Brazil

It has been difficult assessing Brazil's recently-submitted 2035 NDC target, largely due to the lack of published government data on the expected contribution of the land use sector (LULUCF) to the NDC target, resulting in an extraordinarily wide range of estimated emissions from all other sectors (excl. LULUCF) that are consistent with the NDC target. Ultimately, our analysis concludes that Brazil’s 2035 NDC target is not 1.5°C compatible.

Brazil submitted its 2035 NDC mitigation target on 13 November 2024, setting a target to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions between 59–67% below 2005 levels in 2035. This target covers all sectors and all gases. According to the latest national inventory data for 2005, this is consistent with an emissions level between 832–1,033 MtCO₂e in 2035 (in AR4 GWPs, incl. LULUCF).

Brazil has communicated its intent to use the Paris Agreement's Article 6, with carbon offset transfers being authorised to sell its emission reductions from 67% up to the level of 59% below 2005 levels by 2035. We therefore interpret Brazil’s target of 59% below 2005 by 2035 as the “national action component” of its target, or what it commits to do within its borders and with its own resources. The 67% below 2005 by 2035 would be the “internationally supported component” of its target, as the additional reduction beyond the 59% might generate financial resources through the international transfer of mitigation results.^[1]

The Climate Action Tracker evaluates NDC targets excluding emissions from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) in order to keep the focus on emissions from fossil fuels and industry, and because of the often-massive uncertainty in estimations of LULUCF emissions and removals. Given the limited nature of the underlying data so far published by the Brazilian government on LULUCF emissions, we had to build our own range of what the LULUCF contribution to the 2035 NDC could be.

For this, we considered Brazil’s intention to achieve zero deforestation, by eliminating illegal deforestation and compensating for the legal suppression of native vegetation, as stated in its NDC. Under this assumption, we reviewed several studies under which the LULUCF sector would represent a sink in 2035. The size of the sink varied widely across studies, going from -120 MtCO₂e/yr to -610 MtCO₂e/yr^[2]. However, we also observed substantial deviation in historical LULUCF data (2020) across studies, and in comparison with what has been reported by the government in its latest emissions inventory. We therefore applied an offset harmonisation approach to be able to compare these studies between them and to the official government data. After the harmonisation, the LULUCF range for 2035 expands further, now going from being a source of about 80 MtCO₂e/yr to being a sink of -630 MtCO₂e/yr.

The uncertainty around the LULUCF contribution to Brazil's 2035 NDC, driven by of a lack of published data from the government, results in an extraordinarily wide range of estimated emissions excluding LULUCF that are consistent with the NDC.

We welcome Brazil’s initiative to publish sectoral, detailed plans in the coming months and we hope these will include concrete targets and pathways we can use to update our assumptions. For now, the range based on our literature review leads to:

• the target of 59% below 2005, which we interpret as the national action component of the NDC, amounting to a range of between 1–76% above 2005 levels, excluding LULUCF (953–1,666 MtCO₂e/yr). Compared to 2020 emissions (latest available data point reported in the national emissions inventory), this would range from a decrease of 14% to an increase of 51% (excl. LULUCF).
• the target of 67% below 2005, which we interpret as the internationally supported component of the NDC, amounting to a range of 21% below to 55% above 2005 levels, excluding LULUCF (732–1,465 MtCO₂e). Compared to 2020 emissions (latest available data point reported in the national emissions inventory), this would range from a decrease of 32% to an increase of 33% (excl. LULUCF).

In both cases, the resulting level of 2035 emissions of the target (excl. LULUCF) is not aligned with our 1.5°C compatible modelled domestic pathways. According to our most recent publication on what a 1.5°C aligned NDC should look like, to be 1.5°C compatible, Brazil would need to reduce its emissions excl. LULUCF in 2035 to at least 25% below 2005 levels (706 MtCO₂e), which is about 36% below 2020 emission levels.

In the same way, when including LULUCF emissions, neither of the NDC’s two targets are aligned with our 1.5°C compatible modelled domestic pathways. To be 1.5°C compatible, Brazil would need to reduce at least 85% of their total emissions (incl. LULUCF) by 2035, compared to 2005 levels (368 MtCO₂e).

• The target of 59% below 2005 amounts to 1,033 MtCO₂e in 2035, incl. LULUCF. Compared to 2020 emissions (latest available data point reported in the national emissions inventory), this would mean a decrease of 41% (incl. LULUCF).
• The target of 67% below 2005 amounts to 832 MtCO₂e in 2035, incl. LULUCF. Compared to 2020 emissions (latest available data point reported in the national emissions inventory), this would translate to a decrease of 52% (incl. LULUCF).

Brazil’s recent NDC submission did not increase the ambition of its 2030 mitigation target. A failure to substantially increase the ambition of its 2030 targets and action would mean Brazil's ability to limit peak global warming to 1.5°C will be more difficult. Deeper and more rapid emissions reduction targets will be required elsewhere, which will likely lead to a multi-decadal, high overshoot of this limit, even if followed by strong 2035 targets.

[1] According to our methodology, for the case of Brazil, we only compared the internationally supported component of the target to our modelled domestic pathways

[2] Studies considered included e.g., the “Clima e Desenvolvemento: Viöes para o Brazil 2030” report from Instituto Talanoa & Centro Clima; a paper from Soterroni, A., et al (2023) with Forest Code (FC) and Forest Code Plus (FC+) scenarios; the technical note “Bases para proposta de 2a NDC para o Brasil 2030-2035” from Observatorio de Clima & SEEG; amongst others.

For the world to have a significant chance of limiting warming to 1.5˚C, governments must switch to emergency mode and strengthen both their 2030 targets and current policies to include substantial emissions cuts and significantly contribute to closing the 2030 emission gap. Brazil’s submitted 2035 NDC target did not increase the ambition of its 2030 target.

2030 NDC Target

2035 NDC Target

* According to our methodology, for the case of Brazil we only compared the internationally supported component of the target to our modelled domestic pathways

The internationally supported component of Brazil’s submitted 2035 NDC, of a 67% reduction in emissions below 2005 levels, will result in 732–1,465 MtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF) by 2035, roughly 55% above to 21% below 2005 levels (excl. LULUCF) and is not aligned with our 1.5°C compatible modelled domestic pathways: the entire range is above the 1.5°C compatible threshold of 706 MtCO₂e, or a 25% reduction below 2005 levels, excluding LULUCF.

The CAT welcomes Brazil’s commitment to reduce emissions with its own resources but given the large uncertainty derived from the lack of information on the expected contribution of the LULUCF sector, it is difficult to evaluate the Brazilian government's commitment.

The 2035 NDC target includes a reference to its national process of updating the National Plan on Climate Change (Climate Plan), which includes a "National Mitigation Strategy" with seven sectoral mitigation plans. However, the NDC only provides a qualitative description of sectoral mitigation plans, with no targets nor pathways explicitly communicated.

Developed countries need to significantly scale up international climate finance and other means of support. Developed countries should set 1.5°C aligned domestic mitigation targets in their NDCs and communicate the financial and other support they will provide to developing countries. Developing countries should clearly communicate the climate finance they need to set and achieve ambitious 1.5°C aligned conditional targets.

Whether Brazil should receive climate finance to reduce its emissions is a matter of debate. Our methods do not provide a clear answer to this question. On balance, the CAT methodology shows a small amount of international support is technically consistent with a wide range of literature on fair share contributions to meet the Paris Agreement's goals. However, this contribution would likely be small under most equity perspectives. Brazil’s submitted 2035 conditional NDC is not 1.5°C compatible with modelled domestic pathways.

Credible NDCs should build on robust national planning processes that translate the economy-wide emissions reduction target into action in all sectors. Governments need to ramp up the implementation of their existing targets and further develop policies to close the – still significant – emissions gap between current policies and 1.5°C. Contradictory policies must be addressed and reversed: fossil fuel production needs to be phased out, while fossil fuel exploration and fossil fuel subsidies need to stop.

According to our latest assessment, Brazil’s total emissions (excl. LULUCF) will reach between 1,094 MtCO₂e and 1,197 MtCO₂e in 2035 under current policies and actions. The lower end of the domestic component of the 2035 target, to reduce 59% below 2005 levels, is aligned with the current policy projections but is not driving mitigation ambition. This highlights the fact that both Brazil’s targets and polices are lacking ambition to align with the 1.5°C temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.

Brazil’s NDC includes a description of national planning and implementation processes, including mention of its existing relevant policies and the update of the National Plan on Climate Change (Climate Plan). However, while it states an intention to reduce reliance on fossil fuels by promoting biofuels and electrification solutions, the NDC fails to include a fixed timeline for phasing out fossil fuels.

There is also no attention given to the recent policies that continue to allocate significant resources to the production and development of oil and fossil gas in the next decade, which raises serious concerns about the prioritisation of sustainability and environmental goals within Brazil and the credibility of its mitigation targets.

Governments should set absolute, economy wide, emission reduction target trajectories including all GHG gases, specifying the emissions levels for each year as an absolute level of emissions (excluding LULUCF) so they are clear, transparent, and immune to creative accounting. NDC targets should primarily focus on their domestic reductions by decarbonising all sectors of the economy rather than relying on forestry sinks, other carbon dioxide removal (CDR) or international carbon markets.

Brazil’s NDC includes a target that covers all gases and sectors of the economy. However, the formulation of the target has reverted from an absolute emissions reduction to a percentage reduction compared to 2005. The target explicitly indicates that Brazil will adopt the latest National Inventory Report available at the time of assessing progress towards the NDC. Essentially, Brazil is reserving the right to revise its baseline emissions rather than concentrating efforts on reducing emissions in absolute terms.

At the sectoral level, the NDC lacks quantitative specificity and clear targets. In particular, it does not include any details on the expected contributions of LULUCF to the 2035 target. In Brazil's case, the share of expected LULUCF emissions (or removals) has huge implications for the level of decarbonisation required for other sectors of the economy. According to our guidelines for a good NDC, any contribution of the LULUCF sector, engineered and novel types of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) or international carbon markets under Article 6, should be stated separately.

Brazil has communicated its intent to use Article 6, with transfers being authorised to sell the reductions from 59% up to the level of 67% below 2005 levels by 2035. This poses a major risk for Brazil’s long-term mitigation ambition: achieving further mitigation reductions in the future (as needed under the Paris Agreement) will become much more difficult, and more expensive.

Click here for more information on Brazil’s climate targets and policies. For the CAT’s full recommendations for setting NDC targets that form the basis of the analysis above, please click here.