India

India is rapidly expanding renewable energy, but rising electricity demand and inadequate fossil fuel displacement continue to keep emissions on an upward trajectory, with coal and gas used to meet peak demand. Its 2035 NDC does not require additional mitigation measures beyond current policies and allows the gap to a 1.5°C-compatible pathway to widen substantially. Recent geopolitical disruption has reinforced short-term reliance on coal and gas, highlighting the energy security risks of continued fossil fuel dependence.

To ensure a fair contribution to the global climate crisis, India’s emissions would need to stay below the emissions projected under current policies, and with international support, it could expedite faster reductions. The CAT’s overall rating of India’s climate targets and action remains “Highly insufficient”.

India submitted its 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in April 2026, which carries forward its previous weak target with a marginal increase, which does not alter its upward rising emissions trajectory. The 2035 NDC aims to reduce emissions intensity of GDP by 47% below 2005 levels and achieve 60% non-fossil fuel capacity in the power sector by 2035. These targets do not drive any additional mitigation action beyond its current policy. Rather than narrowing the ambition gap, the 2035 NDC allows it to widen substantially: the gap to the 1.5°C-compatible modelled domestic pathway doubles from around 1.9 GtCO₂e in 2030 to 3.9 GtCO₂e in 2035. As a result, India’s 2035 NDC is moving away from a 1.5°C pathway by allowing emissions to continue to rise even above its current policy trajectory and widening the gap between current commitments and a Paris Agreement–aligned pathway.

India has recorded consistent growth in renewable energy deployment, including record solar capacity additions in 2025-26, reinforcing its position as the country with the world's third-largest renewable capacity. India has already exceeded its 2030 NDC targets for installing 50% non-fossil capacity in 2025. It is also on track to meet its emissions intensity reduction target of 45% by 2030 from 2005 levels. These early achievement of the targets show that there is opportunity for India to strengthen its targets.

Due to its heavy dependence on imported fossil fuels, India remains highly vulnerable to geopolitical volatility. Earlier in 2026, the conflict in the Middle East, triggered by the US-Israel war on Iran, once again exposed this vulnerability, contributing to acute energy security concerns. Despite strong growth in renewable energy deployment, India has yet to significantly reduce the share of fossil fuels in its primary energy mix (current share is around 75%) and increase end-use electrification. As a result, emissions continue to rise, moving India further from a 1.5°C-compatible pathway and reinforcing the need for stronger mitigation across the economy, including industry, transport and buildings.

Under current policies, India’s economy-wide emissions are projected to reach around 4.5-4.6 GtCO₂e in 2030 (excluding LULUCF), around 140-146% above 2005 levels. There is no improvement from our previous assessment in India's emissions trajectory, continuing the upward revision in projected 2030 emissions seen across recent updates. India’s 2035 NDC would allow emissions of 6.32 GtCO₂e under the unconditional target, and 5.2-5.8 GtCO₂e under the conditional target, and both targets are likely to be met under current policies, potentially well before 2035.

India’s policy stance on power sector transition continues to follow a dual-track approach: expanding renewable capacity while simultaneously increasing coal production for power sector, adding new coal-fired power plants, and relying more heavily on fossil gas to meet peak demand. Renewable capacity (including large hydro) reached around 256 GW in 2025-26, bringing its share to 50% of installed capacity, with strong policy support and record investment growth of 91.5% between 2023 and 2024.

Despite this rapid expansion in installed capacity, the share of renewables in total electricity generation remains limited, around 29%. Aligning India’s power sector with a 1.5°C pathway would require renewables to supply 52-65% of electricity generation, with wind and solar alone providing 36-49% by 2030. At the same time, the increasing rate of curtailment is highlighting persistent structural challenges such as grid integration and limited storage, and deep dependence on fossil fuels. The states with a high share of renewable energy build out are facing losses due to forced curtailment from the gap in the speed of renewable deployment and transmission infrastructure development.

A notable shift was observed in 2024-25, when most of the incremental electricity demand was met by non-fossil sources, suggesting a potential turning point in the power sector. This trend continued into 2025–26, with renewable generation increasing even as total electricity generation declined, resulting in a decline in coal generation and a modest rise in the share of renewables to 29%, after a stagnated ~25% for the past few years. However, this should be interpreted cautiously, as the increase was partly driven by lower demand due to a milder summer in 2025 and reduced peak load, rather than a clear structural transformation of the energy system. As in the second quarter of 2026, with intensifying heatwaves, coal-based generation increased to meet the new record peak demand of ~270 GW.

Coal continues to dominate India’s power sector, accounting for around 70% of electricity generation and increasing additional capacity, with 23 GW under construction and 107 GW in pre-construction as of 2026. The recent National Generation Adequacy Plan (2026–27 to 2035–36) signals a continued and structural reliance on coal for system reliability in India’s power sector, despite rapid renewable capacity additions, rather than outlining a pathway for its phased reduction. This reliance on coal was also observed during the recent energy crisis triggered by the US-Israel war on Iran, where the immediate response has again included greater reliance on coal.

The role of fossil gas is also increasing in India's energy system, from a complementary role in the power sector to more sustained use in the residential and industrial sectors. This shift is reflected in continued expansion of LNG infrastructure pipeline development and coal gasification.

India has consistently placed energy security at the centre of its energy transition narrative, often using it to justify the continued reliance on coal and the expansion of fossil gas. However, recent geopolitical disruptions and earlier episodes of global energy market volatility have exposed the vulnerability of this approach, particularly given India’s status as a net importer of fossil fuels.

Despite these risks, India continues to expand fossil gas infrastructure, including LNG imports, regasification capacity and pipeline networks, while increasing utilisation of imported coal power plants to meet rising demand. This strategy may provide short-term supply stability, but it also deepens exposure to external shocks and price volatility. A more robust long-term energy security pathway would require reducing dependence on imported fuels through accelerated deployment of domestic renewables and supporting infrastructure, rather than reinforcing fossil fuel dependence.

While key policies push green hydrogen, carbon markets, and electric mobility, these measures do not yet materially increase ambition beyond the weak NDC targets. Green-hydrogen uptake remains slow, the CCTS relies on emissions-intensity rather than absolute caps, and EV uptake remains well below a 1.5°C-compatible trajectory.

The Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS), set to launch by mid-2026, builds on binding targets of emissions intensity reduction for 2025–2027, rather than any absolute emissions reduction. While electric mobility continues to advance in India with 2.45 million EVs sold in FY2025–26, overall EV stock across all vehicle class only stands at 8%, and charging infrastructure - a key enabler of EV adoption - remains inadequate.

Some of the recent positive developments in terms of climate change mitigation policies include:

• India has already surpassed 50% non-fossil installed capacity, a significant deployment milestone of achieving its 2030 NDC target ahead of schedule. However, it also underscores the missed opportunity to update the 2030 target and strengthen the 2035 target, as the current policy will lead to 60% non-fossil capacity by 2030.
• Solar capacity expansion has been particularly rapid, with around half of installed capacity added in the last three years with strong domestic policy support. India has strengthened its domestic solar manufacturing capacity.
• Policy frameworks such as the National Electricity Plan, which is being updated periodically, and the National Generation Adequacy Plan (2026-27 to 2035-36) outline renewable expansion targets.
• The government is advancing industrial decarbonisation through initiatives such as the National Green Hydrogen Mission, targeting specific manufacturing sectors such as steel and fertiliser.
• In the transport sector, policy support for electric mobility continues, with gradual progress in EV deployment, particularly in two- and three-wheelers.

To move forward ambitiously on climate action, India could:

• Strengthen the 2030 and 2035 NDC targets, including through clearer absolute-emissions outcomes and a substantially more ambitious conditional power-sector target.
• Scale up and integrate renewable capacity to displace fossil generation by accelerating transmission build-out, storage deployment, and project commissioning, so that renewable growth displaces coal generation rather than only meeting the incremental demand.
• Develop a clear, time-bound coal transition strategy, including no new coal capacity and a plan for early retirement of inefficient plants.
• Avoid new fossil gas lock-in by reassessing LNG terminals, regasification capacity, pipelines, and gas-fired power use, especially where renewables, storage, and demand-side flexibility can provide cleaner alternatives.
• Plan for rising cooling demand structurally, through stronger appliance efficiency standards, building-sector decarbonisation, demand response, grid flexibility, and renewable-based solutions for peak demand.
• Strengthen the carbon market framework by moving from emissions-intensity targets to absolute emissions-reduction requirements, particularly for energy-intensive industries.
• Scale up EV infrastructure and further support EV adoption in the 4-wheeler segment, where adoption remains very low (~5% of all new 4-wheeler sales in 2025). Expanding public charging infrastructure (currently at 30,000 stations) is critical to enabling wider EV uptake.
• Complement green hydrogen production policies with end use adoptions though both regulatory and financial policy support.

The CAT rates each country’s targets and policies against (1) its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation considering a range of equity principles including responsibility, capability and equality, and (2) what is technically and economically feasible using modelled domestic pathways which in absence of a better method are based on global least-cost climate change mitigation.

Comparing a country’s fair share ranges and modelled domestic pathways provides insights into which governments should provide climate finance and which should receive it. Developed countries with large responsibility for historical emissions and high per-capita emissions, must not only implement ambitious climate action domestically but must also support climate action in developing countries with lower historical responsibility, capability, and lower per-capita emissions.

The CAT rates India’s 2030 climate targets and policies as “Highly insufficient”, indicating that India’s climate policies and commitments are not consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit and lead to rising, rather than falling, emissions.

India’s 2030 targets will not drive real world emission reductions beyond its current level of climate action. Its emissions intensity target is “Insufficient” when compared to India’s fair share contribution.

We rate India’s target of 50% non-fossil capacity by 2030, conditional on international support, as “Highly insufficient” when compared to a 1.5°C modelled domestic pathway.

In July 2025, India achieved this 50% non-fossil capacity target, five years ahead of time and with its current power sector plan, India is already on track to achieve more than 60% non-fossil capacity by 2030. This highlights India’s opportunity to strengthen its conditional target.

India needs to adopt stronger targets that will drive actual emissions reductions and accelerate climate policy implementation. The country will need international support to get onto a 1.5°C pathway.

We rate India’s current policies and action as “Insufficient” compared to its fair share contribution.

The “Insufficient” rating indicates that India’s policies and action in 2030 need substantial improvements to be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. If all countries were to follow India’s approach, warming would reach over 2°C and up to 3°C.

India has ambitious renewable energy plans as outlined in the National Generation Adequacy Plan 2026-27 to 2035-36, aiming for a share of installed renewable capacity of 63% and 6% in 2030-31 and 2035-36, respectively. We have included the National Generation Adequacy Plan in the upper bound of our current policy pathway. 1.5°C pathway would require renewables to supply 52-65% of electricity generation, with wind and solar alone providing 36-49% by 2030.

The renewable energy capacity (including large hydro) in India reached 204 GW, ranking it third in the world in cumulative renewable energy capacity installations in 2025, after China and the US.

India has witnessed a steady rise in renewable energy deployment, particularly in utility-scale and rooftop solar, contributing to a falling share of coal capacity to below 50%, and further to 43% in 2025. Despite this, renewables are struggling to match the rapid increase in electricity demand, exacerbated by extreme heat and rising peak loads. As a result, the share of non-fossil sources in total electricity generation, including large hydro, has stagnated at around 25% until 2024-25, showing no year-on-year improvement.

In 2025–26, renewable energy generation increased both in absolute terms and as a share of total electricity generation, reaching 29%. However, the higher share is mainly the result of an overall decline in total electricity generation, rather than a clear structural phase-down of fossil fuel generation.

Despite this, India has not committed to phasing out coal power or fossil gas. While the country boasts some of the lowest renewable tariffs globally, even when including storage, falling prices alone are unlikely to drive a large-scale transition from coal without strong policy intervention. At the same time, continued fossil-fuel support works against a level playing field for renewable energy as total fossil-fuel subsidies remain around three times those for renewables, with substantial support continuing for coal.

While new fossil gas power projects have been abandoned, the utilisation of existing gas power plants has increased to meet energy demand driven by severe heat stress in recent years. At the same time, despite ongoing geopolitical turmoil that is disrupting fossil gas supplies and heightening energy security risks, India is rapidly expanding its gas infrastructure, mainly targeting the residential sector and industries. This is increasing the risk of lock-in when compared to a 1.5°C compatible pathway.

The government continues to advance its green hydrogen policy with its updated National Green Hydrogen Mission. The policy has set a target of 5 Mt per annum of green hydrogen production by 2030 with associated renewable energy capacity of 125 GW.

India is set to establish its own carbon market by mid-2026 as the government has adopted regulations for its compliance carbon market under the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS). The scheme will set emissions intensity targets for energy-intensive industrial sectors, building on the earlier Perform, Achieve, and Trade (PAT) system, but will not impose absolute emissions reduction caps. Compliance obligations have entered into force for several sectors, with legally binding emissions-intensity targets for 2025–26 and 2026–27.

Transport policy shows progress in electric mobility, with EV sales reaching 2.45 million in FY2025–26, a 22% increase from last financial year, but overall EV penetration remains only around 8%. Charging infrastructure is also far behind need, with around 30,000 public charging stations. India charger to EV ratio is 1:235. When compared with the global benchmark of 1:6 to 20 vehicles, much larger requirements for rapid electrification.

Our full Policies and action analysis is here.

India’s 2030 NDC has three main elements:

• An emissions-intensity target of 45% below 2005 levels by 2030;
• A target of achieving 50% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy resources by 2030; and
• Creation of a carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 GtCO₂e through additional forest and tree cover by 2030.

While India indicated in its 2022 NDC update that achieving the 50% non-fossil capacity target would require international support, it is already on track to achieve more than 60% of non-fossil capacity by 2030 under current policies. In other words, it is set to overachieve its target, which could therefore be strengthened.

We rate this target as “Highly insufficient” when compared to the level of reductions needed in India under modelled domestic pathways to be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C, indicating substantial improvement is needed in this target. India will need international support to get onto a 1.5°C pathway.

We interpret India’s emissions-intensity target as being its unconditional contribution to limiting warming to 1.5°C. We rate this target against what India’s fair share contribution should be and find it to be “Insufficient.”

The “Insufficient” rating indicates that India’s unconditional target in 2030 needs substantial improvements to be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. India’s target is at the least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort, and is not consistent with the 1.5°C limit unless other countries make much deeper reductions and comparably greater effort. If all countries were to follow India’s approach, warming would reach over 2°C and up to 3°C.

The quantification of this target varies depending on how GDP is measured and assumptions made about 2030 projections. The transparency of India’s target could be improved with further information on these elements.

In 2022, India had a net carbon sink of 572 MtCO₂e. India's target for its land and forestry sector remains unchanged in its 2022 NDC update as it plans an additional 2.5–3 GtCO₂e of carbon sink by 2030 through additional forest cover. Recent reports suggest that India is on track to achieve this target, with an additional sink of 2.44 GtCO₂e over the period 2005-2022. Several policies and measures were adopted under the overarching framework of the National Mission of Green India.

In its National Forest Policy of 1988, India has set a target of bringing 33% of its geographical area under forest cover. As of 2021, forest and tree cover accounts for 24.6% of the country’s geographical area, an only marginal increase since 2005 (21%).

At COP26 in 2021, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a 2070 net zero target for India, and during COP27, India submitted its Long-term Strategy for Low Carbon Development (LT-LEDS). We evaluate the net zero target as “Poor”.

Our full net zero analysis is here.