Türkiye

We rate Türkiye’s current policies and action as “Highly insufficient” when compared to its fair share contribution as this metric is more favourable than the modelled domestic pathways. The “Highly insufficient” rating indicates that Türkiye’s policies and action in 2030 lead to rising, rather than falling, emissions and are not at all consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. If all countries were to follow Türkiye’s approach, warming could reach over 3°C and up to 4°C.

The CAT estimates that Türkiye’s emissions will be between 537-634 MtCO₂e in 2030 (excluding LULUCF) under current policies and action. Türkiye is on track to achieve its updated NDC target based on our emissions estimate for 2030 under current policies.

Türkiye’s policies and action rating has changed from “Critically insufficient” in the previous rating to “Highly insufficient”. The rating change is due to an update in methodology of the quantification of the current policies and action range. Previously, our method for quantifying the current policy pathway relied heavily on the ‘With Measures’ (WM) scenario developed by Türkiye for its 2015 INDC with a historic base year of 2012. Türkiye has not updated its WEM scenario since then and states that it does not reflect the current state of its policy landscape (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2023). We have therefore chosen to update our methodology. For a full explanation of our assumptions behind the current policy pathway, please see the ‘Assumptions’ tab.

Türkiye needs to focus on adopting further policies and action to stop its emissions growth and start reducing emissions towards decarbonisation.

A key feature of Turkish policy planning involves reducing its reliance on fossil fuel imports. In 2022 alone, Türkiye’s net energy trade deficit was USD 81 bn, placing a burden not only on its economy but also leaving it vulnerable to volatile commodity markets and geopolitical shifts (Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası (Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye), 2023; Ugurtas, 2022). Increasing energy independence is therefore a strategic goal of the Turkish government, with diversification of the energy mix central to government policy.

Managing energy demand is a first step to reducing reliance on imported fossil fuels. The energy intensity of Türkiye’s economy is low and decreased by a further 6.2% in 2022 compared to the previous year (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2024b). However, it is also the fastest growing energy consumer in the OECD (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Through its 2030 Energy Efficiency Strategy and Action Plan, Türkiye aims to reduce energy consumption by 16% by investing USD 20 bn in energy efficiency projects (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2024b). If realised, these investments could allow Türkiye to decouple energy consumption from economic growth and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Türkiye intends to have 120 GW of installed wind and solar capacity by 2035. Along with hydropower and biomass, Türkiye’s installed renewable capacity in 2035 will be 160 GW (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2024c; Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2022). Meeting the wind and solar targets will involve bringing at least 7.5–8 GW online every year, significantly more than what was envisioned in Türkiye’s 2022 National Energy Plan. However, implementation will need to shift up a gear, as the country is struggling to meet even its National Energy Plan’s targets due to a slower than planned renewables rollout. For instance, 2023 saw the least wind capacity in 13 years added to the grid. Regularity changes including streamlining the permitting process and improving investment conditions are intended to stimulate private investment in renewable energy projects.

Despite the improved commitment to renewables, Türkiye is yet to commit to a phase-out plan for coal or fossil gas, which need to be taken out of the energy mix in the 2030s if Türkiye is to align with the 1.5°C temperature goal (Robins, 2023; Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2022). Instead, Türkiye plans to become a fossil gas hub and expand coal capacity (Robins, 2023; Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2022). If Türkiye is serious about its net zero emissions target, then it will need to introduce a plan to phase out fossil fuels.

The most significant piece of industrial policy of the last year has been the introduction of an Emissions Trading System (ETS) in line with the EU’s ETS. This will likely be the backbone of emissions reductions in Türkiye’s industry sector and will help mitigate some of the more severe impacts of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). CBAM will levy a carbon tax on some product groups imported into the EU if they fail to align with EU emissions standards (European Commission, 2024).

Ramping up production of Türkiye’s domestically produced electric vehicle (EV), the Togg, and high-speed electric trains forms an important part of Türkiye’s industrial strategy which can support domestic uptake while opening a new revenue stream from exports. Türkiye also plans to invest USD 298 bn up to 2053 in the transport sector. Sectoral targets include increasing the share of rail in passenger transport to 5.31% and to 20.12% in freight transport by 2035, up from 2019 levels of 0.89% and 3.13%, respectively (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, 2023).

Fossil fuels continue to meet 58% of Türkiye’s electricity supply (Ember, 2024a). Reliance on fossil fuel imports has driven efforts to diversify the mix, though imported coal in particular continues to drain Turkish finances and imperil efforts to align with 1.5°C (Ember, 2024a; Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası (Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye), 2023).

Türkiye’s power sector is thus a tale of two stories; wind and solar are on the rise, and coal is on the rise. Just as there are efforts to speed up the rollout of renewable energy, Türkiye is also on track to become the largest producer of coal-fired electricity in Europe by 2025, when it is expected to overtake Germany (Ember, 2024c).

Continued reliance on coal runs counter to any serious attempt at achieving Türkiye’s stated goal of net zero emissions by 2053, just as it makes Türkiye an outlier on the European continent (Ember, 2024c; Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 2021). Meanwhile, Türkiye continues to pour money into oil and gas exploration, with plans for 270 drilling operations in 2025 (Türkiye Today, 2024a).

A 1.5°C compatible Turkish power sector does not require a full scale course correction; a renewables rollout has already begun. What is needed now is to double down on renewables by rolling out wind and solar faster – to 90 GW by 2030 and 150 GW by 2035 – while developing a fossil fuel phase out plan.

Coal

Coal’s share in the electricity mix remains on an upward trend accounting for 37% of electricity generation in 2023 (Ember, 2024a). This stands in sharp contrast with what is needed to limit warming to 1.5°C, which would see Türkiye cut coal’s share in electricity generation to 0-3% by 2035.

Türkiye has not adopted COP26’s coal exit. Although going into 2024 the Turkish government was openly supporting the exploitation the country’s coal reserves and had approved deforestation in order to expand coal mines, local resistance and legal action have led to the cancellation of vast majority of planned coal projects (Global Energy Monitor, 2024; Global Energy Monitor et al., 2024; Hummer et al., 2024). This trend is emblematic of wider global trends, whereby citizen opposition, mounting financial risks and decreasing investment interest have led to the cancellation of projects (Global Energy Monitor, 2024; World Resources Institute, 2023).

The exploitation of Türkiye’s domestic coal reserves – and the subsequent cancellation of those plans – only tells half the story. Although plans to exploit domestic coal reserves were intended to reduce dependency on imported fossil fuels, Türkiye continues to be heavily reliant on imported Russian coal. In 2023, around half of Türkiye’s coal capacity was met by foreign imports, racking up a significant import bill (Ember, 2024b). For example, the long-delayed 1.32 GW Hunutlu power plant, whose first-generation unit came online in June 2022, uses coal exclusively imported from Russia due to lower costs (Pitel & Kıraç, 2022).

Cancelling the majority of planned coal capacity is a positive step towards weaning the country off coal. The Turkish government should now develop a coal phase-out plan to align with 1.5°C and ensure an orderly and just transition for Turkish coal communities.

Gas

Fossil gas made up 21% of Türkiye’s electricity supply in 2023 (Ember, 2024a). Despite 1.5°C benchmarks showing that share falling to 0-3% by 2035 (Climate Action Tracker, 2023b). Türkiye intends to rely on gas to generate 19% of electricity in 2035 and aims to become a gas trading hub (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2022).

In recent years, Türkiye has strategically focused on diversifying its gas resources. Russia has long been Türkiye’s main supplier of fossil gas. Efforts to diversify supply have seen the share of Russian gas in total gas imports fall from 58% in 2013 to 42% in 2023 (Energy Market Regulatory Authority, 2023, 2024). Other major suppliers include Azerbaijan, Iran, and the US (Energy Market Regulatory Authority, 2024).

Diversifying gas supply has also taken the form of increasing domestic production. The discovery of the Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea has been Türkiye’s largest fossil gas discovery to date (Daily Sabah, 2022b; IEA, 2021). Production began in 2023, and supply from the Sakarya gas field is expected to grow in the coming years (Energy Market Regulatory Authority, 2024; Offshore Technology, 2023). Oil and gas exploration is a core priority for the Turkish government, with 2024 seeing record extraction and plans for 270 drilling operations in 2025 (Daily Sabah, 2024; Türkiye Today, 2024a).

In 2024, Türkiye signed a gas deal with Hungary; this deal represents the first time Türkiye will be exporting gas to a European country that is not its neighbour (Gavin, 2024). While European negotiators have been open to continuing talks with Türkiye surrounding a gas hub even after the collapse of talks related to Türkiye’s accession to the EU, it is difficult to see European investments directed towards a Turkish gas hub in the medium term as the continent decarbonises from fossil fuels (Siccardi, 2024).

Existing global fossil gas infrastructure already supplies the volumes of gas required. Any addition therefore risks becoming a stranded asset (Climate Action Tracker, 2022). Aside from the risk of stranded assets connected to a fossil gas hub, expanding domestic gas consumption also runs counter to Türkiye’s Paris Agreement obligations. If Türkiye intends to achieve net zero by 2053, it needs to focus on decreasing the share of gas in the energy mix, instead gearing investments towards renewables (Güllü et al., 2023).

Aligning with 1.5°C would see fossil gas effectively phased out of Türkiye’s power sector by the mid-2030s (Climate Action Tracker, 2023a).

Renewables

In 2023, Türkiye ranked 11th in the world in terms of installed renewables capacity, with 58.5 GW of capacity already online (over half of which came from hydro) (IRENA, 2024; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2024a). According to the recently-announced Roadmap for Renewable Energy to 2035, Türkiye intends to increase its total wind and solar capacity to 120 GW by 2035 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2024c). This will involve bringing at least 7.5–8 GW of wind and solar online every year until 2035, a significant increase on its previous goal of 5 GW of annual additions (Kazanci, 2024; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2024a).

This is commendable, and the ratcheting up of ambition reflects a growing appreciation that renewables represent the cheapest and cleanest way of increasing Türkiye’s energy independence. Nevertheless, it is not yet enough for Türkiye to be considered 1.5°C aligned. A 1.5°C compatible Turkish power sector would see wind and solar capacity reach 150 GW by 2035, 30 GW more than its current 120 GW target (NewClimate Institute and Climate Analytics, 2024).

Türkiye’s increased ambition will need to spark increased implementation. Since the National Energy Plan was released in 2022, the country has struggled to meet the annual targets. In 2023, 2 GW of solar and just 411 MW of wind capacity – the lowest annual wind rollout in 13 years - was added (Ember, 2024c). Considering Türkiye’s heavy investments in fossil fuels, missing its renewables targets is tough to justify, particularly given the strategic importance of increasing energy independence.

To speed up the rollout, Türkiye aims to reduce permitting times for new projects from 48 months to less than two years (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2024c). As the private sector is expected to cover the bulk of the costs for the renewable energy transition (Climate Investment Funds, 2024), faster returns on investments should in turn stimulate more investment. A more competition-based model will be encouraged through the use of tenders, and the government will hold a tender for 2 GW of wind and solar each year (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2024c). Regulatory adjustments which offer a floor price and long-term electricity purchase guarantees to investors aim to improve investment conditions for renewable projects (EnergyNews, 2024).

USD 108 bn of public and private investment will be needed to achieve the target, of which USD 28 bn will go towards upgrading the transmission infrastructure (EnergyNews, 2024). This is designed to expand the transmission system in order to improve interconnectivity for the introduction of greater renewable capacity (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2024a; Spasić, 2023).

Nuclear

Efforts to meet growing energy demand while reducing dependency on fossil fuel imports have seen Türkiye include nuclear power in its energy portfolio (Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, 2023). With support from Russia, Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, is expected to begin supplying energy in 2025 (World Nuclear News, 2024). Türkiye aims to bring 7.2 GW of nuclear capacity online by 2035, which would account for 4% of electricity supply (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2022).

A second proposed nuclear power plant in the northern city of Sinop has been in the works since 2013, when Türkiye signed an agreement with Japan (Daily Sabah, 2019). However, in 2020 the partnership between Japan and Türkiye to build the 4.5 GW nuclear power plant fell apart (Hürriyet Daily News, 2020). The Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation has given a positive environmental impact assessment (EIA) to the Sinop project, though the government is still seeking project partners (Shaw, 2024). Türkiye is also in advanced negotiations with China to build another nuclear power plant in Thrace, near the Greek border (Nuclear Business Platform, 2024).

While nuclear power can reduce the emissions intensity of the Turkish power system, fears exist around the potential impact of earthquakes in the region (Hadjicostis & Mcdermott, 2023). There has been considerable opposition towards nuclear energy as a result, with safety considerations around seismic activity a concern for local communities (Temocin, 2018). The uncertainties and risks around nuclear construction make the technology unreliable in terms of planning the necessary power system decarbonisation, which needs to happen globally by 2050.

Although nuclear electricity generation does not emit CO₂, the CAT does not see nuclear as the solution to the climate crisis due to its risks such as nuclear accidents and proliferation, high and increasing costs compared to alternatives such as renewables, long construction times, incompatibility with flexible supply of electricity from wind and solar, its vulnerability to heat waves, and security issues.

Türkiye’s industry sector accounts for 25% of total emissions (excl. LULUCF) (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2023). This share is split between industrial processes (13%) and energy use (12%). The manufacturing industry alone represents over a fifth of Turkish GDP (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2024a), so decoupling economic growth from emissions will be critical to Turkish industry on the path to net zero.

Cement, iron and steel production account for the majority of process-related emissions (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2024a). These industries will be negatively impacted by the EU’s Carbon Adjustment Border Mechanism (CBAM), which will be fully introduced in 2026 (European Commission, 2024). CBAM places a carbon price on goods imported into the EU. Given that the EU represents an important trading partner for Türkiye, decarbonising the industrial sector will be essential to maintaining industrial competitiveness.

Türkiye has announced the launch of an Emissions Trading System (ETS) largely modelled on the EU’s ETS (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2024a). This is a market mechanism which caps how much GHGs a company can emit, with the cap gradually declining over time. The pilot phase of Türkiye’s ETS will begin in October 2024, with full implementation planned for two years later, in October 2026 (Barut & Kesikli, 2024).

Critically, the ETS will also be applied to the shipping sector. By setting a carbon price on emissions from ships entering and exiting Turkish ports, Turkish policy is aligned with EU policy, thus closing potential loopholes which shipping companies could use to avoid carbon prices (Safety4Sea, 2024).

The ETS is a central pillar of Türkiye’s climate legislation, and the government has been clear in communicating specific details about the policy (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2024b), more so due to its trade implications than climate. Developing clear policies with actionable targets and measures are critical for ministries to successfully reduce emissions. The government’s drafting and communication of the ETS can therefore be followed when developing future climate policies.

Transport emissions account for around 16% of Türkiye’s GHG emissions (excl. LULUCF), or 91 MtCO₂e (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2023). The largest share of emissions comes from road transportation, which more than tripled between 1990 and 2021 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2023).

In line with increasing road transport emissions, the number of vehicles on Turkish roads has almost tripled since 1990 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2024a). Nevertheless, there are 161 motor vehicles per 1000 inhabitants in Türkiye, which is far less than in developed countries (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2024a). In the EU, for instance, this figure is 560 per 1000 inhabitants (Eurostat, 2024).

Turkish transport policy is therefore at a crossroads. As the economy continues to grow, so too will vehicle ownership. Putting in place incentives and infrastructure designed to increase electric vehicle (EV) uptake will allow Türkiye to expand vehicle ownership sustainably. Türkiye aims to place EVs at the heart of industrial policy through the manufacturing of its first domestically produced EV, the Togg (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Industry and Technology, 2022).

Türkiye adopted the COP26 declaration on accelerating the transition to 100% zero emission cars and vans, but has not introduced policy at national level with a firm commitment to expanding the market share of zero emission vehicles to 100% by 2040. However, Türkiye does aim to increase the market share of EVs to 35% by 2030 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Industry and Technology, 2022). Its domestic EV production gives it an advantage in terms of meeting the goals of the COP26 declaration, and Togg sales have already driven a substantial increase in EV sales in Türkiye (Kasapovic & Knowles, 2024). A stronger target in line with its COP26 commitment can allow Türkiye to achieve 100% zero emission sales by 2040.

Rolling out EV infrastructure is critical to supporting their uptake. The government aims to establish a fast-charging network by providing grant support to private sector actors (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2023), as well as supporting drivers’ access to public charging stations at a regulated price (Kaya, 2022). However, EV infrastructure is not being rolled out fast enough. There are 12.5 EVs per charging point. In contrast, there are 3-to-1 in the Netherlands and Belgium, and 5-to-6 in Italy (Hürriyet Daily News, 2024).

A modal shift towards rail will form an important aspect of reducing emissions in line with 1.5°C. Türkiye aims to increase the share of freight transport by rail to 20.12% by 2035 and the share of passenger transport by rail to 5.31% by 2035, up from 2019 levels of 0.89% and 3.13%, respectively (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2023). Ongoing measures to achieve this include significant investments in modernising its rolling stock and constructing new lines between major cities (Railway Gazette International, 2024; Railway Supply, 2024). Türkiye also aims to become producer of high-speed electric trains which it can use domestically as well as export. Similar to the Togg, Türkiye sees domestic manufacturing of electric trains as a way to blend industrial policy with environmental goals.

Türkiye had a small LULUCF sink of 47 MtCO₂ in 2021, while Türkiye’s total emissions were 517.2 MtCO₂ (incl. LULUCF). The sink is diminishing, however, due in large part to the government’s increase in wood production (Climate Transparency, 2022). Türkiye has also suffered from increasingly severe wildfires in recent years (Global Forest Watch, 2023).

Türkiye was successful in meeting its target of increasing its forest land to cover 30% by 2023 (Kübra Ağaçyetiştiren, 2024; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2024a).

Türkiye signed the forestry pledge at COP26. The updated NDC does not specifically mention the declaration; however, the main mitigation policies in the LULUCF section do aim to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030.

Methane is responsible for around 16% of Turkiye’s emissions and comes predominantly from agriculture and waste (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment Urbanisation and Climate Change, 2023). Türkiye has not signed the global methane pledge.