International Shipping

Whereas the Kyoto Protocol stipulated that developed countries should reduce emissions from international bunkers through the IMO, the Paris Agreement does not explicitly mention it. However, the Paris Agreement provides that governments are to set “economy-wide” reduction targets, which implies that governments should include emissions from international bunkers in their climate targets under the Paris Agreement.

In the absence of sufficiently ambitious action through the IMO, which has made limited progress towards reducing GHG emissions since discussions started in 1997, national action is critical to keeping the Paris Agreement temperature limit of 1.5°C within reach. National governments need to take responsibility for emissions from their contributions to international bunkers and actively work to bring those to zero.

Some countries have begun to address their international shipping emissions. For countries that the CAT analyses, we track whether international shipping has been included in their net zero targets. This information is available on individual country pages.

The European Union included several measures relevant for international shipping emissions in its ‘Fit for 55’ package. These include:

• The maritime EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) (EU 2023/959) – pricing emissions from ships above 5000GT (European Parliament & European Council, 2023a)
• The FuelEU Maritime Regulation – setting GHG emissions reductions targets for fuels (European Parliament & European Council, 2023c)
• The Alternative Fuel Infrastructure regulation (AFIR) – ensuring shore power and bunkering infrastructure for low carbon fuels (European Parliament & European Council, 2023b)
• Renewable Energy Directive (RED III) – setting targets for the uptake of RFNBOs in the maritime sector

As of 2025, all Fit for 55 regulations are in force, except the Energy Taxation Directive, which is yet to be finalised.

The EU ETS maritime regulates Tank-to-Wake GHG emissions. There will be a gradual increase in volume of emissions covered by the EU ETS, from 40% of the maritime emissions in 2024, 70% in 2025, and 100% in 2026. The emissions covered by the expansion of the EU ETS will cover CO₂, and will gradually consider methane and nitrous oxide, with a geographic scope of 100% of emissions from intra-EU voyages (voyages between any two or more ports in the European Economic Area) and while at berth in EEA ports.

It will also cover 50% of emissions from international voyages to and from an EEA port and a third country. An assessment from the European Commission found that, since the EU ETS maritime came into effect in 2024, there has been no evidence of general relocation of container transhipment from EU hubs to neighbouring non-EU ports, no evidence of a modal shift to road freight, and no indication of increased use of smaller ships outside the scope of the regulation or ship-to-ship transfers to evade the regulation (European Commission, 2025a)

The EU ETS applies only to vessels larger than 5,000 GT, however, monitoring, reporting, and verification of emission from certain high emitting smaller vessels began in 2025 to cover general cargo vessels less than 400 GT and off short ships more than 400 GT (European Commission, 2025b).

The FuelEU Maritime Regulation sets out binding emissions reductions targets for GHG intensity in maritime fuels. These targets will increase in stringency over five-year intervals, from a 2% reduction in 2025, 6% in 2030, 11% in 2035, and 75% by 2050. Additionally, a compliance mechanism applies a penalty to ship owners unable to achieve the target GHG intensity reductions (European Parliament & European Council, 2023c).

The revenues generated from the maritime ETS and the FuelEU are to be directed towards decarbonisation projects. In the case of the FuelEU, all revenues from penalties must be used to promote the distribution and use of renewable and low carbon fuels in the maritime sector through the Innovation Fund (European Parliament & European Council, 2023c). The ETS revenues should be allocated to climate and energy related projects, with include port decarbonisation projects.

In 2025, the EU started negotiations of its next budget for 2028 to 2032 and has proposed using a portion of its ETS revenues for non-climate and non-energy related financing, which undermines the ETS principle to utilise all revenues to accelerate decarbonisation efforts. This could be another sign of backsliding by the EU on its climate commitments. It is uncertain what this will mean for maritime decarbonisation financing at this point.

By 2030, under the Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Directive (AFIR), ports need to provide shore-side power outputs to meet 90% of the demand. However, the AFIR also includes provisions for port facilities to support LNG fuelled ships, which incentivises the development of fossil gas (LNG) infrastructure at ports, leaving it to EU member states to decide on the level of deployment by 2025, risking high-cost stranded assets.

The United States formally withdrew from the IMO’s MEPC83 negotiations in April 2025 in opposition to the development of mitigation measures in the international shipping sector. At the Extraordinary Session (ES.2) in October 2025, the Trump Administration threatened governments with retaliatory tariffs, as well as visa restrictions and port levies, if they voted to adopt the Net Zero Framework (NZF) (Reuters, 2025b). Ultimately, these efforts were successful: many countries abandoned their support for the NZF, resulting in the vote being postponed to October 2026 (Esme Stallard, 2025). The US intervention was a significant setback for reducing the sector’s emissions, likely requiring even more state and non-state action to decarbonise the sector (UCL, 2025).

The US Environment Protection Agency (EPA) launched the Clean Ports Program under the Biden Administration, which awarded USD 3bn between 2024 and 2025 for zero-emission cargo-handling equipment, port electrification, and planning (US EPA, 2023). Additionally, the Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs (H2Hubs) initiative was established to support prospective marine fuel supply chains. The 2024 Hydrogen Program Plan detailed a USD 8bn deployment framework at the federal level, while, at the state level, California’s At Berth Regulation rule continues to tighten ship emissions at berth. However, pressure and funding cuts in 2025 under the Trump Administration have abolished or weakened these federal programmes from the EPA (Cathleen Kelly & Jasia Smith, 2025).

In July 2022, the US initiated the Clean Shipping Action proposal that will set carbon intensity standards on marine fuels, with a target of reaching 100% zero-emission fuels by 2040 (U.S. Government, 2022). In March 2023, the Port of Los Angeles signed an agreement with the port authorities of Yokohama, Japan, to establish a green shipping corridor (see the non-state actors and initiatives section).

In previous years, US port authorities have focused on establishing green corridors in the Asia-Pacific region; the US has existing agreements with Shanghai and Singapore, and is exploring options in India, Australia, Panama and South Korea. Despite the Trump Administration‘s attacks on maritime decarbonisation, port-to-port green shipping corridor agreements appear to continue, including the port corridor between the US to South Korea (Kosmajac, 2025).

In November 2022, at COP 27, the US and Norway signed the Green Shipping Challenge to pressure action at the IMO to tackle further emissions reductions measures and challenge other countries to take further action domestically (DNV, 2022).

The UK includes its share of international shipping emissions in its sixth carbon budget for 2033-2037 (Government of the UK, 2025a).

At COP27, the US and the UK announced the launch of a US – UK Green Shipping Corridor Task Force with the aim of establishing a green shipping corridor between the two countries. In 2025, the UK government committed 448 million GBP to reducing emission in the maritime sector (Reuters, 2025a)

In 2025, the UK released its maritime decarbonisation strategy which sets outs targets and policy measures. This includes a domestic 30% GHG emission reduction target by 2030, 80% by 2040 and net zero by 2050, which covers life cycle emissions, relative to 2008 levels (Government of the UK, 2025b). with this strategy the UK has indicated that it will include international shipping emissions in its 2050 net zero target but has not yet enshrined this into its Climate Change Act.

As of 2026, the UK will begin implementing its expansion of its ETS to its maritime sector. The strategy also seeks to increase energy efficiency, support on-shore power projects and regulate fuel use to encourage t the use of low and zero carbon fuels (Government of the UK, 2025b)

China is the world’s largest ship builder, accounting for 54% of ships built in 2024 (by gross tonnage) (UNCTAD, 2025). China has been expanding its green shipping corridors domestically and internationally, connecting to Australia, the US, and Europe (Global Maritime Forum, 2025). Inland port specialised berth shore-power coverage basically reached 100% in 2021. By June 2022, the completion rate for shore-power receiving facility retrofits on coastal domestic dry bulk carriers was about 71% (Hu & Dong, 2024), therefore cutting emissions at ports.

China has implemented several polices to transition its shipping sector; notably, its 14^th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) (Government of the People’s Republic of China & Climate Change Laws, 2021) and its Action Plan for the Green Development of the Shipbuilding Industry (2024–2030) (Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2024).

Worryingly, China’s definition of green marine fuels also includes LNG. The government indicates its intention to become the global leader in supplying LNG and methanol fuelled ships by 2025. China plans to set up a green and low carbons standards framework which will include oversight of green supply chains and sets a carbon intensity reduction target of 13.5% by 2025 below 2020 levels. By 2030, it seeks to be a fully developed green shipbuilding manufacturer, including scaling up ammonia, hydrogen and battery powered-ship design, improving fuel supply infrastructure system and complying with international IMO energy efficiency target (Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2024). Chinese shipping companies have already started using fully electric freight ships in their fleets since 2024 (see Non-state actors and Initiatives below).

In November 2020, the IMO adopted resolution MEPC.327(75) to encourage member states to develop national action plans to initiate shipping decarbonisation at national level (IMO, 2020). To date, 10 countries (Japan, Norway, Finland. France, India, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, South Korea, the Marshall Islands, and the UK) have published National Action Plans (NAPs) to address domestic maritime decarbonisation. France and the Solomon Islands were the latest countries to published their plans in 2025 (IMO, 2025b).

The GreenVoyage2050 programme, launched by the IMO and Norway in 2019 and extended to 2030, supports developing countries and small island developing states (SIDS) in cutting shipping emissions and developing National Action Plans. It began with pilot states such as Azerbaijan, Belize, China, India, Kenya, and South Africa, and was later expanded to include Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Türkiye, and Viet Nam. By supporting capacity building, developing pilot projects, and offering technical assistance, the programme helps ensure that developing maritime nations can actively participate in the global transition to net zero shipping (IMO, 2025c, 2025a).

Many of the world’s largest international shipping corporations have made commitments—of varying levels of ambition—to decarbonise their operations.

Several companies that have set decarbonisation targets by or before 2050; including Mærsk, Hapag-Lloyd, MSC, ONE and CMA CGM. In contrast, COSCO Shipping, has set a target of carbon-neutrality for 2060, much later than other companies (CMA CGM, 2025; Maersk, 2024; ONE, 2025; Sustainable Ships, 2022)

Mærsk, the most climate-ambitious of all companies, owns and charters close to 700 vessels as of 2025, aims to have its entire business operations at net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2040. Mærsk indicates that its transition will focus on biodiesel, methanol and ammonia. Its climate transition plan indicates that by 2040, they expect unbated emissions to be 6.2MtCO₂e/yr which they are considering offsetting through the use of carbon credits and natural carbon solutions (Maersk, 2024).

Some companies are enacting measures that directly undercut their goals. Hapag-Lloyd, for example, has a climate-neutrality target for 2045, but is banking on transitioning to LNG fuelled ships and has entered a multi-year deal with Shell for the supply of liquified natural gas (LNG) (Hapag Lloyd, 2025; Hapag-Lloyd, 2024). CMA CGM has committed to carbon neutrality by 2050, rather than climate neutrality (CMA CGM, 2025), implying it could exclude non-CO₂. It is also considering adopting LNG as part of its sustainability strategy.

These approaches will ensure that fossil fuels will continue to be part of the fuel mix beyond 2050 and lead to locked-in investments and stranded assets, representing lost opportunities to finance the scale-up of zero-emission fuels. Singapore based ONE shipping company , which aims to cut GHG emission intensity by 70% by 2030 compared to 2008 levels and reach climate neutrality by 2050, received its first dual engine ammonia-methanol ship in 2025 as part of its shift to low carbon fuels, which also includes an increase in biofuels (ONE, 2025).

Chinese shipping companies have become the first to introduce fully battery electric powered ships in their fleets for river and short distance coastal shipping. Shipping giant COSCO has two electric ships from 2024 the Green Water 01 and 02 (Doll, 2024). The Ningbo Ocean Shipping Co. is undergoing sea trails in 2026 as the largest electric ship capable of transporting 740 TEU of cargo and equipped with on-board solar power to extend its range. Another ship is also on order (Marine Insight, 2026). These trials are demonstrating that battery powered ships have now moved from concept to reality.

At COP26 in November 2021, the Clydebank Declaration was signed to initiate a partnership between countries, industry, and relevant stakeholders to develop Green Shipping Corridors: a systems-based approach to transition key shipping routes to accommodate zero-emission fuel bunkers, ports, vessels, and associated elements.

As of 2025, 26 countries have signed on to the Clydebank Declaration, committing to multiple green shipping corridor initiatives (MMMCZC, 2025), with 84 green shipping corridor initiatives worldwide currently active. More than 300 stakeholders, including governments, ports, shipping companies, cargo owners, and fuel producers are now engaged, with the most leadership coming from industry. Over recent years, the number of these projects have grown annually. In 2024, 19 corridors progressed to the next phases in their development. Most corridor initiatives focus on methanol, followed by ammonia, electric, methane, hydrogen and biofuel energy sources (GMF, 2025).

Positively there are signs of early commercialisation of methanol dual-fuel ships and growing momentum behind ammonia as the likely dominant scalable zero-emission fuel (SZEF) post 2030. Vessel deployment plans already include more than 35 ammonia-fuelled ships expected in service between 2027 and 2030, alongside early pilots of methanol-fuelled container ships and ferries, and a growing base of battery-electric ferries in the Nordic countries (Global Maritime Forum, 2024, 2025).

Progress can also been seen at the infrastructure level, with ports such as Rotterdam, Singapore, Antwerp-Bruges, Seattle, and Pilbara positioning themselves as early hubs for zero-emission bunkering, safety trials, and certification pilots.

Despite these advances, Global Maritime Forum (2024b) caution that many initiatives face a feasibility wall: while concepts and feasibility studies are multiplying, moving to full implementation requires closing the fuel cost gap, scaling up SZEF production, ensuring offtake certainty, and delivering policy and financial support at pace.