India

This analysis was published in September 2026.

India submitted its 2035 NDC on 24 April 2026. Both the emissions‑intensity and non‑fossil capacity targets as presented in the 2035 NDC will be achievable under current policies, and possibly by or — even before — 2030, without additional mitigation action. As a result, the 2035 NDC will not materially accelerate India’s emissions reductions beyond what its existing trajectory already delivers.

India’s NDC is achievable under existing policies but weak on additional ambition. Its most credible feature is that it builds on existing domestic policy architecture and is framed within national planning priorities, making implementation politically and institutionally plausible. However, the NDC is less credible as a Paris Agreement-aligned mitigation instrument because it does not include an absolute emissions target, does not commit to peaking emissions before 2035, and does not outline a managed decline of fossil fuel use or production.

India’s 2035 NDC includes three main mitigation 2035 targets: an unconditional 47% reduction in emissions intensity from 2005 levels, a 60% non-fossil fuel-based electric power capacity target as conditional on the availability of international finance, and the enhancement of carbon sinks up to 3.5-4 GtCO2e from 2005 levels. India’s 2035 targets would lead to emissions above current policies, far above the 1.5°C-compatible fair share contribution or the modelled domestic pathway.

Similar to its 2030 targets, a key limitation of India’s 2035 target is that they are built around the same parameters. The 2035 NDC's continued reliance on intensity metrics and installed capacity, rather than absolute emissions reduction or non-fossil electricity generation, do not necessarily ensure any emissions reduction. Indeed, since emissions intensity is tied to GDP, total emissions could continue to grow as the economy expands, even if the target is met.

Capacity‑based metrics do not indicate how much electricity will actually be generated from non‑fossil sources, nor how much fossil‑fuel use will be displaced. This approach leaves substantial uncertainty about India’s future emissions trajectory and the real contribution of non‑fossil energy to its power system.

To make its fair contribution to climate action, India would need to peak its emissions close to historical levels of 2023 and reduce thereafter (excluding LULUCF). Instead, India’s unconditional 2035 target would allow emissions to rise to around 6.3 GtCO₂e, almost 64% above 2023 levels. To align with the 1.5°C-compatible modelled domestic pathway, which India should achieve with significant financial support, emissions need to stabilise below 2009 levels by 2035.

With continued renewable energy expansion, in July 2025 India achieved its conditional target of 2030 NDC of 50 % non-fossil installed capacity ahead of schedule and is on track to reach more than 60% non-fossil capacity by 2030 and around 70% by 2035 under current policies. This underscores a missed opportunity to raise ambition of the conditional target, as the new 60% non-fossil capacity target does not go beyond what is expected under current policy. The CAT shows that aligning India’s power sector with a 1.5°C pathway would require renewables to supply 74-82% of electricity generation, with wind and solar alone providing 56-64% by 2035 (Climate Action Tracker, 2026).

Similarly, energy intensity target is also only increased by two percentage point from the 2030 target and emissions intensity under current policy will lead to 54-59% emissions intensity reduction by 2035 (compared to the 47% target). As a result, the ambition gap, defined as the difference between the 1.5°C-compatible model domestic emissions and the conditional NDC target, doubles from 1.9 GtCO2e in 2030 to 3.9 GtCO2e in 2035. Instead of narrowing the ambition gap between 2030 and 2035, India is moving further from 1.5°C alignment.

Nor does the new NDC commit to phasing out coal exploration, production, or coal-fired power generation. As one of the world’s major emitters, India’s failure to substantially increase its ambition would make it more difficult for the world to limit the extent and duration of overshoot before reaching to 1.5°C.

India has not updated the ambition of its 2030 target, please see full 2030 NDC assessment here.

For the world to have a significant chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C, governments must switch to emergency mode and strengthen both their 2030 targets and current policies to include substantial emissions cuts and significantly contribute to closing the 2030 emission gap. India has not updated the ambition of its 2030 target, please see full 2030 NDC assessment here.

2030 targets

2035 targets

India submitted its 2035 NDC mitigation target on 24 April 2026. India’s 2035 NDC had three main mitigation elements:

• an emissions intensity target,
• a non-fossil fuel-based electric power capacity target and
• the enhancement of carbon sinks.

The country’s unconditional 2035 target aims for a 47% reduction in its emissions intensity by 2005 levels, while the conditional targets aim for 60% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel sources. India also aims to develop a carbon sink of 3.5 to 4.0 GtCO₂e by 2035 from 2005 levels. These targets cover all sectors and all gases.

While the targets appear marginally stronger on paper, India will over-achieve them with its current level of climate action, so the targets will not drive further emissions reductions. Our estimate for India’s 2030 emissions based on current policies (excluding LULUCF) is consistent with a 47-49% reduction in emissions intensity below 2005 levels and non-fossil power capacity of more than 60%.

By 2035, under current policies, emissions intensity could be reduced by 54-60% below 2005 levels, with the share of non-fossil capacity reaching around 70%. In essence, India has replaced its already unambitious 2030 mitigation targets with targets that are even weaker than what is expected under policies that are already in place.

• When compared to its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation, India’s unconditional target of emissions intensity of 47% below 2005 levels in 2035 is not 1.5°C compatible. This target translates to an emission level of 6.3 GtCO2e, which is 82% above the 1.5oC compatible threshold of 3.5 GtCO2e (excl. LULUCF). To make its fair contribution to climate action, India would need to reduce its emissions by 6% compared to 2022 levels, broadly stabilising emissions at current levels (excl. LULUCF).
• When compared to its 1.5°C modelled domestic pathways, India's conditional target of 60% installed capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy resources in 2035 is not 1.5°C compatible. This target translates to an emissions level of 5.2-5.8 GtCO2e, 174% above the1.5°C compatible threshold of 2.2 GtCO2e (excl. LULUCF). To align with a 1.5°C modelled domestic pathway, India would need to reduce its emissions to at least 38% below 2022 in 2035 (excl. LULUCF) and will need additional international climate finance and other international support to reach the target.

The 2035 NDC target includes sectoral plans and targets in some selected sectors:

• 60% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy resources by 2035
• Create a carbon sink of 3.5 to 4.0 GtCO₂e equivalent through forest and tree cover by 2035 as compared to the baseline year of 2005

These sectoral targets are not explicitly linked nor aligned with the Global Stocktake (GST) goals to triple renewable energy capacity and end deforestation by 2030.

Further information on India's targets can be found here.

*For the table above, 2005 is used as the reference year, as it is the reference year of India’s NDC targets.

Developed countries need to significantly scale up international climate finance and other means of support. Developed countries should set 1.5°C aligned domestic mitigation targets in their NDCs and communicate the financial and other support they will provide to developing countries. Developing countries should clearly communicate the climate finance they need to set and achieve ambitious 1.5°C aligned conditional targets.

Most developing countries will need financial support to mitigate emissions beyond what would be their fair share according to effort-sharing frameworks. Therefore, the CAT encourages these governments to put forward an ambitious conditional target that is in line with their 1.5°C modelled domestic pathway, and to quantify climate finance needed, including an implementation plan, to meet the set target.

India presents its conditional NDC target – 60% non-fossil electricity installed capacity target by 2035 – as achievable only with scaled-up international support, particularly low-cost finance, technology transfer and capacity building from developed countries.

While the NDC identifies the types of support required and links them to equity, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) and development needs, it does not provide a quantified estimate of India-specific finance needs or a detailed implementation plan for how international support would close the gap. Instead, the NDC cites the broader finance needs of developing countries, as estimated by the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance – USD 5.012–6.852 trillion by 2030. India reserves the right to make further submissions on its own detailed climate finance requirements once the gap between implementation costs and available international resources becomes clearer (Government of India, 2026).

Credible NDCs should build on robust national planning processes that translate the economy-wide emissions reduction target into action in all sectors. Governments need to ramp up the implementation of their existing targets and further develop policies to close the – still significant – emissions gap between current policies and 1.5°C pathway. Contradictory policies must be addressed and reversed: fossil fuel production needs to be phased out, while fossil fuel exploration and fossil fuel subsidies need to stop.

India’s 2035 NDC is credible as a continuation of existing national policy direction, but less credible as a signal of enhanced mitigation ambition. The NDC increases India’s non-fossil electricity capacity target to 60% by 2035 and raises the emissions-intensity reduction target to 47% below 2005 levels. These targets are broadly aligned with India’s current policy, and they do not clearly require additional emission reductions beyond existing policy trends. In fact, according to our estimates, India is already on track to exceed both targets without adopting additional mitigation measures.

Our latest projections show that India will achieve an emissions intensity reduction of 47-49% by 2030 and 54-60% by 2035 from 2005 levels, based on the latest available GDP projection. Similarly, under current policies, India is on track to achieve non-fossil capacity of 63-64% by 2030 and 69-70% by 2035. Hence, both of the 2035 targets are less ambitious than the current policies, and those will be overachieved under current policies.

In addition, both are intensity- or capacity-based, not absolute emissions targets. As a result, emissions can continue rising if there's strong growth in GDP and electricity demand. The target, therefore, provides limited evidence of a step-change in ambition.

India has implemented several relevant policy instruments: renewable energy targets, energy efficiency programmes, green hydrogen policy, electric mobility support, carbon market development, and state-level climate plans. These provide a credible delivery architecture for parts of the NDC, especially non-fossil electricity capacity. However, the NDC does not set out a quantified sectoral pathway showing how these policies will collectively deliver the 2035 target.

The NDC is embedded in India’s broader national development framing, including equity, poverty eradication, energy security, sustainable lifestyles, net zero scenario “Viksit Bharat @2047”, and the principle of CBDR-RC. This strengthens domestic political credibility because the target is framed as compatible with national development priorities rather than as an externally imposed mitigation pathway.

The NDC refers to existing national and state-level climate institutions and policy processes, including the National Action Plan on Climate Change and State Action Plans on Climate Change. This indicates some implementation capacity. However, it does not provide a dedicated 2035 NDC implementation plan, clear institutional responsibilities, milestones, monitoring arrangements, nor sectoral accountability mechanisms.

The NDC does not include a coal phase-out, fossil fuel production phase-out, nor a timeline for reducing dependence on fossil fuels. This is a major credibility gap given India’s continued reliance on coal for electricity and energy security. The NDC focuses on scaling up non-fossil capacity but does not specify how or when fossil generation will decline.

The NDC does not transitioning away from fossil fuels in the energy system, nor does it set a timeline for reducing coal-fired generation or fossil fuel use. It also does not address public finance alignment with a fossil fuel transition. This weakens credibility from a 1.5°C-consistent perspective, even though it reflects India’s longstanding equity-based position that developed countries should move first and provide financial and technological support.

Governments should set absolute, economy wide, emissions reductions target trajectories including all GHG gases, specifying the emissions levels for each year as an absolute level of emissions (excl. LULUCF) so they are clear, transparent, and immune to creative accounting. NDC targets should primarily focus on their domestic reductions by decarbonising all sectors of the economy rather than relying on forestry sinks, other carbon dioxide removal (CDR) or international carbon markets.

Target formulation

In terms of transparency, the main limitation of India’s 2035 NDC is that its core mitigation targets are expressed as emissions intensity of GDP and installed non-fossil power capacity, rather than absolute emissions levels or generation from non-fossil sources, either in share or total generation. Translating the intensity target into an absolute emissions level requires assumptions about GDP data and future growth that the NDC does not specify; translating the capacity target into emissions requires assumptions about actual generation and the fossil generation displaced. These metrics do not specify the absolute level of India’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2035, nor the actual amount or share of electricity that will be generated from non-fossil sources.

In fact, a non-fossil capacity target does not necessarily result in a proportional decline in emissions unless it translates into actual electricity generation. India has already achieved 50% non-fossil capacity, but the share of non-fossil sources in total generation remains comparatively low. As a result, the NDC leaves substantial uncertainty about India’s expected emissions trajectory and the real contribution of non-fossil energy to electricity supply.

Additionally, the quantification of the emissions intensity target may vary depending on how GDP is measured and assumptions made about 2035 projections. India’s 2035 NDC does not specify the GDP data source, the GDP series used, or the assumptions underpinning projected GDP growth to 2035. Recent assessments by the IMF have also raised concerns about the robustness of India’s GDP measurement, which introduces additional uncertainty in emissions intensity-based targets and their comparability over time (The Financial Express, 2025). Greater transparency on these elements would improve the clarity, reproducibility, and comparability of the target assessment.

The emissions-intensity target appears economy-wide, but the NDC does not provide sectoral coverage in a quantified way. It does not specify separate mitigation contributions for power, industry, transport, buildings, agriculture, or waste.

The NDC provides endpoint-style targets for 2035 but does not specify annual emissions trajectories, a peaking year, cumulative emissions, or interim milestones between 2031 and 2035. This makes it difficult to assess whether emissions would peak, plateau, or continue rising.

India presents a separate additional forest and tree-cover carbon sink target of 3.5-4.0 GtCO₂e by 2035 from 2005 levels. This is a positive transparency feature because the land-sector sink is not fully hidden inside the headline emissions-intensity target.

The NDC does not separately identify engineered removals or other CDR categories. It focuses on forest and tree-cover sinks, without distinguishing removals by technology or permanence characteristics.

Article 6 use

India’s reference to voluntary cooperation under Article 6 in its NDC signals a cautious but strategic openness to international carbon market mechanisms, framed primarily around technology access rather than conventional offset trading.

India intends to use voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to facilitate the adoption and/or transfer of emerging technologies. It identifies activities including green hydrogen, offshore wind, fuel-cell mobility, green ammonia, carbon capture, utilisation and storage, and advanced energy-efficiency technologies (Government of India, 2026). If India were to use Article 6 cooperation to transfer mitigation outcomes internationally, this could present two risks: first, that India could oversell credits and thereby compromise the achievement of its NDC. This is especially the case if India sells emissions reductions that are relatively inexpensive, leaving it with fewer and more costly options. Second, India may not be able to ratchet up its NDC due to the overreliance on international carbon markets. This contradicts the objective of Article 6, which is to allow for higher ambition in a country’s mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity.

Finance generated through the purchase of carbon credits (ITMOs) under Article 6 should not be counted as climate finance. ITMO transactions are designed to help the buying country achieve its targets, while the selling country must make a corresponding adjustment that effectively makes the achievement of its target more difficult. For more information on the promise and pitfalls of Article 6 mechanisms, see the recent CAT briefing here.

For more information on India’s climate targets and policies, please click here. For the CAT’s full recommendations for setting NDC targets that form the basis of the analysis above, please click here.