China

China’s energy transition continues to advance rapidly across both the power and end-use sectors, driving an emerging emissions decline after decades of growth. Expanding renewable generation is increasingly displacing coal-fired power, and rapid electrification is reducing oil demand in road transport. China’s leadership in renewable energy manufacturing and deployment continues to accelerate the global energy transition.

However, whether this emerging emissions decline can be sustained will depend on continued renewable energy expansion, improved grid integration, and the displacement of fossil fuels across the economy. Current domestic targets and policies remain inconsistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C.

The CAT’s overall rating for China’s policies and targets remains “Highly insufficient.”

The CAT estimates China’s GHG emissions have stabilised at 15.6 GtCO₂e in 2025 (excl. LULUCF) and projects total absolute emissions will decline to 13.4-15.2 GtCO₂e in 2030 and 12.0-14.9 GtCO₂e in 2035. We have derived current policy projections (CPP) in two scenarios: conservative and optimistic. Details are provided in the Assumptions tab.

Compared to our November 2025 assessment, the CPP range has widened. Upward revisions to historical emissions data have raised projected emissions at the upper end of the range, while the inclusion of ambitious renewable energy targets in China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) has lowered the bottom end of the range through accelerated renewable deployment and greater fossil fuel displacement:

• In the conservative scenario, China’s emissions decline by an average of 0.5% per year through 2035, reaching 5% below peak levels by 2035. By 2030, coal and oil consumption are projected to decline by 3% and 5%, respectively, while fossil gas consumption grows by roughly 21%, reflecting its role as a “transitional fuel” in China’s energy strategy.
• In the optimistic scenario, faster renewables deployment drives an average emissions decline of 2.6% per year through 2035, bringing emissions to around 23% below 2025 levels. By 2030, coal and oil consumption falls more decisively, by 20% and 17%, respectively, while gas growth moderates by around 7%.

Recent developments in China’s power sector underscore the uncertainty. Although new renewable generation fully covered the increase in electricity demand in 2025, grid and market constraints limited further renewable integration in the first half of 2026, resulting in higher renewable curtailment and a rebound in coal generation. This trend reversed in Q3 2026, when coal-fired generation declined as electricity demand growth slowed and renewable curtailment eased.

The optimistic CPP scenario highlights a significant opportunity for China to contribute to peaking global emissions through a sustained domestic emissions decline. Realising this potential would require policymakers to address barriers to renewable integration and phase out incentives for new coal-fired power capacity and carbon-intensive industrial expansion, building on China's rapid progress in clean energy deployment and transport electrification.

Beyond the power sector, rapid electrification is driving a structural decline in road transport oil demand, with electric vehicles now accounting for more than two-thirds of new sales. Oil supply disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz and the resulting increase in fuel prices have put additional short-term downward pressure on oil consumption. In industry, lower cement and steel production helped reduce CO₂ emissions. But rapid expansion of the carbon-intensive coal-to-chemicals industry partly offset these reductions, with the sector's emissions rising by 12% in 2025.

China’s 15th FYP, released in March 2026, sets a 17% carbon intensity reduction target for 2030, down from the previous 18% target, which China failed to meet. The CAT considers the new target conservative, as we project China will already achieve it under current policies and market trends. The FYP's accompanying sectoral plans target a 50% increase in renewable energy consumption from 2025 levels to 1.8 billion tonnes of coal equivalent by 2030 and a doubling of non-fossil energy supply from 2025 levels by 2035. Their emissions impact will depend on how much fossil fuel use the additional renewable energy displaces. Other 15th FYP targets, including raising electrification to 35% and the share of non-fossil power generation to 50% by 2030, appear broadly achievable under current trends.

China has overachieved its 2030 NDC targets for renewable energy capacity and forest stock volume in 2024. Under the CAT's optimistic current policies scenario, it is also projected to achieve a 65% reduction in carbon intensity below 2005 levels and a 25% share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption.

Its 2035 NDC commits to reducing economy-wide net GHG emissions by 7–10% from peak levels by 2035 and extends its targets for renewable energy capacity and non-fossil energy share. The CAT translates the 2035 emissions target to 14.4 GtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF). China is projected to meet this target under the optimistic scenario. Under the conservative scenario, it would need additional measures.

Ahead of COP31, China has called for multilateral climate cooperation, greater climate finance from developed countries, and an open trading system that facilitates clean technology deployment. Its manufacturing capacity and growing South–South cooperation offer important opportunities to accelerate renewable energy deployment internationally.

China’s plateauing emissions trajectory reflects its progress in clean technology:

• Investment and manufacturing: China remains the global leader in energy transition investment, reaching USD 800 bn in 2025. Its clean energy sector contributed over one-third of the country's total economic growth in 2025. China also dominates key supply chains, producing around 85% of solar PVs, 70% of wind turbines, 70% of EVs, and 80% of lithium-ion batteries worldwide.
• Renewable energy: China added a record 430 GW of wind and solar capacity in 2025, bringing total renewable capacity, including hydropower, to 2,395 GW. The share of renewables in power generation rose from 28% in 2020 to 37% in 2025, while coal’s share declined from 63% to 54%.
• Electrification and EV uptake: electricity rose from 23% of final energy consumption in 2015 to 30% in 2025. China’s latest energy plan targets electricity to account for 35% of final energy consumption by 2030, achieving the level of the COP31 presidency’s global electrification goal five years early. In 2025, EVs captured over 50% market share and made up 12% of all vehicles on the road in China. Their share of new sales reached 67% in September 2026. Meanwhile, sales of combustion-engine cars in China peaked in 2017 and have been declining ever since. A cleaner power mix will increase the emissions benefits of electrification.

Areas where stronger policies are needed:

• Fossil fuel dependence: despite declining coal demand in the power sector and average plant utilisation below 50%, 291 GW of coal capacity remained in the pipeline in 2025. Limits on new coal capacity and total coal consumption during the 15th FYP period would reduce the risk of locking in emissions and creating stranded assets. Meanwhile, growing gas-fired generation and planned capacity additions are also inconsistent with a 1.5°C-compatible pathway, which requires a full phase-out of fossil-based power generation by 2040.
• Industrial decarbonisation: recent emission reductions in cement and steel sectors have mainly come from lower production. Stronger incentives to deploy low-emissions production technologies would help sustain reductions if demand rebounds and improves competitiveness in markets subject to measures such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
• Emission trading: China expanded its national emissions trading scheme (ETS) to cement, steel, and aluminium in 2025 and plans to cover all major emissions-intensive industries by 2027 and full coverage of high-emitting sectors by 2035. Its mitigation impact will depend on the stringency of the emissions cap and how allowances are allocated, both of which will remain under development until 2030.
• Non-CO₂ emissions: China’s 2035 NDC covers all GHGs, and the 15th FYP calls for projects to curb methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons, with a mitigation capacity of 30 MtCO₂e. The plan leaves the timeframe and accounting basis for this target unclear, making its mitigation impact difficult to assess. More specific targets and measures are needed, particularly for coal mine methane.

The CAT ratings compare country’s targets and policies to (1) its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation considering a range of equity principles including responsibility, capability and equality, and (2) what is technically and economically feasible using modelled domestic pathways which are based on global least-cost climate change mitigation.

Comparing a country’s fair share ranges and modelled domestic pathways provides insights into which governments should provide climate finance and which should receive it. Developed countries with large responsibility for historical emissions and high per-capita emissions, must not only implement ambitious climate action domestically but must also support climate action in developing countries with lower historical responsibility, capability, and lower per-capita emissions.

While China emits over one-third of global CO₂, it is also the world’s factory, producing more than one-third of global manufactured goods (IEA, 2024; Norton, 2024). Our calculations follow a production-based approach, which does not reflect the role of international trade in driving China’s emissions. According to the Global Carbon Budget, China’s 2023 consumption-based CO₂ emissions are about 11% (or 1.3 GtCO₂) lower than its territorial emissions (Global Carbon Budget, 2025).

The CAT rates China’s climate targets and policies as “Highly insufficient.” This rating indicates that China’s climate policies and commitments are not consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit.

China is not meeting its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation. China’s unconditional NDC and policies and action are rated as “Insufficient” compared to its fair share. China’s unconditional NDC is rated as “Highly insufficient” compared with modelled domestic pathways.

Although progress in the power sector’s transition helps China achieve a downward emissions trend, the country should adopt more concrete and ambitious policies to accelerate its shift away from fossil fuels, in order to contribute sufficiently to the 1.5°C goal.

The CAT estimates China’s total GHG emissions may have peaked in 2025 at 15.6 GtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF) if the downward emissions trajectory continues in the future. This is largely driven by record renewable deployment, which has kept pace with rising electricity demand, constrained coal-fired generation, and reduced CO₂ emissions in the power sector. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has accelerated this trend.

Under current policies, emissions are projected to decline to 13.4-15.2 CO₂e by 2030 and 12.0-14.9 GtCO₂e by 2035. Compared to our previous assessment published in July 2026, the projections have widened and shifted slightly upward on average, driven by the inclusion of the 2030 RE consumption target and updated historical emissions data.

China’s rapid renewable deployment is a central driver of power sector decarbonisation. By the end of September 2026, the installed capacity of wind and solar power reached 2,013 GW. However, continued fossil expansion creates a structural tension. By end-2025, 291 GW of coal capacity remained in the pipeline, despite declining coal demand in the power sector, increasing the risk of carbon lock-in and stranded assets.

Emissions in industry, transport, and buildings are stabilising or declining. This reflects rising EV uptake in transport, reduced cement and steel output, and deepened electrification and efficiency improvements in building operations.

However, the pace of China’s energy transition remains insufficient to align with limiting warming to 1.5°C. China’s overall policies and action rating remain “Insufficient.”

The full policies and action analysis can be found here.

Under China’s NDC targets, the country’s emission levels would reach 14.8 GtCO₂e in 2030 and 14.4 GtCO₂e in 2035, equivalent to reductions of 6% and 8% respectively compared with 2025 levels. The estimates reflect the median of the CAT’s conservative and optimistic scenarios based on the 2030 carbon intensity target and the 2035 net emissions reduction target.

The CAT keeps its rating of China’s 2030 NDC target against modelled domestic pathways as “Highly Insufficient,” indicating that its 2030 domestic targets need substantial improvements to be consistent with the 1.5°C temperature limit.

China’s emission levels under its NDC commitments are higher than what would be deemed 1.5°C compatible compared to our “fair share” approach. The CAT maintains its rating of China’s NDC targets against its fair share as “Insufficient.”

China’s President Xi Jinping first announced China’s commitment to reach “carbon neutrality before 2060” in a declaration at the UN General Assembly in September 2020. China has since officially submitted a long-term strategy (LTS) to the UNFCCC in October 2021. As the formulation of the LTS submission does not meet the majority of the CAT’s criteria for a best-practice approach, we find China’s net zero target to be “Poor.”