewable projects, further damaging the nascent domestic industry (Melnikov, 2023; Skarytovsky, 2022). Russia is now developing closer ties with China, and the two countries agreed in 2024 to cooperate on renewable energy projects (Jingjing, 2024). Considering Russia’s vast resources and China’s industrial expertise, there is significant potential for the two countries to cooperate in harnessing Russia’s wind and solar resources.

Nuclear

Like its hydroelectric industry, much of Russia’s nuclear capacity is a legacy of Soviet era support. That support waned in the aftermath of Chernobyl and collapse of the Soviet Union, before reviving again in the 2000s (World Nuclear Association, 2024). In 2024, nuclear supplied 18% of Russia’s electricity generation (Ember, 2025). The high share of nuclear exemplifies what is lacking in Russia’s renewable industry – early and strong state support can create a long-term profitable domestic industry.

State funding allowed Russia’s nuclear industry to invest in R&D, expand its infrastructure and develop economies of scale which allowed it to become profitable without depending on government subsidies (World Nuclear Association, 2024). Russia’s local content requirements, which serve to block the growth of renewables, appear to benefit the nuclear industry: Rosatom claims that 95% of Russian nuclear power plants are made in Russia (President of Russia, 2022).

Russia plans to increase the share of nuclear in power generation to 24% by 2042 (Russian Federation, 2024d). Rosatom, the state enterprise in charge of Russia’s nuclear industry, is influential not just domestically but in exerting Russian influence internationally. It is the largest nuclear enterprise in the world and is present in 57 countries, most of which are developing countries (Rosatom, 2024b, 2024a). Russia views these projects as financial and technological support to developing countries as defined under the Paris Agreement (Russian Federation, 2024b).

Although nuclear electricity generation does not emit CO₂, long construction times reduce its viability as an alternative to renewables as a means to cutting emissions in line with 1.5°C. The CAT views investments in renewables as a more effective and ultimately cheaper way to cut Russia’s power sector emissions than nuclear. Renewables also do not pose a security risk, nor do they produce radioactive waste.

Hydrogen

Before the war in Ukraine, Russia released a hydrogen strategy which aimed to capture up to 20% of the global hydrogen market by 2030 (Russian Federation, 2021b). Russian-produced hydrogen is intended for domestic use as well as for export. However, many potential markets are now considered "unfriendly countries," leading to the Ministry of Energy to revise Russia’s hydrogen export potential downwards (Digital Energy Association, 2022).

Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2050 reaffirms its ambition to become a world leader in hydrogen (Russian Federation, 2025b). Due to its existing fossil gas infrastructure and its technological inferiority when it comes to producing "green" hydrogen, i.e. hydrogen produced from renewables, Russian hydrogen would be produced almost exclusively from fossil fuels (Patonia, 2022; Russian Federation, 2021b).

Given that Russia is sanctioned by many of the world’s key hydrogen consumers, the resulting impact on foreign investment associated with those sanctions, and Russia’s technological inferiority to countries such as China in the development of renewable energy for green hydrogen (Patonia, 2022), it is likely to struggle to meet its goal of capturing 20% of the global hydrogen market.

Russia aims to reduce transport emissions by 1.2% below 2017 levels by 2030 (Russian Federation, 2021a). Russia has not adopted the COP26 declaration on accelerating the transition to 100% zero emission cars and vans. However, it does place an emphasis on supporting electric vehicle (EV) uptake. In 2021, it set a target of EVs constituting at least 10% of domestically produced vehicles by 2030, which would have amounted to around 220,000 vehicles (Kalinin et al., 2021; Partsvania, 2023; Russian Federation, 2021c).

Economic sanctions have limited Russia’s ability to import key technological components, causing the domestic production of automobiles to plummet (Bogdanova, 2022). Updated targets now aim to produce 54,250 EVs in 2030, and a new EV, the Atom, is expected to begin serial production in 2025 (Interfax, 2024c; Russian Federation, 2025e). However, these targets are not ambitious enough given the level of decarbonisation needed to meet key benchmarks in the transport sector (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).

To spur adoption, the government subsidises 35% of the cost of a domestically produced EV as long as that cost does not exceed USD 10,825 (Bobylev, 2024; Litnarovych, 2025). Demand remains low, however, with only 60,000 EVs registered in Russia at the beginning of 2025, representing 0.12% of the total passenger car fleet (Autostat, 2025).

Moscow leads the country in electrifying transportation. One-quarter of the total EV fleet is in the capital, and the rollout of electric buses places Moscow first not just in Russia but in Europe for the most electric buses in operation (Kozlova, 2024; Parfenenkova, 2023; Timerkhanov, 2024). Major investments in metro lines have revolutionised Moscow’s public transport and will inevitably support emissions reductions.

At the national level, Russia’s rail system is struggling, primarily due to insufficient investment (Goble, 2025, p. 20). Given the sheer size of Russia, rail is critical for transporting goods across the country. However, rail speeds are at their lowest in years and shifting trade to the east since the war in Ukraine has put the system under even greater pressure (The Moscow Times, 2024).

In 2024, Russia recalculated the emissions sink from its land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector for the whole historical time series from 1990 to 2022 (Russian Federation, 2024a). In some years, CO₂ absorption nearly doubled compared to what was previously reported. For example, 2021 data – the most recent year available before and after the revision – showed the LULUCF sector absorbing 505 MtCO₂e (when converted to GWP AR5) before the revision, and 750 MtCO₂e afterwards (Russian Federation, 2023a, 2025a). This represents an almost 50% increase. Earlier years show similar or even larger revisions.

Although Russia aims to reach net zero by 2060, until 2050 it plans to cut emissions (excluding LULUCF) to 1,830 MtCO₂e. Its long-term strategy involves feeble emissions reductions from all economic sectors and instead relies on a huge increase in its LULUCF sink – to 1,200 MtCO₂e in 2050. Given that the LULUCF sink supposedly absorbed 1,172 MtCO₂e from the atmosphere in 2023, the recalculations now allow Russia to meet its LULUCF target for 2050 with no additional policies. This is highly suspicious (Russian Federation, 2025a).

Emissions data was taken from its national monitoring system for climate active substances, and Russia claims that the data was independently peer-reviewed (Russian Federation, 2024a). However, a crackdown on dissent since the war in Ukraine has led to environmental organisations critical of government policy being labelled as "foreign agents" as a means of suppressing their work (OVD-Info, 2024). Meanwhile, independent analyses of forest fires have found the real area of the fires being significantly larger than official government accounts, with 2024 seeing 5.59 Mha of forest loss, equivalent to 816 MtCO₂e of emissions (Global Forest Watch, 2025; Novaya Gazeta Europe, 2023). Given many fires occur in unmanaged forests, this further accelerates their intensity.

A justification for the increase in absorption capacity is Russia’s decision to include unmanaged “reserve” forests alongside managed forests in its GHG inventory (Light, 2021). This violates a key element of international climate reporting, with the UN’s IPCC guidelines stating that only managed forests may be included in carbon accounting practices (2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, 2006).

Russia emitted 10.4 Mt of methane in 2022 which, when converted into CO₂-equivalents, amounts to 36% of Russia’s total emissions. The energy sector is the principal source of methane emissions, followed by waste and agriculture.

Similar to the forestry sector, there are significant doubts around the authenticity of Russia’s methane accounting. Russia has a history of underreporting its methane emissions (Amazawa & Shimbun, 2024; Halff et al., 2023), making it difficult to assess exactly how much methane is being emitted inside Russia’s borders. This is particularly relevant for the oil and gas industry, which is not only Russia’s largest source of methane, but is significantly more methane-intensive than the global industry average (Wiese & Seymour, 2023).

Russia’s oil and gas industry is poorly regulated and does not subscribe to industry best practices in managing methane leaks (Wiese & Seymour, 2023), nor has Russia adopted the COP26 methane pledge which aims to reduce methane emissions by 30% by 2030 compared to 2020 levels. Russia is the highest flaring country in the world, with flaring increasing by 2% in 2024 compared to the previous year, with oilfields in Eastern Siberia driving this trend (World Bank, 2025).