China

Historical emissions data excl. the LULUCF sector for all GHGs was obtained from the PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series and covers the period from 1990 to 2024 (Gütschow et al., 2025). This data is broken down by gas and sector: energy, industrial process, agriculture, and waste. Historical emissions data for the LULUCF sector are sourced from the Chinese inventories submitted to the UNFCCC, including three Biennial Update Reports (BUR) and the latest Biennial Transparency Report (BTR), we have interpolated between missing years (Government of China, 2025).As of June 2025, the CAT uses 100-year Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).

We estimated China‘s energy-related CO₂ emission in 2024 based on growth rates on fossil fuel consumptions reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of China ​(NBS of China, 2025)​ and the total primary energy demand (TPED) from World Energy Outlook (WEO) ​(IEA, 2024b)​ Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) and Global Energy and Climate Outlook (GECO) ​(JRC, 2025)​ reference scenario.

Energy-related CO₂ emissions

For the current policy projections (CPP), the CAT has derived a conservative (CPP max) and an optimistic (CPP min) range from the IEA World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2025, harmonised with historical energy consumption data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and supplemented by additional calculations that account for recent policy developments in the energy sector (IEA, 2025; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2026).

The CPP max scenario is based on the IEA WEO 2025 Current Policies Scenario (CPS), which reflects a snapshot of policies and regulations already in place and adopts a generally cautious view of the pace at which new energy technologies are deployed across the energy system.

The CPP min scenario is based on the WEO 2025 Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), which additionally incorporates policies that have been formally announced or tabled but not yet adopted, as well as relevant official strategy documents indicating future policy directions. Compared to CPS, STEPS assumes lower barriers to the deployment of new technologies.

Key assumptions and quantified policies underpinning CPS and STEPS are documented in Annex B of the WEO report (IEA, 2025).

The CAT assesses key targets from China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), with detailed in the table below (National People’s Congress of China, 2026; NDRC, 2026).

Based on IEA WEO 2025 projections, most targets are already met in both the CPP max and CPP min scenarios, indicating that they are conservative relative to the IEA outlook. The target of doubling non-fossil fuel supply adds significant ambition to the baseline scenarios and is quantified separately in the CPP min.

Energy-related CO₂ emissions in 2025 are estimated using fossil fuel consumption data reported by the NBS and emission factors from the IEA WEO CPS.

Other CO₂ emissions:

Projections of China’s CO₂ emissions outside the energy sector are derived by applying assumed change rates to historical data from PRIMAP.

Cement production is a key determinant of industrial process emissions and represents China’s second-largest source of CO₂ emissions after power generation. Industry sector CO₂ emissions are thus projected using growth rates aligned with changes in China’s cement production volumes based on the IEA WEO CPS and 2025 national statistics.

For the comparatively smaller sources of non-energy CO₂ emissions from agriculture, waste, and other sectors, which together account for less than 1% of China’s total CO₂ emissions, the same growth rates as those assumed for sectoral non-CO₂ emissions are applied. These assumptions are described in further detail in the following section.

Non-CO₂ emissions:

Projections of China’s non-CO₂ emissions are derived by applying sectoral growth rates are taken from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) projections for non-CO₂ greenhouse gas emissions in the energy, agriculture, industrial processes, and waste sectors (EPA, 2025). In addition, the impacts of the Kigali Amendment on HFC emissions are explicitly quantified, following the staged phase-down schedule that results in an 80% reduction from baseline levels by 2045.

China has multiple targets in its 2030 and 2035 NDC. Except for the targets on forest volume increase, these targets are quantified separately based on CPPs, with assumptions detailed in the table below.

China’s NDC targets can be translated into a range of emissions pathways, as they are not derived from an integrated scenario analysis but instead reflect ambition across different policy dimensions. The absolute GHG emissions levels implied by China’s NDC targets, excluding the forest stock volume target, are summarised below.

To quantify China’s NDC outcomes for use in CAT ratings and global aggregation, a median approach is applied, selecting the middle range defined by the two most stringent targets to adopt a conservative interpretation. The most pessimistic interpretations (those associated with the highest expected emissions) are excluded as including these would imply emissions levels exceeding those projected under the CPPs. This reflects China’s typical approach of formulating climate commitments conservatively, which does not fully capture its underlying mitigation action.

For this assessment, conducted in the first half of 2026, the quantification of the 2030 NDC is based on the min-emissions implied by the non-fossil energy share target and the max-emissions implied by the carbon intensity target. For 2035, the quantification combines the min- with the max-emissions implied by the non-fossil energy share target.

China has committed to achieving carbon neutrality before 2060. The officially submitted Long-Term Strategy (LTS) indicates that this commitment applies to CO₂ emissions only. Given that the 2060 target year lies beyond the main scope of this assessment and that limited information is available on intermediate milestones, a simplified linear approach is adopted to extend China’s emissions pathway towards carbon neutrality, using the current policy projections as the basis.

The LULUCF sector is assumed to act as a net carbon sink in China. Net LULUCF emissions are estimated by harmonising projections from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) with historical data from China’s national inventories (PBL, 2025). IIASA’s projections are for the period 2025 to 2035, reflecting data availability constraints. Due to the high uncertainty associated with LULUCF emissions, net LULUCF sinks are assumed to remain constant from 2035 to 2060.

For CO₂ emissions incl. LULUCF, a linear decline from 2035 levels to carbon neutrality in 2060 is assumed. CO₂ emissions excl. LULUCF are derived accordingly, based on the assumed net LULUCF sinks. For non-CO₂ GHGs, a more conservative phase-out pathway is assumed, reaching net zero in 2080 from 2035 levels. Under these assumptions, China’s total emissions in 2060 excl. LULUCF consist of residual CO₂ emissions offset by LULUCF carbon sinks and ongoing non-CO₂ GHG emissions. Total emissions between 2030 and 2060 are linearly interpolated along this pathway.

China’s GHG emissions in 2060 are calculated as 2.5 Gt CO2e (excl. LULUCF), comprising 1.2 Gt CO₂e of non-CO₂ GHG emissions and 1.3 Gt CO₂ emissions that are offset by net removals in the LULUCF sector.

The CAT uses Global Warming Potential (GWP) values from the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) for all its figures and time series. Assessments completed before June 2025 used GWP values from the IPCC's Forth Assessment Report (AR4). Assessments completed before December 2018 (COP24) used GWP values from the Second Assessment Report (SAR).