Brazil

Brazil shows a mixed picture with new progressive climate policies and expansion of fossil fuels at the same time. During 2025 and 2026, Brazil adopted new economy-wide policies aimed at sustainable development, job creation and environmental restoration, including commitments to end net deforestation by 2030 and significantly expand renewable energy capacity. However, Brazil’s climate action remains inconsistent with the 1.5°C warming limit. Continued expansion of oil and fossil gas production, including new drilling in the Amazon, directly contradicts both Brazil’s climate leadership ambitions and the Paris Agreement goals.

Brazil’s 2035 NDC is not 1.5°C aligned and the gap between its target and a 1.5°C modelled domestic pathway has grown compared to 2030. This is not an ambitious target for Brazil as it heavily relies on planned land-use sink rather than decarbonising all sectors of the economy. Brazil’s decarbonisation of the economy is significantly slower than what we had initially assumed for 2030, while our emissions projections for current policies for 2030 are now higher, compared to our previous update.

Brazil’s overall CAT rating of its climate targets and actions has worsened from “Insufficient” to “Highly Insufficient”.

Brazil’s recent domestic policies highlight renewed political engagement with climate action, including ambitious forest protection and restoration targets, new sectoral mitigation and adaptation strategies, and economy-wide policy frameworks such as the Ecological Transformation Plan. This domestic engagement has been reinforced by Brazil’s recent international climate leadership roles and its hosting of COP30 in November 2025.

However, this policy momentum is undermined by Brazil's continued expansion of oil and gas production. Long-term plans and major public investment programmes continue to support fossil fuel development, with no fixed timeline for a phase-out. This includes the approval for drilling of oil in the Amazon Basin and the passing of the General Environmental Licensing Law, also referred to as the "Devastation Bill" (PL 2.159/2021), both passed at the end of 2025, significantly weakening environmental licensing rules. Expanding oil and fossil gas production contradicts the Paris Agreement goals and raises concerns about long-term fossil fuel lock-in.

More ambitious action and expansion of fossil fuels cancel each other out, leaving our estimate of emissions under current policies slightly higher than in our previous assessments a year ago. Emissions under current policies (excluding LULUCF) are expected to slightly increase over the rest of the decade. Yet, Brazil would need to peak and rapidly decrease emissions to align with 1.5°C compatible pathways.

Brazil’s 2035 NDC targets a 59–67% reduction in net GHG emissions below 2005 levels by 2035. According to our analysis, this target is not 1.5°C aligned. Brazil did not strengthen its 2030 target and indicated it may use Article 6 to sell up to 200 MtCO₂e in carbon credits, which risks selling emission reductions that are relatively inexpensive or would have occurred anyway, leaving Brazil with fewer and more costly options to increase domestic mitigation ambition in the future. Following its NDC submission, the government published two key documents: the National Mitigation Strategy (ENM) and the National Climate Plan (“Plano Clima”), which include the expected contribution of each sector to both the 2030 and 2035 NDC targets. The CAT welcomes this increased transparency. However, the new information reveals that Brazil plans to heavily rely on transforming the land use and forests sector into a net sink.

While reducing emissions from deforestation is needed globally, in Brazil’s case, it is effectively reducing incentives for the much needed fossil fuel phase out and emissions reductions in other sectors. The projected emissions pathway in the sectoral plans rely on reductions in the land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector, while projected emissions in other key sectors such as industry, agriculture, energy and transport remain stable or even increase. The reliance on large-scale LULUCF removals assumes continued progress in reducing deforestation and restoring ecosystems. Initiatives like the “Devastation Bill” (which would allow high-impact industries, including agribusiness, mining, and construction, to self-approve projects with minimal regulatory oversight; critically rolling back environmental protection regulations in the country) significantly reduce the credibility of these assumptions.

Based on the sectoral information published in the ENM, we recalculated the ambition level of Brazil’s NDC targets:

• For 2030, the ENM plans to transform the LULUCF sector from the current net source of emissions to a net sink, which leads to significantly higher 2030 emissions level excluding LULUCF; going from close to 900 MtCO₂e in our previous assessments, to now 1,275 MtCO₂e for 2030.
• For 2035, the ENM numbers allowed us to recalculate the target range, significantly shrinking it compared to our initial assessment of the 2035 NDC.

In its NDC, Brazil includes a goal to reach climate neutrality by 2050 (for all GHGs), but has not yet submitted a Long-Term Strategy (LTS). The country’s recently published National Mitigation Strategy also sets out the goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2040 (for CO₂ only).

Recent positive policy developments include:

• The change in government in 2023 that prioritised the reconstruction of the country’s environmental and climate governance, reversing years of policy rollbacks and budget cuts. This resulted in the publication of sectoral mitigation and adaptation strategies under the Plano Clima framework and the National Mitigation Strategy (ENM), covering the period to 2035, as well as indicative sectoral targets for 2030 and 2035.
• Reductions in deforestation rates in response to renewed enforcement and monitoring efforts, with deforestation in 2024 in the Amazon falling by 31% and, for the first time in five years, deforestation in the Cerrado declining by 26% compared to 2023.
• Rapid expansion of wind and solar capacity, with solar reaching 53 GW of installed capacity (22% of the total electricity capacity mix), and wind around GwGW (13%) in 2024. This strengthens Brazil’s position as a leader in renewable energy deployment.
• Introduction of an economy-wide policy frameworks such as the Ecological Transformation Plan (PTE), which includes energy transition as one of its core pillars and aims at aligning development, finance, and climate objectives.

To improve its climate targets and action rating, Brazil could:

• Increase the strength of its 2030 and 2035 NDC targets to drive economy-wide decarbonisation, including stronger reductions in fossil fuel emissions, prioritise mitigation across all sectors, and reduce reliance on LULUCF sinks, while maintaining its targets to reduce deforestation. The current target design allows emissions in most sectors to remain at or even exceed current levels by 2030 and 2035, whereas what is needed is a rapid and sustained decline in emissions across the economy.
• Develop a comprehensive energy transition strategy with a timeline for phasing out fossil fuels and clear measures to ensure a just and equitable transition. Brazil’s long-term energy plans see an expanded role for fossil gas and oil, with the production set to increase in the coming decade supported by policies such as the NovoPac infrastructure investment programme, which currently signals larger investments in fossil fuels than in clean energy.
• Strengthen mitigation policies in the agricultural sector, Brazil’s second-largest emissions source, and to particularly address methane emissions. This would require the wider adoption of sustainable and efficient agriculture practices, especially in livestock production.
• Submit a Long-Term Strategy to the UNFCCC, clarifying sectoral pathways to achieve the climate neutrality goal by 2050. This should again provide clarity on the intended role of the LULUCF sector in meeting Brazil’s long-term targets.

The CAT ratings compare country’s targets and policies to (1) its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation considering a range of equity principles including responsibility, capability and equality, and (2) what is technically and economically feasible using modelled domestic pathways which are based on global least-cost climate change mitigation.

Comparing a country’s fair share ranges and modelled domestic pathways provides insights into which governments should provide climate finance and which should receive it. Developed countries with large responsibility for historical emissions and high per-capita emissions, must not only implement ambitious climate action domestically but must also support climate action in developing countries with lower historical responsibility, capability, and lower per-capita emissions.

The CAT rates Brazil’s climate targets and policies as "Highly insufficient". The “Highly insufficient” rating indicates that Brazil’s climate policies and commitments are not consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit, and lead to rising, rather than falling, emissions.

To get a better rating, Brazil needs to strengthen its climate targets and adopt and implement policies that curb the growth in national emissions and set them on a downward trend across all sectors.

We rate Brazil’s current policies as “Insufficient” when compared to their fair-share contribution to climate change mitigation. Under current policies, Brazil’s emissions (excluding LULUCF) have steadily increased over the past decades but are expected to essentially plateau. Yet, Brazil needs to cut its emissions this decade for 1.5°C compatibility.

Our calculations show Brazil's total emissions (excluding LULUCF) will reach between 1,182 MtCO₂e and 1,338 MtCO₂e in 2030 under current policies, almost 25% above 2005 levels. To peak and then rapidly decrease emissions, as required in order to limit warming to 1.5°C, Brazil will need to sustain and strengthen policy implementation and accelerate mitigation action in all sectors—including a reversal of present plans to expand fossil fuel energy sources.

Brazil’s current policies show promising steps, particularly in reducing deforestation and embedding climate considerations into development plans. However, continued expansion of fossil fuel production, as reflected in the Novo PAC and the Energy Expansion Plan (PDE), poses a major barrier to achieving sustained emissions reductions and net-zero goals.

The full policies and action analysis can be found here.

Brazil’s current NDC is not aligned with the emission reductions required to limit warming to 1.5°C. We rate Brazil’s 2030 NDC target as “Highly insufficient” when compared to modelled domestic pathways. The “Highly insufficient” rating indicates that Brazil’s 2030 NDC leads to rising, rather than falling, emissions and is not at all consistent with modelled domestic pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C. If all countries were to follow Brazil’s approach, warming could reach over 3°C and up to 4°C.

This is a significant change from our previous evaluation of the 2030 NDC, which we previously rated as “Almost sufficient,” and responds to the recalculation of the 2030 NDC target, driven by updated LULUCF assumptions, as explained in the Targets section.

Whether Brazil should receive international climate finance to reduce its emissions is a matter of debate. Our methods do not provide a clear answer to this question. However, if so, this contribution would likely be small under most equity perspectives. The 2030 NDC target to be achieved with own resources needs to be significantly improved to align with the 1.5°C limit, regardless of international support.

The CAT rates Brazil’s 2030 NDC as “Insufficient” when compared with its fair share contribution to climate action. The “Insufficient” rating indicates that Brazil’s 2030 NDC target needs substantial improvements to be consistent with its fair share of the global mitigation effort to limit warming to 1.5°C. Brazil’s target is at the least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort, and is not consistent with the 1.5°C limit, unless other countries make much deeper reductions and comparably greater effort. If all countries were to follow Brazil’s approach, warming would reach over 2°C and up to 3°C.

This is a downgrade from our previous evaluation of the 2030 NDC, which we previously rated as “Almost sufficient”, and responds to the recalculation of the 2030 NDC target, driven by updated LULUCF assumptions, as explained in the Targets section.

Land use and forestry are a key component of Brazil’s emissions profile. The sector has been by far the largest source of GHG emissions in Brazil since the early 1990s, and still accounted for around 42% of total emissions in 2024 (906 MtCO₂e). High deforestation rates are linked to a historical process of horizontal expansion and land tenure in Brazil. Weak legal boundaries have been enabling land grabbers to occupy and deforest undesignated public forests.

Recent developments indicate mixed signals in the sector. The decrease of deforestation rates in the Amazon (a 31% decrease in 2024) and in the Cerrado (a 26% decrease in 2024) reflects the re-enactment of monitoring and conservation frameworks by the government. At the same time, the recently-approved drilling of oil in the Amazon Basin and passing of the General Environmental Licensing Law, also referred to as the“Devastation Bill”, weakens environmental oversight and threatens to revert progress.

For Brazil to meet its NDC target requires a continuation of efforts to halt deforestation, accompanied by extensive reforestation and restoration of native forests. This will help Brazil to transition towards scenarios where the land use sector not only reduces its emissions but also actively removes carbon from the atmosphere.

We evaluate Brazil’s net zero target as: Poor.

Brazil aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2040 and climate neutrality by 2050, a target reiterated in its 2024 NDC submission. The National Mitigation Strategy articulates the goal of carbon neutrality by 2040, relying on net negative emissions to offset non-CO₂ gases, which are considered hard to abate. Between 2010 and 2020, non-CO₂ gases represented 45% of Brazil’s total emissions.

As of June 2026, Brazil has not submitted a long-term strategy to the UNFCCC.

Brazil should clearly state its plans for reducing emissions across all sectors of the economy, particularly for non-LULUCF sectors. It is important to avoid overreliance on removals that might not be feasible in the long-term.

The full net zero target analysis can be found here.