Egypt

The CAT rates Egypt’s policies and action as “Almost Sufficient” when compared to their fair-share contribution to climate change mitigation. The “Almost Sufficient” rating indicates that Egypt’s climate policies and action in 2030 are not yet consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C but could be, with moderate improvements. If all countries were to follow Egypt’s approach, warming could be held at—but not well below—2°C.

The rating of Egypt’s policies and action has improved from “Insufficient” to “Almost Sufficient”. This reflects a literature update to our fair share (FS) ranges, aligning our equity approaches with international environmental law and excluding studies based solely on cost-effectiveness. We also incorporated additional recent studies to capture the latest research in the field. Importantly, this adjustment does not indicate any actual improvement in Egypt’s policies compared to our previous assessment.

Egypt is expected to implement additional policies with its own resources to meet its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation. Egypt will need international support to implement policies that drive emission reductions beyond its fair share, to support the global reductions necessary to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement's 1.5˚C warming limit.

Further information on how the CAT rates countries (with modelled domestic pathways and fair shares) can be found here.

The CAT estimates that, under current policies, Egypt’s emission levels will rise to 440–467 MtCO₂e by 2030, about 11–18% above 2023 levels. Egypt could easily overachieve its NDC targets with the policies it already has in place, as they are set above the emission levels already expected under Egypt’s current policies. This means that they can be achieved with existing policies alone, without the need for additional, more ambitious policies. Egypt’s emissions would need to be roughly stabilised at current levels to be in line with a 1.5°C compatible pathway.

Egypt’s main mitigation policies are set out in its latest 2030 NDC, submitted in 2023. In 2022, Egypt launched its 2050 National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS), which does not include an overall emissions reduction goal. The strategy is intended to align with Egypt’s Vision 2030, the national sustainable development framework. The updated Vision 2030 places greater emphasis on sustainable energy and environmental sustainability. Still, it lacks concrete climate mitigation indicators, with the only quantified target being the share of renewables in electricity generation. In late 2024, the government published its first Biennial Transparency Report (BTR1), which provides an updated emissions inventory, progress toward achieving its NDC, and an overview of climate mitigation policies.

Egypt’s renewable energy target has seen repeated revisions, with its original 2016 target of 42% renewable electricity by 2035 brought forward to 2030 in its latest NDC and briefly raised to 58% by 2040 before being scaled back to 40% in late 2024. At COP29, the government reaffirmed the 42% target for 2030, though Prime Minister Madbouly warned it is at risk without greater international support. As of 2024, renewables accounted for just 11% of the electricity mix, showing stagnant growth over the past five years.

Egypt’s 2024 National Strategy for Low-Carbon Hydrogen aims to position the country as a regional hydrogen and ammonia hub, with ambitious export-oriented targets, targeted incentive schemes, and over USD 33 bn in announced investments. While it holds potential for decarbonising hard-to-abate sectors like steel and chemical, the inclusion of blue hydrogen (made with fossil fuels) and the heavy emphasis on exports raise concerns. Without significant renewable energy deployment and safeguards to prioritise domestic decarbonisation, Egypt risks falling short on its green hydrogen production and broader energy transition goals.

Overall, Egypt’s energy system remains dominated by fossil fuels, which accounted for more than 90% of the country’s total energy supply in 2023 (IEA, 2025b). While official targets aim to scale up renewables to 42% by 2030, deployment remains slow due to grid constraints and currency devaluation. Nuclear power has emerged as an energy diversification strategy, with the El Dabaa plant under construction. Meanwhile, fossil fuel extraction and export ambitions (particularly in fossil gas) continue to expand, risking carbon lock-in, stranded assets, and undermining Egypt’s climate commitments.

Egypt's power sector remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels, which generated around 90% of electricity in 2024 (Ember, 2025a). Fossil gas remains the dominant source (81%), followed by oil (8%), hydropower (6%), wind (3%) and solar (3%) (Ember, 2025b). The power sector accounts for almost 40% of the country's total CO₂-related emissions (Ritchie et al., 2020; IEA, 2025b). In its updated NDC, Egypt pledged to reduce emissions in the sector by 37% by 2030 compared to a BAU scenario.

Egypt’s electricity planning framework remains difficult to assess due to limited transparency. The country’s primary roadmap for the energy sector, the Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy (ISES) 2035 has not been updated since its adoption in 2016 by the Supreme Energy Council, Egypt’s top energy decision-making body. Its five-year plans are also difficult to access. Eight scenarios were considered as part of the strategy development. The scenario ultimately adopted sets targets to generate 20% of electricity from renewable sources in 2022, increasing to 42% by 2035. With the updated 2030 NDC, the renewable energy target was revised to 42% of renewable energy in Egypt’s electricity mix by 2030, five year earlier than planned.

Egypt is expanding its power transmission infrastructure to support its energy transition and regional integration efforts. The Saudi Arabia-Egypt electricity interconnection project was set to be fully operational by mid-2025 and will enable the exchange of up to 3 GW of electricity (Power Technology, 2024). This project is the first large-scale high-voltage direct current (HVDC) link in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It is designed to enhance grid flexibility, support peak demand, and facilitate future renewable electricity trade. It aligns with Egypt’s broader grid modernisation efforts (Government of Egypt, 2024). The Electricity Ministry aims to invest EGP 63 bn in grid upgrades by the end of 2025 (Enterprise, 2025a).

Fossil gas and oil

Egypt’s power sector remains heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with fossil gas and oil together generating around 90% of the country’s electricity in 2024 (Ember, 2025b). Over the past two decades, power sector emissions have grown three and a half times, driven by a significant rise in gas generation to keep pace with a tripling in electricity demand (Ember, 2025a). Egypt has not set a phase-out timeline for fossil gas and oil for power generation. Instead, the government is doubling down on domestic fossil fuel production, aiming to restore pre-crisis oil and fossil gas output levels by 2025 to ensure energy security and reduce import dependence (Financial Times, 2024) (see the Industry section below).

While a slower transition is expected for developing countries, they are still urged to phase out unabated fossil fuels by 2040 to stay below the 1.5˚C temperature warming limit. Egypt’s current energy trajectory shows that fossil fuels will continue to dominate the electricity mix, and there is limited evidence of a planned shift away from gas and oil in the near term.

Egypt's energy transition faces significant economic and infrastructure challenges that complicate a rapid fossil fuel phase-out. The country's economy remains highly dependent on fossil fuel revenues, and its power sector has experienced substantial growth in fossil gas-fired generation over the past two decades to meet rising electricity demand.

Renewable energy

Despite having some of the highest solar irradiance levels globally (Rahoma et al., 2025), renewable energy deployment in Egypt has seen minimal progress in the last five years. In 2024, renewables generation only made up around 11% of Egypt’s power mix – a mere 1% increase since 2019 (Moharram et al., 2022; Cohen and Helwa, 2025; Ember, 2025a). Although installed renewable capacity grew by around 35% between 2019 (6 GW) and 2024 (8 GW), growth in absolute generation remained limited, rising from 20 TWh in 2019 to 27 TWh in 2024 (Ember, 2025b). Among renewables, hydropower remains the largest contributor (6%), followed by wind (3%) and solar PV (2%), with bioenergy making up a negligible share.

This slow progress stands in contrast to Egypt’s renewable energy targets, which have undergone multiple revisions in the last few years. The Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy (ISES) from 2016 initially set a goal of 20% renewable electricity by 2022 (which was not achieved), and 42% by 2035. In its latest NDC, the government brought the 42% target forward to 2030. In June 2024, then-Electricity Minister Mohamed Shaker raised the ambition further, announcing a 58% target by 2040 (Reuters, 2024a).

However, just a few months later, in October 2024, Petroleum Minister Karim Badawi revised the 2040 target downward to 40%, signalling a policy shift toward greater reliance on fossil gas (Reuters, 2024a). In November 2024, Egypt reaffirmed its 2030 target of 42% at COP29. Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly reiterated the goal but stressed that it remains at serious risk without increased international support (Reuters, 2024b).

The government has announced plans to add 3 GW of solar and wind capacity by 2025, alongside several high-profile projects, including a 1 GW wind plant in the Gulf of Suez (claimed to be Africa's largest wind project) and 1.2 GW of solar projects with 720 MWh of battery storage (Cohen and Helwa, 2025). However, even if completed on schedule, these projects would still leave Egypt well short of the capacity required to meet its 2030 targets. The government will need to speed up renewable energy installation if it hopes to meet its new 2030 target.

Several systemic barriers impede more rapid renewable deployment, including grid infrastructure limitations to integrate a higher share of variable renewable energy, as well as currency devaluation that has increased the capital cost of imported components (Government of Egypt, 2024). Just as critical as expanding renewable generation is securing sufficient international finance to upgrade the grid infrastructure and accommodate a higher share of renewables.

Nuclear power

Egypt is currently constructing its first nuclear power plant at El Dabaa. The 4.8 GW project, estimated at USD 30 bn, consists of four third-generation pressurised water reactors. The plant is being developed in cooperation with, and largely financed by, the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation (ROSATOM) (Power Technology, 2023).

After multiple delays, construction officially started in mid-2022 (Kumar, 2025). Commercial operation of the first two units is planned for 2030, with the plant projected to contribute around 9% of national electricity generation (World Nuclear News, 2025).

Although nuclear electricity generation does not emit CO₂, the CAT doesn’t consider nuclear as a solution to the climate crisis, due to its risks such as nuclear accidents and proliferation, high and increasing costs compared to alternatives such as renewables, long construction times, incompatibility with flexible supply of electricity from wind and solar and its vulnerability to heat waves.

Coal power

Egypt currently has no operational coal-fired power plants, and as of mid-2025, no new coal plants have been announced or permitted (Global Energy Monitor, 2025). During the 2014 energy crisis, he government started touting coal as a solution to fossil gas shortages and rising electricity demand, incorporating it into Egypt’s Vision 2030. Between 2015 and 2017, several large coal power projects were proposed, including the biggest plant in Hamrawein (6 GW) (Global Energy Monitor, no date). However, the discovery of significant gas fields (particularly the Zohr Field) transformed Egypt's energy landscape. By 2019, Egypt became a net exporter of fossil gas, eliminating the need for coal-based generation. This shift, combined with a growing surplus in electricity capacity, led the government to revise its plans. In 2020, it indefinitely postponed the construction of the planned 6 GW Hamrawein coal-fired power plant and instead decided to pursue alternative renewable energy projects (Daily News Egypt, 2020).

Egypt has since made a formal commitment to stay away from coal-based generation. As a signatory of the Clean Power Transition Statement, Egypt has committed to not building any unabated coal-fired power generation in the future. Coal is no longer part of Egypt’s long-term electricity planning, with latest energy strategies, including the ISES (2035), prioritising renewables, fossil gas, and nuclear energy. Nevertheless, coal continues to be used extensively in Egypt’s industrial sector, particularly in cement production (see the Industry – Cement section).

Fossil fuel subsidy reform

Egypt is implementing comprehensive energy sector reforms that include the gradual removal of subsidies on both electricity and petroleum products, as part of a broader national economic reform program and in line with its commitments under the IMF’s loan agreement (Reuters, 2025a). The main objectives are to reduce fiscal burdens, promote efficient energy use, reduce fuel consumption, and reallocate resources towards cleaner energy (Government of Egypt, 2024).

Since 2014, the government has steadily raised fuel and electricity prices, significantly reducing a subsidy burden that once consumed over 20% of the national budget (WRI, 2021). A fuel price indexation mechanism introduced in 2018 links domestic prices to global oil prices and exchange rates, with a quarterly cap of 10% to contain volatility. In April 2025, fuel prices were increased by up to 15%, with additional hikes planned through the end of the year (Egypt Independent, 2025a).

Despite this progress, Egypt continues to spend around EGP 10 bn (USD 198 million) per month on fuel subsidies as of early 2025 (Reuters, 2025a). While most subsidies are set to be lifted by the end of 2025, the government has confirmed that diesel and butane, essential for transport and household use, will remain partially subsidised to support vulnerable populations (Egypt Independent, 2025b). Prime Minister Madbouly also noted that “cross-subsidisation” between petroleum products will be maintained to balance prices. To mitigate the social impacts, Egypt has transitioned from product-based subsidies to targeted cash assistance (World Bank Group, 2023; Mahmoud, 2025).

Fossil fuel extraction

Fossil fuel extraction is a key pillar of Egypt’s economy, contributing to almost a quarter of Egypt’s GDP in FY 2019-2020 (U.S. ITA, 2022). At its peak in 2019-2020, fossil fuels accounted for nearly a quarter of the country’s national GDP (U.S. ITA, 2021). Hydrocarbon production, particularly fossil gas, remains Egypt’s largest industrial activity, and a core element of its energy and export strategy. The country remains outside the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA) and continues to plan significant expansions in fossil fuel production.

Fossil gas

The government positions fossil gas at the centre of energy strategy, both as a domestic energy source and a key export commodity. Egypt ranks among Africa’s top fossil gas producers: it holds the third-largest proven reserves after Nigeria and Algeria, ranks second in production level after Algeria, has the continent’s highest gas consumption (equivalent to one-third of Africa’s total gas consumption) and the highest CO₂ emissions linked to fossil gas, accounting for nearly 40% of Africa’s total CO₂ emissions (U.S. EIA, 2024).

Egypt has long sought to position itself as a regional gas hub (Al-Jazeera, 2023). The Egyptian government has clearly stated its intention to rapidly increase gas exports to cater to higher demand, in particular from Europe. Following Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine, Egypt ramped up gas exports to European countries (S&P Global, 2023). In mid-2022, the EU signed a deal with Egypt and Israel aimed at increasing the volumes of fossil gas exports to Europe (Reuters, 2023). Between 2020 and 2024, Israel exported around 26 bcm of gas to Egypt, which enables LNG re-exports of about 9 bcm to Europe (Global Witness, 2025).

The discovery of the Zohr field in 2015 fuelled Egypt’s ambitions. Gas production peaked at 0.2 bcm per day in early 2021, following a sharp recovery from post-revolution declines in 2011. However, since then production growth has stalled due to a lack of new fields under development, declining production with maturing fields, and persistent technical issues at Zohr. In early 2025, output had fallen to 0.1 bcm per day (Reuters, 2025c).

Rising domestic demand, exacerbated by extreme summer temperatures and increased industrial use, led to power shortages and a halt in LNG exports in mid-2024 (U.S. EIA, 2024). Despite having invested heavily in gas infrastructure and new power stations over the past decade, Egypt was forced to resume LNG imports during this time, spending USD 6.3 billion on LNG imports (Financial Times, 2024). Recently, Egypt signed a USD 35 bn agreement with Israel to import about 130 bcm of gas through 2040 (Reuters, 2025b).

To reverse this trend, Egypt planned to return fossil fuel production output to “normal levels” and beyond from 2025. The country has launched new investment rounds to boost upstream activity (Financial Times, 2024; Daily News Egypt, 2025a). In March 2025, the Ministry of Petroleum offered seven undeveloped Mediterranean fields and six blocks in the Gulf of Suez and Western Desert, aiming to attract fresh capital, through its digital platform, the Egypt Upstream Gateway (EUG). The government plans to drill 586 exploratory wells by 2030, with estimated investments of USD 7.2 billion (Arab News, 2024).

This fossil gas-centric strategy complicates Egypt’s energy transition and risks jeopardising its decarbonisation efforts. The government continues to promote gas as a “bridging fuel” and is expanding investments across the gas value chain. However, this strategy risks locking Egypt into long-term fossil fuel dependence, making its energy system increasingly vulnerable from energy and climate resilience perspectives. If Egypt continues to prioritise gas over renewables, it faces growing risks of emissions lock-in, stranded assets, and missed economic opportunities in renewable energy. To meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement, no new investments should be made into fossil gas production and exploration.

CAT analysis shows that a high share of renewables in the power sector (82% in 2035) could create an additional 1.8 million jobs compared to the government’s 2035 Energy Strategy - translating to nearly 130,000 additional jobs per year. A high share of renewable energy (82% by 2035) could also avoid more than 5,300 premature deaths linked to air pollution from fossil gas in the next two decades compared to the 2035 Energy Strategy, which foresees over 50% of electricity to be generated with gas in 2035.

Oil

Although Egypt remains among the top five oil producers in Africa, its crude oil production has steadily declined over the past two decades, falling to a multi-decade low of 476,000 barrels per day (Enterprise, 2025c). Most output comes from mature fields in the Western Desert, Gulf of Suez, and Sinai, with limited new discoveries in recent years. In 2024, Egypt stabilised output by supporting the drilling of 95 new wells that added more than 63,000 barrels per day (U.S. EIA, 2024).

As domestic oil production continues to decline, Egypt’s oil trade balance has shifted considerably. In 2023, net crude oil exports accounted for only around 2% of total production, while oil product imports surged to cover nearly 50% of domestic consumption, marking a fourfold increase since 2000 (IEA, 2025c).

To reverse this trend, the government is promoting upstream investment. As of mid-2024, Egypt had signed 145 active oil and gas exploration concessions with 40 partners, including with international oil companies like ENI, BP, Chevron, and Shell. Egypt also raised nearly USD 30 bn by floating shares of five state-owned oil and gas firms on the stock exchange to help finance field development and infrastructure upgrades (Hafez, 2025).

Egypt joined the World Bank’s Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 Initiative in 2018 to end gas flaring in oil production by 2030 and has since made progress in reducing flaring through expanded pipeline networks and digital monitoring (GGFR, 2022; Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, 2023).

Hydrogen and ammonia

Egypt aims to position itself as a regional hub for hydrogen and ammonia production, targeting exports to regions such as Europe and Asia, and boosting the domestic industrial capacity (Ringel et al., 2024). To support this transition, Egypt launched its National Strategy for Low-Carbon Hydrogen in 2024, which aims to promote hydrogen deployment across industry and transport. The strategy outlines two pathways:

• A central scenario targeting 1.5 Mt of green hydrogen annually by 2030 (1.4 Mt for export), rising to 5.8 Mt by 2040 (3.8 Mt for export). This pathway would require 19 GW of renewables and 13 GW of electrolyser capacity by 2030, potentially securing 5% of the global tradable hydrogen market by 2040.
• A more ambitious green scenario aiming for 3.2 Mt by 2030 (2.8 Mt for export) and 9.2 Mt by 2040 (5.6 Mt for export), requiring 41 GW of renewables and 27 GW of electrolyser capacity by 2030. Under this scenario, Egypt could capture up to 8% of the global tradable market.

According to the government’s strategy, green hydrogen is central to decarbonising Egypt’s hard-to-abate sectors such as steel, cement, and fertilisers. A key application is green ammonia production, which replaces conventional fossil-based feedstock in nitrogen fertiliser and fuel use. Key projects include a recently announced USD 33 bn consortium in green hydrogen and ammonia agreements signed in 2024 with major European developers (Reuters, 2024c). Another flagship project is the USD 17 bn green hydrogen facility in South Sinai, set to become the world’s largest, targeting 400,000 tonnes of annual production powered by 3.1 GW of solar energy (Government of Egypt, 2024; Green Hydrogen Organisation, 2025).

These developments are supported by the Green Hydrogen Incentives Law, which offers a range of fiscal and administrative incentives, including tax credits, VAT exemptions, and fast-tracked permitting (ADSERO, 2024). Egypt is also pursuing concessional financing from international donors and climate funds (e.g., Green Climate Fund, European Investment Bank, World Bank), and expanding EU cooperation via the developing Mediterranean Green Hydrogen Partnership (European Commission, 2022; MPED, 2024).

Despite branding its national hydrogen strategy as “green”, Egypt continues to include blue hydrogen derived from fossil gas as part of its low-carbon approach. Blue hydrogen is considered viable due to Egypt’s existing grey hydrogen infrastructure, which could be retrofitted with carbon capture technologies. However, CCS technologies are neither commercially viable nor proven at scale, and the technology doesn't remove 100% of emissions from power plants. Heavily relying on unproven CCS simply prolongs the use of fossil fuels, diverting attention and resources away from the necessary and urgent switch to renewable energy generation that drives down actual emissions.

To be consistent with the 1.5°C temperature limit, Egypt’s hydrogen strategy should focus exclusively on green hydrogen and phase out reliance on fossil-based alternatives. Without a significant acceleration of renewable energy deployment, there is a real risk that hydrogen production in Egypt will rely heavily on fossil-based sources, undermining the strategy’s climate credibility and its alignment with the 1.5°C temperature goal.

The strategy’s strong export focus raises concerns. In both central and ambitious scenarios, most green hydrogen is earmarked for export, which risks redirecting renewable energy from decarbonising Egypt’s fossil fuel-reliant economy. It is crucial that no international incentives encourage Egypt to prematurely export clean energy at the expense of its domestic climate goals. At a minimum, any targets to export green hydrogen should, at the very least, be coupled with a proportional increase in the ambition of current renewable energy targets, which should be supported by significant international financial support.

Cement

Egypt's cement industry is responsible for approximately 14% of the country's CO₂ emissions, (Elghamrawi, 2023). In 2022 alone, the sector emitted approximately 25 MtCO₂, nearly a sixfold increase since 1990. This growth is driven by rising production volumes, the difficulty of decarbonising its process emissions from clinker production, and continued reliance on carbon-intensive fuels (Government of Egypt, 2024).

Following the 2014 energy crisis, coal consumption in Egypt’s industry sector, particularly cement, increased substantially between 2016 and 2018 as fossil gas shortage prompted a shift to coal. Coal use in the sector has since declined but remains relatively high. Between 2013-2022, Egypt consumes an average of 2.8 million tonnes of coal per year mainly for industrial use, all of which is imported, as the country does not produce coal domestically (U.S. EIA, 2024). Coal imports have shown an upward trend in recent years, reaching 6.6 million tonnes in 2024 (Reuters, 2024d).

The Egyptian cement industry has consistently struggled with overcapacity issues, the industry operating at around 50% capacity utilisation over the past five years (Enterprise, 2025e).

In 2016, Egypt developed a Low Carbon Roadmap for the Cement Industry, outlining a series of decarbonisation measures for the industry, which still relies heavily on coal and petcoke, with only about 5-6% coming from waste and refuse-derived fuels in 2015 (Vanderborght et al., 2016). Key strategies include lowering clinker content, improving thermal and electrical efficiency, and increasing the use of alternative fuels. The roadmap also highlights the importance of establishing a monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) system, introducing economic incentives, and strengthening capacity building.

In 2021, a ministerial decree required cement producers to substitute at least 10% of their thermal energy use with Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF) from municipal solid waste (MSW). The decree also introduced a carbon tax equivalent to 1% of the coal/petcoke price, with 0.1% allocated to support RDF producers. Other measures included improving energy efficiency of the production process and reducing the use of clinker in cement production to as low as 80% of the mix, conditional on meeting national standards.

Despite the RDF mandate, progress remains limited (Elghamrawi, 2023). As of 2023, approximately 1.7 million tonnes of MSW were being converted annually into RDF for use in cement factories, out of 8.5 million tonnes treated (Government of Egypt, 2024). While this reflects progress, uptake remains modest. Experts cite the absence of carbon policies with clear incentives and penalties alongside financing difficulties as key barriers slowing the transition. Recent research shows that strengthening the link between the waste and cement sectors could unlock new revenue streams for waste operators, reduce dependence on imported coal, and generate thousands of jobs for the Egyptian labour market (Elghamrawi, 2023).

Beyond emissions, the sector’s health impacts are significant. In 2024, an Alexandria court ordered Titan Cement to compensate residents for respiratory illnesses linked to air pollution from coal burning (EIPR, 2024).

The transport sector accounted for 32% of Egypt’s total energy consumption in 2023 and 26% of CO₂ emissions in 2022 (IEA, 2025a). In its latest NDC, Egypt pledged to reduce emissions in the sector by 7% by 2030 compared to a BAU scenario.

Compressed natural gas use

Compressed natural gas (CNG) has been promoted as a transitional solution for decarbonising Egypt’s vehicle fleet. In 2020, the government launched a programme to convert 400,000 vehicles to CNG, later expanding its ambition to reach 1.5 million conversions (Egypt State Information Service, 2024b). To date, approximately 643,000 vehicles have been converted (Samir, 2025). These efforts are economically motivated; by leveraging domestic fossil gas reserves, the country aims to reduce reliance on imported fuels and lower costs for consumers.

The CNG push also extends to public transport. A large-scale diesel-to-CNG conversion programme led by Egyptian bus manufacturer Geyushi, in cooperation with the Ministry of Local Development and petroleum companies such as Cargas and Gastec, is underway to retrofit over 2,200 buses in Cairo and Alexandria (Sustainable Bus, 2024).

The project involves adapting CNG engines in collaboration with suppliers to ensure compatibility with existing vehicle systems. While CNG is often promoted as a cleaner alternative to oil-fuelled cars, it is by no means a solution for air pollution. CNG-fuelled cars emit a significant amount of particle pollution (ultrafine and PM2.5), and its use risks locking in fossil fuel infrastructure (Transport & Environment, 2020).

Public transport

Egypt has made progress in upgrading and expanding its public transport systems as part of a broader strategy to reduce transport emissions (Government of Egypt, 2024). The Cairo Metro network, a key component of the capital’s mass transit infrastructure, has undergone major expansion in recent years. As of May 2024, the system comprises three operational lines spanning around 110 km and serving nearly four million passengers daily. Several metro lines are currently being extended.

The Cairo Monorail system, projected to be the world’s longest driverless monorail, is currently under construction. With two lines connecting the New Administrative Capital and 6th of October City to Cairo, the system is expected to serve up to one million passengers daily upon completion between 2025 and 2026. Complementing this, a 2,000 km three-lines High-Speed Rail network is being developed to serve 2.5 million passengers and transport 20,000 tonnes of freight daily (Government of Egypt, 2024).

Additional initiatives include the Bus Rapid Transit project along Cairo’s Ring Road, which will operate 100 electric buses across 49 designated stations, integrating with existing metro and LRT lines.

Electric vehicles

Electric vehicles represent just 0.1% of Egypt’s passenger car market, roughly 8,500 registered EVs out of more than five million privately owned vehicles (Albordeny and Hanafy, 2025). Key barriers to adoption include high upfront vehicle costs, limited charging infrastructure, low consumer awareness, and regulatory uncertainty, particularly around import rules and unclear licensing procedures (Nawar, 2025).

Egypt is looking to accelerate EV adoption through its recently revised Automotive Industry Development Programme (AIDP), which offers a broad range of fiscal incentives to stimulate local manufacturing (Daily News Egypt, 2025b).

Recent developments show growing investment in domestic EV production. In October 2024, China’s BAIC and Alkan Auto agreed to build an EV factory in Egypt, targeting 20,000 units in 2025, with plans to scale-up to 50,000 by the fifth year and achieve 48-58% local content. A separate deal with FAW, signed in May 2024, aims to start production in early 2025 with 65% local components (Nasr, 2024). Regionally, Egypt partnered with Jordan, the UAE, and Bahrain in 2023 to build three joint EV manufacturing plants (Zawya, 2023).

Infrastructure development remains a key challenge. A state-owned EV charging company, launched in 2022, has yet to meet its 3,000-station target. Infinity, the largest private player, had built over 700 charging points across 16 governorates by early 2025 and plans to reach 1,000 by year-end (Enterprise, 2025d).

A recent regulatory decision to mandate the European Combined Charging System Type 2 (CCS2) standard has rendered around 80% of existing public EV fast chargers, primarily built for Chinese vehicles, unusable, disrupting service for most EV users (Enterprise, 2025b). The abrupt move threatens to stall EV adoption and strand recent infrastructure investments. Industry groups have called for a transitional period to protect existing users and avoid derailing the country’s clean transport goals.

The buildings sector accounted for approximately 4% of Egypt’s total emissions in 2022, with energy demand met primarily by electricity (60%), followed by fossil fuels (30%) and biomass (10%) (Climate Analytics, 2025). Electricity demand in the sector has surged, fuelled by rapid population growth, urbanisation, rising living standards, and a growing reliance on air conditioning amid hotter and longer summers. In response, Egypt has introduced a range of policies and measures focusing on the promotion of energy-efficient appliances, rooftop solar, and green buildings.

Since the mid-2000s, Egypt has had a regulatory framework for green buildings (defined as those meeting specific energy efficiency and sustainability standards), with building codes introduced for residential (2005), commercial (2009), and government buildings (2010).

Egypt’s primary strategy for energy efficiency is outlined in its latest National Energy Efficiency Action Plan, which supports two national certification systems developed by the Egyptian Green Building Council: the Green Pyramid Rating System (GPRS) and Tarsheed, both designed to help buildings meet performance requirements tailored to Egypt’s local climate, economic, and environmental context (El-Hendy et al., 2022). International certification schemes, such as the Excellence in Design for Greater Efficiencies (EDGE) and the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) are also gaining traction. Nevertheless, the market remains at an early stage of development (EDGE, 2024).

Several large-scale public initiatives have driven early progress. The “Housing for All” programme, Egypt’s flagship affordable housing scheme, incorporates GPRS standards and has delivered 7,000 certified housing units, with an additional 25,000 planned by 2030 (Government of Egypt, 2024). Similarly, the “Decent Life” (Haya Karima) initiative, targeting rural development, has mobilised over EGP 298 bn in infrastructure investment, with some villages achieving green building certification under the Tarsheed system (Egypt State Information Service, 2024a). Additionally, the country reported that its Electricity Distribution Companies have distributed 156 million LED lamps in residential and other buildings (Government of Egypt, 2024).

In contrast, the deployment of rooftop solar PV has been limited. Key initiatives include the installation project in the New Administrative Capital (18 MWp across 64 government buildings) and plans to equip over 7,200 public secondary schools with solar panels as part of the broader Energy Efficiency Improvement Project (Government of Egypt, 2024).

In 2023, the waste sector accounted for around 9% of Egypt’s total GHG emissions (Gütschow et al., 2024). The country generates an estimated 100 million tonnes of waste annually, including approximately 20-26 million tonnes of municipal solid waste (MSW) (Government of Egypt, 2024; Faragalla et al., 2025). MSW is largely organic (50-60%), which creates challenges for recycling and energy recovery due to high moisture content and low calorific value. While urban collection rates are relatively high, disposal practices overall remain inefficient: the majority of collected MSW is dumped in uncontrolled sites, and only a small percentage is recycled, composted, or sent to sanitary landfills (Government of Egypt, 2024; Faragalla et al., 2025).

To address this, the government enacted the Waste Management Regulation Law. National targets aim to improve collection efficiency to 95%, treat 60% of collected waste through mechanical and biological treatment (MBT), and reduce landfill disposal to no more than 20% by 2025 (Government of Egypt, 2024). As of the latest reports, 48 MBT lines are operational, treating 8.5 million tonnes annually and producing 4.3 million tonnes of compost and 1.7 million tonnes of refuse-derived fuel (RDF), largely used in the cement sector (Government of Egypt, 2024). At least six uncontrolled dumpsites have been closed and replaced with 21 operational sanitary landfills (Government of Egypt, 2024).

A key mitigation focus is the scale-up of waste-to-energy (WtE). As part of this strategy, Egypt aims 20% of treated waste for energy recovery and developing 300 MW of WtE capacity by 2026 (Government of Egypt, 2024). The government has introduced several policies to support this including a specific feed-in tariff, a mandate requiring the partial substitution of fossil fuels with refuse-derived fuels in the cement industry, and a carbon tax set at 1% of the coal/pet-coke price (Government of Egypt, 2024). A USD 3 billion waste-to-hydrogen project in the Suez Canal Economic Zone has also been announced in 2022 (Waya, 2022).

In 2023, methane accounted for approximately 15% of Egypt’s total emissions (Gütschow et al., 2024). Nationally, methane emissions are primarily concentrated in three sectors: waste (70%), agriculture (19%), and energy (11%). In 2022, Egypt joined the Global Methane Pledge, committing to contribute to the global goal of reducing methane emissions by 30% by 2030. Egypt’s 2023 NDC includes a specific target to cut flaring in the oil and gas sector by more than half by 2030 from 2015 levels.

Egypt has reduced flaring by an average of 6% per year in the six years leading up to 2022 due to operational improvements driven by flare capture projects (Capterio and Clean Air Task Force, 2022). Between 2018 and 2022, Egypt implemented 23 gas recovery projects and launched zero-flaring initiatives in key oil-producing regions (Government of Egypt, 2024).

The Ministry of Petroleum has also begun developing a monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) system, including a preliminary digital platform for data collection. However, methane leak detection and quantification systems remain limited in coverage and transparency. Egypt continues to flare a significant volume of gas, and its flaring intensity remains twice the global average (Capterio and Clean Air Task Force, 2022).

It remains uncertain whether Egypt’s current measures are sufficient to meet its methane reduction commitments, particularly given the planned expansion of oil and gas production. Moreover, Egypt lacks clear and quantified targets for the waste and agriculture sector, both major methane sources. The latter is notably absent from the NDC and lacks any concrete mitigation strategy. To close these gaps, Egypt must adopt stronger regulatory frameworks, expand leak detection and repair programs, and develop targeted strategies for the agriculture and waste sectors.