Japan

With the latest NDC submitted on 22 October 2021, Japan aims to achieve a 46% (50% as aspirational target) emissions reduction including LULUCF by 2030 below 2013 levels. The CAT rates this target as “Insufficient” when compared to required domestic efforts, and “insufficient” when compared to Japan’s fair share.

Japan has not updated its NDC since the major update submitted in October 2021.In this NDC update, Japan strengthened its target to a 46% (42% excluding LULUCF) reduction in 2030 below 2013 levels from the previous 26% target. This would lead to absolute emissions of 813 MtCO₂e/year, compared to 1079 MtCO₂e/year with the previous target (sum of sector- and gas-level targets), both excluding LULUCF (Government of Japan, 2021b). The government planned to investigate additional measures that could lead to a 50% reduction.

* Before September 2021, all CAT ratings were based exclusively on fair share and only assessed a country’s target

Target development timeline & previous CAT analysis

• 21.11.2019 “Japan’s reluctance to update its NDC - media reports”
• 30.03.2020 “Japan’s updated NDC fails to increase action, undermines Paris Agreement”
• 01.09.2020 “Japan’s revised NDC expected in 2021 will be a test for the nation’s seriousness on its 2050 net zero goal and its consistency with the Paris Agreement”
• 03.2021 “Japan’s Paris Agreement target should be more than 60% by 2030 – analysis”
• 22.04.2021 “Japan's new target a significant step, but more needed”
• 22.10.2021 “Japan submitted a stronger NDC target”

The CAT rates NDC targets against each country’s fair share contribution to global climate change mitigation, considering a range of equity principles including responsibility, capability, and equality. The CAT also rates NDC targets against indicative national emissions from global least-cost emissions pathways (called modelled domestic pathways). For assessing targets against the fair share, we consider both a country’s domestic emission reductions and any emissions it supports abroad through the use of market mechanisms or other ways of support, as relevant.

Japan has indicated that it may use market mechanisms to achieve its target but has not provided sufficient details on the extent of such usage. In the absence of the clarity on the extent of usage, we have rated its NDC target against both global domestic pathways and fairness metrics.

The CAT rates the proposed 2030 reduction target of 46% (42% excluding LULUCF credits) below 2013 levels as “Insufficient” when compared to modelled domestic emissions pathways. This rating indicates that Japan’s target in 2030 needs substantial improvements to be consistent with modelled domestic pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C. If all countries were to follow Japan’s approach, warming would reach over 2°C and up to 3°C.

The CAT rates Japan’s 2030 reduction target of 46% (42% excluding LULUCF credits) below 2013 levels as “Insufficient” when compared with its fair-share emissions allocation. This rating indicates that Japan’s NDC target in 2030 needs substantial improvement to be consistent with its fair share of the global mitigation effort to limit warming to 1.5°C .

Some of these improvements should be made to the domestic emissions reductions target itself, others could come in the form of additional financial support for emissions reduction in developing countries. Japan’s target is not consistent with the 1.5°C limit unless other countries make much deeper reductions and comparably greater effort. If all countries were to follow Japan’s approach, warming would reach up to 3°C.

Further information on how the CAT rates countries (against modelled domestic pathways and fair share) can be found here.

The CAT rates Japan’s international public climate finance contributions as “Highly insufficient”. Japan remains committed to providing climate finance in the period post-2020 but contributions to date have been very low compared to its fair share. To improve its rating Japan needs to further accelerate commitments to increase climate finance and stop funding fossil fuel overseas.

Japan reports significant levels of climate finance, but only a small share takes the form of grants or has climate as a primary objective (OECD, 2022). Japan also counts 50% of broader development projects as climate finance–- even though they are explicitly defined as not primarily targeting climate action (Carty & Kowalzig, 2022). The CAT accounted for these factors and the resulting finance considered in this rating is considerably lower than originally reported by the government.

Japan has contributed to the achievement of the USD 100bn goal yearly until 2020 and commits ‘to maintain the same level of amount beyond 2020’. However, it is important to note that the USD 100bn goal itself is insufficient post-2020. A clear and sustained increase in international climate mitigation finance is thus fundamental in the post-2020 period. In this sense, it is positive that Prime Minister Kishida committed at COP26 to add USD 10bn for climate finance in general and USD 14.8bn for climate adaptation in particular (Reynolds, 2021). But more support is necessary.

Japan is still investing in international fossil fuel projects but is gradually moving away from this. At the G7 summit in 2021 and 2022, Japan joined the commitment to end new public finance of unabated coal power by the end of 2021, and of other fossil projects by the end of 2022 (G7, 2021, 2022). While Japan accordingly cancelled its involvement in the coal power projects in Indonesia and Bangladesh (Nikkei Asia, 2022b), the country is still one of the largest investors in fossil fuels abroad including its support for international oil and gas upstream developments (Christoph Bals, 2022; Kumagai, 2022).

In March 2023, Japan officially launched the Asia Zero Emissions Community (AZEC) initiative, a cooperation framework to help Asian countries ensure energy security while striving towards decarbonisation (METI, 2023b).

Under the initiative, Japan will support countries in drawing up roadmaps for energy transitions and help them develop and implement “decarbonisation technologies”. However, these seem to also include carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) technologies and hydrogen & ammonia co-firing, as ways to curb emissions in coal-fired power plants and gas-fired turbines/boilers (METI, 2023g). While these technologies have a role to play in the transition to net zero, they should only be used in hard-to-abate sectors, certainly not in the power sector, and particularly not as tools designed to curb emissions in coal-fired power plants.

Through the AZEC initiative, Japan is also pushing for further development of LNG infrastructure in the region, as the government seeks to position fossil gas as a transitional fuel (METI, 2023a). However, such investment would further contribute to locking-in carbon-intensive developments: fossil gas needs to be phased out, globally, by only a few years after coal, to keep warming to 1.5˚C.

Further information on the CAT climate finance ratings can be found here.

We evaluate Japan’s net zero target as: “Poor”

Japan’s 2050 net-zero target was published in October 2020, which was subsequently integrated into the amended Promotion Act of Global Warming Countermeasures in 2021 (Government of Japan, 2021a). The Green Growth Strategy was accordingly revised in June 2021 to provide further information on sector-level roadmaps towards net zero, which was reflected on Japan’s updated Long Term Strategy submitted before COP26 (Government of Japan, 2021c).

However, these documents still lack several details on key elements that ensure effectiveness and transparency of net zero targets and have room for further improvement. For this reason, the CAT rates Japan’s net zero target as “Poor”.

For our full Japan net zero analysis click here.