Colombia

We rate Colombia’s policies and action as “Insufficient”. The “Insufficient” rating indicates that Colombia’s climate policies and action in 2030 need substantial improvements to be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. If all countries were to follow Colombia’s approach, warming would reach over 2°C and up to 3°C.

According to our analysis, Colombia’s current policies and action are not 1.5°C compatible when compared to its expected fair share contribution to climate change mitigation. Current policy projections estimate Colombia’s 2030 emissions at 205-209 MtCO₂e (excluding LULUCF), significantly above its 1.5°C-aligned fair share of 146 MtCO₂e and 36%-38% higher than its 2030 NDC target.

Planned policies are estimated to cut emissions to 173-180 MtCO2e by 2030, remaining 15%–19% above Colombia’s NDC target of 151 MtCO₂e (excluding LULUCF) and therefore insufficient to achieve it. While these measures move the country closer to its target, our analysis finds that faster implementation and additional mitigation efforts this decade are essential to fully meet NDC commitments.

Colombia’s climate action, as reflected in its targets and the emissions trajectory under current and planned policies, reveals that the country’s major climate gap lies not in ambition but in implementation. Meeting its targets, and moving toward full decarbonisation, will require the adoption of additional domestic policies, supported by national resources as well as substantial international assistance.

This includes not only expanding climate finance but also realigning the incentive structure created by the global financial system to support, leverage investments and reflect greater national climate ambition. For this reason, this assessment focuses on the country’s implementation progress and the barriers it faces, recognising this as a prerequisite for strengthening ambition even further.

Further information on how the CAT rates countries (against modelled pathways and fair share) can be found here.

The lower bound of Colombia's current policies projection, which reflects recent government announcements such as halting new oil and fossil gas exploration licences and reducing fossil fuel use across energy sectors, shows that Colombia’s emissions are expected to peak in 2029. This is two years later than the 2027 peak target defined in Colombia’s current NDC of 2020.

Planned policies, those that have been announced but not yet implemented, are estimated to cut emissions to between 173–180 MtCO2e in 2030. This would place the country within 15%–19% above its NDC target (151 MtCO2e target, excl. LULUCF). Although planned policies put the country closer to meet its NDC, according to our analysis, Colombia will need to accelerate the implementation of existing policies and introduce additional mitigation measures within this decade to meet its NDC commitments. Priority areas include accelerating electrification and implementing robust energy efficiency strategies across energy-intensive demand sectors.

Since taking office in August 2022, the Petro administration has brought climate change to the forefront of its political agenda. The government has committed to reduce deforestation, halt new oil and fossil gas exploration, end fossil gas fracking, and to accelerate the energy transition. Over the past three years, efforts have focused on aligning national strategies, institutional frameworks, and sectoral plans with climate objectives.

The National Development Plan 2022–2026 (PND) places climate action and decarbonisation at the core of its development vision. One of its five main transformations, “Productive transformation, internationalisation and climate action,” explicitly targets economic decarbonisation and a just, reliable, and efficient energy transition. Around 10% of the plan’s resources – approximately USD 23 billion – are allocated to this transformation. The plan also institutionalises the concept of energy communities, promoting local participation in clean energy development (Law 2294, 2023).

Complementing the PND, the government launched a Just Energy Transition (JET) roadmap, designed through participatory dialogues with more than 2,000 stakeholders. The roadmap envisions a progressive phase-out of coal-fired power with last coal plant to close by 2036, a ban on new concessions for open-pit coal mining, and an end to oil and fossil gas exploration. This roadmap presents a scenario that reduces emissions three times more than previous government plans (MinEnergía Colombia, 2024c, 2025b).

The government is also repurposing public institutions to implement its climate agenda. Notably, institutions traditionally focused on the management of fossil fuel resources now actively engage in drafting and implementing decarbonisation strategies:

• The National Agency of Hydrocarbons (ANH) oversees new offshore wind project allocations, leveraging on its expertise on oil and fossil gas for spatial planning and pre-feasibility. The ANH also coordinates the national hydrogen strategy (MinEnergía Colombia, 2022b; The Renewables Consulting Group, 2022).
• Ecopetrol, the state-controlled oil company, committed to net zero CO2 direct and indirect emissions by 2050, and a 50% reduction in all emissions (scope 1, 2 and 3) by the same date. Ecopetrol is also re-prioritising low-emissions solutions, investing a third of its 2023 budget in renewable energy, hydrogen, transmission, and efficiency measures (Ecopetrol, 2022b, 2022c).

Despite being a government priority, Colombia’s ambitious climate agenda is hampered by a macroeconomic model in which short-term dynamics are determined by external financial shocks, exacerbated by the systemic limitations of the international financial architecture (Burke et al., 2024; Expert Review on Debt, 2025; Ocampo, 2016; WTW, 2023). Limited access to adequate climate finance, pressures on sovereign debt, and restrictive credit rating dynamics hinder the country’s ability to close its implementation gap.

Colombia's experience highlights both the promise and the risks of pursuing ambitious climate action under a constrained global economic system, signalling the urgent need to reform international financial rules. A system that treats fossil fuel phase-out strategies as strengths rather than liabilities is essential for enabling just and effective transitions in Colombia and the Global South. This topic is covered in more detail in the section below ‘High climate ambition amidst hindering global structures’.

Notably, Colombia’s climate action and energy transition efforts are explicitly framed around peacebuilding, economic development and social justice. Colombia remains one of the most unequal nations in Latin America and is one of the region's historically most affected by violence against environmental leaders, mostly related to ongoing armed conflict and land disputes (MinEnergía Colombia, 2024b; World Bank Group, 2023). In this context, climate action goes beyond emissions mitigation to also address structural inequalities.

For example, the government has developed initiatives that leverage climate action to tackle long-standing challenges such as social inequality, land rights, and inclusive decision making, such as:

• Linking decisions on territorial planning with climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies (Minambiente Colombia, 2023).
• Creating energy communities aimed at marginalised areas with limited access to public services, education, and food security. The target is to create 20,000 energy communities with energy generation from non-conventional renewable energy sources by 2026 (DNP Colombia, 2023).
• Benefit sharing of profits from clean energy projects (e.g., 1-6% of gross energy sales) directed to local communities (Vega Araújo & Muñoz Cabré, 2023; Vega-Araújo et al., 2024).
• Programmes for job retraining and new sources of productivity in coal-dependent regions like Cesar and La Guajira (MinEnergía Colombia, 2025b).

Colombia’s role in the global climate arena

Colombia has become a prominent voice on the global climate stage, with President Petro and top officials delivering ambitious climate messages at major forums such as COP29, the World Economic Forum, the UN General Assembly and high-level dialogues including the China–CELAC ministerial summit, where they have advocated for strong language on the global phase-out of fossil fuels.

The country has underscored its commitment by joining international coalitions like the Powering Past Coal Alliance, the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, and endorsing the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty at COP28, becoming the first Latin American nation and the largest coal and gas producer to do so. Colombia’s environmental leadership also extended to hosting the 2024 UN biodiversity summit (COP16) in Cali, where it emphasised the links between climate, biodiversity, justice, and indigenous inclusion (Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, 2023; Powering Past Coal Alliance, 2023).

Looking ahead to COP30 in Belém, Colombia is positioning itself as a regional climate leader. However, sustaining and scaling this leadership will require international support, so that Colombia and other developing countries can pursue ambitious climate goals without compromising sustainable development and social priorities.

Recent developments

In November 2024, severe flooding devastated Colombia’s Pacific region, especially in Chocó, where 85% of the territory was submerged and over 188,000 people were displaced (OCHA, 2024). Scientific studies link the increased intensity of these floods to climate change, with rainfall in the region up to 40% higher than in previous decades, making Chocó one of the country’s most climate-vulnerable regions in the country (Cazzaniga et al., 2024).

Alongside climate impacts, Colombia has faced social unrest over fossil fuel subsidies. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the previous government increased direct subsidies to lower gasoline and diesel prices by 13% and 9%, respectively. Attempts by Petro’s government to reform these subsidies, which are crucial for a population where 33% live below the poverty line, sparked nation-wide protests, particularly among heavy-duty vehicle transport workers (IEA, 2023a).

The energy transition in Colombia’s power sector has gained momentum, particularly in solar power deployment and transmission infrastructure. By 2024, installed solar capacity reached 2 GW, quadrupling the previous year’s wind and solar capacity and accounting for roughly 10% of total installed capacity (UPME, 2024f). Recent advances in transmission infrastructure, such as in the ‘Colectora’ line that will connect La Guajira – Colombia’s region with the greatest wind and solar potential – to the national grid, are expected to further unlock renewable potential.

Despite these advances, many wind and solar projects continue to face delays due to permitting and consultation processes with local communities. These challenges often stem from concerns over how projects are introduced to the territories and the legitimacy of consultations rather than opposition to renewable energy itself. Some companies have withdrawn from projects due to licensing delays and uncertainty (see more in the ‘Power Sector’ section below).

In the transport sector, electric vehicle sales surged by 150% in 2024 from the previous year, accounting for 5.9% of total vehicle sales that year. In April 2025 alone, sales of low-emission vehicles accounted for approximately 38% of the market share for that month, positioning Colombia as a regional leader in transport (see more in the ‘Transport’ section below).

Despite these achievements, political instability and governance challenges threaten the implementation of Colombia’s climate agenda. Frequent cabinet changes, a broad reform agenda, and tensions with the opposition in Congress have strained the government’s ability to coordinate and deliver on key climate policies. This instability has affected the governance and political articulation required for the effective implementation of climate-related initiatives.

Colombia has also taken steps to mobilise climate finance:

• Green taxonomy: in 2022, Colombia became the first country in Latin America to adopt a green taxonomy to guide environmentally aligned investments and boost green capital markets (Minhacienda Colombia, 2024).
• Sovereign green bonds: in 2022, Colombia issued its first sovereign green bonds in local currency to fund clean transport, water management, biodiversity, and renewable energy (La Republica, 2021).
• Country platform: in 2025, the government launched a Country Platform; a country-driven financing mechanism to coordinate climate and development finance to support its climate and energy transition goals around strategic investment priorities, including clean energy, sustainable mobility, and conservation (Gobierno de Colombia, 2025a).
• Just Energy Transition Platform (JET-P): Colombia’s proposed JET-P (USD 40 billion) targets renewable energy, nature restoration, and economic diversification away from coal. The plan, still under development, has the support from donors like the UK, Germany, Canada, and the EU (Climate Home News, 2024; Minambiente Colombia, 2024).

Despite these efforts, climate spending remains low: in 2022, only 0.28% of the national budget was allocated to climate action, fossil fuels received nearly half of the energy sector financing between 2016 and 2021, and renewables received less than 5%. The Just Energy Transition roadmap estimates investment needs at 7.4–10.3% of GDP (GFLAC, 2023; MinEnergía Colombia, 2024a).

Colombia’s ability to implement its ambitious climate agenda is being held back by a macroeconomic model that remains highly exposed to external financial shocks, compounded by structural barriers within the global financial system. Limited climate finance, debt pressures, and restrictive credit frameworks hinder implementation, highlighting the need for international reforms that treat fossil fuel phase-out strategies as assets rather than liabilities.

With the inauguration of the current administration in 2022, the Colombian government committed to halting the issuance of new coal mining and oil/fossil gas exploration concessions, stating that no new oil and fossil gas exploration contracts would be signed. In line with this, the government also put forward a bill proposing a ban on fracking.

From a global perspective, these commitments align with global net zero scenarios by 2050 to keep the 1.5°C temperature goal within reach, which underscores that no new oil and fossil gas fields are necessary beyond those already approved (IEA, 2023b; IRENA, 2024b). Colombia’s position in this regard represents a bold and necessary step toward global decarbonisation.

On the one hand, the difficulties in implementing these ambitious climate commitments are linked to the fact that Colombia remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels for fiscal revenue, exports, and investment. This tension between ambition and dependency underscores the complexity of the country’s decarbonisation pathway (see the section on Upstream Fossil Fuels for an in-depth analysis).

On the other hand, however, significant obstacles to closing Colombia's implementation gap also lie beyond its borders. They stem from a restrictive financial architecture where insufficient climate finance, sovereign debt pressures, and country credit rating dynamics constrain national action (Expert Review on Debt, 2025).

Despite Colombia’s climate leadership, the international financial system responded negatively to the country’s decision to halt new oil and fossil gas exploration. Following the announcement, international credit rating agencies interpreted it as heightening fiscal risks due to the country’s reliance on fossil fuels, a perception that was reflected in a lower credit rating and increasing borrowing costs. This underscores a system that continues to reward fossil fuel-based growth while treating transition-oriented actions as economic risks (S&P Global Ratings, 2024).

These rating downgrades increase external debt servicing cots, put pressure on public finances, and narrow fiscal space for essential social and development investments. They also limit the ability to implement broader critical mitigation measures beyond fossil fuel phase-out. Higher financing costs, for instance, raise the cost of capital for renewable energy, directly affecting their competitiveness and slowing their deployment (IRENA, 2024a).

The international climate finance commitments remain vastly insufficient. The new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance, agreed in Baku to raise funds to USD 300 billion annually by 2035 (UNFCCC, 2024), falls short of the USD 1.3 trillion recommended by the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance to support developing countries (Bhattacharya et al., 2024). Without a significant increase in both the quantity and quality of concessional and non-concessional finance that help reducing risk factors associated with decarbonisation efforts, countries like Colombia lack the instruments necessary to drive their transition forwards.

Collaborative mechanisms that align domestic transition priorities with international financial support, such as the Country Platform that Colombia launched, could be key vehicles to unlock and coordinate funding flows. These platforms can help translate national decarbonization strategies into bankable projects, de-risk investment for private capital, and create greater transparency. This requires donor countries stepping up with far more ambitious financial commitments.

Recognising the implications of these dynamics and how they limit financing domestic climate action, Colombia is leading a joint initiative with Kenya, France, and Germany to conduct an expert review of the sovereign debt–climate–nature nexus. The review highlights the compounding crises of debt and environmental shocks, noting that many developing countries are forced to borrow heavily in response to climate-related disasters or to pursue ambitious climate-compatible development agendas, only to face higher debt burdens and slower growth. This feedback loop restricts investment in climate action and threatens debt sustainability (Expert Review on Debt, 2025).

The expert review recommends integrating climate and nature considerations into macroeconomic and fiscal policies, including revising the IMF's debt sustainability frameworks to reflect environmental risks and benefits. It urges credit rating agencies to incorporate climate and nature-related risks into their analyses, promotes restructuring or refinancing debt linked to environmental outcomes, and emphasises the need to unlock affordable climate finance for vulnerable countries.

Colombia's experience illustrates both the promise and the risks of ambitious climate action in a constrained global economic system. Its leadership signals the need for urgent reform of international financial rules to enable just and effective transitions in the Global South.

The extraction and production of fossil fuels – coal, oil and fossil gas – contributed to approximately 6.5% of the country’s total GHG emissions in 2021. These include fugitive emissions during extraction and from combustion associated with refining and solid fuel production (IDEAM, 2024).

Colombia has aligned with international efforts to phase out fossil fuels. In 2023, the country joined global alliances such as the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA), and supported calls for a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, 2023; Powering Past Coal Alliance, 2023). Under President Petro’s administration, Colombia announced the halt of new oil and fossil gas exploration licenses. However, existing exploration licenses remain effective and new investments are still allowed in the over 380 existing oil and fossil gas contracts (Mesa Puyo et al., 2024).

Simultaneously, the government took decisive action against fracking, halting pilot projects authorised under the previous administration and proposing a ban. In July 2025, the government submitted a bill to Congress to ban fossil gas exploration and exploitation via fracking, currently under review. This marks the sixth attempt to ban fracking in the past decade, three of them during the current administration (Minambiente Colombia, 2025b; Presidencia Colombia, 2025).

Colombia’s gradual approach to phase out fossil fuels involves improving recovery from existing reserves, accelerating renewables, electrification of energy demand, and diversifying the economy. However, these efforts require long-term planning and continuity beyond presidential cycles that articulate governance with efficient economic and political signals.

The government has introduced policies to phase out coal, including banning investment in new mines, applying a tax on coal production and consumption, fiscal measures aimed at discouraging coal exports, and the designation of special mining districts to aid their economic diversification (in Cesar and La Guajira).

Cerrejon, one of the two largest coal mines in Colombia owned by Glencore, is planned to close after the end of its mining concession in 2034 (Argus media, 2024). Colombia’s Just Energy Transition roadmap envisions phasing out coal-fired power plants by 2036 and from the wider economy by 2040. However, these remain scenario-based exercises rather than binding targets. To align with the 1.5°C temperature limit, emerging economies should phase out coal for electricity generation by 2040 at the latest (IEA, 2023a, 2023b; IRENA, 2024b; MinEnergía Colombia, 2024c).

In 2024, the Colombian government suspended all coal exports to Israel, citing non-compliance with the provisional measures issued by the International Court of Justice concerning the ongoing genocide in the Gaza Strip. Although exports to Israel account for only about 5% of Colombia’s total coal exports, they represent approximately 84% of Israel’s coal imports, highlighting the geopolitical weight of the decision (Presidencia Colombia, 2024; The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024).

Although public support for clean energy is growing (CELAG, 2024, 2025), it faces significant political and media opposition. Opponents have deployed discourses of climate delay, framing the pledge as a threat to energy security and economic stability, claims that various media outlets have failed to challenge or contextualize (Edwards, 2025).

Colombia’s economy remains deeply dependent on fossil fuels for exports, fiscal revenues, and foreign investment, exposing the country to volatile global markets and hampers the development of other sectors. Ambitious fossil fuel phase-out plans must be weighed against Colombia’s complex dependence on the sector. Recognising this complexity, the following sections explore Colombia's energy, fiscal, economic, and social ties to fossil fuels, highlighting both the challenges posed by this opposition and the opportunities for a just transition.

Energy dependency on fossil fuels

In 2023, nearly 70% of total final energy consumption came from fossil fuels – gasoline and diesel each represented 21%, 17% from fossil gas, and 6% from coal, and imports supplied a significant share of these fuels. While Colombia imports an average of 12% of its final energy consumption, nearly all imports are liquid fuels for transport. Despite having a relatively clean electricity mix, Colombia’s electrification rate was only 18% in 2023. Accelerating electrification remains a key strategy to reduce both fossil fuel and import dependency (UPME, 2024b).

Concerns over energy security and the potential impact on current and future fossil fuel reserves have become central arguments against Colombia’s energy transition.

• Regarding coal, Colombia’s energy security is not reliant on this resource. While Colombia is Latin America’s largest coal producer, its domestic use is limited. In 2023, 85% of coal production was exported. Only 6% of total energy needs were met by coal. Coal accounted for roughly 10% of power generation (UPME, 2024b).
• Regarding crude oil, despite being an exporter (63% of oil production was exported in 2023), Colombia imports significant volumes of refined oil products such as gasoline and diesel, exposing the country to external energy supply and price fluctuations. As for oil reserves, latest reports show proven oil reserves will last 7.2 years at current extraction rates, a trend consistent over the last five years. The government’s Just Energy Transition roadmap suggests that current reserves could meet domestic demand until the early 2030s if electrification and demand reduction policies are implemented (MinEnergía Colombia, 2025b).
  In Colombia, where around 70% of crude oil production has been exported over the past decade, a reduction in oil production due to halting new exploration licenses would primarily affect exports, not domestic supply. Colombia’s energy sovereignty is already compromised by its dependence on imported refined products for the transport sector. Therefore, expanding fossil fuel exploration infrastructure does not strengthen energy sovereignty and instead poses significant stranded asset risks.
• Regarding fossil gas, Colombia has recently become a net importer due to declining domestic production and increased thermal demand. In 2024, domestic gas met only 81% of total supply, down from 92% in 2023, with imports at record highs (UPME, 2024b, 2025a). Current proven reserves as of 2024 would last 5.9 years, continuing a declining trend since 2013 (ANH, 2025b). Developing existing offshore fields could extend supply up to 20 years, but this would require major infrastructure investments that risk becoming stranded assets if demand drops in line with national and global climate goals.
  Investing in new fossil fuel infrastructure is increasingly risky as global fossil fuel consumption declines and clean energy alternatives become more competitive. Such projects may become obsolete before their costs are recovered, locking in emissions and capital, and diverting resources from sustainable energy solutions. Colombia’s current energy security strategies (incl. improving extraction efficiency, resolving contingencies of existing reserves, and expanding import capacity) are based on outdated assumptions of stable or rising gas demand that conflicts with the structural changes of the ongoing energy transition. True energy sovereignty will depend less on expanding fossil fuel infrastructure and more on reducing demand.
  Reducing fossil gas use is critical and the options are within reach. In 2023, 35% of gas consumption went to thermal power plants. Expanding wind and solar generation, supported by Colombia’s abundant hydro resources, can significantly cut this dependency. Residential and commercial gas use (18% of demand in 2023) can be replaced with efficient electric alternatives for cooking and water heating. The industry sector (23% of total gas demand in 2023) also offers opportunities for electrification of low- to medium-temperature processes.

In sum, while halting new fossil fuel exploration is often framed as a threat to Colombia’s energy sovereignty, the reality varies by fuel and, overall, stopping exploration would not threaten energy security but may carry economic implications (addressed below). Coal is largely exported and poses little risk to domestic supply. For oil, sovereignty is already weakened by dependence on imported refined products. Fossil gas is the main challenge, as current policies assume rising demand and ongoing reliance on imports or new infrastructure. However, energy security in this sector can be strengthened with structural changes to reduce demand, electrifying end uses, and accelerating renewable energy deployment. In the long term, Colombia’s energy sovereignty will depend more on reducing fossil fuel reliance than on expanding its production.

Fiscal dependency on fossil fuels

Colombia’s economic model and fiscal space is highly dependent on revenues from coal, oil, and fossil gas extraction. This reliance has created structural vulnerabilities, especially as the global economy moves away from fossil fuels.

The country’s fiscal space is increasingly constrained, limiting its ability to finance development and climate action. A major obstacle is directly related to the international financial architecture, which rather than supporting countries in their climate efforts often penalises them. Tighter global financing conditions and credit ratings that do not account for climate action are further widening the gap between climate ambition and implementation.

As of 2024, Colombia’s external debt represented 48% of its GDP. In the first quarter of 2025, 60% of public sector debt repayments corresponded solely to interest payments. These high interest payments on foreign debt (approximately 4% of GDP) represent a major capital outflow and restrict public investment in development, social programmes, and the energy transition (Banco de la República Colombia, 2025; UNCTAD, 2025a).

This challenge is further exacerbated by sovereign credit ratings, which increase borrowing costs. In 2023, credit rating agencies such as S&P and Fitch responded negatively to Colombia’s decision to halt new oil and gas exploration contracts, an important part of its climate agenda, interpreting it as a fiscal risk. In early 2024, S&P changed Colombia’s outlook to negative, explicitly referencing the country’s energy transition as a contributing factor. These assessments increased Colombia’s cost of capital and discouraged further ambition (S&P Global Ratings, 2024).

To address this constraint, Colombia has explored alternative financing mechanisms, such as debt-for-nature swaps, which aim to free up resources for climate action without increasing debt burdens. However, the country turned down such proposals due to concerns that these instruments, while environmentally beneficial, might negatively impact its credit rating (Financial Post, 2025).

This reflects the tension between climate ambition and the design of current international financial systems, which often interpret such measures through a narrow lens of debt distress rather than environmental opportunity. Colombia has also joined a group of countries including Kenya, France, and Germany to advocate for reforms to the international financial architecture that would allow countries to advance climate goals without being penalised through higher borrowing costs, particularly for fossil fuel exporters (Financial Post, 2025; Mesa Puyo et al., 2024).

At the domestic level, fossil fuel revenues play a critical role in national fiscal performance. In 2022, income from fossil fuel production, commercialisation, and exports contributed 17% of national revenue. Ecopetrol, a majority state-owned oil company, accounted for 7% of government revenue in that year. By 2024, Ecopetrol’s contribution to government revenue declined to 4%, compared to a peak of 11% in 2013. The close correlation between global oil prices and hydrocarbon fiscal revenues illustrates the high volatility and exposure of public finances to fossil fuel price swings (Ecopetrol, 2024; GFLAC, 2023; Minhacienda Colombia, 2025).

Fossil fuel subsidies also significantly affect Colombia’s fiscal space. While fossil fuel extraction generates substantial revenue, it has also historically benefited from considerable tax advantages and direct subsidies, primarily to keep fuel prices low. These subsidies distort energy markets by encouraging overconsumption of fossil fuels and discouraging investment in cleaner technologies. According to the IMF, fossil fuel subsidies in Colombia reached approximately USD 29 billion in 2022 (about 7% of GDP), mostly directed to gasoline and diesel. Subsidies for coal and fossil gas were USD 2.9 billion (0.7% of GDP) and USD 2.2 billion (0.5% of GDP), respectively (Black et al., 2023).

The fiscal cost of these subsidies is considerable. In 2022 and 2023, global oil price increases, combined with fixed retail fuel prices in Colombia, pushed the annual fiscal burden of fuel subsidies to nearly USD 8 billion, or 2.5% of GDP. Efforts to reduce this burden, such as the government’s attempt to cut diesel subsidies in 2024, have met with strong resistance, including strikes by the heavy-duty transport sector. These dynamics underscore the political and economic complexity of reforming fossil fuel subsidies, even as they limit the resources available for essential investments in health, education, and climate mitigation (Fossil Fuel Subsidy Tracker, 2023).

Colombia’s fiscal dependency on fossil fuels, coupled with an unsupportive international financial system and the continued weight of fossil fuel subsidies, constrains the country's ability to accelerate a just and sustainable energy transition. Addressing these structural challenges is essential to closing the implementation gap between climate ambition and action.

Macroeconomic dependency on fossil fuels

Colombia’s macroeconomic stability is closely tied to its balance of payments, which is largely influenced by external financial flows, including trade balance, external debt service, and foreign direct investment (FDI). In turn, the performance of the balance of payments is highly dependent on fossil fuel exploration and production, making Colombia particularly vulnerable to external shocks. A decline in prices often leads to a worsening trade balance, reduced FDI inflows, and increased interest rates and downward pressure on GDP (Beltrán-Saavedra, 2015; Ocampo, 2016; UNCTAD, 2025b).

Fossil fuel extraction has historically been one of the most attractive sectors for foreign investment in Colombia. Between 2000 and 2022, the oil sector accounted for 22% of total FDI on average, followed by the mining and energy sectors (17% each). Overall, from 2001 to 2014, oil, coal, and gas projects together represented over 50% of total annual FDI inflows (MinEnergía Colombia, 2024b).

In recent years, this share has declined. In 2024, FDI in oil and gas and mining (including coal) amounted to USD 3 billion, or 31% of total FDI (oil industry contributed to 18% and mining to 13%). Although investment in renewable energy is increasing, with solar energy projects alone attracting nearly USD 1 billion in 2024 and Enel committing USD 2 billion over the next three years in Colombia, investments in renewables still need to substantially increase to match the scale of the fossil fuel sectors (Bloomberg, 2024, 2025; SER Colombia, 2025; UPME, 2024e).

Colombia is a net importer overall but a net exporter of some energy commodities, particularly coal, and crude oil. These products account for a significant share of the total exports of the country. In 2024, fossil fuels represented 45% of the country's total exports, down from 54% in 2022 and nearly two-thirds in 2013. Between 2009 and 2024, fossil fuel exports have contributed an average of 56% of Colombia’s total export revenues (DANE, 2025; MinEnergía Colombia, 2024b).

The vast majority of coal and oil produced in Colombia is exported. In 2023, 85% of coal and 63% of oil production were exported. Colombia is the world’s fifth-largest exporter of thermal coal, with major export destinations including Europe, Türkiye, Brazil, Chile, and Israel. However, as several of these countries advance decarbonisation agendas, the long-term viability of coal exports is uncertain. For instance, Chile aims to phase out 50% of its coal fleet by 2025 and 100% by 2040, 23 European countries have announced they will phase out coal by 2030 or shortly after, and the EU is implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). If only the EU, Chile, and Israel met their announced targets by 2030, Colombia could lose over 40% of its thermal coal export market (Beyond Fossil Fuels, 2025; IEA, 2024; Ministry of Energy Chile, 2020; UPME, 2024h).

The extractive sector has also contributed to Colombia’s GDP, averaging 5% over the last two decades. Hydrocarbons account for approximately 3.5% of GDP, and coal around 1%. In regions where extraction is concentrated, these contributions are much higher. In 2019, the coal sector represented 41% of GDP in Cesar and 39% in La Guajira, while oil contributed 47% in Meta and 45% in Casanare (MinEnergía Colombia, 2022c). However, their contribution to value-added growth has been limited, particularly in recent years as commodity prices have declined (MinEnergía Colombia, 2024b).

Royalties from fossil fuel extraction constitute a major revenue source for producing regions. Between 2012 and 2022, hydrocarbons generated 75% of royalty income, while mining – predominantly coal – contributed the remaining 25%. In 2023, royalties made up 55% of total income in Casanare, 46% in Cesar, and 44% in Meta. These funds support investments in public infrastructure, education, and health, underscoring the socioeconomic dependence of these regions on extractive activities.

Social dependency on fossil fuels

While fossil fuel exploration and production play a significant role in Colombia’s macroeconomic indicators, their contribution to national employment is relatively limited. The mining sector, including the extraction and production of hydrocarbons and coal, has historically accounted for around 1% of total employment in Colombia. In 2019, thermal coal mining and crude oil and gas extraction responsible for about 88,000 jobs (MinEnergía Colombia, 2024b).

However, the social dependency on fossil fuel activities is more pronounced in specific regions where these industries are concentrated. In departments such as La Guajira and Cesar, coal mining alone directly employed between 22,000 and 26,000 workers in 2023. The decline in fossil fuel production poses significant risks for these workers and their communities, underscoring the need for targeted support measures as part of the energy transition.

The Colombian government has begun addressing this challenge through initiatives such as the national strategy for green jobs and just transition, led by the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Environment. Among its goals is the promotion of local ownership of non-conventional renewable energy sources by former coal miners in La Guajira and Cesar, aiming to ensure that the benefits of the energy transition are locally anchored (Minambiente Colombia, 2022; MinEnergía Colombia, 2022a).

Additionally, Colombia’s transition toward climate neutrality and the development of new value chains, particularly around critical minerals and renewable energy, present opportunities to create alternative sources of employment. These sectors have the potential to deliver social and economic benefits while contributing to the country’s shift from a fossil-fuel-based economy to a low-carbon, diversified energy economy (IEA, 2023a).

Takeaways on fossil fuel dependency

Understanding Colombia’s structural dependency on fossil fuels is essential to grasp both the scale of the energy transition challenge and the importance of the political commitment in guiding it. As outlined above, Colombia’s economy model remains deeply rooted in the extraction and export of low value-added fossil fuels, often at significant fiscal, social, and environmental costs in the regions of production. This model leaves Colombia highly exposed to global commodity fluctuations and economic shocks.

Decarbonisation of the Colombian economy will require a gradual and managed restructuring of its productive system to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. The need for this transition is also driven by mounting climate transition risks. International markets for oil and coal are expected to contract sharply in the coming years, particularly as global climate policies align with the Paris Agreement. Colombia's position as an export-oriented fossil fuel producer makes it particularly vulnerable to these shifts. Projections suggest that failing to adapt could result in over USD 88 billion in economic output losses by 2050, equivalent to 27% of Colombia’s 2019 GDP (World Bank Group, 2023; WTW, 2023).

The risks go beyond export revenues. Pressures from international companies, evolving climate standards, and policy instruments such as CBAM are already reshaping global demand for carbon-intensive commodities. Producers will increasingly compete for shares in a shrinking market, and Colombia, with declining reserves and limited influence over global demand, faces growing risks of stranded assets and economic losses if new exploration projects proceed without a transition plan.

As evidenced above, the challenge is not one of energy security but of economic and fiscal dependency. A successful transition will require three key shifts: the accelerated deployment of renewable energy and electrification across all sectors; efficient management of existing reserves in the short term; and, crucially, economic and fiscal diversification toward productive activities that are not reliant on fossil fuels.

However, achieving this transformation is not possible without robust international support. Ambitious climate finance and a reformed international financial architecture aligned with global decarbonisation goals are indispensable. Without these, countries like Colombia will lack the tools and resources to implement climate-aligned transitions, remaining constrained by an outdated global system that fails to match the scale of the climate challenge.

The electricity sector in Colombia is among the cleanest in Latin America in terms of GHG emissions, making it a strategic enabler for accelerating decarbonisation in other sectors through the electrification of end uses. In 2021, it accounted for only 3% of the country’s total emissions, largely due to the predominance of hydropower in the generation mix (IDEAM, 2024). In 2024, renewable energy sources made up approximately 70% of total electricity generation, with hydropower alone contributing 65%. While wind and solar energy still represent a small portion of the mix, their contribution has grown rapidly, doubling from 2023 to reach 4% in 2024 (XM, 2024).

The sector’s heavy reliance on hydropower also makes it highly vulnerable to climate variability, particularly to El Niño events that bring prolonged droughts. In 2024, such events caused a sharp drop in reservoir levels, stressing the system. Reduced hydropower output leads to increased reliance on fossil gas and coal-fired plants, driving up electricity prices. As climate change is expected to increase the unpredictability, frequency and severity of such events, the system’s reliance on water availability poses growing challenges for supply reliability and price stability (Cai et al., 2023).

Thermal power generation has increased largely driven by a regulatory framework and market design aimed at ensuring supply reliability during droughts, at a time when thermal plants were the only viable backup to hydropower. As a result, its share in recent decades increased to account for about 30% of electricity mix in 2024.

Modernising regulation and market rules is essential now that wind and solar are available at scale, cost-competitive, and increasingly capable of supporting system reliability. Better integration of wind and solar with hydropower, leveraging their complementarity for flexibility and long-term storage, can strengthen energy security while advancing decarbonisation.

Colombia has accelerated installations of renewables other than hydropower. By the end of 2024, Colombia had nearly 2 GW of installed solar capacity, four times more than the year before and equivalent to 9% of total installed capacity. These numbers are expected to increase: by the end of 2024, 5 GW of solar and 1.6 GW of onshore wind were under construction. Over 300 solar projects (13.5 GW) and 21 wind projects (2.8 GW) have been approved, with expected start of operations between 2025 and 2033 (UPME, 2024f, 2024g, 2025b).

Colombia is an attractive market for renewable energy investment, ranking fourth in Latin America in 2024 according to Bloomberg (Climatescope, 2024; Mitri et al., 2023). The Colombian Renewable Energy Association (SER) reports that while USD 2.2 billion had been invested in 66 projects in 2024, only about half of the planned capacity was operational by the end of the year (SER Colombia, 2024a).

The progress made in recent years, combined with the economic attractiveness and strong pipeline, confirms that non-conventional renewables are already a reality and are set play a key role in Colombia’s power sector.

Renewable energy policies

The country’s main instruments for guiding electricity sector expansion are auctions, particularly through the Reliability Charge auction. Introduced in 2006, this mechanism ensures long-term supply by compensating generators that provide firm energy during hydropower shortages. Historically, this approach favoured thermal generation, but wind and solar are now eligible to participate (Resolution 101-6, 2023; Resolution 101-007, 2023). In the most recent auction for the 2027–2028 period, 33 new generation plants were awarded, adding 4,489 MW to the system, almost in its totality from solar projects (99%) (CREG, 2024).

In parallel, Colombia has held three long-term renewable energy auctions directed exclusively to non-conventional renewable energy projects by granting 15- to 20-year power purchase agreements (PPAs). While the first auction in 2019 was unsuccessful due to a lack of competition, the second awarded around 1.3 GW (17% solar and 83% wind, in energy terms) and the third allocated contracts to 11 solar projects (with total capacity of 796 MW) (IRENA & USAID, 2021). However, as of 2024, none of the awarded projects have begun operating, largely due to permitting delays, social and environmental conflicts, and transmission constraints.

Colombia is also taking early steps to develop offshore wind energy. The Ministry of Mines and Energy and the National Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH) have launched the country’s first offshore wind round, in which 69 developers expressed interest (ANH, 2024a, 2025a, 2025c; Resolution 40179, 2025). The government’s offshore wind roadmap outlines two scenarios: a case with limited state support, reaching only 200 MW by 2030, 500 MW by 2040, and 1.5 GW by 2050; and an ambitious scenario aligned with national renewable energy targets, aiming for 1 GW by 2030, 3 GW by 2040, and 9 GW by 2050 (The Renewables Consulting Group, 2022).

At the local level, the government has embraced energy communities as a central pillar of its decentralisation and energy democratisation strategy. The National Development Plan 2022–2026 aims to create 20,000 energy communities by 2026, prioritising small and medium-scale renewable energy projects. Energy communities could play a key role in off-grid zones where renewable options can displace diesel, which is their primary energy source.

The government has launched 23 "Energy Peace Communities" in 11 departments, targeting regions historically affected by conflict. These initiatives seek to expand energy access, reduce poverty, and support peacebuilding through local renewable energy development (ANH, 2024b; DNP Colombia, 2023; MinEnergía Colombia, 2024d; Vega-Araújo et al., 2025).

Moreover, the abovementioned policies are supported by a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework to promote investments on non-conventional renewable energy. Key legislative instruments (Decree 895, 2022; Law 1715, 2014; Law 2099, 2021) provide fiscal incentives such as a 50% income tax deduction, accelerated depreciation of renewable energy assets, exemptions from VAT on imports and purchases of related equipment, and customs duty exemptions.

Barriers

Despite supportive policy mechanisms, economic attractiveness of renewables, and recent advances in solar installations, the large-scale deployment of non-conventional renewable energy in Colombia still face significant challenges that hinder implementation at its full potential.

One of the main barriers lies in the delays and difficulties experienced by wind energy projects, particularly in La Guajira, a region with some of the world’s best wind speeds but also high levels of social inequality and energy poverty. Developers have faced cost overruns and lengthy environmental and social licensing processes, leading several companies to withdraw wind projects in 2024. As of mid-2025, only two wind farms are operational, seven are stalled in the licensing phase and another seven have been cancelled (Celsia, 2024; EDP, 2024; La Silla Vacía, 2023).

Delays often stem from inadequate consultation processes with local communities, particularly the Wayúu Indigenous population in La Guajira. Although Colombian law mandates prior consultation to ensure informed consent from Indigenous peoples before project implementation, these processes are frequently underfunded, poorly coordinated, or initiated too late; creating mistrust, resistance, and legal uncertainty. Local communities are not opposed to renewables but demand adequate consultation, capacity building, and fair benefit-sharing (Vega-Araújo et al., 2024).

Transmission infrastructure is also a key bottleneck. The Colectora transmission line aims to connect 2.3 GW of renewable energy capacity from La Guajira to the national grid. After years of delays, construction began in September 2024, following more than 235 prior consultations and formal agreements reached with the Wayúu communities. Once completed, this line is expected to unlock substantial new capacity for renewable generation, but its setbacks have already limited the pace of deployment.

In this context, the recent acquisition by Ecopetrol of the Windpeshi wind project, originally suspended by Enel, is a significant move (Ecopetrol, 2025). As a majority state-owned oil and gas company, Ecopetrol has the institutional weight and legitimacy to coordinate national, regional, and local stakeholders, potentially improving engagement with Indigenous communities and demonstrating a state-led model for advancing the energy transition in sensitive social contexts.

Phase-out of fossil fuel plants

In 2023, Colombia joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) and the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA), committing to halt the construction of new unabated coal and gas-fired power plants and signalling its commitment to moving away from fossil fuels in the power sector (Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, 2023; Powering Past Coal Alliance, 2023).

Although no explicit coal or fossil gas phase-out date has been set for Colombia, the latest national Indicative Generation Expansion Plan does not foresee any new coal capacity in any scenario and, for the first time, includes a Just Energy Transition (JET) pathway with a gradual coal exit. The government’s JET Roadmap foresees a full phase-out of coal in power generation by 2036, when the last firm energy obligations for coal plants expire (MinEnergía Colombia, 2025b; UPME, 2024g).

Beyond political will, the gradual phase-out of coal in all scenarios and indicative plans is primarily driven by market forces, as non-conventional renewables increasingly outcompete coal on cost and efficiency. Non-conventional renewable energy technologies (mainly solar PV) are increasingly displacing old coal plants. This shift is driven by lower investment and generation costs of renewables, which allow them to offer more competitive prices in long-term contracts and even in the wholesale electricity market (BID, 2019).

The competitiveness of coal-fired power plants is also particularly vulnerable to price volatility in global markets. In 2022, international coal prices surged to over USD 360 per tonne during the global energy crisis. When global prices are high, domestic production tends to be redirected to exports, driving up domestic coal prices and, consequently, the cost of coal-fired power generation. These economic pressures to coal-fired power generation will intensify with the gradual implementation of the carbon tax (Law 2722 of 2022), which will reach 50% of its full rate in 2026, 75% in 2027, and 100% from 2028 onwards.

In this context, a coal phase-out would not only reduce emissions but also shield the sector from volatile and high energy prices. The coal phase-out is already within reach, as the non-conventional renewable projects already registered in the pipeline with guarantees could meet future demand growth and make up for the energy deficit from retiring coal-fired plants (Transforma, 2024).

Preparing for the closure of coal-fired plants, whether driven by technological obsolescence, market forces, or the large-scale entry of renewables, will be critical. A proactive Just Energy Transition Plan will be essential to manage the impacts on workers and local economies, ensuring that the coal phase-out contributes to both climate objectives and a socially fair transition.

Transport is a significant contributor to Colombia’s GHG emissions. In 2021, the sector was responsible for 42.17 MtCO₂e, accounting for 15% of total emissions. Road transport alone is responsible for 84% of emissions in the sector, with heavy-duty vehicles contributing roughly half of those emissions (IDEAM, 2024).

The mitigation measures proposed in Colombia’s NDC for the transport sector are insufficient (mitigation potential of 6.7 MtCO₂e by 2030) in proportion to the sector's contribution (Gobierno de Colombia, 2020b).

To date, Colombia has not set a phase-out date for internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. Despite the lack of ambitious policies to reduce emissions in the sector, the recent growth in sales of electric vehicles (EVs) indicates a positive momentum towards decarbonisation.

In 2024, nearly 10,000 EVs were sold nationwide, a 150% increase over the previous year and a new record for Colombia’s market. EVs represented 5.9% of total vehicle sales in that year. In April 2025 alone, over 5,500 low-emission vehicles were registered, accounting for 38% of market share in the month. These developments have positioned Colombia as an emerging leader in transport electrification in Latin America (Fadhil & Shen, 2025; Fenalco, 2024; Portafolio, 2025b, 2025a).

In 2023, 95% of energy use in the transport sector came from gasoline and diesel. Beyond emissions reduction, phasing out fossil fuels in the transport sector through electrification has broader benefits for public health, energy security, and social stability:

• Public health: combustion of fossil fuels remains the leading source of air pollution in Colombia’s major cities, contributing to significant health impacts (Gobierno de Colombia, 2019b).
• Social and economic stability: rising fuel prices have direct social and economic consequences. In 2024, heavy-duty transport workers held widespread protests in response to a government restructuring of diesel subsidies, which had kept prices artificially low since January 2020. The subsidy, while helping to control domestic fuel prices, created a large fiscal burden via the Fuel Price Stabilisation Fund (FEPC), limiting public resources for other priorities (Universidad Javeriana, 2024).
• Energy security: around 30% of Colombia’s liquid fuel consumption, most of it for the transport sector, relied on imports over the past decade. Transport sector decarbonisation plays a key role in reducing external dependency and shielding the economy from international price volatility.

Colombia has taken several regulatory and policy steps to promote decarbonisation in the transport sector, with a focus on electric mobility. The 2019 Electric Vehicle Law (Ley 1964 de 2019) was the first national EV policy, providing a suite of incentives such as tax exemptions, preferential parking, and circulation benefits for EVs. It established mandates that include 10% of urban bus sales being ZEVs by 2025 and 100% by 2035. It also required that 30% of the government fleet be electric by 2030. The Law mandates a minimum number of EV fast-charging stations (5 in special category cities and 20 in the capital). Complementing this, Law 1972 of 2019 requires 20% of new public transport fleets to use zero-emission technologies from 2030 (ICCT, 2021; Law 1964, 2019; Resolution 40362, 2021).

The national electric mobility strategy, developed under the previous administration, establishes a goal of deploying 600,000 EVs across all vehicle types by 2030. The strategy includes actions to support regulation, market mechanisms, and infrastructure, as well as retrofitting freight vehicles with cleaner technologies (Gobierno de Colombia, 2019b).

With over 20,000 EVs sold as of 2024, Colombia would need to sustain at least 75% annual growth in EV sales between 2025-2030 to meet this target. In 2024, Colombia joined the international ZEV Declaration, committing to work towards 100% zero-emission new cars and vans sales by 2040, becoming the third Latin American country to do soClick or tap here to enter text. (ICCT, 2024).

Additional policy efforts include the air quality policy (CONPES 3943/2018), which promotes low-emission vehicles through labelling and incentives, and the hydrogen roadmap, which envisions 1,500–2,000 light-duty and 1,000–1,500 heavy-duty hydrogen fuel cell vehicles by 2030 (MinEnergía Colombia, 2022b). The National Energy Planning Unit (UPME) defined energy efficiency and labelling standards for heavy-duty vehicles and motorcycles (UPME, 2024c, 2024d).

According to the JET roadmap, full implementation of existing policies would lead to a peak in fossil fuel consumption in the transport sector between 2030 and 2035 (MinEnergía Colombia, 2025b).

To effectively reduce emissions from the transport sector, Colombia will need to adopt structural solutions:

• Accelerate electrification, for LDV and HDV. Hydrogen alternatives for heavy-duty transport should also be explored.
• Stricter fuel economy standards could yield significant mitigation benefits. For instance, aligning with Chile’s 2017 standard of 5.32 lge/100 km could help Colombia avoid 2 MtCO₂eq by 2030 – currently, the average consumption for LDV is 7,06 lge/100 km (Transforma, 2024).
• Strengthen public transportation and encourage a modal shift to rail, especially for freight transport.

The industry sector accounted for 9% of Colombia’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2021, with 4.8% (13.54 MtCO₂e) from fuel combustion for energy use and 4.2% (11.72 MtCO₂e) from industrial processes and product use (IDEAM, 2024).

The industry sector is a significant energy consumer, representing 23% of national consumption in 2023, and remains highly dependent on fossil fuels (57%). Colombia’s updated NDC includes mitigation measures targeted for this sector, with a total potential to reduce 8.9 MtCO₂e by 2030 (Gobierno de Colombia, 2020b).

The Indicative Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (PAI PROURE) 2022–2030 outlines ambitious targets, focusing on improving heat processes, which account for 88% of industrial energy consumption, with potential efficiency gains of up to 20% in boilers and furnaces (IEA, 2023a). In the cement sector, Colombia aims to reduce emissions intensity by 7.5% by 2030, primarily through energy efficiency measures and increased co-processing of waste, with the potential to reduce emissions by 4.04 MtCO₂e. Similar measures in brick production could contribute an additional 0.83 MtCO₂e in mitigation (Transforma, 2024). The CAT indicates that to be compatible with the 1.5°C limit, cement production needs to reduce its emissions intensity to zero by 2050 (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).

The 2022–2026 National Development Plan (PND) includes industrial energy efficiency actions and a reindustrialisation policy aimed at strengthening productive sectors and adapting technologies for the energy transition. Under the Just Energy Transition (JET) roadmap, the government envisions a secure and gradual shift in industrial practices, with a complete phase-out of coal due to increasing costs from the carbon tax (DNP Colombia, 2023; MinEnergía Colombia, 2025b).

To effectively reduce emissions from the industry sector, Colombia will need to adopt structural solutions:

• Energy efficiency (EE) improvements, particularly in cement, construction, and iron and steelmaking. EE measures can be encouraged through tax incentives, energy audits, and process optimisation.
• Fuel substitution: replace coal with biomass (such as bagasse, palm kernel shells, and coffee husks) in sectors like food, beverages, non-metallic minerals, chemicals, and steel. This transition is particularly viable in regions near biomass sources, with some scenarios projecting coal’s share in industrial energy use falling by 10% from 2025 and phasing out completely by 2030 or 2040 (UPME, 2024a).
• Electrification of industrial processes is gaining traction, particularly for low-temperature heat applications, where electricity increasingly replaces coal and liquid fuels in energy demand projections and scenarios (UPME, 2024a).

The industry sector accounted for 9% of Colombia’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2021, with 4.8% (13.54 MtCO₂e) from fuel combustion for energy use and 4.2% (11.72 MtCO₂e) from industrial processes and product use (IDEAM, 2024).

The industry sector is a significant energy consumer, representing 23% of national consumption in 2023, and remains highly dependent on fossil fuels (57%). Colombia’s updated NDC includes mitigation measures targeted for this sector, with a total potential to reduce 8.9 MtCO₂e by 2030 (Gobierno de Colombia, 2020b).

The Indicative Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (PAI PROURE) 2022–2030 outlines ambitious targets, focusing on improving heat processes, which account for 88% of industrial energy consumption, with potential efficiency gains of up to 20% in boilers and furnaces (IEA, 2023a). In the cement sector, Colombia aims to reduce emissions intensity by 7.5% by 2030, primarily through energy efficiency measures and increased co-processing of waste, with the potential to reduce emissions by 4.04 MtCO₂e. Similar measures in brick production could contribute an additional 0.83 MtCO₂e in mitigation (Transforma, 2024). The CAT indicates that to be compatible with the 1.5°C limit, cement production needs to reduce its emissions intensity to zero by 2050 (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).

The 2022–2026 National Development Plan (PND) includes industrial energy efficiency actions and a reindustrialisation policy aimed at strengthening productive sectors and adapting technologies for the energy transition. Under the Just Energy Transition (JET) roadmap, the government envisions a secure and gradual shift in industrial practices, with a complete phase-out of coal due to increasing costs from the carbon tax (DNP Colombia, 2023; MinEnergía Colombia, 2025b).

To effectively reduce emissions from the industry sector, Colombia will need to adopt structural solutions:

• Energy efficiency (EE) improvements, particularly in cement, construction, and iron and steelmaking. EE measures can be encouraged through tax incentives, energy audits, and process optimisation.
• Fuel substitution: replace coal with biomass (such as bagasse, palm kernel shells, and coffee husks) in sectors like food, beverages, non-metallic minerals, chemicals, and steel. This transition is particularly viable in regions near biomass sources, with some scenarios projecting coal’s share in industrial energy use falling by 10% from 2025 and phasing out completely by 2030 or 2040 (UPME, 2024a).
• Electrification of industrial processes is gaining traction, particularly for low-temperature heat applications, where electricity increasingly replaces coal and liquid fuels in energy demand projections and scenarios (UPME, 2024a).

In 2021, the buildings sector in Colombia accounted for 3.2% of total GHG emissions (IDEAM, 2024). In 2023, it represented 24% of national energy demand, 77% of it corresponds to the residential segment and the remaining 23% to commercial and public buildings (UPME, 2024b).

Colombia has advanced a suite of policies and measures aimed at reducing emissions and energy use in buildings. The National Policy on Sustainable Buildings (CONPES 3919) is a key instrument aimed at promoting sustainability within the construction sector throughout the entire life cycle of buildings through financial incentives and monitoring instruments. Its implementation horison was initially set until 2025. By the first quarter of 2023, it had achieved 80.1% progress in its execution (MinEnergía Colombia, 2024b).

Complementing this, the 2022 Roadmap for Net Zero Carbon Buildings outlines a pathway to achieve net zero emissions in new buildings by 2030 and in all buildings by 2050, setting specific targets for construction, renovation, and urban development practices. The CAT indicates that to be compatible with the 1.5°C limit, all new buildings constructed should be Zero Emissions Buildings (ZEBs) by 2025.

Colombia's decarbonisation efforts in the residential sector focus on three pillars: renewable energy adoption, energy efficiency, and electrification.

• Renewable adoption: new laws and rules (like Law 1715 of 2014 and Resolution CREG 174/2021) have made it easier for people and businesses to install solar PV panels on their rooftops for self-generation. There are also tax breaks and lower import costs for solar equipment (Resolution 174, 2021). By August 2024, almost 9,000 small solar projects were installed, totalling 187 MW (SER Colombia, 2024b)
• Energy efficiency: the government has set clear targets to help residential and service buildings use less energy by 2030, aiming for big energy savings. This is stated in the Indicative Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (PAI PROURE).
• Electrification measures encourage families to stop using gas, LPG and firewood for cooking and water heating. The National Energy Plan (PEN) 2022–2052 and the 2022–2026 National Development Plan promote switching to cleaner alternatives such as electricity, solar, and biogas, especially in rural and urban areas

Together, these initiatives contribute to decarbonising the residential sector while addressing energy access, air quality, and social equity.

The agricultural sector in Colombia plays a significant role in the country's economy and emissions. Agriculture accounted for 21% of Colombian emissions in 2021, with cattle alone representing about two thirds of the emissions in the sector (IDEAM, 2024).

The NDC relies on the largest emissions reductions to come from the agriculture and forestry sector (AFOLU), which is currently the biggest source of emission, with a total potential to reduce 11.3 MtCO₂e in agriculture by 2030. The main mitigation measures planned for Colombia's agriculture sector include intensifying livestock production to free up 69,000 hectares for land restoration and scaling up investments in agroforestry and silvopastoral systems for cocoa and coffee cultivation. These systems aim to increase forest cover while enhancing farmers’ economic returns. By 2030, the goal is to transition 150,000 hectares of cocoa and 936,500 hectares of coffee to agroforestry systems, alongside expanding the area under sustainable rice production (Gobierno de Colombia, 2020b).

While ambitious on paper, current policies in the sector fall short to deliver effective strategies for sustainable land use and deforestation control. This gap stems from a combination of institutional fragmentation, weak coordination, vested economic interests, inadequate territorial planning, chronic underfunding of environmental institutions, and misaligned governance between central and local levels.

These structural barriers are compounded by direct pressures such as livestock expansion, which accounts for 14.8% of emissions and occupies 91% of agricultural land, weak law enforcement, and unresolved land tenure issues, with 60% of rural land lacking formal property titles. Together, these challenges expose the persistent gap between ambition and implementation, driving continued expansion of the agricultural frontier (Lobos & Cardenas, 2024).

Agriculture is a vital sector for Colombia, contributing to 7% of the GDP and employing 17% of the labour force, 60% in rural areas (Portafolio, 2020; World Bank Group, 2023). Yet, over 15 million people face food insecurity and malnutrition, which may be exacerbated by the impacts of climate change on agricultural productivity (WFP, 2023; World Bank Group, 2023). Key export crops such as coffee and cocoa are particularly vulnerable to climate change. Coffee cultivations are already shifting to higher elevation areas due to rising temperatures and declining rainfall (Wight, 2021).

To build a resilient, productive, and low-carbon agricultural sector, Colombia should focus on four key areas of action:

• Strengthen land governance and deforestation control: ensure more effective enforcement to curb deforestation and land grabbing. Improve alignment of policies across ministries and local levels of government to prevent agricultural expansion into ecosystems and define areas for conservation.
• Promote climate-smart and sustainable agriculture: encourage sustainable practices such as soil conservation, crop diversification, and silvopastoral systems to improve resilience, particularly in livestock production. Redirect public support toward research, rural extension, and financing for climate-smart agriculture to strengthen innovation systems to develop and scale technologies that boost productivity, resource efficiency, and ecosystem protection. Expand access to credits and innovate in financial and investment instruments to increase labour and agricultural intensification.
• Enhance adaptation capacity and information: develop robust climate risk analyses for agriculture and implement early warning systems for droughts and floods. Build farmer awareness and provide training on sustainable practices and resilience measures.
• Improve policy and regulatory frameworks: set clear targets and strategies for agricultural decarbonisation, supported by incentives and regulations. Align agricultural policies with national climate goals and territorial planning. Establish comprehensive programs to meet NDC targets with financing frameworks to enable implementation.

Land use and deforestation is the single largest contributor to Colombia’s GHG emissions, representing more than 34% of the country’s total emissions in 2021. The agriculture, forestry and land use (AFOLU) sector combined account for 55% of Colombia’s emissions (IDEAM, 2024).

Colombia's NDC places a significant responsibility on the LULUCF sector, accounting for 59% of the total mitigation potential proposed to meet its NDC (Gobierno de Colombia, 2020b). This exposes an uneven distribution of burdens at the sectoral level between the mitigation measures in each sector and their responsibility for reducing emissions. Overburdening the LULUCF sector with greater responsibility for mitigation efforts could not only slow down decarbonisation in other sectors, but also risks relying on a sector that already faces many challenges beyond climate action (like the high concentration of land tenure, socio-environmental conflicts, and internal conflict), which make it difficult to comply with emission reduction commitments.

The full implementation of government’s plans in its NDC to stop deforestation and land conversion, and encourage restoration could turn the LULUCF sector from net source into net sink. Protecting forests, developing agricultural land, afforestation and ecological restoration are intended to develop an absorption capacity for the country of potentially up to 508 MtCO2e per year (IEA, 2023a). However, Colombia should avoid relying too much on LULUCF sinks to achieve its NDC target, given the high volatility and chance of carbon being released back into the atmosphere through deforestation or natural disturbance and eventual competition for land.

In its latest NDC submission, Colombia sets a deforestation target between 37,500–50,000 hectares per year in 2035, representing no additional commitment from the 2030 NDC goal of 50,000 hectares per year (Gobierno de Colombia, 2025b).

The credibility of Colombia’s NDC deforestation goal is undermined by its contradiction with the 2022–2026 National Development Plan. While the NDC relies heavily on reducing deforestation to meet its mitigation objectives, the National Development Plan sets a deforestation goal 39% weaker than the NDC’s 2025 milestone, raising questions about its feasibility and policy articulation (World Bank Group, 2023).

In 2023, deforestation was at 79,000 hectares, a 36% decrease from 123,000 hectares in 2022. Although the 2023 figure was the lowest recorded in 23 years, this trend reversed in 2024, with 113,600 hectares deforested: a 43% increase compared to 2023. The Amazon region concentrated 65% of the deforestation in 2024 (Minambiente Colombia, 2025a). The progress of peace negotiations between the government and armed groups in the area, together with economic incentives for farmers in the Amazon to contribute to conservation, reversed the upward trend in deforestation in 2022. However, deforestation increased in 2024 amid stalled negotiations with armed groups and exacerbated by drought conditions caused by the severe El Niño weather phenomenon (El País, 2025).

The increase in livestock and agriculture is responsible for 90% of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon. Forests are converted into pastures and crops to feed the growing demand for meat and soy. The lack of government control and sanctions, and the presence of illegal armed groups are also contributing factors to deforestation. More effective measures are needed to combat this problem that includes implementing policies that discourage the expansion of livestock and agriculture in forested areas (Murillo-Sandoval et al., 2023).

In August 2023, Colombia joined several South American countries in an alliance to protect the Amazon. Members signed a joint declaration laying out a roadmap to promote sustainable development, end deforestation and fight the organised crime that fuels it. Colombia also signed the Glasgow Leaders Declaration on Forest and Land Use at COP26 in 2022, as well as declaring 30% of its territory as protected areas (Infobae, 2023).

In 2022, Petro announced that Colombia would set aside USD 200 million a year over the next two decades to protect the Amazon. Petro also called on rich nations to cancel foreign debt in exchange for conserving areas including the Amazon.

In 2021, the waste sector accounted for 22 MtCO2e of emissions, around 8% of total emissions (IDEAM, 2024) . Colombia’s updated NDC includes mitigation measures targeted for this sector, with a total potential to reduce 20.7 MtCO₂e by 2030, 14% of all the mitigation potential proposed to meet its NDC (Gobierno de Colombia, 2020b).

The National Strategy for the Circular Economy (ENEC) from 2019 aims to create a new model of economic development in the country that includes recovering resources, optimising efficiency in the production and consumption of materials, the correct use of resources such as water and energy, reducing the carbon footprint, increasing the benefits for new business models, the promotion of industrial symbiosis, and the consolidation of sustainable cities (Gobierno de Colombia, 2019a).

Other measures in the waste sector, include increased capture and use of biogas for energy from waste streams. The efficient use of biogas from waste streams contributes to the increasing use of non-hydro renewables in Colombia and can be a particularly efficient source of renewable energy for Colombia’s dense urban areas. Colombia also launched a circular economy initiative for wastewater treatment plants to capture and valorise methane, a joint effort by the Water and Basic Sanitation Regulation Commission (CRA) and the Ministry of Energy (CEPAL, 2025). Full implementation of these measures will also contribute to Colombia fulfilling the Global Methane Pledge Colombia made at COP26.

In 2021, methane accounted for around 41% of the country’s emissions (excl. LULUCF), predominantly from agriculture (64%). Methane emissions have been rising roughly between 1%-5% annually since 1990, although it stabilised in 75 MtCO2 between 2018-2021, the last year reported in the inventory (IDEAM, 2024). Colombia’s NDC update includes a number of mitigation measures aimed at reducing methane emissions in the energy, waste and agricultural sectors.

The energy sector accounts for 11% of Colombia’s total methane emissions, primarily from oil and gas exploration and production. Between 2019 and 2023, the sector reduced methane emissions by more than 16% and has committed to a 51% reduction from 2019 levels by 2030 (Argus, 2024)

In 2022, the government finalised its flaring and fugitive methane emission regulations, which aim to reduce fugitive emissions from upstream oil and gas activities at a national level, making it the first South American nation to regulate methane emissions from oil and gas showing its full commitment to the Global Methane pledge it signed at COP26 (MinEnergía Colombia, 2022d; Miranda-González & Banks, 2022).

Colombia’s largest oil and gas producer, Ecopetrol, has joined the Aiming for Zero Methane Initiative, led by the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI), which seeks to reduce methane emissions in the sector to near zero. Ecopetrol is the second company in Latin America to pledge to do everything possible to achieve near zero methane emissions from its operated oil and gas assets by 2030 (OGCI, 2023).