Peru

Peru’s current policies are “Almost sufficient” when compared to their fair-share contribution. The “Almost sufficient” rating indicates that Peru’s climate policies and action in 2030 are not yet consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C but could be, with moderate improvements. If all countries were to follow Peru’s approach, warming could be held at – but not well below – 2°C. However, compared to modelled domestic pathways, Peru’s current policies would be rated as "Highly insufficient."

Peru’s progress in advancing climate policy has been worryingly slow. Following a period of political and social turmoil in late 2022 which featured nationwide protests and ended in the impeachment of President Pedro Castillo, President Dina Boluarte took office in December 2022 (Roy, 2022). President Boluarte’s term has been marked by conflict with an increasingly powerful legislature and scandal, adding to the feeling of political instability in the country and slowing down policy development overall (Haczek, 2025).

Our analysis shows that Peru could reach its unconditional NDC target under current policies, without the need for additional, more ambitious policies, which represents a missed opportunity for Peru to enact ambitious emissions reductions in line with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit. Peru is expected to implement additional policies with its own resources but will also need international support to implement policies that are fully in line with decarbonisation.

Further information on how the CAT rates countries (against modelled domestic pathways and fair share) can be found here.

Peru’s emissions, excluding LULUCF, have roughly doubled, going from 58 MtCO₂e in 1990 to 118 MtCO₂e in 2023 (Government of Peru, 2024; Gütschow et al., 2024). We estimate emissions under current policies will reach 130-143 MtCO₂e, excl. LULUCF, by 2030 (125-148% above 1990 levels, see Assumptions for details). Under current policy projections, Peru would just about reach its unconditional 2030 target, and will need to implement new, more ambitious policies in order to reach its conditional target.

Alongside the 2018 Framework Law on Climate Change, which provides the legal basis for NDC implementation, Supreme Decree 003-2022-MINAM establishes the climate emergency as a matter of national interest, stating Peru should “urgently” implement economy-wide measures to achieve its 2030 NDC target. In late 2024, Peru released its updated National Strategy on Climate Change to 2050 (ENCC), setting sectoral targets and measurable indicators for 2030 and 2050. The ENCC aims to reduce emissions across all key sectors, protect vulnerable populations, and improve climate governance, with goals like cutting cattle farming emissions by 30% by 2050.

Policy implementation in Peru has been hampered by political instability. In July 2021, Pedro Castillo assumed the presidency, but his ousting in December 2022 prompted significant anti-government protests as then-Vice President Dina Boluarte assumed the Presidency as constitutionally prescribed. Her term legally ends in 2026 as she faces historically high disapproval ratings of over 95% (Freedom House, 2025). Unsurprisingly, political instability, lack of political will, and low trust in the current government has led to very slow progress in advancing and implementing climate policy (Debre, 2024; Praeli, 2024).

Peru’s energy sector has seen growth in renewable electricity and steps to promote green hydrogen, with a new law in 2024 making hydrogen a national priority and supporting research and regulation (Ember, 2025). However, these advances are offset by continued investments in fossil fuels, including new oil extraction licenses and plans to increase oil and gas production by 24% in 2025, which conflict with the country’s net zero by 2050 target (IEA, 2021; Perú Energía, 2022; Teodoro, 2025).

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently confirmed that limiting warming to 1.5°C is central to the Paris Agreement and that countries failing to cut emissions, especially by expanding fossil fuel production, may be violating international law. By continuing to grow its oil and gas industry, Peru is falling short of its responsibilities under the Paris Agreement (International Court of Justice, 2025).

In the forestry sector, deforestation reached a two-decade high in 2020, driven by cocoa and palm oil cultivation, with palm oil now designated as a national interest (EIA US, 2024; Praeli, 2021). While not reaching the all-time high seen in 2020, Peru lost 705 kha of forest between 2021 and 2024 (Global Forest Watch, 2025). Recent regulatory changes have weakened environmental protections, raising concerns about formalizing deforestation and threatening indigenous rights (Castro, 2024; Selibas, 2024).

In October 2021, Peru and Switzerland signed a carbon credit agreement, allowing Switzerland to count emission reductions achieved in Peru towards its own climate targets. Peru and Switzerland held a joint launch event in spring 2025 outlining the conditions to participate and opening a platform to submit project proposals (Foundation for Climate Protection & and Carbon Offset KliK, 2025). Peru signed a similar implementation agreement with Singapore in 2025, although specific details on accounting and oversight are not yet clear (MInistry of Trade and Industry Singapore, 2025).

With these agreements, Peru risks selling emission reductions that are relatively inexpensive or would have occurred anyway, or the so-called “low-hanging fruit”, which may leave Peru with fewer and more costly options to increase its own mitigation ambition in the future. Finance generated through the purchase of carbon credits (ITMOs) should not be counted as climate finance. ITMO transactions are designed to help the buying country (often a developed country) achieve its targets, while the selling country (e.g., Peru) must make a corresponding adjustment that effectively makes the achievement of its own target more difficult.

In 2023, Peru’s power sector emitted roughly 19 MtCO₂e, the third largest source of emissions behind LULUCF and transport (Ember, 2025; Government of Peru, 2024; IEA, 2025). Despite large hydropower resources, fossil fuels make up a large share of energy generation in Peru.

In 2024, fossil gas accounted for roughly 40% of total electricity generation. In 2024, 50% of the country’s power came from hydro, roughly the same level as in 2015, but down from 58% in 2020 (Ember, 2025). Hydro generation is up from a 2015 low of only 49% of generation, however persistent drought threatens the stability of hydropower, with fossil gas often supplying baseload electricity when hydro generation dips. Solar and wind contribute a small share, at around 7% of total electricity generation, up from 1% in 2015. Bioenergy and oil each contribute a small share, around 1%.

The ENCC sets a sector-wide target of reducing the rate of increase in GHG emissions from ‘energy processes’ from a baseline of 2.356% per capita to 1.208% by 2030 (MINAM, 2025). Peru’s National Energy Plan 2010-2040 establishes the legal framework governing the power sector, setting objectives and policy guidelines (APEC Energy Working Group, 2024).

Key objectives include developing a diversified energy matrix through emphasis on renewable energy and energy efficiency measures, universal energy access, integration with regional energy markets and development of the natural gas industry. In March 2025, MINAM established a working group to develop the National Energy Plan to 2050 with the goals of strengthening energy security and diversify Peru’s energy mix (BNamericas, 2025)

Other recent developments include amendments to Peru’s law on efficient development of electricity generation (Law 28832, 2006) that allow all power generation technologies to compete in electricity supply tenders (Enerdata, 2024b). This change in regulation is expected to support integration of low-cost variable renewable energy into the energy mix.

With a base of hydropower resources, decisive action in Peru could drive further decarbonisation in the power sector. However, current plans to expand fossil gas generation across all sectors in Peru and lack of a fossil fuel phase-out target threaten to push Peru’s power sector in the wrong direction. Fossil gas should play only a minor role in Paris Agreement-compatible pathways according to the CAT’s power sector benchmarks, and the CAT finds that to align with 1.5°C the world must achieve a clean energy mix by 2040 (Climate Action Tracker, 2023).

Fossil gas and oil

Fossil gas made up 45% of Peru’s electricity supply in 2023, up from 34% in 2010 (Ember, 2025). The CAT’s 1.5°C compatible benchmarks indicate that globally, fossil gas needs to reach a 0–3% share of electricity generation by 2035. Despite this, Peru plans to continue expanding fossil gas use in the power sector (ProInversion, 2023). Peru currently has 7.1 GW of oil and gas plant capacity, with a further 590 MW gas generation capacity under development (Global Energy Monitor, 2025a).

Continued development and expansion of Peru’s fossil gas resources and infrastructure is centred around expanding extraction (see the Industry section below), increasing energy access, and improving energy security. In recent years, as regional droughts impacted hydro generation, fossil gas generation increased to respond to demand and maintain system resilience (Huang, 2023).

However, Peru has significant renewable energy potential – conservative estimates show that Peru could potentially generate significantly more annual electricity than today from solar alone (Cox, 2019). Paired with transmission expansion, flexibility interventions and storage, Peru could achieve a stable, 100% renewable power system. By continuing to expand fossil gas infrastructure Peru risks investing in costly stranded assets if Peru is to meet its climate targets and phase fossil gas out of the energy system by 2040.

Renewables

In 2023, renewables accounted for 55% of Peru’s total electricity generation (Ember, 2025). Nearly all of this comes from hydro, which accounts for just under 50% of all electricity generation. Wind and solar contribute roughly 5%, up from less than 1% in 2010.

Peru’s regulatory framework for the power sector enables path dependency – current activity is driven by the National Energy Plan 2010-2040, which prioritises development of oil and gas resources and hasn’t been updated since 2010 (IEA, 2017). In 2023, Italian multinational Enel announced its exit from the Peruvian power market, in part due to Peru’s regulatory stagnation, saying it was opting to focus on markets where “the regulatory frameworks support a clear, orderly and accelerated energy transition.” (Huang, 2023). Without decisive action to integrate renewables into the electricity market, Peru risks losing investments and falling behind in the energy transition.

Peru has made some regulatory updates to support integration of variable renewable energy into the generation mix, including allowing all-technology energy supply tenders and streamlining permitting (BNamericas, 2024b, 2024c; Enerdata, 2024a). In 2023, Peru added 513 MW of wind capacity and no additional solar capacity (Global Energy Monitor, 2025c, 2025b). Due in part to the slow pace of capacity additions, wind and solar still lag behind at just under 5% of generation in 2023 (Ember, 2025). CAT analysis indicates that the global share of renewables in generation in 2030 needs to reach 81–89% to be 1.5°C-aligned. Despite the relatively large share of hydro generation, without a significant ramp-up of wind and solar, Peru is not on track to reach this benchmark.

Hydrogen

In 2022, the government agreed to Peru's first green hydrogen project, in the south of the country, with a pilot phase producing up to 55 tonnes of hydrogen per day and requiring 160 MW of renewable capacity (H2 Peru, 2022; Peru Energia, 2022b).

In March 2022, the vice-Ministry of Electricity signed an agreement to promote the development of green hydrogen in the country. According to the green hydrogen roadmap, the hydrogen industry has the potential to create up to 94,000 jobs in the country by 2050 (H2 Peru, 2022; Peru Energia, 2022b).

Peru continues to develop its hydrogen regulatory framework, introducing the “Law for the Promotion of Green Hydrogen” in March 2024, which designates hydrogen as a matter of national significance, promotes research and development activities, and establishes the Ministry of Mines and Energy as the responsible agency for developing further regulations and incentives (Baker McKenzie, 2024b). The government amended the legal definition of green hydrogen to specifically include only hydrogen produced using renewable energy resources manufacture later that year.

The Ministry of Mines and Energy is primarily positioning green hydrogen in Peru as a fuel to use in industrial processes, actively pursuing new projects. The Minister of Energy and Mines, Rómulo Mucho, announced in mid-2024 that there were an estimated USD 12.5bn in prospective foreign investments in green hydrogen in Peru (Andina, 2024). In late 2024, Dublin-based Phelan Green Energy announced plans for a USD 2.3bn green hydrogen plant, with 1.8 GW solar and capacity to produce 80,000 tonnes of hydrogen annually which will then be converted into ammonia for export (Kavitha, 2024).

In 2023, industry processes accounted for roughly 7% of Peru’s total emissions and the sector contributed around 34% of GDP in 2024 (Group Credit Agricole, 2025). While manufacturing of consumer goods continues to grow, Peru’s industry sector is characterised by its relative abundance of various natural resources including metal ores, fossil fuels, and fish (OEC, 2025). The ENCC establishes sector-wide targets of reducing use of HFCs by 10% in 2030 and reducing use of clinker in cement production from a baseline of 81% to 65% in 2030 (MINAM, 2025).

Mining

Peru is a top international producer of several materials critical to the energy transition, including copper, zinc, and gold. The mining sector accounts for nearly 65% of Peru’s exports, and just under 10% of annual GDP (García, 2025). The mining industry accounted roughly 5% of Peru’s overall annual emissions as of 2021 and is the largest source of industrial emissions, with increasing global demand for materials for the energy transition likely to result in increasing emissions in the sector (World Bank Group, 2022).

Peru currently has over 50 mining projects in the development pipeline with a further 75 projects in potential exploration stage. In 2019 MINEM approved a “Vision of Mining 2019” which includes environmental sustainability and notes the need for integrated water and energy management to address climate concerns, however this has not yet been translated into implementable public policies (World Bank Group, 2022). Peru has not explicitly included the mining sector in its main climate policy documents, which primarily focus on adaptation, energy and hydrocarbons, and agriculture.

Oil & gas production

Peru’s National Energy Plan 2010-2040 sets objectives and policy guidelines, which includes the exploitation of oil and fossil gas resources under MINAM (IEA, 2017). The Plan establishes development of the fossil gas industry as a key objective.

The government continues to expand oil and gas exploration and extraction. In July 2022, the government approved the license contract for oil extraction in Block 192 (Lote 192), Peru's most important oil asset, located in the middle of the Amazon region, comprising about 500,000 ha. It holds 127 million barrels of proven reserves, producing approximately 10,500 bpd (Peru Energia, 2022a).

In 2023, PetroPeru (the state energy agency) offered up 31 additional contracts for oil and gas exploration. In 2024 production of oil reached the highest level since its 2019 pre-COVID peak, at 41.9 thousand bpd. Fossil gas reached 1381 MMcfd (PetroPeru, 2025). Petroperu projects oil production will reach 63,000 bpd and fossil gas will reach 1396 MMcfd in 2028. 66% of Peru’s domestic crude oil demand is met through domestic sources. Peru is a net exporter of fossil gas, with production accounting for 153% of domestic demand and 35% of Peru’s fossil gas exported (IEA, 2025).

New investments in oil and gas are incompatible with reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 and are at odds with Peru’s net zero target (IEA, 2021). The recent advisory opinion on climate change issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reaffirmed the scientific consensus that the 1.5°C limit is the fundamental goal of the Paris agreement and reinforces the responsibility of states to regulate activity within their jurisdictions in line with their Paris Agreement obligations (International Court of Justice, 2025).

The ICJ finds that states who fail to take action to reduce emissions in order to limit warming, including by continuing the production of fossil fuels and by granting further licenses for exploration may be engaging in internationally wrongful acts which are attributable to the state. By continuing to take deliberate action to expand the oil and fossil gas industry, Peru is derogating from its obligations and responsibilities under the Paris Agreement.

Peru is not a signatory of the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA), an international alliance of governments and stakeholders working together to facilitate the managed phase-out of oil and gas production. In order to limit global warming to 1.5°C, new investments in oil and gas production must stop immediately. Further investments are at significant risk of becoming stranded assets.

In 2023 the transport sector emitted ~27 MtCO₂e, which represents roughly 20% of Peru’s total national emissions (excl. LULUCF) and 40% of the country’s energy-related emissions; it is the largest single contributor to the sector’s emissions (Government of Peru, 2024).

Oil dominates the energy mix of Peru’s transport sector, at nearly a 90% share, with fossil gas and biofuels making up the remaining 10%. As of 2023 electricity accounted for 1% of the energy consumption in transport (SLOCAT, 2023). Peru’s ENCC sets a goal of reducing emissions from rail from a baseline reduction of -11% to 8.79% in 2030 and reducing emissions from land freight transport from a baseline of -41% to 0.97% in 2030 (MINAM, 2025).

To help mitigate the rapid increase in transport emissions, Peru set up a range of policies over the years:

• In 2020, the government approved a decree that sets tax incentives to promote the acquisition of hybrid or electric vehicles by an accelerated depreciation of up to 50% per year (Gobierno del Perú, 2020b).
• In the same year, the government approved by law the National Programme for Sustainable Urban Transport, which supports the development of cycling infrastructure, and aims to increase the capacity of regions and cities to develop and implement Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (SUMPs) (Gobierno del Perú, 2019).
• Multiple rail projects are in development or implementation phases, including Lima metro lines No. 2, 3, and 4, as well as six new commuter rail projects aimed at connecting the coast expected to be completed by 2032 (BNamericas, 2024a).
• Supreme Decree No. 036-2023-EM was published in early 2024 and sets regulations for installation and operation of charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (MINEM, 2024). A comprehensive electromobility law was proposed in 2022, but has not yet been passed by the legislature (Fonti, 2024).
• An updated emissions standards Decree which establishes maximum permissible limits of atmospheric emissions for vehicles and mandates that as of 1 October 2024, new light-duty vehicles must meet Euro 6b emission standards (TransportPolicy, 2024)

The buildings sector in Peru accounted for roughly 6 MtCO₂e in 2023, 5% of total emissions (European Commission. Joint Research Centre. & IEA, 2024). Peru has national building regulations, but up to 70% of buildings are constructed informally and the ENCC does not establish specific emission reductions targets for the buildings sector (KfW, 2024). Peru does not have any national level sustainable building standards or any government-funded schemes to incentivise green retrofits aimed at improving energy efficiency in existing buildings (Baker McKenzie, 2024a).

Cities across the country have been growing rapidly and in a disorderly way over the last decade, paying little to no attention to climate-friendly construction guidelines. In the coastal region, which hosts almost 60% of the country’s population, winters have been getting colder and summers warmer over the past decade. The lack of sustainable infrastructure will only become more evident in the near future as the country continues to experience record temperatures every year (Gaillard, n.d.).

Peru’s agricultural sector produced roughly 25% of total emissions in 2023, or 30 MtCO₂e (Government of Peru, 2024). Just under 45% of land in Peru is used for agriculture and Peru’s diverse landscapes and climate zones means it can produce a wide variety of crops (FAO, 2023). Peru is a top-five global producer of avocados, blueberries and a top-10 global producer of coffee and cocoa among other crops, with agriculture employing nearly 30% of the population. The main drivers of emissions in the agriculture sector are enteric fermentation and use of nitrogen fertilisers, which produces N₂O. The cultivation of coffee, cocoa and palm is a key driver of deforestation (see Forestry).

Agricultural policy is primarily guided by the Agrarian Law, which was implemented in 2020 following the repeal of the 2000 Agrarian Promotion Law (APL) (Killeen, 2024). The 2000 APL formalised labour in the sector, supporting agribusiness and incentivising large investments. Between 2000 and 2022, emissions from agriculture grew by roughly 20%. The new Agrarian Law sets new minimum wage and taxation rules, with impacts still unclear.

The ENCC (2024) sets the reduction of emissions from agriculture as its fifth strategic goal, establishing a reduction target for cattle farming and rice cultivation of 30% by 2050 (MINAM, 2025). It introduces a number of policy priorities for the agricultural sector, including building the capacity of local and regional governments to implement mitigation measures, improving access to extension services for farmers to learn and implement less emissions-intensive farming techniques.

The land use, land-use change and forestry sector has consistently been a significant source of emissions in Peru over the last 20 years.

In 2020, Peru reached its highest deforestation rate in 20 years and while deforestation rates have declined somewhat, a 2024 report finds that small-scale agriculture and agribusiness continue to drive destruction of an average of 135,000 hectares annually (EIA US, 2024). Peru hosts about 740,000 square kilometres of forests, including the largest area of the Amazon rainforest after Brazil (World Bank, 2023).

In Peru, land use and forestry is the main source of emissions, with a share of roughly 44% reported for 2021 (Government of Peru, 2024). To be aligned with the Paris Agreement, the rate of deforestation worldwide needs to decline 70% by 2030 and 95% by 2050, compared to 2018 levels (Boehm et al., 2023).

The ENCC seeks to increase emissions removals from LULUCF as a share of total emissions to 26.6% in 2030 and 100% in 2050. It also sets a goal of reducing emissions from deforestation by 55% in 2050 (MINAM, 2025).

Cultivation of cocoa and palm for palm oil are significant drivers of deforestation, with the government declaring palm oil to be of ‘national interest’ in an effort to become a regionally significant exporter. This ambition is supported by regulatory changes first issued in January 2024 that loosen environmental protections, which opponents argue may essentially formalise deforestation, reduce accountability for illegal clear-cutters, and threaten the rights of indigenous peoples (Castro, 2024; Selibas, 2024).

At COP26, Peru signed the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use, alongside over 145 other countries. The declaration aims to stop deforestation, as well as promote the conservation, protection and sustainable management of forests (UN Climate Change Conference, 2021). While many celebrated the announcement, others seemed less optimistic of the potential impacts, while also highlighting the reluctance of some of the Declaration’s donors to take a harder line on the extractive and agricultural industries that have historically been the biggest threats to their societies (Mongabay, 2021).

Waste accounts for just under 10% of Peru’s overall emissions as of 2023, and around 20% of Peru’s methane emissions (Government of Peru, 2024; Gütschow et al., 2024). While waste management in Peru continues to be formalised, lack of a comprehensive waste management system exacerbates the environmental, social and climate impacts of the waste sector (Cristóbal et al., 2022). The National Plan for Integrated Solid Waste Management establishes a strategy to formalise waste disposal on the national level, reduce waste production, and promote circularity measures including urban mining to reduce the climate impacts of Peru’s waste sector (MINAM, 2023).

Methane emissions in Peru represent about 35 MtCO₂e or just over 30% of total emissions in 2023 (excl. LULUCF), with 46% coming from agriculture. Small-scale agriculture and cattle ranching accounts for over 30% of agricultural methane, and Peru’s National Climate Strategy outlines key policy initiatives including increasing the capacity of local and regional governments to address agricultural emissions (MINAM, 2025). The energy sector contributes to 27% of the country’s methane emissions, and the waste sector with the remaining 25% (Government of Peru, 2024).

Peru signed the methane pledge at COP26. Although Peru’s NDC indicates it covers all gases and sectors, the methane pledge is not explicitly referenced, nor does it include any specific action on methane emissions. For Peru, reducing 30% of current methane emissions could roughly translate into a 10 MtCO₂e reduction by 2030 which could potentially lead to lower emissions level than that under the unconditional NDC.