Türkiye

As Türkiye prepares to host COP31 in November 2026, it faces a crisis of contradiction: while calling for accelerated climate action, its own targets are weak and lack the ambition necessary to drive much-needed emissions reductions. Even as the impacts of climate change intensify across Europe and the Mediterranean, Türkiye’s 2035 NDC would be well overachieved with currently implemented policies and see emissions still increase over the next decade, clearly incompatible with the 1.5°C limit and its Paris Agreement obligations. A 1.5°C compatible trajectory would see Türkiye’s emissions begin to decline immediately, falling by nearly 50% below 2018 levels by 2035 (excluding LULUCF). Türkiye’s overall CAT rating remains “Critically insufficient.”

Türkiye has made good progress on expanding wind and solar energy, nearly doubling their share of total electricity generation in the last five years. Its commitment to install 120 GW of new wind and solar capacity by 2035 is commendable, but this target would need to increase to at least 150 GW to align with 1.5°C benchmarks. At the same time, the government's efforts to increase fossil fuel production and become a hub for oil and fossil gas, as well as to cement its status as the largest producer of coal-fired electricity in Europe, undermine Türkiye’s credibility and risk locking the country into a fossil fuel-intensive future.

To substantiate its commitment to reaching net zero emissions by 2053 and align with the Paris Agreement, Türkiye needs to strengthen its 2030 and 2035 NDC targets in line with 1.5°C, develop a coal phase-out plan, and stop investing in fossil fuels. As it prepares to host COP31, demonstrating genuine climate ambition and taking real action will be key to Türkiye’s credibility on the international stage.

According to our latest projections, Türkiye’s emissions are set to continue increasing through to 2035, a significant upward correction compared to our last assessment of a year ago, with emissions in 2035 worsening from 3–20% above 2018 levels to 7–25%. Despite its strengthened renewables target, without a rapid decline of economy-wide emissions, Türkiye remains well off-track from aligning with 1.5°C. Modelled domestic pathways show that aligning with 1.5°C would require Türkiye to cut its emissions by 31% in 2030 and 48% in 2035 below 2018 levels (excl. LULUCF).

Both Türkiye’s 2030 and 2035 targets allow emissions to continue increasing and will easily be achieved with current policies, meaning that they neither drive real-world emission reductions nor represent a significant effort to decarbonise. The Long-Term Climate Strategy (LTS), submitted in November 2024, allows emissions to continue rising until 2038, which is far too late and puts its net zero target further out of reach.

The energy sector is Türkiye's largest source of emissions by far with the power sector illustrating the contradictory direction of the country's energy transition. On the one hand, wind and solar generation almost doubled from 12% of electricity supply in 2020 to 22% in 2025, supported by ambitious capacity targets and strong resource potential. Both technologies are declining in cost – a trend that will only continue.

On the other hand, fossil fuels still generated 56% of Türkiye's electricity in 2025 and power sector emissions reached a record high. Rising electricity demand has meant that renewable generation has largely supplemented, rather than displaced, fossil fuels. Türkiye is also investing heavily in oil and fossil gas exploration, signing new partnerships, and positioning itself as a new regional hub for fossil fuel exports – overtaking Germany in 2024 as the largest producer of coal-fired electricity in Europe.

Türkiye’s role as COP31 co-host gives it a unique responsibility to implement the global commitment to transition away from fossil fuels agreed to at COP28. The latest energy crisis has shown that fossil fuels are not a reliable or affordable foundation for long-term energy security, strengthening the case for Türkiye to base its leadership at COP31 on a decisive shift to renewables. Türkiye has also put a global target of 35% electrification by 2035 at the centre of its COP31 Action Agenda, but its own National Energy Plan projects electricity’s share of final energy consumption to reach only 24.9% in 2035, up from 21.8% in 2020. As explained in the CAT's recent analysis on Türkiye's power sector, meeting the 35% target would require a substantial step-change in electrification policies and in the deployment of renewable power to avoid that the rising electricity demand is met by fossil fuels rather than clean energy.

Progress on decarbonising Türkiye’s industrial and agricultural sectors, which are the next-largest sources of emissions, is also mixed. In the industrial sector, the production of cement, iron, and steel accounts for most process-related emissions. Decarbonising these hard-to-abate subsectors is critical and will require significant investment, especially given Türkiye’s exposure to the EU’s Carbon Adjustment Border Mechanism (CBAM), which places a carbon price on goods imported into the EU.

In the agricultural sector, emissions have been steadily climbing over the last several decades, driven mainly by methane emissions from livestock. While Türkiye outlined four key priorities for improved land management and climate-smart agriculture in its LTS, the government has not yet translated these goals into policies to decarbonise the sector.

Ahead of COP31, Türkiye should build on its recent successes in increasing renewable energy capacity and announce phase-out targets for coal and fossil gas. By setting out a clear and just plan to phase out fossil fuels at home – and by making this central to its COP agenda – Türkiye can turn its rhetoric on implementation into reality and demonstrate real climate leadership. Additional proposals to cut methane emissions, address emissions from the waste sector, and pursue green industrialisation are also important topics, although it remains to be seen if these ideas will translate into real-world action.

Some recent positive policy developments include:

• The passage of Türkiye’s 2025 Climate Law establishes a legal framework for an Emissions Trading System (ETS) similar to the European Union’s model, with a pilot phase set to begin in Q3 2026, and enshrines Türkiye’s net zero and NDC targets into law.
• The Roadmap for Renewable Energy to 2035 combines wind and solar capacity targets with investments in upgrading grid infrastructure – important steps towards decarbonising Türkiye’s power sector.
• The expansion of domestic wind manufacturers’ capacity has enabled Türkiye to produce key components for wind installations at home, including towers, blades, generators, and gearboxes, with a significant portion of equipment exported to Europe. These exports bring in revenue and help companies sharpen their expertise, which in turn drives down unit costs and powers further expansion of wind capacity in Türkiye and abroad.
• Türkiye is racing ahead on grid-scale batteries, with more than 33 GW already approved and ready for construction, equivalent to over 80% of current wind and solar capacity. An additional 188 GW of battery storage is currently awaiting approval, putting Türkiye in a strong position to accelerate its renewable energy rollout.
• In 2025, the government-supported manufacturer Togg surpassed Tesla and BYD as the best-selling EV brand in Türkiye, as overall EV sales more than doubled. Combined with the special consumption tax (ÖTV), which features much lower rates for batteries, EVs have quickly become the most attractive option for consumers.

To improve its climate targets and action rating, Türkiye could:

• Strengthen both its 2030 and 2035 targets: Türkiye’s NDCs should set ambitious targets that go beyond current policies and drive critical emissions reductions. Ideally, these would be expressed as an emissions limit or a reduction from a historical base year rather than as reductions from a BAU scenario.
• Develop a fossil fuel phase-out plan: Türkiye became the largest producer of coal-fired electricity in Europe in 2024 and is investing heavily in fossil gas, both of which must be phased out of the power sector in the 2030s to align with the 1.5°C limit. Efforts by the current government to establish Türkiye as an oil and gas hub risk damaging the economy by locking the country into a fossil fuel future.
• Strengthen its wind and solar target: If Türkiye succeeds in meeting its annual additions target, it will reach 120 GW of installed wind and solar capacity by 2035. This moves the country in the right direction, but to align with a 1.5°C compatible pathway, Türkiye should aim to bring a combined 150 GW of capacity online by 2035.
• Accelerate the installation of renewable capacity: In 2025, 5 GW of solar and just 2 GW of wind capacity were added to the grid. Considering that current targets are not aligned with a 1.5°C compatible pathway, accelerating the implementation of capacity additions is critical for Türkiye to avoid falling further behind on its power sector transformation.
• Enhance its Long-Term Climate Strategy (LTS): Türkiye can substantiate its LTS by outlining pathways showing how it intends to reach net zero, developing clear policies with actionable targets and measures. The government needs to build on the framework of the new Climate Law to set up periodic reviews to monitor progress, improve transparency and help ministries implement climate goals effectively.

The CAT rates each country’s targets and policies against (1) its fair share contribution to climate change mitigation considering a range of equity principles including responsibility, capability and equality, and (2) what is technically and economically feasible using modelled domestic pathways which in absence of a better method are based on global least-cost climate change mitigation.

Comparing a country’s fair share ranges and modelled domestic pathways provides insights into which governments should provide climate finance and which should receive it. Developed countries with large responsibility for historical emissions and high per-capita emissions, must not only implement ambitious climate action domestically but must also support climate action in developing countries with lower historical responsibility, capability, and lower per-capita emissions.

The CAT rates Türkiye’s climate targets and policies as “Critically insufficient”. This rating indicates that Türkiye's climate policies and commitments reflect minimal to no action and are not at all consistent with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature limit.

In November 2025, Türkiye submitted its 2035 NDC target. As with its latest 2030 NDC, this target is framed as a reduction below a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario – one that appears unrealistically high compared to historical data and may assume inflated forecasts of economic growth. The 2035 target is far from being 1.5°C compatible compared to both modelled domestic pathways and Türkiye’s fair share contribution and would see emissions plateau or even increase over the next decade; this is clearly incompatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement.

To improve its rating, Türkiye needs to set more ambitious NDC targets and develop and implement policies that will set its emissions on a clear downward trajectory across all sectors.

Türkiye’s current policies and action are “Highly insufficient” when compared to modelled domestic pathways. The “Highly insufficient” rating indicates that Türkiye’s policies and action in 2030 lead to rising, rather than falling, emissions and are not at all consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C.

If all countries were to follow Türkiye’s approach, warming could reach over 3°C and up to 4°C. Türkiye needs to focus on adopting further policies and action to stop its emissions growth and start reducing emissions towards decarbonisation.

According to our latest projections, Türkiye’s emissions are set to continue increasing through to 2035, reaching between 7% and 25% above 2018 levels. This is a significant upward correction compared to our last estimate from one year ago. Despite its strengthened renewables target, without a rapid decline in economy-wide emissions, Türkiye remains well off-track from aligning with 1.5°C.

Plans to scale up wind and solar by at least 7.5–8 GW a year until 2035, along with a USD 20bn package to reduce energy demand by 16% by 2030, represent positive steps towards decarbonising Türkiye’s economy. However, this is not enough to align with 1.5°C. If Türkiye succeeds in meeting its annual additions target by 2035, it will reach 120 GW of installed wind and solar capacity, but to be 1.5°C aligned Turkey would need to install 150 GW by 2035.

At the same time, Türkiye continues to invest in fossil fuels to meet its energy demand, with plans to become a fossil gas hub and expand oil and gas production. These developments stand in contrast to 1.5°C compatible scenarios; to align with 1.5°C, Türkiye needs to effectively phase out fossil fuels from the power sector in the 2030s, reaching close to 100% renewable electricity by 2035.

Türkiye has officially established an Emissions Trading System (ETS), with a pilot phase scheduled to begin in Q3 2026, which is expected to include industrial sectors like cement. The ETS will play an important part in cutting industrial emissions and adapting to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, thus maintaining competitiveness for Türkiye’s export-driven industries.

Along with cutting emissions in carbon-intensive industries through the ETS, Türkiye is investing in the domestic manufacturing of electric cars and charging infrastructure. Through domestic production, it is likely that this will feed into accelerated decarbonisation in the Turkish transport sector.

The full policies and action analysis can be found here.

We rate Türkiye’s 2030 NDC target as “Critically insufficient” when compared with modelled domestic pathways. The “Critically insufficient” rating indicates that Türkiye’s NDC target in 2030 reflects minimal to no action and is not at all consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C. If all countries were to follow Türkiye’s approach, warming would exceed 4°C.

In April 2023, Türkiye submitted an updated 2030 NDC target. However, this new 2030 NDC target relied on a BAU scenario which uses a historical base year of 2012. Historical emissions have grown far slower than they have under that BAU scenario. Türkiye already achieves this 2030 target based on our emissions estimate for 2030 under current policies, meaning it does not drive real-world emission reductions and cannot be considered at all ambitious. Türkiye should significantly strengthen its 2030 target.

We also rate Türkiye’s 2030 NDC target as “Critically insufficient” when compared with its fair share contribution to climate action. The “Critically insufficient” rating indicates that Türkiye’s NDC target reflects minimal to no action and is not at all consistent with its fair share of the global mitigation effort to limit warming to 1.5°C. If all countries were to follow Türkiye’s approach, warming would exceed 4°C.

We do not have sufficient information to assess Türkiye’s climate finance contribution.

Türkiye released its long-term strategy (LTS) at COP29 (İklim Değişikliği Başkanliği [Climate Change Directorate], 2024) which reaffirmed its previously announced target of reaching net zero emissions by 2053. If Türkiye successfully achieves this target, it would be a commendable contribution to the global effort to combat climate change. However, as the LTS is currently written, we do not deem it a serious attempt to achieve the 2053 goal. We evaluate the target as: “Poor”.

The full net zero target analysis can be found here.