China

Historical emissions data excl. the LULUCF sector for all GHGs was obtained from the PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series and covers the period from 1990 to 2023 ​(Gütschow et al., 2025)​. This data is broken down by gas and sector: energy, industrial process, agriculture, and waste. Historical emissions data for the LULUCF sector are calculated based on the Chinese inventory submitted to the UNFCCC for the years 1994, 2005, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2018, 2020, and 2021, including three Biennial Update Reports (BUR) and the latest Biennial Transparency Report (BTR).

As of June 2025, the CAT uses 100-year Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).

We estimated China‘s energy-related CO₂ emission in 2024 based on growth rates on fossil fuel consumptions reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of China ​(NBS of China, 2025)​ and the total primary energy demand (TPED) from World Energy Outlook (WEO) ​(IEA, 2024b)​ Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) and Global Energy and Climate Outlook (GECO) ​(JRC, 2025)​ reference scenario.

For China’s 2030 NDC targets, we quantify the peaking target, the non-fossil target, renewable energy capacity target (not quantified in this assessment as it has already been achieved), and the carbon intensity target separately. For the quantification of all targets, we also incorporate achievement of the demand-side policies in China’s current policies pathway (CPP).

The elements of China’s targets that we quantify apply to CO₂ only (excl. LULUCF), given the scope of the targets. To calculate total GHG emissions (excl. LULUCF), we add non-CO₂ emissions based on our current policies projections as described below.

Peaking Target:

Since the NDC contains the target of peaking CO₂ emissions before 2030, the implications for what an “NDC scenario” constitutes can be interpreted in a variety of ways—for instance, the least ambitious way would be to assume emissions simply peak by 2030 while a more ambitious interpretation would be to assume that this peaking happens earlier at an arbitrary date. According to our current policy projections, China’s emissions are due to peak around 2025 in both scenarios but either roughly plateau (CPP max) or drop (CPP min). The quantification of the peaking target range is equivalent to the emissions level in our CPP in 2030.

Non-Fossil Target:

China’s NDC non-fossil target has been increased to 25% in 2030 in its updated NDC while China’s 14th FYP includes the now intermediary target of 20% by 2025. In our CPP projections, China is projected to overachieve these targets comfortably.

To calculate energy-related CO₂ emissions based on the 2030 target, we:

• Recalculate the total primary energy demand (TPED) from CPPs scenarios based on WEO STEPS and GECO reference scenario.
• Technology shares for non-fossil sources are decreased to achieve the 25% share target (no more, no less), while coal and gas are assumed to replace the gap from decreased non-fossil sources
• Adjust individual non-fossil energy sources equally based on their relative share of non-fossil energy demand in the CPPs

Renewable Capacity Target:

The NDC includes a target of 1,200 GW of wind and solar installed by 2030. As China has already achieved the target in 2024, it is not quantified in this assessment.

Carbon Intensity Targets:

For the calculation of the intensity targets for 2020 and 2030, we use historical emissions data from China’s most recent inventory submission to the UNFCCC and historical GDP data from World Bank database. GDP projections until 2029 are mainly based on World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) database and supplemented with near-term forecasts from a mix of domestic and international sources (thus establishing an optimistic and pessimistic range for growth). We also integrate the underlying GDP forecast from WEO STEPS 2024 as part of the range ​(IEA, 2024b)​.  We assume that the carbon intensity target applies to all CO₂ emissions excluding LULUCF. The emissions quantification for carbon intensity targets changes annually, due to updated forecasts in China’s GDP trajectory.

A note on the global aggregation:

China’s rating is based on the two NDC emissions targets which are estimated to have the lowest emission levels: the lower end of the carbon intensity target in 2030 and the upper end of the peaking target (which is the CPP max). We employ this method as we try to capture the likely range of China’s emissions levels when achieving their NDC, but there is uncertainty on absolute emission levels as China has several targets: China’s peaking target is guaranteed to be achieved by definition, but which of China’s remaining NDC targets is achieved (or if they all are) is uncertain.

We exclude the most pessimistic interpretations—target with the highest expected emissions—as we would be assuming they emit more than the CPP analysis shows. We also do not take only the most optimistic interpretation—lower bound of China’s carbon intensity target— as this is not constrained target (fluctuating year to year depending on economic forecasts). If we only took one target, we would then be assuming China’s other quantitative targets are completely null. The emission levels of all of China’s targets are dependent on future developments (e.g., growth in energy consumption, GDP). We thus take a median approach to capture the middle range (median) of the two most stringent targets to be conservative: the minimum of the carbon intensity target and the maximum of the next most ambitious target, the peaking target.

Energy-related CO₂ emissions:

For our current policy projections (CPP), we establish an optimistic (CPP min) and a conservative (CPP max) range based on different scenarios projecting the development of China’s energy sector based on policies and developments.

We calculate China’s energy-related CO₂ emissions in 2025 based on our 2024 estimate, assuming constant emissions from 2024 to 2025 at the conservative end. At the optimistic end, we assume total CO₂ emissions decline by 1%, reflecting a continued trend observed in the first half of 2025. At both ends of the range, given the limited time remaining, China is expected to miss the short-term carbon intensity reduction targets set out in its 14th FYP ​(Xinhua News Agency, 2021)​:

• Reduce CO₂ intensity of economy by 18% from 2021 to 2025
• Reduce energy intensity (fossil fuel only) by 13.5% from 2021 to 2025

Emissions for 2030 and 2035 are calculated based on projections from WEO 2024 (for CPP min) and GECO 2024 (for CPP max), with emissions for the intervening years determined through interpolation.

For the CPP min scenario, we start with the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) in IEA WEO 2024—which for China we take as a basis for the current policies scenario as stated policies are highly certain to be achieved in the country— and calculate TPED based on the Chinese methodology of applying the average efficiency of coal-fired power plants to calculate TPED from non-fossil sources (renewables and nuclear) ​(IEA, 2022b)​. We start with an efficiency of 305.5 grams coal equivalent (gce) per kWh (around 8.9 MJ/kWh for Chinese coal-fired power plants), based on NDRC ​(2021)​, which improves over time to 300 gce/kWh in 2025 and 295 gce/kWh in 2030 based on a conservative scenario from IEA ​(2021b)​. This is deemed as an optimistic end of the CPP as it is an ambitious interpretation of current policies and achieves China’s NDC targets. Given that China’s NDC targets are now subsumed under domestic policies, and that China’s current policy developments are highly likely to overachieve its targets, we employ this as a minimum bound.

The scenario assumes that China meets a range of policy targets including:

• 20% non-fossil share of energy mix by 2025 and 25% non-fossil share of energy mix by 2030 ​(Xinhua News Agency, 2021)​
• 50% renewable energy capacity by 2025 ​(SASAC, 2021)​
• 39% non-fossil share and 33% RE share (3300 TWh) in electricity generation for 2025 ​(NDRC and NEA, 2022)​
• Doubling wind and solar generation from 2021 to 2025 ​(L. Wang, 2022)​
• Over 50% of incremental electricity consumption is met by renewables from 2021-2025

This scenario describes an optimistic projection of China’s energy system, now freed from the national shift from dual-energy to dual-carbon controls (no longer limiting energy demand growth in guidance to policymakers and developers). This scenario shows a growing energy demand off the back of an accelerated power sector transformation: energy demand is met by an exponential rise in renewable (wind and solar) development and integration. Renewables can both meet the rise of demand and displace fossil fuels, namely coal consumption.

For the CPP max scenario, we take the reference scenario from GECO 2024 as the starting point. As the GECO projects a future in which TPED is too low to represent a conservative projection, we adjust the TPED in the GECO 2024 reference scenario to align with the levels in our CPP min scenario based on WEO 2024, filling the gap with increased fossil fuel consumption.

The scenario assumes that China achieves the same range of policy targets as in the CPP minimum scenario. China’s 2035 NDC neither strengthens the 2025–2030 climate ambition nor specifies a peak emission cap. Therefore, from a conservative perspective, carbon emissions could plateau at a high level towards 2030. We adopt a cautious approach in the CPP maximum scenario by keeping CO₂ emissions constant at the 2025 level until 2030, effectively delaying emissions reductions beyond the peak year indicated in the previous NDC.

In both scenarios, supply-side targets such as the production capacity of fossil fuels and installed capacity targets from the 14th FYP on energy are not considered binding as these policies will likely result in excess capacity with uncertain outcomes for emissions.

Other CO₂ emissions: 

We project industrial-process CO₂ emissions by applying growth rates from cement production volume based on the IEA WEO 2024 STEPS scenario to our latest 2023 value estimates. CO₂ emissions from industry are now revised to have peaked in 2023, plateauing until 2025—several years earlier than the target outlined in China’s building materials peaking plan ​(MIIT of China, NDRC, MEE, et al., 2022)​.

For the relatively small CO₂ emissions from agriculture, waste, and other sectors, which together account for less than 1% of China’s total CO₂ emissions, we apply the same growth rates used for non-CO₂ emissions in the following section.

Non-CO₂ emissions: 

We apply the growth rates from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s non-CO₂ GHG emission projections to the PRIMAP historical data in energy, agriculture, industrial processes, and waste sectors, respectively ​(US EPA, 2025)​.

We additionally quantify the impacts of the Kigali Amendment on HFCs following the staged phaseout schedule eventually leading to an 80% reduction from baseline levels by 2045.

The officially submitted LTS appears to confirm the commitment covers only carbon dioxide emissions. Due to the 2060 timeframe extending past our scope of analysis, as well as insufficient details in intermediary targets to reach the carbon neutrality target, we take a simplified linear approach for China’s pathway to carbon neutrality.

The government is pursuing expansion of China’s carbon sinks in the LULUCF sector. While specific modelling details of these sinks are not provided, the 2030 NDC commits to increasing forest stock volume by 6bn m3 from the 2005 level, which has already been achieves according to its BTR 1 ​(Government of China, 2022; UNFCCC, 2025b)​. The 2035 NDC enhances the target, aiming at a 24bn m3 forest stock volume. We regress the historical LULUCF sinks from national inventories and forest stock volumes to predict the LULUCF sinks up to 2035, assuming a constant forest volume at 2035 level until 2060, pending new policies beyond 2035. The CAT estimates that net carbon sinks in China’s LULUCF sector will increase from 1,315 MtCO₂e in 2021 to 1,739 MtCO₂e in 2035. Accurate quantification of anthropogenic LULUCF carbon fluxes remains subject to significant uncertainties. While the projected 2035 sink levels may appear overestimated, studies indicate that China’s land-use change carbon sinks have historically been underestimated ​(Zhu et al., 2025)​. With continued forestation efforts, China’s LULUCF carbon sinks could continue to increase towards 2060.

Emissions are established through our current policy projections. For CO₂ (incl. LULUCF), we assume a linear decarbonisation to zero in 2060 from 2030 levels, CO₂ (excl. LULUCF) is thus calculated based on the assumed constant LULUCF sinks. For non-CO₂, we assume a more conservative phaseout path to zero in 2080 from 2030 levels. China’s resulting emissions in 2060 (excl. LULUCF) is then assumed to be the addition of CO₂ (excl. LULUCF) and non-CO₂ GHGs, totalled 2,943 Mt CO₂e. The pathway for all GHG emissions from 2030 to the emissions in 2060 is linearly interpolated.

The CAT uses Global Warming Potential (GWP) values from the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) for all its figures and time series. Assessments completed before June 2025 used GWP values from the IPCC's Forth Assessment Report (AR4). Assessments completed before December 2018 (COP24) used GWP values from the Second Assessment Report (SAR).