Brazil

Critically Insufficient4°C+
World
NDCs with this rating fall well outside of a country’s “fair share” range and are not at all consistent with holding warming to below 2°C let alone with the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit. If all government NDCs were in this range, warming would exceed 4°C. For sectors, the rating indicates that the target is consistent with warming of greater than 4°C if all other sectors were to follow the same approach.
Highly insufficient< 4°C
World
NDCs with this rating fall outside of a country’s “fair share” range and are not at all consistent with holding warming to below 2°C let alone with the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit. If all government NDCs were in this range, warming would reach between 3°C and 4°C. For sectors, the rating indicates that the target is consistent with warming between 3°C and 4°C if all other sectors were to follow the same approach.
Insufficient< 3°C
World
NDCs with this rating are in the least stringent part of a country’s “fair share” range and not consistent with holding warming below 2°C let alone with the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit. If all government NDCs were in this range, warming would reach over 2°C and up to 3°C. For sectors, the rating indicates that the target is consistent with warming over 2°C and up to 3°C if all other sectors were to follow the same approach.
2°C Compatible< 2°C
World
NDCs with this rating are consistent with the 2009 Copenhagen 2°C goal and therefore fall within a country’s “fair share” range, but are not fully consistent with the Paris Agreement long term temperature goal. If all government NDCs were in this range, warming could be held below, but not well below, 2°C and still be too high to be consistent with the Paris Agreement 1.5°C limit. For sectors, the rating indicates that the target is consistent with holding warming below, but not well below, 2°C if all other sectors were to follow the same approach.
1.5°C Paris Agreement Compatible< 1.5°C
World
This rating indicates that a government’s NDCs in the most stringent part of its “fair share” range: it is consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C limit. For sectors, the rating indicates that the target is consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C limit.
Role model<< 1.5°C
World
This rating indicates that a government’s NDC is more ambitious than what is considered a “fair” contribution: it is more than consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C limit. No “role model” rating has been developed for the sectors.
1.5°C Compatible< 1.5°C
World
This rating indicates that a government’s NDCs in the most stringent part of its “fair share” range: it is consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C limit. For sectors, the rating indicates that the target is consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C limit.

Overview

According to our most recent assessment, with currently implemented policies Brazil will reach emissions levels (excluding LULUCF) of 1,056MtCO2e in 2025 and 1,088 MtCO2e by 2030 (respectively, 25% and 28% above 2005 levels and 88% and 93% above 1990 levels). Under this scenario emissions in most sectors are expected to resume and rise at least until 2030.

The remarkable progress in forestry emissions mitigation observed over the last decade has now stopped, with deforestation emissions reverting to an upward trend. With an economy-wide target of 1.3 GtCO2e by 2025 and 1.2 GtCO2e by 2030 and rising LULUCF emissions, Brazil is on track to miss its economy-wide NDC targets, and miss its 2020 deforestation targets by a large margin. These findings have been confirmed by independent assessments (Angelo & Rittl, 2019).

Bolsonaro’s administration is at odds with the urgent need for climate action in Brazil. Current energy infrastructure planning which foresees a very important role for fossil fuels in the decades to come, and the developments in the LULUCF sector reflect a worsening of national climate policy implementation and ambition.

President Bolsonaro and his team of Ministers have publicly expressed their opposition to many of Brazil’s existing climate policies and have passed legislation that weakens the institutional and legal framework to fight deforestation and other environmental offenses, as well as reforms that weaken substantially the participation of civil society, including pro-environment groups, in policy making and oversight of policy implementation (NBC news, 2019; Observatório do Clima, 2019c, 2019d; The New York Times, 2019).

The main policy instruments included in our current policy projections pathway are the energy efficiency national plans and the incentives for the uptake of renewables in the energy sector, including capacity auctions in the power sector and the ethanol and biodiesel mandates in the transport sector (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2019). In addition to the policies included in the World Energy Outlook current policy scenario, we estimate the impact of The Resolution Nr 5 of June 2018, which includes the annual national emissions intensity targets of the national biofuels policy RenovaBio (Conselho nacional de política energética, 2018).

Brazil will need to implement additional policies to meet its economy wide NDC targets, but is well on track to meet its energy sector NDC targets according to the draft Ten Year Plan (Ministério de Minas e Energia – MME, 2019), as show in the table below.

Brazil has enacted other sectoral plans to reduce emissions in other sectors of the economy, including the Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change for a Low-Carbon Emission Agriculture (ABC Plan), the Steel Industry Plan, the Low Carbon Emission Economy in the Manufacturing Industry Plan, The Sectoral Transport and Urban Mobility Plan and the Low-Carbon Emission Mining Plan. Most of those policies and instruments, however, are still not part of national development planning and are therefore not included in our current policy projections emissions pathway.

To contribute to a global peak in emissions followed by a steep decrease in the coming decades, as required under the Paris Agreement, Brazil will need to reverse its current trend of weakening climate policy by sustaining and strengthening policy implementation in the forestry sector, reversing present steps to expand fossil fuel energy sources, and accelerating mitigation action in other sectors.

Energy supply

Brazil’s energy mix has been characterised by a high share of renewables, especially large hydro generation in the electricity sector. The renewable energy NDC targets of a 45% share in the primary energy mix and a 23% share of renewables (other than hydropower) in the power supply mix by 2030 would, if met, contribute to an improvement in Brazil’s carbon intensity. This improvement is even more relevant in light of Brazilian energy demand expansion expected to continue at least until 2030 (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2019; Ministério de Minas e Energia – MME, 2019)

Under current policy projections, the indicative NDC target of a 45% share of renewables in the total energy mix by 2030 will be achieved. This is confirmed by the latest projection from the National Energy Plan, which expects renewable energy to represent 47% of the energy mix in 2027 (Ministerio de Minas e Energia, 2018) and 48% in 2029 (Ministério de Minas e Energia – MME, 2019).

Renewable energy generation for Brazil

The reduction in electricity demand that led to the cancellation of a tender for renewable plants in 2016 - largely a product of the recent economic recession - seems to have been overcome, and recent market developments appear to favour renewable energy over fossil fuels. Since then, Brazil’s Ministry of Energy and Mines has been following its new schedule for energy auctions, which will go up to the end of 2021, with six procurements for new large-scale power projects (Ministério de Minas e Energia., 2019a).

The latest national energy auction for new capacity, held in October 2019, was a six-year commissioning auction (A-6) for projects to start operation in 2025. Even though coal generation was allowed to participate in similar to previous auctions, no coal was actually contracted. In fact, three quarters out of the 2.9 GW contracted went to renewable energy:

  • 35% to wind energy, with an average price of 98.9 BRL/MWh, equivalent to 24.3 USD/MWh,
  • 18% to solar, with an average price of 84.4 BRL/MWh, equivalent to 21 USD/MWh,
  • 15% to hydroelectric, with average price of 157 BRL/MWh, equivalent to 38.6 USD/MWh, and
  • 7.6% to biomass, with an average price of 188 BRL/MWh, equivalent to 46.2 USD/MWh.

The only contracted energy from fossil fuels came from two gas power plants that represented 25% of the total capacity contracted, at a price of BRL 188.8/MWh, equivalent to 46.5 USD/MWh (Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency - ANEEL, 2019). This was the first A-6 energy auction where solar energy was allowed to participate, resulting in 20-year power purchase agreements for 11 solar projects that offered the lowest price of all technologies in the auction. The 530 MW of solar capacity awarded is more than double that of the 211 MW awarded in the four year commissioning auction (A-4) held in June 2019 (PV Magazine, 2019). However, progress in decarbonisation of the Brazilian power sector are not yet in line with government plans and policy developments.

The current energy infrastructure planning seems to continue favouring fossil fuels, including coal and gas, as opposed to what is required under the Paris Agreement. To meet Brazil’s increasing energy demand, the government is planning to maintain a diverse energy mix by increasing investments in renewable energy and fossil fuels. The current Ten-Year Plan for Energy Expansion has planned an increase in the share of investments in fossil energy sources to 76.1% of total energy investments in the period 2018-2027 (Ministerio de Minas e Energia, 2018). Recent long-term energy scenarios released by the Energy Ministry show a 2050 energy mix projection that has very similar shares of fossil fuels compared to current levels, surpassing half of the final energy consumption (Ministério de Minas e Energia., 2019b).

The latest Ten Year Plan (2019-2029) envisions a large expansion of renewable energy, with non-convectional renewables reaching a third of the installed power generation capacity by 2029, but also a natural gas capacity more than doubling from current levels, and fossil fuels increasing their share in the electricity mix from 14% in 2020 to 18% in 2029 (Ministério de Minas e Energia – MME, 2019).

The same document includes projections for GHG emissions, which show energy emissions growing until 2029, although a reduction of 8.2% in the emissions intensity of the energy sector compared to 2005 levels is expected, and the government presents high certainty about the achievement of the NDC targets for the energy sector.

The draft Ten Year Plan (2019-2029), also provides projections for fossil fuel production, and shows national production expanding substantially in the next decade, with oil production going from 3.2 million barrels in 2020 to 5.5 million barrels in 2029, and gross natural gas production going from 130 million m3/day in 2020 to 253 million m3/day (Ministério de Minas e Energia – MME, 2019). A large part of this expansion in fossil fuel production is expected to come from unconventional resources not yet exploited, which have a much larger associated carbon footprint in their exploration and extraction. This stands in stark contrast with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, which would require a large share of the global fossil fuel reserves remaining unexploited.

While recent developments may ultimately limit the options for long-term deep decarbonisation of the economy as a consequence of unnecessarily locking Brazil in carbon-intensive energy infrastructure, market developments bring hope for renewable energy.

Agriculture

Agriculture is an important industry in Brazil, due to the immense land resource available. The most significant products are coffee, soybeans, wheat, rice, corn, sugarcane, cocoa, citrus and beef (FAOSTAT, 2017). Agriculture is the second biggest contributor to Brazil’s GHG footprint, being responsible for around half of the country’s emissions once the LULUCF sector is excluded. If the indirect emissions of the agriculture sector (mostly related to deforestation resulting from the expansion of the agricultural frontier) were taken into account, this would be by far the single largest emissions source in Brazil.

Historically, there is a strong correlation between agriculture expansion and deforestation emissions in Brazil. Recent estimates show that between 1895 and 2018, 89 million hectares (890,000 square kilometres) of native vegetation were lost in Brazil, while the territory dedicated to agriculture and cattle ranching grew by 47 million hectares (Observatório do Clima, 2019e).

It is important to note here that historical data shows that in the past grain production has increased during periods of reduced deforestation. So expanding the agriculture frontier through deforestation is not necessary to increase productivity and the expansion of this industry. Adding value and productivity in agriculture can be achieved by investment in more sustainable and efficient agriculture methods in already available areas instead of expanding the cultivated area (Observatório do Clima, 2019a).

Given the importance of agriculture and deforestation in Brazil’s emissions profile, mitigation policies in these sectors play a pivotal role in the achievement of the national emissions reductions targets, which is now in jeopardy after the 2018 elections. The “agriculture caucus” (bancada ruralista) — a party that responds to demands from the agriculture lobby, and which generally opposes land preservation efforts and other anti-deforestation policies — is the second largest coordinated legislative group in the National Congress, with wide representation in State legislatures (Gazeta do Povo, 2018). This political party has been a strong supporter of Bolsonaro.

Land Use and Land Use Change

Inventory emissions data available shows that the land use and forestry sector had been by far the largest source of GHG emissions in Brazil since the early 1990s. This picture changed significantly after 2004, when effective anti-deforestation policies, including the National Forest Code, the Action Plan for Deforestation Prevention and Control in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm) and the Cerrado (PPCerrado), were implemented and resulted in a reduction on LULUCF emissions of about 86% between 2005 and 2012 (Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation of Brazil, 2016a).

Brazil’s remarkable progress in forestry emissions mitigation observed since 2004 has stopped, with deforestation and resulting emissions increases picking up speed again in recent years. In 2018, Brazil recorded the highest loss of tropical primary rainforest in the world, reaching 1.3 million hectares, mostly due to deforestation in the Amazon, with several hot spots near and within indigenous territories (Weisse & Goldman, 2019). National estimates show total deforestation reaching 7900 km2 in 2018, which is an increase of 13,7% from 2017 levels, and 72% from the historic low reached in 2012 (PRODES, 2019).

In 2019, the fire season caught the attention of Brazil and the world due to its magnitude. Between January 1 and August 29, 2019, 45,256 centres of heat were detected in the Amazon biome, the largest ever recorded since 2010. This significant increase in outbreaks, compared to previous years, occurred in practically all land categories, especially in private properties (PP), which cover 18% of the Amazon biome and accounted for 33% of the total number of outbreaks this year (Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia (IPAM), 2019). These massive forest fires occurred in the context of a 2019 dry season that was milder than the previous three years, indicating that anthropogenic emissions, including illegal deforestation, are rising rapidly in Brazil (Idem).

This trend takes Brazil in the opposite direction of its commitments under the Paris Agreement, which include a target of zero illegal deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia by 2030.

September 2019 was the third consecutive month that the deforestation warning area detected by the satellite monitoring system (Deter-B) reached records since its launch in 2015. It detected monthly deforestation varying by 1,000 km2 to 2,500 km2, compared with previous years when the same estimate for the dry season ranged between 200km2 and 1000km2 (Observatório do Clima, 2019f).

This recent increase in deforestation represents a reversal of the trend over the last decade and local authorities have declared they lack the resources to control illegal deforestation in the entire national territory (Messias, 2017). The enforcing capacity of national authorities has deteriorated due to sharp spending cuts.

In 2017, the Government cut the Environment Ministry budget by more than 50% (Climate Home, 2017a), with continued cuts in 2018. The National Institute for Space Research (INPE), responsible among others for the satellite monitoring of deforestation in the Amazon, suffered nearly 70% reduction in its budget in the past 7 years (Estado de São Paulo, 2017).

Much more radical cuts in the budgets of the national authorities in charge of forest protection have been observed under the current administration(Rodrigues, 2019). April and May 2019 saw severe budget cuts for key environmental enforcement authorities related to forest protection including:

  • Environment Ministry (MMA): 95% cut for Initiatives for the Implementation of the National Policy on Climate Change.
  • Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA): a 69% cut for Sustainable use of biodiversity management; a 50% reduction for environmental monitoring and management of environmental information and environmental education; a 43% cut for Federal Environmental Licenses; a 38% cut for prevention and control of forest fires in priority federal areas; and a 24% cut for environmental control and inspection.
  • Chico Mendes Biodiversity Institute (ICMBio): a 26% cut for support for the Creation, Management and Implementation of Federal Units of Conservation; and 20% for environmental inspection and prevention and fight against forest fires.

With these changes Brazil’s ability to monitor, inspect, and prevent environmental crimes has been severely reduced. Not only has the enforcing capacity of authorities been reduced, but the Government has also started to reverse LULUCF policies already in place. The previous administration signed legislation, previously approved by Congress, to regularise more illegal land-grabbing practices and sent a bill to Congress that that would remove protection from 349,000 hectares (862,000 acres) of Jamanxim National Forest, in the Amazon state of Pará (Climate Home, 2017b). Bolsonaro’s administration has continued with the reversal of key environmental policies and weakening of environmental institutions.

The changes include transferring the body responsible for identifying, demarcating, and registering Indigenous territory to the Ministry of Agriculture (The New York Times, 2019); easing the rules for converting environmental fines into alternative compensations (Climate Policy Initiative, 2019b; Observatório do Clima, 2019c); changes in the Forest code to extend deadlines for enforcement measures (Climate Policy Initiative, 2019a); and the abolition of most committees and commissions for civil participation and social control in the Federal Government (Observatório do Clima, 2019d). While it is hard to predict the effect of these regulatory changes on emissions, most of them have the potential to drive up illegal deforestation and other environmental offenses.

As evidenced in the 2019 forest fire season, these negative developments in LULUCF policies are projected to have negative consequences for deforestation, potentially causing Brazil to miss its 2020 and NDC deforestation targets by a large margin (Rochedo et al., 2018; Soterroni et al., 2018). To illustrate this, we have added alternative projections for LULUCF produced by national experts (Rochedo et al., 2018) to our main graph, showing they stand in stark contrast with the official government projections.

Given the key role of the Land Use and Forestry sector in Brazil’s NDC and the huge global importance of its forests for environmental services, biodiversity, and carbon sequestration, the Brazilian government urgently needs to strengthen mitigation action in this sector—instead of weakening it. Bolsonaro’s agenda on environment is at odds with the pressing need for climate action in Brazil.

Transport

According to the latest World Energy Outlook (2019), the transport sector accounted for 48% of energy-related CO2 emissions in Brazil in 2018. Emissions have been increasing over recent decades mainly due to increased vehicle ownership. Brazil is currently the world’s second largest producer and consumer of biofuels. In 2017, the country produced an estimated 27.7 billion litres of ethanol and 4.2 billion litres of biodiesel (Berk & Barros, 2017).

In its latest National Communication, Brazil identifies the Sectoral Transport and Urban Mobility Plan for the Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change (PSTM) as its key policy to tackle transport sector emissions (Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation of Brazil, 2016b). This Plan aims at contributing to mitigating GHG emissions through initiatives that lead to the expansion of cargo transport infrastructure and using more energy-efficient modes; and in the sector of urban mobility, increasing the use of efficient systems of public passenger transportation.

The Resolution Nr 5 of June 2018 approved the annual national emissions intensity targets under RenovaBio, a new national biofuels policy (Conselho nacional de política energética, 2018). The policy aims to increase the use of all biofuels in Brazil, including ethanol, biodiesel and biomethane, aiming to increase energy security and reduce GHG emissions. Under our current policy projections, the CAT has estimated transport emissions will grow 6-7% from 2018 levels by 2030, which is significantly lower than our previous estimates (23% growth by 2030) that didn’t consider the new RenovaBio targets.

While biofuels have contributed significantly to improve the emissions intensity of the road transport sector in Brazil (see below), full decarbonisation of the transport sector will require a fast uptake of electric vehicles (EVs). In terms of EVs, Brazil is a laggard, with a very small penetration rate and without a clear strategy to substantially increase the adoption of this technology. In the reference case scenario of the Ministry of Energy’s long-term scenarios, EVs will continue to account for an insignificant share of the market until at least 2035, reaching a very modest 11% penetration rate (72% if hybrids are included) in 2050 under the reference scenario (Ministério de Minas e Energia., 2019b).

Road Transport Emission Intensity in Brazil

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